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Abstract
This study focuses on European integration of national visa policies as a case study on 
the constitutional structure of the European Union (EU).
The thesis starts by tracing the nature of visas in international practice and in national 
laws. Visas are inextricably linked to the concept of the State and to some of its 
essential functions. They express the sovereign right to control entry into the State, play 
an important role in recognition of other States and governments, and reflect 
information from overseas embassies. From the national point of view, they are an 
instrument of foreign policy and of internal security.
The present constitutional design of the EU permits the Member States to retain 
sovereign status and autonomy in the maintenance of internal order and security through 
recourse to the intergovernmental method for cooperation on foreign and security policy 
(the Second Pillar) and for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (the Third 
Pillar). Increasingly, the two legal methods deployed by the EU (the Community and 
the intergovernmental methods) cross-fertilize and the EU acts as a ‘unity’.
Against this background, the thesis traces the development of the common policy on 
short-term visas and its characteristics. Within the EU constitutional structure, the 
nature of visas is at the heart of the difficulties which have been encountered in the 
process of harmonization and explains the sui generis character of the common policy. 
The thesis describes cooperation before the Treaty on European Union adopted at 
Maastricht, under the Schengen Convention and under the Maastricht Treaty. It 
considers the highly complex legal framework introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and 
changes proposed in the Draft Constitutional Treaty.
It further considers the issue of ‘consistency’ with regard to the overlap of powers under 
different Pillars of the EU on visas and with regard to policy formulation on the ‘area of 
freedom, security and justice’.
The thesis finally draws conclusions on what visa policy reveals on constitutional issues 
such as vertical division of competence, convergence of legal methods, consistency and 
the increasing complexity of the European legal framework.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Community (EC) has been surrounded by much debate as to its nature. 
Difficulties in describing the Community derive from its combination of both federal 
and intergovernmental characteristics. On the one hand, the Community owes its 
existence to a treaty among sovereign States. It operates under the principle of 
‘conferral of powers’, and the Member States acting as the Council have a prominent 
role in its operation.
On the other hand, the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect of Community law, as 
developed by the Court of Justice, give a federal constitutional character to the 
Community. The development of these doctrines by the Court rests on the claim that the 
Community established a ‘new legal order’.
At national level, national courts have resisted the Court of Justice’s approach. The 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are generally applied by national courts on the 
basis of national constitutional or legislative provisions transferring or delegating 
sovereignty to the Community, rather than on the basis of the higher nature of 
Community law. This implies that national courts may declare Community law invalid 
if it breaches fundamental constitutional rights, and that they retain the ultimate 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz. As one commentator put it: ‘They would not be allowed under 
their own constitution to sign up and ratify a treaty the consequence of which was that 
they had no ultimate control over the size of the slice of the apple pie which they had 
given away’.1
The difference between the Court of Justice and the national courts with regard to the 
foundation of Community law illustrates the existence of a lack of consensus on the 
constitutional nature of the Community. The result of this lack of consensus is that the 
Community continues to be sui generis. This sui generis character is at the heart of the 
Community’s democratic deficit.
On the other hand, the conditions for developing the Community into a federal State do 
not seem at present to exist. This implies that the democratic deficit will not be 
addressed by transposing the national model of parliamentary democracy to the 
Community, but that a different model is to be constructed.
1 Evidence given by Professor Craig, House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Union (2003- 
04a), q. 7, p. 7.
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The establishment of the European Union (EU) by the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) agreed at Maastricht modified the whole picture. With the TEU, the Community 
was absorbed into a wider legal framework predominantly intergovernmental in 
character.
The newly established ‘European Union’ rested on three ‘Pillars’: the European 
Community (the First Pillar), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP -  the 
Second Pillar) and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA -  the Third Pillar). 
The three Pillars were united by the Common and Final Provisions of the TEU. The 
Second and Third Pillars were essentially ‘intergovernmental’. They differed from the 
Community with regard to decision-making procedure, institutional competences and 
most importantly the legal effect of adopted instruments on national autonomy.
The three-pillar structure thus represented a compromise in the search for consistency 
between the Community and intergovernmental cooperation. Recourse to the three- 
pillar structure made it possible to retain the ‘international law method’ for CFSP and 
JHA (and thus national autonomy in these areas), but it also made it possible to ‘unite’ 
the Community and intergovernmental cooperation through the establishment of 
common objectives, common principles and values, a ‘single institutional framework’, 
and a requirement for the Commission and the Council to ensure ‘consistency’ of Union 
activity.
The actual extent that the TEU could be considered to have ‘legally united’ the Pillars 
became the object of much debate. Any answer to this question has important 
implications for the nature of the Community and the Union.
The unity of the Union was initially denied by commentators on the basis of the 
different nature of the Pillars. This approach was however criticized on various grounds. 
First, the Community itself, increasingly, envisages a whole range of different 
procedures with different institutional competences, and even a different legal effect for 
instruments adopted in different areas. Second, the approach seems to overlook the 
efforts of the TEU to unite the Pillars. Third, it also overlooks the Union’s capacity to 
adopt binding legal instruments, its increased decisional autonomy and its emerging 
international identity. Consensus is emerging that the Union, on the basis in particular
12
of the ‘single institutional framework’ and the requirement of consistency o f Union 
activity, constitutes a single legal system.
The operation of the Union as a single legal system has however been problematic. The 
differences between the Pillars with regard to institutional competences and the 
difficulties in clearly demarcating competence between them have often led to 
institutional conflict with regard to the correct allocation of competence between the 
Pillars. Similar problems do happen within the Community context when different legal 
bases envisaging different procedures may potentially be used for the adoption of a 
measure. The demarcation of competence between the Community and the 
intergovernmental Pillars, however, assumes more significance in the light of the more 
crucial legal and constitutional implications.
The TEU offers very little guidance for resolving the competence allocation problem. 
One of the few examples where the TEU regulates the interaction of the Pillars is 
constituted by Article 301 on economic sanctions. Article 47 (requiring that nothing in 
the TEU shall affect the Treaty establishing the European Community) constitutes a 
further criterion. However, as has been pointed out, an unconditional reliance on Article 
47 whenever issues on competence allocation arise is probably not intended and would
•y
empty many of the other provisions of the TEU of any significance. A further (last 
resort) mechanism for determining the allocation of competence is the Court of Justice. 
The Court has indeed affirmed its jurisdiction to determine the boundary between the 
Pillars in the Airport Transit Visas Case?
In this context, it seems that the practical operation of the Union as a single system 
depends on the institutions agreeing their respective competences and acting as 
interlocking components in pursuance of one and the same goal. There have been many 
examples of institutional conflict on demarcation of powers, but also examples of 
successful cross-pillar action. Increasingly, issues are tackled by a combination of 
instruments under the different Pillars. At the same time, increasingly Community 
policies contain elements of potential conditionality, and political decisions are 
‘implemented’ through Community instruments.
This result has also been achieved thanks to a refinement of the three-pillar structure. 
This refinement has taken two forms. First, it has concentrated on reformulating the 
allocation of competence between the Pillars (see for example the dual-use goods
2 W essel (2000a) p. 1148.
3 Case C -170/96 Commission v. Council [1998] E C R 1-2763.
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regime) and eliminating what can be called ‘unreasonable’ overlaps or unclear 
fragmentation of policies between the Pillars (see for example visa policy).
Second, it has concentrated on creating or strengthening ‘procedural and institutional 
bridges’ between the Pillars.4
This last aspect leads to the issue of ‘convergence of methods’. The strengthening of 
procedural and institutional bridges between the Pillars has implied a certain extent of 
convergence of methods. The role of the institutions within the intergovernmental 
Pillars has been strengthened. The organization and procedures of the intergovernmental 
Pillars have to some extent been aligned to those of the Community. At the same time, 
the role of the European Council as the ultimate director of Union activity has been 
strengthened, and provisions have been inserted in the Treaty with the aim of increasing 
the political pressure on the Commission to execute CFSP decisions.
Convergence o f methods has also resulted from a different process. This process is a 
continuing attempt, both within the framework of the Community and within that of the 
intergovernmental Pillars, to reconcile conflicting interests, namely uniformity versus 
diversity and efficiency versus democracy.
Unity has important implications for a definition of the EC and the EU. Some 
commentators have submitted that unity ‘requires a rethinking of age-old doctrines 
about the nature of European Community law’.5 At the same time, however, it has been 
argued that unity implies that ‘the legal principles developed in the context of the EC 
Treaty can be extended to the EU Treaty as long as they are not expressly excluded’.6 
Furthermore, the issue of unity opened the debate on whether internal unity necessarily 
implied external unity (i.e. a single identity or even legal personality).
The Constitutional Treaty, with its aim to ‘simplify and reorganize’ the Treaties, 
introduces significant changes. The pillar structure is abandoned in favour of a unitary 
structure, and a single entity with legal personality -  the European Union -  is created. 
Important institutional changes accompany the introduction of this unitary structure. It 
remains unclear whether this new design implies an extension of the Community legal 
method to the Second Pillar, with the relevant constitutional implications. The almost
4 Schmalz (1998).
5 De Witte (1998) p. 65.
6 Von Bogdandy (1999) p. 909.
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complete exclusion of the Court of Justice from the Second Pillar would seem to 
preclude a definitive answer to this crucial question.
This study is intended to contribute to the understanding of the structure of the 
European Union through an analysis of the EU visa policy. The common visa policy has 
been selected for three reasons. First, its formation documents the development of the 
structure of the European Union. In particular, visa policy shows how this structure was 
developed and refined over time in order to increase the efficiency of intergovernmental 
cooperation and permit the smooth functioning of the Union as a ‘unity’. The 
development and refinement of the Union structure have thus been characterized by a 
continuous strengthening of the framework for intergovernmental cooperation and its 
association with the Community, and by reformulation of competence allocation (which 
in the case o f visa policy has implied the introduction of variable geometry 
arrangements).
Second, visa policy, notwithstanding its ‘communitarization’ with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, continues to straddle all the Pillars of the Union because of the 
ramifications of visas into areas for which the Member States retain ultimate 
competence and which increasingly form the object of cooperation within the 
intergovernmental Pillars.
Visa policy, because of its cross-pillar nature, therefore provides an opportunity to 
consider the interaction of the Pillars. In particular, it is possible to consider issues 
relating to delimitation of competence, the impact of the Pillars’ overlap on the nature 
of the common policy, the consequences of the overlap in terms of convergence of 
methods, the sustainability of the pillar structure and whether in the context of visa 
policy the Union acts as a ‘unity’.
The third reason for selecting visa policy relates to the fact that visa policy is part of the 
Union’s wider policy on the formation of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. In 
relation to the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice, the Union has 
declared its determination to act as a ‘unity’. The construction of the area of freedom, 
security and justice requires the coordination of policies falling under different Pillars, 
the integration of justice and home affairs concerns into the Union’s external activity 
and the coordination of different Treaty objectives. In this context, it is possible to trace 
some of the institutional and legal implications of the Union acting as a unity, as well as 
some of the obstacles to the smooth functioning of the Union structure.
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This study thus essentially focuses on the issues of ‘consistency’ and ‘convergence of 
methods’ which are ultimately relevant for a definition of the Community and the 
Union.
The first and second chapters of the thesis provide the background for this analysis. The 
first chapter traces the nature of visas. This is at the heart of many of the difficulties 
encountered in the process of harmonization of national visa policies, such as 
differences between the Member States over allocating competence to the Community. 
The nature of visas also explains the cross-pillar character of the common visa policy. 
The second chapter introduces the structure of the European Union.
The third and fourth chapters trace the development of the structures for cooperation 
and the characteristics of the common policy. The fifth chapter considers the issue of 
consistency both with regard to the functioning of the common visa policy and with 
regard to the construction of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.
Finally, some conclusions will be drawn as to what visa policy reveals on constitutional 
issues such as division of competence, consistency, convergence of methods, and the 
increasing complexity of the European legal framework.
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1 VISAS IN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW
This Chapter considers the significance of visas and passports in international law and 
practice and from the domestic point of view. For this purpose it is divided in two parts. 
The first part considers the international law rules which directly or indirectly govern 
movement of persons across state frontiers. More precisely, it considers the limits on 
state discretion to control movement stemming from international customary and treaty 
law, the basic rules on movement, and the role of nationality.
The second part of the Chapter analyses against the international background the legal 
and political significance of visas and passports. It considers their definition, 
implications and functions under international law and practice and from the national 
point of view.
This Chapter provides the background to look at the process of European integration 
with regard to visa policy. In particular, by highlighting the significance of visas and 
how they are linked to the concept of sovereignty, it provides the background for an 
analysis of European integration on visa policy as a case study of the constitutional 
structure of the European Union.
1. Limits on state discretion over the movement of persons across state frontiers
1.1 State discretion over entry. residence and expulsion o f  aliens
It is generally accepted that States are free to control the entry and residence of aliens 
into their territory, and to expel or deport aliens, especially for reasons of public order 
and national security.1 Such discretion is inferred from sovereignty. In contemporary 
international relations, it is however apparent that state sovereignty in this area is not 
absolute. Principles of general international law and obligations arising out of treaties 
limit state discretion as to entry, transit, residence and expulsion of aliens. Such 
limitations are reflected in domestic legislation.
1.1.1 Limits on expulsion under rules o f general international law
1 See for example The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping  v. US) 130 US 581, 609 (1889). For the 
sources o f  the principle see Plender (1988) pp. 1-4; Harris (1998) pp. 525-526.
2 See Goodwin-Gill (1978); Plender (1988).
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Rules of general international law regarding the treatment of aliens provide for limits on 
the circumstances and the manner in which a State may expel aliens. As Goodwin-Gill 
argues: ‘The power of expulsion is a discretion, not absolute, but limited by the rules 
and standards of international law’.3 In particular, a State may not expel aliens in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory manner, or in breach of its international obligations. Thus, a 
State may not use unnecessary force, mistreat the alien or refuse to give the alien 
sufficient time to wind up his affairs.
Moreover, it has been argued that any claim of ‘ordre public’, forming the basis for the 
expulsion decision, is to be weighed against the interests of the individual, including his 
basic human rights, family, property and legitimate expectations, in accordance with the 
principles of good faith and ‘reasonable cause’.5
A number of multilateral treaties also impose restrictions on the State’s discretion to 
expel aliens.6
1.1.2 Movement o f  special categories
Rules of general international law and treaties exist with regard to special categories of 
aliens.
(i) Acquired rights
With regard to aliens who, under the law of the host State, have an indefinite right of 
residence in the host State, it has been argued, on the basis of congruence of state 
practice, that they are vested with ‘acquired rights' or ‘legitimate expectations' as to 
their entry and stay in the State.7
(ii) Diplomats and consuls
Diplomats and consuls are a further category in relation to whose movement across 
frontiers special rules exist. Such rules are part of the privileges and immunities 
attached to this special category which are justified on functional necessity.
It is generally accepted that a diplomat who arrives at the frontier of the State to which 
he is to be accredited is to be admitted. Any objection to his appointment is to be raised
3 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 204.
4 For the sources o f  this rule see Harris (1998) pp. 527-530.
5 Harris (1998) p. 529.
6 See for example Article 4 o f  the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR 1963 (ETS 46) which prohibits the 
collective expulsion o f  aliens. See also Article 1 o f  the Seventh Protocol 1984 (ETS 117) which states 
that an alien can be expelled only in pursuance o f  a decision reached in accordance with law, and that he 
has a right to have his case reviewed, unless public order or national security require that he is expelled  
before he exercises such right. See also Article 13 o f the ICCPR 1966 ((1967) 6 ILM 368).
7 See Goodwin-Gill (1978) pp. 259-261; Plender (1988) pp. 161 -162.
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before he is dispatched to take up his post.8 Such a rule is reflected in domestic 
legislation. The United Kingdom Immigration Act 1971 as amended, for example, 
provides that laws affecting non-patrials are not applicable to members of diplomatic 
missions and members of their families.9 There is however no general rule by which 
diplomats are exempt from visa requirements, but, as a matter of international comity, 
visas, when required, must be issued promptly.10
A right of transit through third States does not seem to exist. Article 40 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 196111 provides that a diplomatic agent passing 
through a third State, which has granted him a visa i f  such visa was required, while 
proceeding to take up or returning to his post, or when returning to his country shall be 
accorded inviolability and such immunities as are necessary to ensure his transit. Article 
40, accordingly, provides no right of transit to diplomatic agents, but confirms the right
i  'y
of the transit State to refuse passage.
Article 44 of the Vienna Convention lays down the receiving State’s obligation, in case 
of armed conflict, to grant facilities for departure. The duty to grant facilities for 
departure was interpreted in some States as conferring exemption from exit visa 
requirements in ordinary circumstances.13
Similar rules exist with regard to the admission of consuls. Furthermore, Article 46 of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 196314 provides for exemption from 
obligations in the matter of alien registration, residence and work permits for consuls, 
members of their families and certain of their staff.I ?
(Hi) Representatives to, sta ff and experts o f international organizations 
Special rules also exist with regard to representatives to, staff and experts of 
international organizations. Before modem practice became established, international 
officials were treated by analogy with diplomats. As Goodwin-Gill argues: ‘This 
practice could clearly compromise their independent status by subjecting them to the 
vagaries of national passport regimes and to the personal objections of receiving
8 See Goodwin-Gill (1978) pp. 147-148; Plender (1988) pp. 163.
9 C.77, Section 8(3).
10 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 150.
11 500 UNTS 95.
12 See Denza (1998) p. 369. The issue o f  transit may be regulated by treaty. The 1929 Lateran Treaty 
between the Holy See and Italy, for example, stipulates the right to transit through Italy for 
representatives and envoys o f  the Holy See, diplomatic representations and envoys o f  States to the Holy 
See and dignitaries o f  the church if they possess passports issued by the countries from which they come 
and visas issued by papal representatives abroad. See Turack (1972) p. 210; Denza (1998) p. 368.
13 See Denza (1998) p. 389.
14 596 UNTS 261.
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States’.16 Today, Article 105 of the United Nations (UN) Charter provides that 
representatives of Members of the UN and officials of the UN shall enjoy such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions. Building on Article 105, the 1947 General Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations17 provides that Members’ representatives to the UN 
and UN officials are to enjoy, while exercising their functions and during their journey 
to and from the place of meeting, exemption from immigration restrictions and alien 
registration. Similar provisions are provided with regard to UN specialized agencies by
1 ftthe 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies. These 
Conventions are supplemented by bilateral headquarters agreements. The United States 
(US)-UN Headquarters Agreement,19 for example, provides that US authorities will not 
impede transit to and from the headquarters, independently of the relationship between 
the US and the government of the individual concerned. Visas may be required, but 
these must be issued promptly. It however appears that in a number of occasions States 
have departed from the obligations to grant admission for political reasons.20 
The UN Conventions and Headquarters Agreements have also formed models for 
subsequent agreements made by other organizations including the Council of Europe 
and, to a lesser extent, the European Community.21
Such international obligations are implemented in the United Kingdom under the 
Immigration Act 1971 and the International Organizations Act 1968 as amended.
(iv) Visiting forces
Armed forces of foreign countries or international organizations may also be exempt 
from provisions of immigration laws, in accordance with international treaties or as a 
result of special agreements with the host State.22
(v) Seamen and aircrews
15 Goodwin-Gill argues that similar principles apply to the admission o f  special missions. See Goodwin- 
Gill (1978) p. 152.
16 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 152.
17 1 UNTS 15.
18 33 UNTS 261.
19 11 UNTS 11.
20 In the early 1990s, for example, the US government denied Arafat a visa for a trip to the UN. See also 
Plender (1988) p. 173, with regard to the practice by some Islamic countries o f  refusing to admit 
representatives sent by Israel to meetings o f  international organizations taking place within their 
territories.
See Plender (1988) p. 171. See for example the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities o f  the EEC 
1957, 298 UNTS 170.
22 See for example the NATO Status o f  Forces Agreement 1952, which provides that members o f  the 
forces are to be exempt from passport and visa requirements and immigration inspection on entering or 
leaving the territory o f  the receiving State. See Plender (1988) pp. 176-180.
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Seamen and aircrews are further categories which, because of functional necessity, 
benefit from their own special international travel regimes. As Goodwin-Gill states: 
‘The International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Consultative Organization have both pioneered the widespread adoption of international 
standards and practices regarding the movement of seamen and aircrews. Most of the 
progress has been accomplished in the years since 1950 and, as with many such
23developments, the process began through the medium of the bilateral treaty’.
With regard to aircrews, Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation 194424 stipulates that holders of a crew member license or certificate, 
complying with certain requirements, are to be exempted from passport and visa 
requirements, provided certain conditions as to their stay are fulfilled.2' Implementing 
such recommendations, the United Kingdom Immigration Act 1971 provides that 
aircrews do not require leave to enter when they enter on engagement and leave within
7Aseven days, provided certain conditions are fulfilled.
Despite the general acceptance of Annex 9, some States implement it through bilateral
77agreements based on reciprocity.
With regard to seamen, the Seafarers’ National Identity Documents Convention 1958 
provides for the issue by Contracting States to their national seafarers of a seafarers’ 
identity document. This identity document may also be issued to non-nationals 
seafarers. In such a case, no statement of the holder’s nationality is required (and if one 
is included it is not treated as conclusive proof of nationality) but the issuing State is 
under an obligation to re-admit the holder into its territory.
The 1958 Convention further stipulates that the Contracting Parties are obliged to admit 
a seafarer holding a valid seafarers’ identity document for temporary shore leave, to join 
a ship, or for transit.29
The Convention on Facilitation of Maritime Transport 196 530 provides that a valid 
seafarers’ identity document or a passport shall be the basic document providing public
23 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 156.
24 15 UNTS 295.
25 For a full analysis see Turack (1972) pp. 149-153. Article 22 o f  the Convention requests the Members 
‘to adopt all practical measures, through the issuance o f  special regulations or otherwise, to facilitate and 
expedite navigation by aircraft between the territories o f  Contracting States, and to prevent unnecessary 
delays to aircraft, crew ...especially in the administration o f  the laws relating to immigration ...and  
clearance’.
26 Section 8(1).
27 Turack (1972) p. 152.
28 389 UNTS 277.
29 See Turack (1972) p. 140.
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authorities with information relating to the individual member of the crew on arrival or 
departure of a ship. Furthermore, the Convention provides that a seafarers’ identity 
document is to be accepted in lieu of a passport when it is necessary for the seaman to 
enter a country to join a ship or transit to join a ship in another country or for 
repatriation, provided the document guarantees the holder re-admission to the issuing 
State. Implementation of the Convention’s international regulations is voluntary. In the 
United Kingdom, implementation takes place through the Immigration Act 1971, which 
provides that members of ship crews may enter and remain without leave until the 
departure of the ship on which they are engaged, provided certain conditions are 
satisfied.31
(vi) Other categories
A number of other multilateral and bilateral treaties affect the movement across 
frontiers of special categories of persons. Agreements may be concluded, for example, 
with regard to the hosting of international sporting events. Rules established by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), entrusted by the 1894 Congress of Paris with 
the control and development of the modem Olympic Games, provide, for example, that 
the national government of a city applying to host the Olympic Games must give the 
assurance that every competitor will be given free entry without discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, religion, colour or political affiliation. This involves the 
assurance that the national government will not refuse visas to any of the competitors. 
States have however often breached such rules and the prospect of sanctions by the IOC 
has not worked as a deterrent. In 1976, for example, the Canadian government refused 
visas to the representatives of Taiwan for the Montreal Olympic Games because they 
were unwilling to forgo the title of the Republic of China under which their National 
Olympic Committee was admitted to the IOC.
Other treaties affecting the movement of special categories of persons across frontiers 
include the European Agreement on Travel by Young Persons on Collective Passports
10 4 ILM 501. Under the Convention, the Contracting Parties, with the aim o f  facilitating and expediting 
international maritime traffic, bound themselves to ‘co-operate in securing the highest practicable degree 
o f  uniformity in formalities, documentary requirements and procedures in all matters which would 
facilitate and improve international maritime traffic’. See Turack (1972) p. 142.
31 Section 8(1).
32 Encyclopaedia Britannica CD 99.
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1961,33 the European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees 1963,34 and the
35European Agreement on Au Pair Placement 1969.
1.1.3 Common travel areas and passport unions
After the Second World War efforts were made among governments to reduce the 
restrictions on movement of persons that had developed in response to the state of 
emergency brought about by the two World Wars. Various ‘common travel areas’ and 
‘passport unions’ were established.
(i) The Benelux Economic Union
In 1958 Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty establishing the 
Benelux Economic Union.36 This Treaty was the culmination of a number of 
agreements concluded by the Parties between 1945 and 1958, and provided for the 
free movement of persons, goods, capital and services. It provided that nationals of the 
Contracting Parties could enter or leave the territory of any other Contracting Party, and 
that they were to receive the same treatment as nationals with regard to movement, 
sojourn, settlement, freedom to carry out a trade or occupation and the provision of 
services. The Treaty stipulated that a further Convention was to be concluded with 
regard to the provisions under which a Contracting State might justify restricting the 
movement of nationals of another Contracting State on grounds of public order, public 
security, public health or morality.
Two Conventions were accordingly concluded in 1960: the Convention on 
Establishment and the Convention concerning the Transfer of Entry and Exit Controls 
to the External Frontiers of the Benelux Territory. This latter Convention provides for 
the Parties to abolish internal frontier controls and effect external border controls valid 
for all the Benelux territory. A common visa policy and common conditions of entry for 
non-Contracting Parties’ nationals were established. It was further provided that a 
person admitted to the Benelux territory was to be free to travel within the territory of 
the Contracting Parties for a limited period of time. The Parties undertook to harmonize 
their laws relating to the punishment of infringements and reserved the right to re- 
impose internal frontier controls for reasons of public order or national security.39
33 ETS 37.
34 ETS 31.
35 ETS 68.
36 5 Ybk (1959) 167.
37 Plender (1988) p. 274.
38 3 74 U N T S3.
39 For a detailed analysis see Turack (1972) pp. 89-100; Plender (1988) pp. 273-276.
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(ii) The Nordic Community
In 1957 Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Iceland concluded the Convention 
concerning the Waiver of Passport Control at the Intra-Nordic Frontiers.40 Since 
nationals of States other than the Contracting States enjoy the benefits of the 
Convention, the Convention provides for the establishment of common standards for 
passport controls at the external borders. The Convention is complemented by 
agreements establishing a common labour market and recognition of social security 
entitlements.
(Hi) The Common Travel Area between the United Kingdom and Ireland 
A common travel area was also established in 1952 between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland.41 Under the arrangement, citizens of either country may cross the frontiers 
between the two countries without producing a passport or other identity document. 
Third country nationals are subject to immigration control only on initial entry to either 
country from abroad.
(iv) Efforts within the framework o f the Council o f Europe
After the Second World War efforts to reduce the strictness of the existing passport 
regimes were also undertaken within the Council of Europe. Work on the feasibility of 
introducing a European passport was referred to the Committee on Legal and 
Administrative Questions of the Council of Europe. Following recommendations from 
the Legal Committee, in 1949 the Consultative Assembly recommended to the 
Committee of Ministers to instruct each Member State to study the question of a 
European passport. However, replies from the Member States indicated that the 
emergence of a European passport was not feasible, but only standardization of national 
passports was acceptable. The Committee of Ministers accordingly adopted a resolution 
establishing the governmental Committee of Experts on Passports and Visas to study 
standardization of national passports and measures to facilitate freedom of movement.42 
Intergovernmental efforts produced a series of multilateral and bilateral agreements 
between the Member States. Among these was the European Agreement on Regulations 
governing the Movement of Persons between the Member States of the Council of 
Europe signed by Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, 
Italy and Luxembourg on 13 December 1957.43 The Agreement provided that nationals
40 322 UNTS 245. For an account see Turack (1972) pp. 81-87; Plender (1988) pp. 288.
41 See Section 9 o f  the Immigration Act 1971. The Agreement has not been published. See Turack (1972)
p. 118.
42 See Turack (1972) pp. 67-74.
43 ETS 25.
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of a Contracting State could enter or leave the territory of other Contracting States for 
visits of no more than three months on presentation at the frontier of one of the 
documents contained in the Appendix. These included passports, identity cards and 
other identity documents. As Turack states: ‘This meant that the passport was no longer 
essential for travel, however, the use of the passport as one of the identity documents 
suitable for travel was maintained because a number of member states expected to sign 
the agreement did not issue identity cards -  Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom’.44 Under the Agreement each Contracting State reserved the right to 
forbid the entry of nationals of other Contracting States considered ‘undesirable’, and to 
temporarily suspend the operation of the Convention on grounds of ‘ordre public’, 
security or health. Several Contracting States invoked such power in the 1980s to
4 9suspend the operation of the Agreement in relation to Turkey.
Other instruments agreed within the framework of the Council of Europe include: the 
European Convention on Establishment 1955,46 by which the Contracting States 
undertook to facilitate the entry into their territory of each others’ nationals for the 
purpose of temporary visits provided this was not contrary to ‘ordre public’, national 
security, public health or morality;47 the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on
j O
Human Rights 1963, which requires inter alia respect for the right to move freely 
within the territory of the Contracting States and for the right to leave that territory 
subject to restrictions necessary in the interest of public order and national security; the 
European Agreement on Travel by Young Persons on Collective Passports 1961 ;49 the 
European Social Charter 1961;50 the European Convention on Social Security 1972;51 
and the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 1977.'
(v) Efforts between the Member States o f the European Community
The establishment of a passport union was also considered by the Member States of the
European Community during the 1970s.53 However, as a result of increased terrorism in
44 Turack (1972) p. 75.
45 Plender (1988) p. 344.
46 ETS 19.
47 The European Convention on Establishment deals with all questions affecting an alien permanently 
resident in a European State such as entry, residence, expulsion, exercise o f  private rights, judicial and 
administrative guarantees, individual and political rights, taxation, expropriation and naturalization. See 
Plender (1988) pp. 236-240.
48 Supra  n. 6.
49 Supra  n. 33.
50 529 UNTS 89.
51 ETS 78.
52 ETS 93.
53 For a fuller account see Chapter 3.
25
particular, active consideration was eventually given only to the establishment of a 
uniform format for national passports.
A non-binding intergovernmental Resolution was agreed on 23 June 1981.54 Under this 
the Member States would issue their passports in an agreed uniform format -  described 
in the Resolution -  by 1 January 1985. The data page of the uniform format passport 
was to be the data page agreed within the context of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO).
1.1.4 Treaties on commerce and establishment and economic integration
Treaties on economic integration and on commerce and establishment are a further 
category of treaties establishing limitations on the State’s discretion over entry of aliens. 
With regard to treaties on economic integration, mention has already been made of the 
Benelux Economic Union and the Nordic Community. The European Community 
constitutes a special case. The EC Treaty provides for an ‘individual right’ for nationals 
of the Member States to move freely within the Community for the purpose of 
employment, establishment or the provision or reception of services.55 Secondary 
Community law clarifies the public policy, security and health grounds under which a 
Member State may exclude an EC national in derogation from the free movement
c z  # # cn
provisions. The European Court of Justice has interpreted such grounds restrictively. 
With regard to bilateral treaties on commerce and establishment, they generally provide, 
with the purpose of securing ‘national treatment’, that nationals of each contracting 
party ‘shall have a right of entry subject to compliance with national immigration and 
police laws’. Such clauses have posed two problems of interpretation. Firstly, it is 
unclear to what extent ‘treaty-aliens’ enjoy rights beyond those of ‘aliens’ in general. 
Secondly, it is unclear in which circumstances reliance on national rules or on concept 
such as ‘public order’ or ‘national security’ may limit or nullify the right granted under 
the treaty.58
1.1.5 Human rights
54 Resolution o f  the Representatives o f  the Governments o f  the Member States, OJ 1981 C 241.
55 Articles 39-55 EC Treaty. By virtue o f  secondary Community law, econom ically inactive but self- 
sufficient EC nationals also enjoy free movement rights. See for example Directive 90/364, OJ 1990 L 
180/26.
56 Directive 64/221, OJ Sp. Ed. 1964 L 850/64.
57 See for example Cases 67/74 Bonsignore [1975] ECR 297; 30/77 Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999.
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International instruments and customary international law on human rights have 
curtailed state discretion over admission and expulsion of aliens.
(i) Asylum-seekers
The 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees59 as extended by the 
1967 New York Protocol60 defines a ‘refugee’ as a person who is outside his country of 
nationality and unable or unwilling to return to it owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.
In international law the ‘right of asylum’ is the right of each State to grant asylum to a 
fugitive, rather than the right of the individual to be granted asylum.61 This view is 
consonant with the premise that international law creates rights and duties between 
States only, and leaves the State free to exclude aliens from its territory. It is however 
arguable that there have been some developments towards the establishment in 
international law of the right of the individual to be granted asylum.62 
The Geneva Convention 1951 represents the principal basis for the international legal 
protection of refugees. The Convention does not guarantee a right of entry for refugees. 
Still, it imposes a number of obligations on the Contracting States with regard to the 
admission and expulsion of refugees. Article 31 of the Convention stipulates that the 
Contracting States shall not impose penalties for illegal entry on refugees coming 
directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened, provided they report 
to the authorities without delay and show good cause for their actions. Article 32 
stipulates that the Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory, 
save on grounds of national security or public order. Under Article 33 a refugee shall 
not be expelled or returned to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would 
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion (non-refoulement), unless he is reasonably suspected of 
being a security risk or, having been finally convicted of a particular serious crime, 
constitutes a danger to the community.
Refoulement describes an administrative act by which a person seeking admission, or 
admitted temporarily or conditionally is returned to the country whence he came. Thus,
58 For an analysis see Goodwin-Gill (1978) pp. 186-195. For an analysis o f  the establishment provisions 
o f  a specific treaty (a ‘Europe Agreement’ between the European Community and its Member States and 
a Eastern European country) see Weiss (2001) pp. 255-260.
59 189 UNTS 150.
60 606 UNTS 267.
61 See Boccardi (2002) p. 3.
62 Plender (1988) pp. 394-415.
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the act of refusing admission may amount to refoulement63 It has been argued that the 
rule of non-refoulement has become a rule of general international law.64 
The right to be granted asylum (in the sense of ‘non-refoulement ’) is guaranteed in 
many national constitutions.65 Moreover, the obligations imposed by the Geneva 
Convention 1951 are reflected in domestic legislation. The United Kingdom’s 
Immigration Rules, for example, provide that a person is not to be refused entry if 
removal would be contrary to the provisions of the Convention and Protocol.66 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 195067 extends the obligation of 
non-refoulement. Under the Convention, removal of an alien to a State where he faces 
persecution or the death penalty has been held to amount to inhuman or degrading 
treatment prohibited by Article 3.68 Also, an extradition decision may infringe Article 6 
(the right to a fair trial) where the affected person risks suffering a flagrant denial of a 
fair trial in the requesting country.69
(ii) Family re-unification
The ‘right to family life’ is proclaimed in many international instruments of varying 
legal effect.70 As Plender explains:
‘Even if  they are taken together, these international and regional provisions do not amount to 
evidence o f  a right to family reunification in general international law. They do, however, 
establish the widespread acceptance o f  the moral or political proposition that States should 
facilitate the admission to their territories o f  members o f  the families o f  their own citizens or 
residents, at least when it would be unreasonable to expect the family to be reunited elsewhere. 
Thereby, they influence the content o f  bilateral agreements and domestic law. Indeed, the special 
position o f  the family, as a fundamental unit o f  society entitled to the protection o f  the State, is 
the subject o f  explicit constitutional provisions in at least fifty countries’.71
63 See Boccardi (2002) pp. 10-11.
64 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 140.
65 See for example Article 10 o f  the 1947 Italian Constitution.
66 HC 395, para. 334.
67 European Convention for the Protection o f  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (213 
UNTS 221).
68 See Soering  v. United Kingdom  (1989)11 EHRR 439; See also D  v. United Kingdom  (1997) 24 EHRR 
423, where it was held that removal o f  a person in terminal stages o f  AIDS to a place where there was no 
appropriate medical treatment, no social welfare and no family support would violate Article 3.
6 See Soering  v. United Kingdom , supra  n. 68; M amatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey (Nos. 46827/99  
and 46951/99), 6 February 2003.
70 See for example Article 16(3) o f  the UDHR 1948 ((1949) AJIL 142 Supp. 127); Article 23 o f  the 
1CCPR 1966, supra  n. 6; Article 19 o f  the European Social Charter 1961, supra  n. 50; Articles 8 and 12 
o f  the ECHR 1950, supra  n. 67; and the Helsinki Final Act 1975 ((1975) 14 ILM 1292).
71 Plender (1988) pp. 366-367.
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The ECHR leaves the Contracting States free to decide on the adoption and 
implementation of family re-unification policies.72 However, the European Court of 
Human Rights established that the enjoyment of a right to family reunification provided
73under national law is to be secured without discrimination on grounds of sex. 
Moreover, it is established that refusal of entry into a country as far as it results in the 
separation of the affected person from close members of his family (i.e. it is not 
reasonable to expect the affected persons to conduct their family life elsewhere) may 
raise issues under Article 8 of the Convention.74
Restrictions on family reunification, introduced as part of the enactment of restrictive 
immigration policies since the 1960s, have often also been challenged as 
unconstitutional.75 
(Hi) Other
The ECHR may affect other aspects of immigration law. In the East African Asians 
Case,76 for example, the Human Rights Commission found the United Kingdom’s
77Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 discriminatory on ground of colour or race. 
According to the Commission such discrimination could in certain circumstances 
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention.
Human rights may also be violated by state authorities during the examination of an 
individual at the border. The individual may be unlawfully detained in violation of
7 0
Article 5 of the Convention. It may also be argued that intrusive questioning may 
amount to a violation of the right to private life under Article 8(2) of the Convention.
72 Article 8 provides: ‘(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise o f  this right 
except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests o f  
national security, public safety or the econom ic well-being o f  the country, for the prevention o f  disorder 
or crime, for the protection o f  health or morals, or for the protection o f  the rights and freedoms o f  others’.
73 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandoli v. U nited Kingdom  (1985) 7 EHRR 471. The case arose out o f  
United Kingdom’s legislation by which only men enjoyed an absolute right to be joined by their spouses. 
After the judgement, the United Kingdom abolished such an absolute right for men (HC 503, 15 July 
1985, paras. 41-47).
74 See Berrehab  v. the Netherlands (1989) 11 EHRR 322; Sen v. the Netherlands (2003) 36 EHRR 7.
75 In France, for example, the right to family reunification was abolished in 1974 and restored in May 
1975 following a ruling from the Consel d ’Etat declaring the suspension unconstitutional. See Silverman 
(1992) p. 53. The Consel d’Etat also ruled that deportation order could not be enforced if enforcement 
resulted in family break-up. See Hollifield (1999) pp. 68, 83-84. The prohibition on working, as a 
condition o f  entry for family members, applied by France and Germany up to the late 1970s was also 
declared unconstitutional or illegal. See Layton-Henry (1985) p. 63.
76 Patel and Others v. United Kingdom  (1971) 10 1LM 6.
77 The Act subjected to immigration control holders o f  United Kingdom passports unless they had an 
ancestral link to the United Kingdom (they were bom or one o f  their parents or grandparents was bom in 
the United Kingdom). This limited the access o f  non-whites but ensured the free entry o f  the progeny o f  
white people who had migrated from Britain to its overseas possessions.
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Moreover, limited possibilities of challenging a decision at the border may violate the 
right to an effective remedy laid down by Article 13 of the Convention.
The ECHR has also had an indirect impact on immigration law. In Roth v. Home 
Secretary the United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal found that the scheme adopted under 
the Carriers’ Liability Act 1987, and extended under Part II of the Immigration and 
Asylum Act 1999, which imposed penalties on those responsible for bringing 
clandestine entrants to the United Kingdom, was incompatible with Article 6 and 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. The scheme was contrary to Article 6 due to the 
imposition of a high, fixed penalty with no possibility of mitigation. This aspect of the 
scheme deprived the carrier of his right to have the penalty determined by an 
independent tribunal. Moreover, the scale and inflexibility of the penalty in conjunction 
with other aspects of the scheme imposed a disproportionate burden on the carrier in
7Q
violation of Article 1 (the right to property).
1.2 Limits on the State’s discretion over exit o f  its nationals
In the same way as it is inferred from sovereignty that a State has discretion with regard 
to admission, residence and expulsion of aliens, it is inferred that a State has discretion 
whether to permit its nationals to travel abroad. Such discretion is often reflected in 
domestic law. Generally, the issue of passports -  in most circumstances indispensable 
for travelling outside one’s own State -  is a power exercised by the executive, and, 
although passports are usually denied only on certain specific grounds, it amounts to an 
unfettered exercise of discretion. In some States however nationals may have a right to a
O A
passport by virtue of their right to travel under the constitution or domestic
O 1
legislation. Under the EC Treaty, nationals of the Member States enjoy an individual 
right to leave their Member State of origin for the purpose of exercising their free 
movement rights under the Treaty.
78 Amuur v. France (1996) 22 EHRR 533.
79 International Transport Roth GmbH and Others v. Secretary' o f  State fo r  the Home Departm ent [2002] 
EWCA Civ 158. Carriers’ sanctions are arguably also contrary to Annex 9 (para. 3.37) to the International 
Convention on Civil Aviation, supra  n. 24, which provides that carriers are only under an obligation ‘to 
take precautions’ to ensure that passengers have the appropriate documentation and envisages liability 
only in the case o f  carriers’ negligence in carrying out controls.
80 Freedom to leave and re-enter Italy, for example, is a constitutional right under Article 6 o f  the 1947 
Constitution.
81 For judicial cases where discretionary decisions to deny passports were held against the ‘right to travel’ 
see Goodwin-Gill (1978) pp. 29-32. For the reaction o f  US Courts to the government’s post Second 
World War practice o f  denying and withdrawing passports and imposing ‘area restrictions’ on foreign 
policy and national security grounds, see Ehrlich (1966).
2 See for example Article 2 o f  Directive 68/360, OJ Sp. Ed. 1968 L 257/13.
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The Tight to leave any country, including one’s own’ seems to be protected by 
customary international law, although it is fraught with difficulty of interpretation, and 
often with the possibility of qualification.83
This right is provided for in Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights (UDHR) 1948,84 Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966,85 Article 5(d) of the International Convention on 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 1966,86 and Article 2(2) of the Fourth 
Protocol of the ECHR 1963.87 The Human Rights Committee considered the right to 
leave, as laid down in Article 12 of the ICCPR in a number of cases involving refusals 
to renew a passport. It consistently held that, since the passport is an instrument 
enabling the holder To leave any country, including his own’, refusal to renew a 
passport may constitute a breach of Article 12, particularly when the applicant is not
• • R Rgiven any reasons for the decision.
1.3 Basic international law rules governing movement across frontiers
The basic rules of international law with regard to the movement of persons across state
frontiers are set out in Oppenheim:
‘Nationality is the principal link between individuals and international law. This function o f  
nationality becomes apparent with regard to individuals abroad, or to property abroad belonging 
to individuals who are them selves within the territory o f  their home state, especially on account 
o f  one particular right and one particular duty o f  every state towards all other states. The right is 
that o f  protection over its nationals abroad which every state holds, and occasionally vigorously 
exercises, as against other states; .... The duty is that o f  receiving on its territory such o f  its 
nationals as are not allowed to remain on the territory o f  other states. Since no state is obliged by 
international law to allow foreigners to remain within its boundaries, it may, for many reasons, 
happen that certain individuals are expelled from all foreign countries. The state o f  nationality o f  
expelled persons is bound to receive them on its territory’.89
1.3.1 The State’s duty to admit its own nationals
83 See Higgins (1988).
84 Supra  n. 70.
85 Supra  n. 6.
86 60 UNTS 115.
87 Supra  n. 6.
88 For the cases see Higgins (1988) pp. 153-156.
89 Oppenheim (1992) pp. 857-858.
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One of the basic rules of international law with regard to the movement of persons 
across frontiers is that each State is obliged to admit its own nationals to its territory. 
Such a duty is a corollary of the right of the State to expel aliens.
The issue of the duty of the State to admit its own nationals arose, for example, in 
relation to the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1972. When Uganda became 
independent, many Asians in Uganda kept their United Kingdom and Colonies 
citizenship under an exceptional arrangement.90 However, by virtue of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, which was originally passed to stop the inflow of 
Asians from Kenya, those Asians from Uganda with United Kingdom and Colonies 
passports were subject to immigration control in the United Kingdom, unless they had 
an ancestral link to it.91 While domestic legislation permitted the United Kingdom to 
deny admission to the Asians from Uganda in possession of United Kingdom passports, 
they were ‘nationals of the United Kingdom’, and so under international law the United 
Kingdom was under a duty to admit them if they were otherwise by reason of expulsion 
from some other country to become refugees. The United Kingdom acknowledged its 
obligations under international law. The Lord Chancellor stated: ‘...the Attorney 
General...advised us that in international law a State is under a duty to other States to 
accept in its territory those of its nationals who have nowhere else to go. If a citizen of 
the United Kingdom is expelled, as I think illegally from Uganda, and is not accepted
09for settlement elsewhere, we could be required by any State to accept him’.
A related issue is whether the right of the individual to enter his own country has 
acquired the status of a customary rule of international law. Such a right is provided for 
in Article 13(2) of the UDHR 1948,93 Article 12(4) of the ICCPR 1966,94 Article 5(d) of 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
1966,95 and Article 3(2) of the Fourth Protocol to the ECHR.96 With regard to the
90 When Uganda became independent it adopted its own nationality law. Uganda gave its citizenship  
automatically only to those who had been bom there and had at least one parent bom there. There were 
therefore many people who did not become Ugandan citizens automatically but kept their United 
Kingdom citizenship. The British government accepted this in order to prevent these people becoming 
stateless and many obtained United Kingdom passports. See Layton-Henry (1985) p. 104; Hiro (1991) p. 
199.
91 Under the Act holders o f  United Kingdom passports who were citizens o f  the United Kingdom and 
Colonies were subject to immigration control unless they or at least one o f  their parents or grandparents 
were bom, naturalized or adopted in the United Kingdom or became a citizen o f the United Kingdom and 
Colonies by registration in the United Kingdom or in an independent country within the Commonwealth.
92 Hansard, HL, Vol. 335, col. 497. Quotation from Harris (1998) p. 531.
93 Supra  n. 70.
94 Supra  n. 6.
95 Supra  n. 86.
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United Kingdom’s Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968, the European Commission of 
Human Rights, independently from the issue of the right to enter one’s own country, 
found in the East Africa Asians Case97 that the United Kingdom’s enactment 
discriminated against the applicants and this could amount to degrading treatment under 
Article 3 ECHR.
1.3.2 The State’s right to protect its own nationals
It is a universally accepted rule of customary international law that every State has the 
right to protect its citizens abroad. The identification of a State’s nationals becomes
98accordingly of crucial importance.
In the context of the European Union (EU), a practical consequence of the establishment 
of ‘EU citizenship’ is that a EU national is entitled, in the territory of a third country 
where the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, to protection by 
the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State.99 Thus, for example, 
under a Decision of the Representative of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council, an emergency travel document may be issued by any 
Member State’s diplomatic mission in a third country to citizens of a Member State 
which has no permanent diplomatic or consular representation there (on the authority of 
and with clearance from the latter Member State).100
1.3.3 Limits on the State’s discretion to define nationality and denationalize 
It is generally held that each State has discretion to determine who its nationals are.101 
Determination of nationality is considered a matter for municipal law, and a State may 
have different categories of nationals subject to varying rights and obligations.
96 Supra  n. 6.
97 Supra  n. 76.
98 See for example the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Case, PICJ Rep., 1939, Ser. A/B, N o 76. The identification 
o f  a State’s nationals may be bundled with claims o f  sovereignty, as is the case for China and Taiwan. 
China’s policy is to provide protection for Taiwanese abroad while Taiwan aims at strengthening its 
efforts to offer care and emergency services to its nationals living or travelling abroad, see 
www.fmprc.gov.cn and w ww.m ofa.gov.tw .
99 Article 20 EC Treaty and Decision o f  the Representatives o f  the Governments o f  the Member States 
meeting in the Council o f  19 December 1995 regarding protection for citizens o f  the European Union by 
diplomatic and consular representations, OJ 1995 L 314.
100 Decision on the Establishment o f  an Emergency Travel Document for Community Nationals, 25 June 
1996, OJ 1996 L I68/4.
101 See for example the Nationality D ecrees in Tunis and M orocco  Case, PCIJ Rep., 1923, Ser. B, No 4, 
p. 24. See also Brownlie (1998) p. 385. See also the European Court o f  Justice’s approach in Case C- 
369/90 M icheletti [1992] ECR 1-4239.
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State discretion with regard to nationality has led inevitably to anomalies such as dual 
and multiple nationality and statelessness. However, as far as the determination of 
nationality has consequences under international law -  in view of the two basic rules of 
the State’s right to protect its own nationals and the State’s duty to admit its own
nationals -  international law imposes certain limitations on the State’s discretion to
102determine who its nationals are.
Goodwin-Gill identifies three situations in particular where international law imposes 
limitations on state discretion: (i) the imposition of nationality upon immigrants or 
residents, (ii) denationalization, and (iii) the issue of nationality in relation to diplomatic 
protection.103
With regard to the imposition of nationality upon immigrants and residents, the 
automatic imposition of nationality by a State on aliens entering its territory need not be 
recognized by other States if such imposition is not accompanied by request or consent, 
unless a ‘genuine connection’ between the individual and the State by parentage or 
permanent domicile exists.104 Automatic imposition would in fact result, if accepted, in 
the State avoiding its duties with regard to the treatment of aliens. In the case of 
succession of States, the nationality of resident or domiciled inhabitants follows the 
change of sovereignty. Accordingly, there must be a ‘sufficient link’ (domicile or 
habitual residence) between the successor State and those whom it claims its 
nationals.105
The limits imposed by international law on the State’s discretion with regard to 
denationalization are explained by Plender as follows:
‘Modem State practice provides some support for the proposition that a decree o f  
denaturalization may be ineffective to relieve the State o f  its duty to admit a person covered by 
such a decree. ...A  decree which discriminates on racial grounds, or is in any other sense 
‘arbitrary’, need not be recognized by other States as effective to deprive o f  their nationality 
those to whom it purports to apply. Where the element o f  arbitrariness is absent, the 
denaturalization decree may nevertheless be ineffective to relieve the former State o f  nationality 
o f  its obligation to readmit the individual. This will be the case if the decree deprives o f  
nationality a person who has already gained admission to another State, on the understanding
102 See for example the Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict o f  Nationality 
Laws 1930, 179 UNTS 89. Article 1 provides: ‘It is for each State to determine under its own law who are 
its nationals. This law shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international 
conventions, international custom, and the principles o f  law generally recognized with regard to 
nationality... ’. As to the doctrine o f  ‘genuine link’ or ‘effective link’ see Brownlie (1998) pp. 401 -424.
103 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 6.
104 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 7; Harris (1998) p. 587.
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that he w ill be readmitted to his country o f  origin, and who has not obtained any other national 
status’.106
Finally, international law limits state discretion with regard to the determination of 
nationality as far as such determination has consequences with regard to diplomatic 
protection. The relevant rules were stated by the International Court of Justice in the 
Nottebohm Case.107 The Court held:
‘It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation the rules 
relating to the acquisition o f  its nationality, and to confer that nationality by naturalization 
granted by its own organs in accordance with that legislation...It does not depend on the law or 
on the decision o f  Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its protection in the case 
under consideration.’
The Court went on:
‘The character thus recognized on the international level as pertaining to nationality is in no way 
inconsistent with the fact that international law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules 
governing the grant o f  its own nationality. The reason for this is that the diversity o f  
demographic conditions has thus far made it impossible for any general agreement to be reached 
on the rules relating to nationality...On the other hand, a State cannot claim that the rules it has 
thus laid down are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with 
this general aim o f  making the legal bond o f  nationality accord with the individual’s genuine 
connection with the State which assumes the defence o f  its citizens by means o f  protection 
against other States....Conferred by a State, [nationality] only entitles that State to exercise 
protection vis-a-vis another State, if  it constitutes a translation into juridical terms o f  the 
individual’s connection with the State which has made him its national’.
1.3.4 Legal consequences flowing from the admission o f aliens
Although entitled to expel aliens, the State is under international law obligations with
I n o  g #
regard to their treatment. Among them are obligations arising from treaties or general 
international law which limit the State’s power over the circumstances and manner of 
expulsion.
105 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 7.
106 Plender (1988) p. 149.
107ICJ Rep., 1955, p. 4.
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2. Legal and political significance of passports and visas
2.1 Definition and functions o f passports
A passport may be defined as an official document attesting the holder’s identity and 
nationality issued by a State to its own national for the purpose of travel abroad. 
Regulations in relation to applications for passports were first formulated in 1846. 
However, it was generally rare before the First World War for someone travelling 
abroad to apply for a passport. Possession of a passport was confined largely to 
merchants and diplomats, and the vast majority of those travelling overseas had no 
formal document.109 The modem international passport and visa systems originated 
during the First World War.110
Under international customary and treaty law, a statement of the bearer’s identity and 
nationality is essential for the international recognition of the passport.111 
While the issue of passports is accepted as the prerogative of States, there have been 
cases were passports have been issued by other international legal persons whose
sovereign status was questioned, such as the Holy See, the Order of Malta and the
112Condominium of Andorra.
International customary law and many municipal law systems do not recognize the 
passport as conclusive proof of nationality. Not only is the discretion of a State with 
regard to the acquisition of its nationality limited under international law insofar as the 
determination of nationality has consequences under international law, as in the case of 
diplomatic protection and admission of the State’s own nationals,113 but it is also 
apparent that some States issue passports to non-nationals.114
Passports, however, have been used as corroborative evidence concerning nationality 
before international tribunals.115
The function of the passport as a laissez-passer/safe conduct bears witness to the 
document’s origin in diplomatic practice.116
108 An account is beyond the scope o f  this work.
109 The Times, 1 August 2002 (Questions Answered).
110 See Torpey (2000) particularly pp. 112-116.
111 See Turack (1972) p. 21. This is reflected in domestic legislation. The Immigration Rules, HC 395, 
para. 320(10), provide that ‘a person who produces...a passport or travel document which does not 
comply with international passport practice (e.g. ‘World Service’ passports) may be refused entry on that 
ground alone’.
112 See Turack (1972) p. 21.
113 See for example the Nottebohm  Case, supra  n. 107.
114 Plender (1988) p. 150. Plender cites as an example Costa Rica’s Law 4812 o f  28 July 1971. Other 
examples are provided by Turack (1972) p. 225.
115 Turack (1972) p. 231.
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2.1.1 Passports and ‘returnobility'
Although a passport is no conclusive evidence of nationality, under customary 
international law it indicates the existence of a duty on the issuing State to admit the
117holder if he is expelled from another State and has nowhere else to go.
Thus, even when a passport is issued to a non-national it may create an obligation for 
the issuing State to admit the holder if the State of nationality does not admit him, as it 
may be shown that in issuing the passport the issuing State impliedly warranted to a 
third State that the holder would be returnable to its territory.118
Because of such guarantee of ‘retumability’, municipal law generally prescribes the 
possession of passports by aliens as a condition of admission into the State’s territory.119
Deportation may be frustrated if the deportee lacks a passport since the passport is
120usually required by the receiving State to avoid the deportation of non-nationals. Re­
admission agreements may provide that the parties are to admit their nationals without a 
valid passport provided a presumption of nationality is established by virtue of 
documentary evidence (such as identity cards, passports which have expired or other 
travel documents) or other factors.
The requirement of a passport as a condition of entry may be dispensed with by virtue 
of reciprocal bilateral or multilateral agreements. Such agreements may provide for the 
abolition of frontier controls between the contracting States, as in the case of common
1 9 1travel areas or passport unions, or for the use of alternative documents such as 
identity cards in lieu of passports.122 In such cases, suitable arrangements may be made 
to secure deportation.
A number of other documents may be accepted in lieu of passports under international 
agreements. These include: collective passports, refugees’ and stateless persons’ travel
1,6 See Torpey (2000) p. 160. Passports may contain a request by the issuing State that the bearer be given
all lawful aid and protection. Such request o f  protection is only formal and carries no legal significance.
As to diplomatic protection see infra.
117 See Turack (1972) p. 234; Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 46.
118 See Turack (1972) p. 20; Plender (1988) p .150.
119 Immigration Act 1971, Sch. 2, para. 8 and Sch. 3 para. 1; see also the Immigration Rules, paras. 21-23 
and 320(13), which make provision for holders o f ‘restricted’ travel documents and provide that Tack o f  
retumability’ is a ground to refuse entry.
120 In the Brazilian case o f  Feldman v. Justica Publica, Brazil could not deport a Romanian national as 
Romania refused to issue the deportee a passport (Ann. Dig. 1938-40, Case 144).
1 2 1  cSee supra.
122 On this see for example Article 2(1) EC Directive 68/360, supra  n. 82.
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documents, aircrew and seamen licenses and laissez-passer issued by international 
organizations.
With regard to refugees and stateless persons, the International Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees 1951123 and the International Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons 1954124 provide for the issue by the Contracting Parties of Convention 
Travel Documents to refugees and stateless persons within their territory for the purpose 
of travel outside that territory, unless compelling reasons of national security or public 
order require otherwise.125 The Contracting Parties are bound to recognize the validity
1 OAof such documents. The Convention Travel Documents contain a ‘return clause’ 
guaranteeing that the holder will be re-admitted into the issuing State’s territory at any 
time during the period of the validity of the Documents.
Similarly, the special travel documents established to facilitate the international 
movement of aircrews and seamen (see supra) must contain a certification that the 
holder will be re-admitted into the issuing State.
With regard to the UN laissez-passer, Section 24 of Article VII of the General 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946127 provides 
that: ‘The United Nations may issue United Nations laissez-passer to its officials. These 
laissez-passer shall be recognized and accepted as valid travel documents, by the 
authorities of Members... ’.
The purpose of the UN laissez-passer has been well described by a jurist: ‘Passports 
also play their part in making an agent of the international community dependent upon 
his own country, and it is open to question whether the necessity of holding a national 
passport is strictly compatible with the independence which such agents should have in 
their movements. Clearly, the fact that an agent of the international community has to 
ask his government for a passport enables that government to limit his independence to
I no
some extent’.
It has been suggested that one reason for US reluctance to ratify the General 
Convention, and one reason why it did not recognize the UN laissez-passer as an 
international travel document had to do with its strict policy on retumability of aliens
123 Supra  n. 59.
124 360 UNTS 117.
125 Article 28 o f  both Conventions.
126 Para. 7 Schedules.
127 Supra n. 17.
128 Secretan (1935). Quotation from Turack (1972) p. 155.
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and the fact that the UN laissez-passer did not show the holder’s origin, nationality and
129his ability to re-enter some country.
While most documents which, under international agreements, are accepted in lieu of 
passports provide for a guarantee of re-admission of the holder by the issuing State, they 
naturally do not entitle the issuing State to exercise protection since the right of 
protection flows exclusively from the bond of nationality.130
2.1.2 Passports and diplomatic protection
It is a universally recognized rule of customary international law that a State has the 
right to protect its citizens abroad. ‘It is the bond of nationality between the State and 
the individual which alone confers upon the State the right to diplomatic protection’.131 
The passport is considered prima facie evidence of the nationality of the bearer from 
which the possibility of protection by the issuing State may flow, though in itself it does 
not confer on the issuing State a right to protect the bearer.132 In the Nottebohm Case133 
it was held that the acceptance by Guatemala of Nottebohm’s passport and the issue to 
him of a visa did not amount to an act of recognition of his status as a national of 
Liechtenstein, on which Liechtenstein’s right to diplomatic protection depended.
From the point of view of the individual, a passport constitutes evidence of a legitimate 
claim on the resources and services of the embassies and consulates of the issuing State. 
Traditionally, one of the functions of passports was to designate the bearer as someone 
entitled to receive the diplomatic protection and good offices of the diplomatic and 
consular officers of the issuing State.134 Since passports could express an intention to 
extend diplomatic protection to the bearer as well as a request to others to protect him, 
national policies on passport refusal for travel to unrecognized countries or countries 
with which diplomatic relations were not maintained, or the imposition of ‘area 
restrictions’ by which passports were not valid for such countries, were linked to the
129 See Goodwin-Gill (1978) pp. 28-29.
130 See supra  n. 107. There are, however, cases in which protection may be exercized by a State on behalf 
o f  persons not having its nationality. The International Court o f  Justice held in its Advisory Opinion in 
the Reparation fo r  Injuries suffered in the Service o f  the United Nations Case, ICJ Rep. 1949, p. 174, that 
the United Nations has a ‘right o f  functional protection’. The UN Charter implies the Organization’s 
power to afford its agents the limited protection that would consist in the bringing o f  a claim on their 
behalf for reparation for damage suffered during a mission.
131 See supra  ns. 107 and 130.
132 See the Nottebohm  Case, supra  n. 107.
133 Supra  n. 107.
134 See Turack (1972) p. 19.
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issuing State’s inability to extend normal diplomatic and consular protection to its 
citizens in such countries.135
Possession of a passport was also held sufficient to impute allegiance to the issuing 
State. In R v. Joyce, the House of Lords held that possession of a passport, even when 
the passport has been acquired by misrepresentation, confers on the bearer a duty of 
allegiance, just as it gives the bearer rights and imposes obligations on the issuing 
State.136
2.1.3 Passports as an expression o f sovereignty
As an official document issued by the government for international use, the passport has 
important implications in international relations.
It is a customary rule of international law that a State will recognize the passport issued
117by another State to its own citizens. As Turack states: ‘When one state or government 
recognizes the existence of another, it usually recognizes the other's passports. No 
international agreement is signed to constitute the recognition of passports; it is merely 
the operation of the comity of nations’.138
An unrecognized State or government is considered to have no authority to issue 
passports. Documents issued by unrecognized States or governments are not regarded as 
‘passports’.139 They are accorded no official standing: generally, no visa is affixed on an 
unrecognized passport, or if a visa is affixed such action is expressly said not to imply 
recognition of the issuing authority. Similarly, in the case where deportation of a person 
to an unrecognized State (or to a State whose government is unrecognized) is 
considered by the deporting State to necessitate the authorization of the authorities in de 
facto  control, a permit to execute the deportation may be requested from them rather 
than a formal passport.140
Holders of unrecognized passports may be refused entry under domestic immigration 
rules.141 Immigration rules however often make provision to enable such persons to 
enter nevertheless. They may be provided with a travel document by the diplomatic post
135 See Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 33.
136 [1946] AC 347. See Turack (1972) p. 20; Goodwin-Gill (1978) pp. 35-37.
137 Turack (1972) p. 211.
138 Turack (1972) p. 237.
139 Turack gives the example o f  passports issued by Manchukuo, East Germany, and Southern Rhodesia. 
See Turack (1972) pp. 237-241. See also Grossman (2001).
140 See Turack (1972) p. 235.
141 See for example the United Kingdom’s Immigration Rules, para. 320(10).
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of the country that they wish to visit, or their travel documents may be accepted for 
travel purposes, although no visa will be affixed in them.142 Retumability of such 
persons must however be guaranteed. Commonly, nationals of unrecognized States are 
treated like stateless persons or refugees who for visa purposes happen to have a right of 
return to a particular country of origin.143
The nature of passports as an expression of sovereignty is well illustrated by their use in 
those cases where a State is divided into parts governed by different governments with 
each government, or one of them, claiming to be the legitimate government of the whole 
State, thus not recognizing the other.
Before German reunification, for example, West Germany did not require passports 
from East Germans since East Germans were not considered ‘aliens’. West German 
policy -  the so called ‘Hallstein doctrine’ -  maintained that Germany as a whole was a 
continuing State (with one nationality) of which the West German government was the 
only legitimate government.
East Germany, similarly, did not require, up to 1968, passports from West Germans. In 
1968 it decided to use the passport to create the impression that it was a State enjoying 
equal sovereignty with West Germany and to gain further diplomatic recognition. 
Accordingly it announced that West Germans would be required to carry passports with 
an East German visa on them to travel to and from Berlin.144
A similar situation currently exists with regard to China and Taiwan.I4? China provides 
‘travel permits’ to ‘Taiwanese residents of Chinese nationality’ who wish to travel to 
mainland China while Taiwanese Immigration Rules provide that people travelling with 
a travel document issued by the authorities of Mainland China do not qualify for
142 Under the United Kingdom’s Immigration Rules holders o f  unrecognized passports may be issued 
with a ‘Declaration o f  Identity for Visa Purposes’, which together with an entry clearance w ill permit 
them to enter the country. The unrecognized documents, although invalid for travel purposes, may be 
used by the authority issuing the document as a means to establish the identity o f  the person concerned. 
United States practice with regard to holders o f  Somali Democratic Republic passports, for whose 
issuance there is little security, is to issue them with consulate-provided controlled and secured 
documents on which a visa is affixed. Often nationals o f  unrecognized States use passports issued by third 
countries. This is the case o f  Palestinians who use passports issued by the Palestinian Authority, their 
country o f  residence or a neighbouring country (such as Jordan). See Grossman (2001) p. 861.
143 Grossman (2001) p. 874.
144 Turack (1972) p. 239.
145 Both the Chinese and Taiwanese governments claimed to be the one government o f  the one State o f  
China, with Taiwan as part o f  it. This situation developed after the 1949 revolution following which the 
defeated Nationalist Government withdrew to Taiwan. While this policy is still followed by China,
Taiwan seems now to claim to be a ‘sovereign State’. See www.m ofa.gov.tw .
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Republic of China visas in accordance with the Statute Covering Relations Between 
Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.146
With regard to the situation in Cyprus, the policy of the Republic of Cyprus is to deny 
entry to holders of ‘passports’ issued by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’, 
although restrictions on movement have recently been eased.147
The nature of passports as an expression of sovereignty is also well illustrated by the 
practice of recognizing passports issued by governments in exile, as was the case for the 
Baltic States during Russian annexation, or by States which have been invaded, as was
148the case for Kuwait during occupation by Iraq.
Bodies appointed by the UN to administer a territory may have the power of issuing 
travel documents to the inhabitants of the territory.149 This is the case, for example, with 
the current UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).150 In such cases, arrangements may be 
made between the UN and certain third countries with regard to consular assistance, 
retumability and recognition of the travel documents.151
2.1.4 Passports as a political and security instrument
1 OThe nature of the passport as a mechanism of state control has been well documented. " 
Such nature is illustrated in particular by the function of the passport as an instrument to 
control entry and exit of individuals into and from the State.
With regard to entry, the passport plays the role of a certificate of identity and 
retumability. With regard to exit, the executive -  which generally has a discretionary
153power over issuing passports -  may deny passports to prevent exit from the State. It 
seems however that a ‘right to leave one’s own country’ exists in international law, and
146 w w w .fmprc.gov.cn and www.m ofa.gov.tw .
147 Such a policy is in response to the ‘illegal demographic change’. See w w w.m fa.gov.cy. The ‘Turkish 
Republic o f  Northern Cyprus’, which was created following the invasion o f  Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, 
was declared illegal through UN Security Council Resolutions 541/83 and 550/85.
148 UN Resolutions required continuing recognition o f  Kuwait as a State.
149 See for example the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for West N ew  Guinea o f  1962, 
and the UN Council for South West Africa o f  1966. For an account see Turack (1972) pp. 243-244.
150 UNMIK press briefing, 13 March 2000. No short-term visa is required to visit Kosovo, and long-term 
visa arrangements have yet to be decided by UNMIK, see ww w.fco.gov.uk.
151 In the case o f  West N ew  Guinea, for example, both the Netherlands and Indonesia undertook to offer 
consular assistance and protection abroad to Papuans carrying the travel documents issued by UNTEA. 
Many Members o f  the UN expressed their readiness to recognize the documents issued by UNTEA. With 
regard to the documents issued by the UN Council for South West Africa, neighbouring governments 
agreed to the return to their countries o f  South West African using such documents. See supra  n. 149.
152 See Torpey (2000).
153 See supra.
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many national courts have recognized and upheld a constitutional right to travel.154 
Inter-state arrangements for the use of identity cards in lieu of passports have also had 
an impact on the individual’s right to travel since in many cases individuals have a legal 
entitlement to identity cards.155
Control over exit through denial of passports was practiced by the US after the Russian 
Revolution and in the years after the Second World War.156 Travel was restricted for 
members of Communist organizations on grounds of national security and national 
interest. Another practice was the imposition of 'area restrictions’ whereby the validity 
of passports was excluded with regard to unrecognized States or governments, States 
with which diplomatic representation was not maintained, States where armed conflict
1 57existed, and States where health endangering conditions were present. *
Control over exit through denial of passports and exit permits was also notoriously
158practiced by countries of the Eastern block before the collapse of the Berlin Wall. 
With regard to East Germans, since East German passports were not recognized by 
NATO countries as East Germany was considered to be under Soviet control, those East 
Germans who were permitted to leave East Germany had to apply to the Allied Travel 
Office in Berlin for a temporary travel document. The criteria for eligibility for 
temporary travel documents were agreed in NATO and were confidential. Persons 
considered as likely to engage in undesirable political activities during their visits would 
be refused the document.1^ 9
Limitations over exit have also been imposed by developing countries on ‘brain drain’ 
grounds.160
2.2 Definition and functions o f visas
154 See for example the Supreme Court o f  India in Scrwhney v. Assistant Passport Officer [1967] AIR (SC) 
1836; the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. Dulles [1958] 357 US 116.
155 Goodwin-Gill (1978) p. 40. In the context o f  the European Community see, for example, Directive 
68/360, supra  n. 82. Article 2 provides: ‘Member States shall grant [their] nationals the right to leave 
their territory in order to take up activities as employed persons and to pursue such activities in the 
territory o f  another Member State. Such right shall be exercised simply on production o f  a valid identity 
card or passport’.
156 For an account see Ehrlick (1966).
157 In the US, for example, area restrictions existed with regard to Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, China, 
Albania (during the 1939 Italian occupation), Spain (during the Spanish civil war) and Belgium (during 
the 1915 famine). The Italian 1967 Passport Law established that passports issued by the Italian State 
were valid for all countries that Italy recognized. Vietnam, China, North Korea and East Germany were 
excluded. See Turack (1972) pp. 151-152.
158 As to Soviet emigration and the Helsinki Final Act 1975 see Higgins (1988) pp. 146-153.
159 See Turack (1972) p. 239.
160 Torpey (2000) p. 162.
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A visa is an official government stamp applied on foreign passports by the consular or
immigration authorities of a State to authorize entry or stay in that State. Possession of a
visa may be a pre-requisite for admission to the State for certain nationalities or classes
of aliens.161 A visa normally implies acceptance of the passport’s validity/authenticity.
Under passport unions, States may establish a ‘common visa’ valid for their territories 
1
as a whole.
2.2.1 Implications o f the visa as a government official stamp
Because of its nature as an official government stamp that is affixed on official 
documents issued by other governments (passports), the visa plays a significant role in 
the recognition of States and governments.
When a government does not recognize a State or government it refuses, inter alia, to 
give any official standing to official expressions of the latter’s sovereignty, whether 
these take the form of a flag or passport.163 Accordingly, no visa is generally affixed to 
passports issued by an unrecognized State or government (particularly if they purport to 
be diplomatic or official passports) or if a visa is affixed such action is expressly said 
not to constitute recognition of the issuing authority.164
Under the United Kingdom’s Immigration Rules, for example, passports issued by the 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ must not be endorsed by immigration officers 
and any visa is to be placed on a separate form. Visas may be affixed on passports 
issued by Taiwan, with the exception of official and diplomatic passports. Passports 
issued by the Palestinian Authority may also have visas affixed on them, but such action 
‘does not imply recognition of a separate State of Palestine’.16^
161 The United Kingdom’s Immigration Rules lay down the categories o f  persons who need a visa to enter 
the United Kingdom as visitors or for transit. These comprise: (a) nationals o f  approximately 108 
countries; (b) persons who hold passports or travel documents issued by the former Soviet Union or by 
the former Socialist Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia; (c) stateless persons; (d) persons who hold non­
national documents (such as refugee travel documents issued under the 1951 Geneva Convention). These 
persons do not need visas for transit if  they have a confirmed booking on an onward flight within 24 
hours o f  arrival by air unless they are nationals o f  a country listed in the schedule to the Immigration 
(Transit Visa) Order 1993 (which lists approximately 19 countries).
162 See for example the common visa for the Benelux territory under the 1960 Convention concerning the 
Transfer o f  Entry and Exit Controls to the External Frontiers o f  the Benelux Territory, supra  n. 38.
163 In 1966 for example the United Kingdom Foreign Office banned a Post Office stamp designed to 
commemorate the World Football Cup because the stamp bore the flag o f  North Korea which was 
unrecognized by the British government. Historically, unrecognized passports included passports issued 
by Manchuko, East Germany, North Korea, Southern Rhodesia and Franco Spain.
164 See supra.
165 Para. 320(10).
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The visa itself, as a government official stamp, is an expression of sovereignty. Thus, as 
mentioned above, in 1968, for example, East Germany, in an attempt to create the 
impression that it enjoyed equal sovereignty with West Germany and gain further 
diplomatic recognition, required West Germans to carry passports with an East German 
visa to travel to and from Berlin.166
The government of the Republic of Cyprus refuses admission to holders of passports 
with stamps or visas of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. They are only 
allowed to enter after the stamps or visas are cancelled by the Republic of Cyprus 
immigration authorities.167
It is also interesting to note that some Arab States including Iran, Jordan and Egypt as 
part of their policy of non-recognition of Israel, refused admission to bearers of
1ARpassports of any State which had an Israeli visa affixed in them. Also, Cuban 
authorities do not affix Cuban visas on tourists’ passports because of fears that tourists 
may encounter problems entering other countries such as the US. A tourist card is 
instead provided on which the visa is affixed. The card is then removed from the 
passport on departure leaving no physical evidence of the visit.169 
With regard to the situation of Serbia and Kosovo, the fact that Serbia does not 
recognize its border with Kosovo results in the fact that it is illegal to enter Serbia from 
Kosovo as no valid Serbian entry stamp can be acquired.170
Moreover, unrecognized States or governments will of course face practical difficulties 
in issuing visas since they may have no diplomatic representations abroad. Before the 
fall of the Taliban government, for example, a visa for Afghanistan was only obtainable 
from Pakistan, one of three countries that recognized the Taliban government.171 
UN bodies appointed to administer a territory often apply their own entry stamps on the 
passports of visitors to such territories. Thus, a UNMIK stamp is affixed on passports of 
visitors to Kosovo.172
2.2.2 Legal consequence o f a visa in international law
(i) Recognition o f nationality
Supra  n. 144.
167 www.m fa.gov.cy
168 Turack (1972) p. 241.
169 The Guardian, ‘Will a Cuban stamp in my passport make US visit difficult?’, 20 January 2001.
170 www.fco.gov.uk
171 The Observer, ‘W elcome to our beautiful country...’, 5 November 2000.
172 The Guardian  (G2), 29 May 2002.
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A visa does not imply recognition of nationality as attested in the passport for the 
purpose of diplomatic protection. In the Nottebohm Case, the International Court of 
Justice regarded the acceptance of Nottebohm’s passport by Guatemala through the act 
of affixing a visa as nothing more than an administrative act to facilitate the entry of 
Nottebohm in Guatemala. The Court held that: ‘When Nottebohm...presented himself 
before the Guatemala authorities, the latter had before them a private individual; there
i *7^
did not thus come into being any relationship between governments’.
(ii) Recognition o f  diplomatic status
Neither a diplomatic passport granted by the sending State nor a diplomatic visa granted 
by the receiving State guarantee the bearer’s right to diplomatic privileges and 
immunities. A diplomatic passport is prima facie evidence that the bearer is a foreign 
service officer of the issuing State and should accordingly be treated with due respect.174 
A diplomatic visa is only evidence that the bearer is entitled to enter the territory of the 
State that issued the visa.175 In US v. Noriega and Others, 176 a US District Court held 
that General Noriega was not entitled to diplomatic immunity either on the basis of 
holding a Panamanian diplomatic passport or on the basis of US diplomatic visas. The 
Court held that a visa was an ‘administrative action in connection with United States 
immigration law and quite independent of the process of diplomatic accreditation.’ The 
same outcome was reached in R v. Lambeth Justices ex parte Yusufu,177 Here the 
English Divisional Court rejected the argument that Yusufu (charged with kidnapping 
of the Nigerian Minister Dikko, found in a crate about to be flown to Lagos) was 
entitled to diplomatic status on the basis of a diplomatic passport and a diplomatic entry 
visa. There had been no notification of Yusufu as a diplomatic agent to the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. The Court also rejected the claim that Yusufu was a ‘diplomatic 
agent in transit’ on the basis that, while working in the Nigeria High Commission in 
London, he had been granted a diplomatic multiple entry visa to the US.178 
(Hi) A duty to admit?
Under international law a visa may also be significant with regard to retumability.
Under United Kingdom immigration law one of the conditions of entry is that the 
person seeking entry must satisfy the immigration officer, in the case where he intends
173 Supra , n. 107, p. 18.
174 Lee (1991) p. 204.
175 Plender (1988) p. 165.
176 US District Court, Southern District o f  Florida, 8 June 1990, 99 ILR 143, pp. 165-167. See Denza 
(1998) pp. 255.
177 [1985] Criminal Law Reports 510. See Denza (1998) pp. 255-256.
178 See Denza (1998) p. 371.
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to travel to another country after his stay in the United Kingdom, that he will be 
admitted there.179 Similarly, visitors in transit must satisfy the immigration officer that 
they will be assured entry into the country of final destination.180 Possession of a visa 
issued by the country of final destination normally constitutes such proof.
It may therefore be argued that a visa in certain circumstance may impose an obligation 
of admission on the issuing State. Arguably, if State A grants leave to enter on the basis 
that retumability is assured by virtue of a visa issued by State B, State B is obliged to 
admit the holder of the visa in case State A wishes to deport him and no other State is 
prepared to accept him. Given that as a rule the obligation of readmission lies with the 
State of nationality, such a scenario would arise only in special circumstances.
A visa may also be significant in the context of readmission agreements. Readmission 
agreements may provide not only for an obligation for the parties to readmit their own 
nationals but also for an obligation to readmit third country nationals and stateless 
persons coming from or having resided in their territory. A visa may be proof and
1 R1indicative evidence of residence or transit.
(iv) Visas and the right to leave one’s own country
It is unclear whether a visa granted by a State has any impact on the exercise of the right 
to leave one’s own country. In the Lopez Burgos Case (concerning a claim by an 
Uruguayan trade unionist that he had been kidnapped from Argentina by Uruguayan 
intelligence forces and then subjected to torture and unlawful arrest) the Human Rights 
Committee established under the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR did not find that 
Uruguay violated Article 12 of the Covenant (on the right to leave one’s own country) 
by not releasing Lopez Burgos after completion of his sentence. It noted however: ‘that 
the Austrian Government has granted Lopez Burgos an entry visa. In this connection 
and pursuant to Article 12 of the Covenant, the Committee observes that Lopez Burgos 
should be allowed to leave Uruguay, if he so wishes, and travel to Austria to join his 
wife’.182
2.2.3 Visa requirements and bans as a political instrument
179 Immigration Rules, para. 320(13).
180 Immigration Rules, para. 47(3).
181 Within the framework o f  readmission agreements between the Contracting States o f  the Schengen 
Convention, see Decision o f  the Executive Committee o f  15 December 1997 on the guiding principles for 
means o f  proof and indicative evidence within the framework o f  readmission agreements between the 
Schengen States (SCH/Com-ex (97)39 rev.), OJ 2000 L 239/188.
182 Communication n. 52/1979, Selected Decisions, p. 91, para. 11.8. Quotation from Higgins (1988) p. 
155.
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Visas are traditionally a foreign policy instrument. Visa requirements or restrictions are 
often imposed on certain nationalities to indicate political disapproval of their 
governments’ policy. In the same way, exemption from visa requirements, generally 
under bilateral visa exemption agreements, indicates political approval and friendly
183relations.
Many European States, for example, granted exemption from visa requirements to 
nationals of ex-colonies. This is the case for the United Kingdom with regard to some 
Commonwealth countries, and formerly for Spain with regard to South American 
countries in pursuance of Spain’s policy of forging an ‘Ibero-American Community of 
Nations’.
Many international events have resulted, on the other hand, in the imposition by States 
of visa requirements or visa restrictions on certain nationalities. During the Cold War, 
visa requirements were imposed by the United Kingdom and other European States on 
nationals of the Soviet Union, the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, Cuba and
184certain African and Asian countries.
The Member States of the European Union have often imposed visa requirements 
collectively.185
Within this context it can be noted that bilateral visa exemption agreements generally 
contain suspension clauses to the effect that either party may with immediate effect 
temporarily suspend the agreement in whole or in part with an obligation to notify the 
other party without delay. Visa exemption agreements also generally contain a 
denunciation clause.
Visa denial to particular nationalities has also been used. Increasingly, however, visa
bans concern identified persons, with the aim to hurt those who are politically
responsible for a particular state of affairs (‘target sanctions’ or ‘intelligent 
1 86sanctions’). In the early 1990s the US, for example, denied Yasser Arafat a visa for a
187trip to the UN. The US also consistently denied visas to government officials of
183 In this context see for example the agreement between South Korea and Japan to relax visa restrictions 
in occasion o f  the Football World Cup 2002. See The Guardian, ‘World Cup scores for Asian detente’, 26 
March 2002.
184 See Bevan (1986) p. 164.
185 See Chapter 5.
186 Paasivirta and Rosas (2002) p. 208.
187 This was as a result o f  the fact that notwithstanding that the Palestinian National Council voted in 
1998 to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 238 calling for Israel to evacuate the occupied territories and for 
all countries o f  the region to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, Arafat refused to declare 
whether such course o f  action implied Palestinian Liberation Organization recognition o f  Israel right to 
exist. Encyclopaedia Britannica CD 1999.
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Myanmar, Thailand and Bolivia during the 1990s in an attempt to influence these
188governments’ stance on drug trafficking.
Visa bans are often agreed within the UN Security Council.189 In the United Kingdom 
visa bans agreed within the framework of the UN Security Council and the Council of 
the European Union are implemented through the Immigration (Designation of Travel 
Bans) Order 2000 which is based on Section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971. 
International obligations to grant access to the State territory have an impact on the 
State’s ability to impose visa bans, at least when such bans are not prescribed by a UN 
Security Council resolution.190 The Immigration (Designation of Travel Bans) Order 
2000, for example, excludes the imposition of travel bans when these would be contrary 
to the United Kingdom’s international obligations under the ECHR or the Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. On the other hand, a breach of treaty 
obligations resulting from the imposition of sanctions decided by the Security Council 
will not be problematic since Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that where there is 
a conflict between obligations under the Charter and obligations under any other 
international agreement, the former prevail.
2.2.4 Legal implications o f  a visa under domestic legislation
Under United Kingdom law, a visa is equivalent to ieave to enter’ provided it specifies 
the purpose for which the holder wish to enter and it is endorsed with the conditions to 
which it is subject, or, if there are no conditions, with the statement ‘indefinite leave to 
enter’.191 The concept of a visa as conferring leave to enter is not a novelty. Visas were 
so treated until the 1960s. With the increase in migration pressure and the alleged 
spreading of fake or forged documents, immigration officers were instructed in 1965 to 
treat visas only as prima facie evidence of eligibility for entry.192 The current reversal in 
policy seems the result of a perception that re-examining passengers who had already 
undergone an examination as part of the visa issuance procedure is usually unnecessary
Encyclopaedia Britannica CD 1999.
189 This has been the case, for example, in relation to members o f  the governments or de facto 
governments o f  Haiti (Security Council Resolution 917(1994)), Angola (Security Council Resolution 
1127(1997)), Afghanistan (Security Council Resolution 1333(2000)), Liberia (Security Council 
Resolution 1343(2001)), Sierra Leone (Security Council Resolution 1171(1998)).
190 See for example, The Times, ‘Mugabe’s Rome visit beats EU travel ban’, 8 June 2002.
191 Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000, based on Section 3A(3) Immigration Act 1971. 
Transit visas are not treated as conferring leave to enter. See Section 41 Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999 and Article 2 Immigration (Transit Visa) Order 1993.
192 See Roche (1969) pp. 237-238 and 242.
and too time-consuming.193 Indeed, as a result of the tendency to ‘externalize’ 
immigration control, embassies and consular posts are increasingly equipped to detect 
false or forged documents and mala fide applicants.
The visa will often directly or indirectly determine the legal position of the holder in the 
issuing State (the length he is allowed to stay in the country, whether he can take up 
employment, and whether he can claim social benefits).
Under Italian legislation a visa is only prima facie proof of eligibility for entry.194 Once 
the visitor is on Italian territory he must, within eight days from entry, apply for a 
residence permit, which is the only document legitimating his stay on the Italian 
territory for the purpose and duration prescribed in his visa.195
2.2.5 Policy functions o f visas
Since visa systems are an instrument to control entry into the States, one of their most 
evident policy functions is to guarantee national security by keeping out ‘undesirables’. 
This security function of visas often intertwines with their function as a foreign policy 
instrument. The modem international passport and visa systems originated with the First 
World War with the aim of ensuring the exclusion or internment of enemy aliens. Visa 
requirements introduced during the First and Second World Wars were subsequently 
abolished through visa exemption agreements.196
Later, France introduced visa requirements in the 1980s in response to terrorist attacks 
so as to leave only EU nationals and nationals of Switzerland visa exempt.197 The 
United Kingdom introduced visa requirements for nationals of Argentina in 1982 on the
1 QQ
invasion of the Falklands Islands, and in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait it decided 
to refuse student visas to nationals of Iraq and later to refuse visas to all Iraqi 
nationals.199 Morocco imposed visa requirements on nationals of Algeria in August
193 Explanatory Notes to Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 c. 33, para. 28.
194 Article 7(1) decreto del Presidente della Repubblica o f  31 August 1999, n. 394 (1).
195 Article 5 decreto legislativo o f  25 July 1998, n. 286 (as amended) and Articles 9 and 10 o f  decreto del 
Presidente della Republica o f  31 August 1999, n. 394(1). Special rules exist for tourists and other 
categories o f  visitors.
196 In the 1926 Geneva International Passport Conference, the League o f  Nations recognized the value o f  
passports as a means o f  establishing the identity o f  people and assisting the right to travel. The conference 
recommended the simplification o f  issuing formalities and the progressive reduction o f  visa requirements. 
Most States concluded agreements for the reciprocal abolition o f  visa requirements. Visa requirements 
were reintroduced during the Second World War. After that, the United Kingdom concluded visa 
abolition agreements with a number o f  European States and by the 1960s visas were required only from 
nationals o f  Communist countries. See Roche (1969) pp. 112, 114 and 126; Bevan (1986) p. 164; Lee 
(1991) pp. 224-225.
197 Lee (1991) p. 228.
198 Statement o f  Change in Immigration Rules o f  6 December 1982.
199 Statement o f  Change in Immigration Rules o f  September 1990 and 18 January 1991.
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1995 following the killing of two Spanish tourists in Marrakech by members of an
Algerian-Moroccan Islamic group based in France.200 In the United States after the
events of 11 September 2001 there were proposals for the denial of student visas to
201nationals of seven States considered to be ‘sponsors of international terrorism’.
Visa requirements are also used in an effort to keep out crime. The Italian Legge 
Martelli202 introduced in 1990, for example, based the criteria to determine the list of 
countries whose nationals would be subject to visa requirements on the nationality of 
those sentenced for drug trafficking during the three-year period prior to the 
determination. Similarly, the United Kingdom has recently introduced visa requirements
203for nationals of Jamaica in an attempt to clampdown on crack cocaine smuggling. 
Such a ground for imposing visa requirements specifically relates to the activities of 
individuals rather than to the policies of their State of nationality.204 The imposition of 
visa requirements in this context is the first step towards the assessment of individual 
risks. Under national law, cases where a visa may be denied generally include: (i) where 
the applicant has been issued with a deportation order; (ii) where the applicant’s 
exclusion is in the national interest; (iii) where the applicant has failed to respect the 
time limit and conditions attached to a previous leave to enter; and (iv) where the 
applicant has been convicted for a crime punishable in the national territory with 
imprisonment for one year or more.205 The implementation of such conditions is 
assisted by a list of individuals to whom visas must be denied.
Within the context of visas as an instrument contributing to ‘internal security’, one of 
the primary policy functions of visa regimes today is control over migration inflows. 
Since the 1980s visa requirements have been imposed by Western European States on 
nationals of countries deemed to be ‘pressure to emigrate’ countries or producers of
200 British Encyclopaedia 99 CD.
201 The Guardian , ‘US abandons changes to student visa policies’, 26 November 2001.
202 Law n. 37/90, G azzetta Vfficiale 49, February 1990.
203 The G uardian , ‘Visa move to stem drug trade’, 11 February 2002.
204 On the significance o f this shift see Guild (2001) p. 34.
205 With regard to United Kingdom law, see the Immigration Rules, para. 320( 1)-(19). See also Sections 
22(1) and 2(a) o f  the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, C. 24, under which leave to enter or 
remain in the United Kingdom may be refused to a person who has been certified by the Secretary o f  
State to be a ‘suspected international terrorists’. With regard to Italian law, see Articles 4(3) and (6) 
decreto legislativo o f  25 July 1998, n. 286 (as amended) and decreto del Presidente della Repubblica o f  
31 August 1999, n. 394. These mention as a possible ground for exclusion that the applicant has been 
convicted o f  offences relating to smuggling immigrants or trafficking in people for the purpose o f  
prostitution or exploitation o f  minors.
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asylum-seekers.206 The United Kingdom, for example, introduced visa requirements for 
Iranians in 1980 following the revolution, for nationals of Sri Lanka in 1985 arguing 
that Tamils were economic migrants, for nationals of India and Bangladesh in 1986, for 
nationals of Nigeria and Ghana in 1987, for nationals of Turkey and Haiti in 1989, for
207nationals of Uganda in 1991 and for nationals of Zimbabwe in 2002.
Most Member States of the EU introduced visa requirements for nationals of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in 1993.208
Often, visa requirements are lifted under various conditions such as the conclusion of 
re-admission agreements, undertakings as to the enactment of measures to combat travel 
document fraud and trafficking, and the adherence to human rights instruments, which 
contribute to the classification of the third country as ‘safe’ in the context of assessing 
asylum applications.209
In the context of immigration control, visa regimes are generally described as ‘external’ 
measures (i.e. aimed at preventing the arrival of migrants). They are complemented by a 
number of other measures such as carrier sanctions,210 border controls, information 
campaigns in source and transit countries, training of airline staff and immigration
officers and the posting of liaison officers for the detection of fake or forged documents.
211External measures are generally seen less problematic than ‘internal’ ones. State 
action in relation to ‘within-the-country immigrants’ is limited by human and civil
206 Such development is part o f  the policies o f  Western European States o f  halting primary immigration 
and reducing secondary (family re-unification) immigration and asylum inflows. Such restrictive 
immigration policies were firstly introduced in the late 1960s (much later in the case o f  Southern 
European States) and signalled the end o f  the labour recruitment policies that had been practice from 
1945 until then. For an account see Hammar ed. (1985); Collinson (1994). For an analysis o f  the 
justification for such restrictive policies see Hakura (1998).
207 Statements o f  Change in Immigration Rules o f  May 1985, October 1986, 29 January 1987, 14 January 
1989, 26 March 1991. See also The Guardian , ‘Zimbabweans must get a visa to enter the UK ’, 8 
November 2002. Already in 1939 visa requirements were imposed by the United Kingdom on nationals 
o f  Germany and Austria to control the inflows o f  Jewish refugees resulting from the rise o f  the Nazi party 
and the introduction o f  anti-Semitic laws. See Roche (1969) pp. 112, 114 and 126.
208 In April 1993 only Denmark, Italy, Spain, Portugal and France (this latter requiring a letter o f  
sponsorship) did not require visas from Bosnians. See Collinson (1994) p. 140. Moreover, the fact that no 
Member State o f  the EU had a diplomatic mission in Bosnia, made necessary for Bosnians to travel to a 
third country in order to seek a visa for a Member State. In such situation asylum could be refused as the 
principle o f ‘safe third country’ requires the asylum-seeker to apply for asylum in the first safe country it 
enters. See Guild and Niessen (1996) p. 298.
209 Visa requirements were lifted by the European Community for nationals o f  Hong Kong and Macao in 
2001 in return for the conclusion o f  re-admission agreements. See Commission Green Paper for a Return 
Policy at para. 4.1.1, COM (2002) 0175/final.
210 Penalties for airlines or other carriers transporting passengers lacking the necessary documentation or 
using false documents.
211 Internal measures include identity checks, residence and work permits requirements, employer
sanctions, inspections, removal, restrictions on access to social benefits, restrictions on legal integration, 
etc.
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rights, 212 it is more costly, and may involve unpopular measures such as identity 
checks.
Visa systems have resulted in the development of a number of criminal activities. An 
underground industry has emerged for the production of fake visas and passports, which 
has in turn led to the introduction of increasingly sophisticated counterfeit-proof 
passports and visas. More people attempt to cross borders illegally often relying on the 
services of traffickers, which has led governments to fortify borders and introduce 
severe penalties for traffickers. Moreover, many illegal immigrants are visa 
overstayers.213
Among the new developments with regard to visas as an instrument of immigration 
control is the tendency towards transforming visas into identity documents and creating 
databases containing information on visas issued or denied. At EU level, measures have 
been agreed, following the events of 11 September 2001, providing for the insertion of 
biometric data in the visa and for the creation of a database containing information on 
visa holders.214
Apart from security and foreign policy considerations, many other factors are relevant 
in shaping visa policies. The facilitation of economic activities and tourism may be a 
reason to practise a more relaxed visa policy. Interest in tourism was one of the reasons
21 Swhy Italy and Spain, before their entry into Schengen, pursued a relaxed visa policy.
A desire to facilitate global economic activities, for example, has resulted in proposals 
to create a GATS Card, which would take the place of or require the automatic issue of
91visas, work or residence permits for the period of employment. The objective of 
facilitation of movement for transfrontier workers may also result in special 
arrangements. Also, ethnic links may result in special arrangements to facilitate cross­
2,2 As Hollifield states: ‘Respect for human (and civil) rights can compel liberal states...to exercise 
caution in dealing with migrants. Purely realist behaviour by states towards migrants (and refugees) has 
become increasingly problematic; hence international migration has developed and important 
humanitarian and political, as well as econom ic dynamic, making it difficult for any state with liberal 
pretensions to regulate it’. Hollifield (1992) p. 578.
13 In the United Kingdom, plans to adopt a financial bond scheme for visitors under Sections 16 and 17 
o f  the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 were finally abandoned on 28 July 2000, the G uardian , 
im m igration bond scheme dropped’, 29 July 2000.
214 See Chapters 4 and 5.
215 In Italy, before the Legge Martelli, nationals o f  78 countries were exempt from tourist visas. See 
Circolare del Ministero dell’intemo, 19 August 1985, n. 559/443/225388/2/4/6/ reproduced in 
Nascimbene (1988) p. 221.
216 Guild (2001) p. 64.
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border movement.217 The objective of achieving national territorial continuity may also 
result in special arrangements with third countries regarding transit through their 
territory when such transit is necessary to travel from one part of the country to 
another.218
3. Conclusion
Visas are inextricably linked to the concept of the State and to some of its essential 
functions. They are a symbol of the sovereign right to control entry into the State 
(which is limited by international law). They play a role in recognition of other States 
and governments. They are also a foreign policy instrument in the more general sense. 
Further, they are linked to diplomatic representation abroad. From the domestic point of 
view, they fulfil a function, that of ensuring internal security and control over territory, 
on which the very existence of the State is based.
The European Union, in an attempt to reconcile conflicting tendencies towards 
integration and towards retention of national sovereignty, has been characterized by a 
search for efficient and effective ways of cooperation which leave ultimately intact the 
sovereign status of the Member States. This has also been important in the light of the 
diversity which characterizes Europe. This exercise in reconciliation has resulted in a 
sui generis character for the European Community, and in a three-pillar structure for the 
European Union whereby those areas more strictly linked to the concept of sovereignty 
are tackled through the international law method, rather than the more integrationist 
Community method, at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness.
Cooperation on visas, because of the nature of visas, has most been affected by the 
conflict between the different forces at the heart of the process of European integration. 
This has found expression in the constant reformulation of the framework for 
cooperation and in the fragmented and flexible nature of the ensuing common visa 
policy.
Cooperation on visas has also been characterized by practical difficulties deriving from 
fundamental differences between the Member States, and from the fact that visa policy 
touches on areas (such as diplomatic representation) which remain within the
217 This is the case, for example, with regard to Romania and Hungary, and also with regard to Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.
218 See the example o f  Kaliningrad in Chapter 5.
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competence of the Member States, and in which it has been particularly difficult to 
achieve greater integration.
The thesis will now consider the formation of a common visa policy against this 
framework, after introducing the structure of the European Union.
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2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
1. Introduction
The European Union is an entity of a hybrid nature. The Union rests on three Pillars: (i) 
the First Pillar is the European Community; (ii) the Second Pillar is Cooperation on 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); (iii) and the Third Pillar is Judicial and Police 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJC). Notoriously, the three Pillars are of a different 
nature. The European Community is an international organization with international 
legal personality and the capacity to conclude treaties. Internally the Community is 
characterized by a special legal method which presents some of the characteristics 
typical of the constitutional order of federations. These features, whose foundation rests 
on the controversial claim that the Community established a ‘new legal order’, have 
called into question the very classification of the Community as a treaty regime.1 
The Second and Third Pillars are essentially ‘intergovernmental’. The relationship 
between the Member States within the Second and Third Pillars is governed by the rules 
of public international law. The choice for a looser method of cooperation in these 
fields is dictated by a desire on the part of the Member States ultimately to maintain 
national autonomy in these areas. In particular, national autonomy in the field of foreign 
and security policy (i.e. independence in the conduct of foreign relations) remains a 
key-defining feature of the State.
As Forster and Wallace explain:
‘Transfer o f  effective authority over foreign policy and defence would create -  or require -  a 
European federation. Policy cooperation in this field has therefore operated under contradictory 
pressures, in which the rationality o f  common action and o f  sharing scarce resources has been  
balanced by concern for the preservation o f  national sovereignty and o f  diverse national 
traditions and taboos. Thirty years after the establishment o f  European Political Cooperation, 
preoccupation with procedure, status and constitutional authority remains at the heart o f  this 
policy domain, and is reflected in its weak institutionalization and marginal policy output’.3
1 As de Witte points out: ‘The argument linking supremacy/direct effect and the nature o f  EC law has 
gradually acquired an element o f  circularity. At first, supremacy and direct effect were to be recognized 
because the EC Treaty was unlike other international treaties.. .but n ow .. .the direction o f  the argument is 
often reversed: EC law is now often presented as being unique because it is endowed with direct effect 
and supremacy. De Witte (1999) p. 208.
2 See Hendry (1993) p. 310; Muller-Graff (1994) p. 495; Picchio Forlati (1999) p. 461; Hailbronner
(2000) p. 48; Denza (2002) pp. 14-17.
3 Forster and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 462.
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The situation has been different in relation to the Third Pillar. The introduction of the 
Third Pillar by the Maastricht Treaty (as opposed to reliance on the Community 
method) was dictated by the sensitivity of the subject matter and the wide divergences 
between the Member States. The Third Pillar was however seen by a number of 
Member States as a ‘waiting room’ for communitarization, and the Amsterdam Treaty 
indeed communitarized many of the areas previously within its scope at the price of the 
opt-out of some Member States.
The different nature of the Pillars initially led writers to treat them as legally ‘separate’, 
with important repercussions for a definition of the Union. However, as appears clear 
from the Common and Final Provisions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the 
aim of the three-pillar structure is to unite the Pillars notwithstanding their differences. 
The key provisions are those establishing a ‘single institutional framework’ for the 
Union and requiring ‘consistency’ of Union activities.4
The concept of consistency (which was first introduced by the Single European Act 
(SEA)) has notoriously been an ambiguous one.5 There has been disagreement on how 
consistency between the Community and intergovernmental cooperation should be 
achieved. An ‘intergovernmental’ approach to consistency sees the CFSP as the 
legitimate forum where political issues should be decided, and the Community as bound 
to ‘implement’ CFSP decisions. A ‘communitarian’ approach to consistency, on the 
other hand, maintains the independence of the Community system, and advocates 
achieving consistency through a strengthening of the role of the Community institutions 
within the intergovernmental Pillars.
The question of the division of competence between the Community and 
intergovernmental cooperation thus remains open. Should economic matters with 
political implications be decided within the CFSP or the Community? In practice, on 
such a choice of constitutional importance depends the applicable decision-making 
procedure.
The problem of consistency has been tackled in a number of ways. Firstly, some 
formulae have been devised. One of these is Article 301 EC on economic sanctions.
4 Article 3 EU.
5 For the development o f  the concept o f  ‘consistency’ and its practical application see Nuttall (1992) pp. 
260-281 and 319-320, and (2000) pp. 25-28 and 181-184.
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Article 301 EC provides that once a CFSP decision has been reached on the imposition 
of sanctions, the Council (acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission) is to give effect to such decision through a Community instrument. Other 
formulae and practices have been developed by the institutions. Among these are the 
dual-use goods regime, ‘model common positions’ and ‘mixed’ agreements.6
Secondly, the problem of consistency has been tackled through the creation of 
‘procedural and institutional bridges’ between the Pillars.7 Accordingly, the role of the 
Community institutions within the intergovernmental Pillars has been gradually 
strengthened. This has led many authors to describe the intergovernmental Pillar as not 
‘purely’ intergovernmental but as a ‘third way’ between ‘intergovemmentalism’ and the 
Community method.8
Also, the provisions of the Second and Third Pillars (whether on planning, decision­
making, instruments, implementation or representation) have been gradually refined to 
enable the Pillars to be more efficient, effective, transparent and accountable. In some 
cases this refinement has meant that the intergovernmental Pillars have assumed some 
of the positive features of the Community method.9
Moreover, a few provisions have been introduced which aim specifically at facilitating 
the achievement of consistency, although the legal effect o f some of them remains 
controversial.10 Among these are the Common and Final Provisions of the TEU 
prescribing common objectives and principles, a ‘single institutional framework’, and a 
duty for the Council and the Commission to achieve consistency of the Union’s 
activities.11 Provisions specifically aiming at consistency further include those on the 
role of the European Council,12 and Article 14 EU which reads that ‘the Council may 
request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals relating to the 
common foreign and security policy to ensure implementation of a joint action’.
6 See Timmermans (1996); Rummel and Wiedeman (1998); Hillion (2000b) pp. 1216-1223; Koutrakos
(2001) pp. 104-106; Smith, M. (2001) p. 185; Denza (2002) pp. 103 and 303-304.
7 Schmalz (1998). See also W essel (1999) p. 304.
8 Anderson, den Boer and Miller (1994) p. 116; O ’Keeffe (1995) p. 901; Regelsberger and W essels
(1996); Rossi (1997) p. 103.
9 Denza (2002) pp. 5-32.
10 For example, to what extent are European Council guidelines legally binding on the Commission in 
view  o f  Article 47 EU? See Timmermans (1996) p. 68. This uncertainty remains linked to the fact that the 
constitutional issue o f  how consistency is to be achieved remains unresolved.
11 Articles 2, 6 and 3 EU.
12 Articles 4 and 13 EU.
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Thirdly, the Court of Justice has also proved to be a 'consistency insurer'. In the Airport 
Transit Visas Case,13 the Court affirmed its jurisdiction, in accordance with Articles 46 
and 47 EU, to decide on the demarcation of competence between the Community and 
the intergovernmental Pillars. The Court has also affirmed its jurisdiction to assess 
whether powers retained by the Member States are exercised in a manner consistent 
with Community law.14
While the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret provisions of a ‘mixed’ 
agreement falling within the exclusive competence of the Member States, it is apparent 
that it has jurisdiction to interpret provisions of association agreements which relate to a 
field covered by the Treaty.15
The Court, on the basis of the ‘single institutional framework’, has also held that certain 
Treaty rules applicable to the institutions apply in an across-the-pillars fashion.16
The three-pillar structure may therefore be seen as a further stage in a continuing 
process which aims at achieving consistency between the Community and 
intergovernmental cooperation in a situation where it is not possible to sharply divide 
competence between the two frameworks. Three combining factors seem to underlie the 
pillar construction: (i) A determination on the part of the Member States (or at least 
some of them) to maintain their status of sovereign States, which dictates reliance on the 
intergovernmental method for foreign and security policy (the ‘policy appropriateness’ 
argument); (ii) A quest for greater efficiency and effectiveness for intergovernmental 
cooperation, which could imply an alignment of the intergovernmental method to that of 
the Community (the ‘policy effectiveness’ argument); (iii) A determination to maintain 
the independence and integrity of the Community system, which has proven efficient 
and effective.
The picture which emerges from the pillar structure and the search for consistency is 
one of convergence between the intergovernmental and the Community methods.
13 Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council [1998] E C R 1-2763.
14 Cases C-367/89 Aime Richardt [1991] ECR 1-4621; C-70/94 Werner v. Germany [1995] ECR 1-3189; 
C-83/94 Leifer [1995] ECR 1-3231; C-432/92 Anastasiou  [1994] ECR 1-3087; C-124/95 Centro Com
[1997] ECR 1-81. See Article 10 EC which provides that the Member States ‘shall abstain from any 
measure which could jeopardize the attainment o f  the objectives o f  the EC Treaty’. For an analysis see 
Klabbers (2002) p. 167.
15 Case 12/86 D em irel [1987] ECR 3719. See Macleod, Hendry and Hyett (1996) p. 157; Gaja (2002) pp. 
119-120; Eeckhout (2004) pp. 104-105.
16 Cases T-174/95 Svenka Joum alistforbundent v. Council [1998] ECR 1-2289; T-188/98 Kuijer v. 
Council [2000] ECR 11-1959.
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It remains to be seen how the system will develop. An underlying point is that the 
Member States have different attitudes to European integration, with some more keen 
on maintaining the intergovernmental method for certain areas and others assuming a 
more relaxed attitude to ‘communitarization’. This divergence has already found
1 7expression in the introduction of ‘variable geometry’ arrangements.
In this context, the Constitutional Treaty represents a further step forward. The 
Constitutional Treaty abolishes the three-pillar structure in an attempt to ‘simplify and 
reorganize the Treaties’, but the exact implications of such a move are unclear. 
Although the pillar structure is abolished, cooperation on foreign and security policy is 
to be governed by its own special provisions with regard to procedure and institutional 
competence. Still, the Constitutional Treaty leaves unclear to what extent, if  any, 
Community legal doctrines of a federal character extend to the field of foreign and 
security policy.
This Chapter will analyse the structure of the European Union. It will firstly briefly 
outline the essential features of the Community method. Secondly, it will consider the 
intergovernmental Pillars, and particularly how their provisions have been refined in 
order to improve them and make coordination with the Community easier. Thirdly, it 
will consider the relationship between the Pillars. Fourthly, it will consider the changes 
which will be introduced if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified.
This Chapter (together with Chapter 1) provides the foundation for an analysis of the 
working of the pillar structure in relation to the common visa policy. Such an analysis is 
ultimately an attempt to shed some light on the constitutional nature of the Union.
2. Essential features of the Community method
The Community legal method is characterized by special features promoting an 
exceptional degree of integration between the Member States. Some of these features
17 A Protocol and an Agreement on Social Policy introduced by the Maastricht Treaty permitted the 
United Kingdom to opt-out from the provisions o f  the 1989 Social Charter. Special arrangements also 
permitted derogation from the provisions on econom ic and monetary union. See further the opt-outs from 
Title IV EC (in Chapter 4) and the provisions on enhanced cooperation introduced by the Treaty o f  
Amsterdam. For an appraisal see Dashwood (1998) pp. 213-216.
18 See Cremona (2003) p. 1351 and (2004) pp. 571-572; Dashwood (2003a) and (2004) pp. 364-366; 
Denza (2003b). See also de Witte (2004) p. 97, who argues that ‘the merger o f  the structure  was not 
accompanied by a merger o f  the method’.
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are clearly established in the EC Treaty while others have been developed by the Court 
of Justice.
Those features contained in the EC Treaty, although making the Community an 
‘advanced’ international organization, are ultimately consistent with a definition of the 
Community as an ‘international organization’.19 On the other hand, the legal doctrines 
developed by the Court of Justice (the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of 
Community law) give a constitutional federal character to the Community and challenge 
the classification of the Community as a ‘treaty regime’.20
The Community seems thus to ‘combine the hitherto incompatible’. On the one hand, 
the Community owes its existence to a treaty among sovereign States, which arguably 
remain free to amend it as they please,21 to wind up the Community or to withdraw 
unilaterally. It operates under the principle of conferral of powers, and the Member 
States acting as the Council have a prominent role in its functioning. On the other hand, 
the Court of Justice has claimed that the Community established a ‘new legal order’ 
and, on this basis, has developed legal doctrines which create a relationship of a federal 
constitutional character between the national laws of the Member States and 
Community law.
99In this light, it has been difficult to establish the nature of Community law. What can 
be said is that the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy are generally accepted by 
national courts on the basis of national constitutional provisions or acts transferring or 
delegating sovereignty to the Community rather than on the basis of the higher nature of 
Community law. This means that these doctrines are accepted by national courts within 
the overall framework established by their national constitutions. A reflection of this is 
that national courts may declare Community law invalid (i.e. reject the primacy of 
Community law) if Community law breaches fundamental constitutional rights,23 and 
that they retain the ultimate Kompetenz-Kompetenz (i.e. the final say of whether a 
matter is within Community competence).24
19 Hartley (1999) pp. 128-139.
20 See Mancini (2000).
21 See however the Court o f  Justice in Opinion 1/91 (first EEA) [1991] ECR 1-6079.
22 See, for example, Schilling (1996); Ballarino (1997) pp. 4-9 and 131-141; W eiler and Halter (1998); 
Hartley (1999).
23 See the German Constitutional Court in Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.
24 Evidence given by Professor Craig, House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Union (2003- 
04a) q. 7, p. 7 o f  evidence. As he states, this does not mean to deny that: (i) the Court o f  Justice has 
authority to rule on all aspects o f  the EC Treaty including the boundaries between EC and Member States 
competences; (ii) national courts generally avoid direct confrontation with the Court o f  Justice; and (iii) 
the national courts’ approach potentially threatens the uniform application o f  EC law. See q. 3, pp. 4-5 o f  
evidence.
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It seems that Article 1-5 a of the Constitutional Treaty25 which ‘constitutionalizes’ the 
principle of primacy of EU law would not in principle resolve the discrepancy between 
the national courts’ and the Court of Justice’s approaches, but it would perhaps increase 
the pressure to resolve the issue before or after ratification.
The essential characteristics of the Community method are as follows.
First, the Community presents a very sophisticated institutional framework. The task 
of proposing legislation is entrusted exclusively to the Commission, an independent 
body dedicated to the achievement of the Community long-term interests. The 
Commission is also the body that negotiates, under Council’s directives, international 
agreements to be concluded by the Community, and which represents the Community in 
international organizations and fora on matters for which the Community has exclusive 
competence. The Commission is also responsible for the implementation of Community 
policies.29
The entrustment of these functions to an independent body is meant to ensure that the 
Community serves the ‘common interest’ rather than the Member States’ specific 
national interests. It also ensures a constant flow of proposals and coherence in policy 
development. Moreover, the fact that the Commission is required to publish its 
proposals and amendments to these ensures transparency of the law negotiating
30process.
The Commission also fulfils the role of ‘guardian of the Treaty’. It has a duty to ensure 
the enforcement of Community obligations by the Member States and may for this
'X1purpose have recourse to the Court of Justice.
The Council, since the SEA of 1986, generally adopts internal legislation by qualified 
majority voting.32 Decisions to conclude international agreements are also generally
25 See provisional consolidated version o f  the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 25 June 
2004, CIG 86/04.
26 Evidence given by Professor Craig, House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Union (2003- 
04a) q. 17, p. 9 o f  evidence.
27 The account given is meant only to be a sketch. For a full account o f  the institutional framework see, 
for example, Nugent (1999) pp. 101-317.
28 The Council may amend Comm ission’s proposals only by unanimity.
29 See however the ‘com itology’ phenomenon, Nuttall (2000) p. 28.
30 Denza (2002) p. 10.
31 Articles 211 and 226 EC.
32 A s Hooghe and Marks state in the original Treaty o f  Rome there were at least as many treaty provisions 
envisaging majority voting as unanimity but a ‘veto culture’ existed (the so called Luxembourg 
compromise), Hooghe and Marks (2001) p. 17.
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subject to qualified majority voting, except for association agreements and agreements 
covering fields for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal legislation. 
The European Parliament, directly elected since 1979, has an ever-increasing role 
within the Community rule-making process. Under the ‘co-decision’ procedure, which 
has been extended and simplified by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Parliament has an 
opportunity to shape the final outcome of legislation.33 Under the ‘assent’ procedure, it 
can veto the adoption of a measure. Under the ‘consultation’ procedure it has a legally 
enforceable right to be consulted.34
The Court of Justice has compulsory and extensive jurisdiction under the Treaty. The 
Court may review the conformity of action by the Community institutions with the 
Treaty and the conformity of the Member States’ action with primary and secondary 
Community law.35
With regard to actions of the second type, under the preliminary reference procedure in 
particular, the Court has jurisdiction to interpret primary and secondary Community law 
and consider the validity of secondary Community law on a reference from any national 
court.36 Although this procedure is on the face of it designed to ensure a uniform 
interpretation and application of Community law, in practice, given the acceptance of 
the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of Community law by national courts, it 
can result in a national court declaring, under more or less clear directions from the 
Court of Justice, that a national measure cannot be applied because it violates 
Community obligations. Given the keenness of individuals to invoke Community law 
and the binding effect of national courts’ judgements on their governments, such a
33 Article 251 EC.
34 Cases 138/79 Roquette Freres v. Council [1980] ECR 3333; 139/79 M aizena  v. Council [1980] ECR 
3393.
35 With regard to actions o f  the first type, firstly, the Court may, under Article 230 EC, rule on the validity 
o f  secondary Community legislation on the ground o f  lack o f  competence, infringement o f  an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement o f  the Treaty (including the general principles o f  Community law) 
or misuse o f  power, on request from a Member State, a Community institutions or, subject to strict rules 
as to their locus standi, a natural or legal person. Secondly, the Court may, under Article 232 EC, rule on 
a claim from a Community institution or a Member State that a Community institution has ‘failed to act’ 
when it had an obligation to do so. Thirdly, in accordance with Article 300(6) EC the Council, the 
Commission or a Member State may request the Court to deliver an opinion as to the compatibility o f  a 
proposed Community external agreement with the Treaty. With regard to actions o f  the second type, the 
Court may, inter a lia , under Articles 226 and 227 EC, rule on a claim from a Member State or the 
Commission that a Member State has ‘failed to fulfil an obligation’ under Community law. A Member 
State so in breach must take the necessary measures to comply with the Court’s judgement, and the Court 
has the power to fine a Member State that fails to do so. Moreover, in Francovich  (Case C-6 and 9/90  
[1991] ECR 1-5357) the Court held that a Member State is liable for loss and damage caused to 
individuals as a result o f  a breach o f  Community law for which it is responsible.
36 Article 234 EC.
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procedure becomes a formidable instrument to ensure compliance with Community 
obligations.
Another special feature of the Community method is the ‘direct applicability’ of 
Community legislation in the legal systems of the Member States. Regulations are 
immediately directly applicable, and their transposition into a national instrument is 
prohibited. Directives leave discretion to the national authorities only as to the ‘form 
and method’ by which their objective is to be achieved.
Uniform direct applicability is a feature that distinguishes Community law from 
international law. With very few and limited exceptions,37 the effect of international law 
in the legal system of States depends on their constitutional approach to incorporation. 
In States that adopt a dualist approach, international law instruments will take effect in 
the internal legal system only after they have been transposed into national measures. 
Given the long time ratification by national parliaments usually takes, Community law 
thus presents the practical advantage of becoming applicable swiftly and at a precise 
and predictable point in time.38
Notoriously, the other side of the coin is the so-called ‘democratic deficit’. Given that 
the Council is not directly elected (and may take decisions by qualified majority) and 
that the European Parliament has a weak position in the legislative process, direct 
applicability causes a democratic deficit which becomes increasingly serious as 
Community competence expands. The effectiveness of Community law (as resulting 
from the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy) highly exacerbates this democratic 
deficit.40
The answer that has been given to the democratic deficit focuses on a progressive 
strengthening of the roles of the European Parliament (particularly in the light of the 
extension of qualified majority voting in the Council)41 and of national parliaments. The
37 See Cassese (2001) pp. 79-85.
38 Denza (2002) p. 12.
39 Not only because o f  the limited powers o f  the European Parliament against the Council in the law­
making process, but also because o f  the citizens’ weak perception o f  the European Parliament as their 
direct representative.
40 See Weiler (1999) p. 38, who holds that the Member States accepted the ‘constitutionalization’ o f  the 
Community legal structure also because it enhanced the powers o f  their governments. See also Ballarino
(1997) p. 45, who argues that ‘normative supranational ism ’ was paralleled by a movement towards 
‘intergovemmentalism’ at the level o f  policy-making, reflected in particular in the increased importance 
o f  the European Council.
41 The ‘consultation’ procedure was the only one envisaged by the original EC Treaty. The SEA  
introduced the ‘co-operation’ (now used only in very limited cases) and ‘assent’ procedures. The 
Maastricht Treaty introduced the ‘co-decision’ procedure, which has been extended and simplified by the 
Treaty o f  Amsterdam. In general the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have strengthened the
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Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union42 attached to the 
Treaty of Amsterdam provides that all Commission consultation documents are to be 
‘promptly’ forwarded to national parliaments. Moreover, before a proposal may be 
placed on the Council agenda there must be a six-week period from the date copies of 
the proposal have been made available to the European Parliament and the Council so as 
to allow scrutiny by national parliaments.
The Constitutional Treaty strengthens the role of national parliaments in various ways 
and particularly by giving national parliaments a ‘yellow card’ procedure to appraise the 
principle of subsidiarity.43
Addressing the Community democratic deficit through {inter alia) a strengthening of 
the role of national parliaments affirms a refusal to transpose the national model of 
parliamentary democracy to the European level, which is underpinned by the lack of 
consensus on developing the Union into a State.44
The most striking feature of the Community method is the effect of Community law in 
the legal systems of the Member States as it results from the legal doctrines developed 
by the Court of Justice.
The Court of Justice has ruled that Community law is capable of ‘direct effect’.45 When 
it is clear, precise and self-sufficient, Community law can be invoked by individuals 
before any national courts in a Member State, which must afford adequate legal 
remedies. By developing and requiring a uniform approach to enforcement by 
individuals, Community law sharply differentiates itself from international law. As 
mentioned earlier, the effect of international law in the legal systems of States depends 
on their constitutional approach to incorporation. In States that adopt a dualist approach 
an international law instrument capable of conferring rights or duties on individuals will 
not in itself be enforceable in the internal legal system. Only the transposing national 
measure can be invoked before the national court as a source of rights and duties.
Parliament’s role by providing for more intense participation procedures where less intense participation 
procedures were envisaged. The ‘co-decision’ procedure has become the rule for the adoption o f  
legislative acts.
42 OJ 1997 C 340/113.
43 Article 1-9(3) and Protocol on the application o f  the principle o f  subsidiarity and proportionality.
44 See Draetta (1999) p. 45; Verhoeven (2002) p. 71.
45 Cases 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1; 41/74 Van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337. International 
agreements to which the Community is a party, as an integral part o f  Community law, may be capable 
depending on their nature o f  direct effect: Cases 87/75 B resciani[\916]  ECR 129; 104/81 Kupferberg  
[1982] ECR 3641.
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Parallel to the doctrine of direct effect, the Court of Justice developed the doctrine of 
supremacy of Community law.46 According to the doctrine of supremacy, Community 
law takes precedence over national law to the effect that national law which conflicts 
with Community law, including national constitutional law, becomes inapplicable.47 
The doctrine of supremacy again sharply distinguishes Community law from 
international law. Although international law regards itself as hierarchically superior to 
national law and compliance with national law cannot justify a failure to comply with 
international law obligations, international law remains result orientated. A conflict 
between obligations emanating from international law and national law does not result 
in the invalidity of one or the other obligation but in responsibility for breach of the 
relevant obligation.48
The doctrine of supremacy realizes in full the effect of the doctrine of direct effect. 
While the doctrine of direct effect results in the automatic incorporation of Community 
law in the internal legal systems of the Member States regardless of their constitutional 
approach, the doctrine of supremacy establishes a hierarchy of norms to the effect that 
Community law may not be set aside by national law adopted subsequently or by 
constitutional norms.49
Two other important doctrines characterize the Community legal method: the doctrines 
of implied powers and pre-emption.
The Community, as an international organization, operates under the principle of 
attribution of (defined and limited) powers. The Court of Justice has, however, adopted 
a purposive approach to the determination of the scope of Community powers. It has 
ruled that the existence of a given objective or task implies the existence of any power
46 Cases 6/64 Costa  v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585; 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629.
47 It remains for national courts to declare national law inapplicable.
48 See however Joined Cases C -10-22/97 IN.CO.GE  [1998] ECR 1-6307, where the Court held that the 
doctrine o f  supremacy does not render a national rule automatically invalid, but requires a national judge 
to refrain from applying it. See Dashwood (2004) p. 378.
49 See, however, the position expressed by the German Constitutional Court in Brunner, supra  n. 23. The 
German Constitutional Court held, at para. 23, that: ‘If a Council decision made in accordance with Titles 
V or VI o f  the Union Treaty should be implemented by a legal measures o f  the European 
Community...and constitutional rights were infringed as a result, then the European Court or alternatively 
the Federal Constitutional Court would offer adequate protection o f  those rights. Here too, the 
Constitutional Court and the European Court are in a relationship o f  co-operation for the guarantee o f  
constitutional protection, under which they complement one another’. Further, at para. 49, the Court held 
that: ‘[T]he Federal Constitutional Court w ill review legal instruments o f  European institutions and 
agencies to see whether they remain within the limits o f  sovereign rights conferred on them or transgress 
them.’
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necessary to carry it out.50 Such an approach lies at the basis of the doctrine of implied 
powers regarding the Community external powers. The doctrine of implied powers 
recognizes that the attainment of a Community internal objective may require the 
exercise of external powers by the Community. This may be so when the attainment of 
the Community objective is ‘inextricably linked’ to the exercise of an external power by 
the Community,51 or when the exercise of an external power by the Community is 
necessary in order to preserve common internal rules.52 Accordingly, external 
Community competence does not exclusively arises from an express conferment, but it 
may also be implied from Treaty provisions or acts adopted by the Community 
institutions.53
The Court of Justice’s approach to the determination of the scope of Community powers 
has been regarded suspiciously by the Member States particularly in the light of another 
related doctrine developed by the Court, the doctrine of pre-emption or exclusivity.54 
According to the doctrine of pre-emption (which may partly be seen as a reflection of 
the doctrine of supremacy), the existence of a Community rule will preclude even 
parallel national legislation.55 Also, whenever the Community adopts common rules 
internally, the Member States are precluded from undertaking external obligations that 
may affect those rules, and the Community alone is in a position to assume contractual 
obligations towards third countries.56
50 Case 281/85 Germany and others v. Commission  [1987] ECR 3203. See however the Court’s position 
(following the judgement o f  the German Constitutional Court in Brunner) as to the scope o f  Article 235 
EC, expressed in Opinion 2/94 (ECHR) [1996] ECR 1-1759. The Court, at para. 30, held that: ‘On any 
view, Article 235 cannot be used as a basis for the adoption o f  provisions whose effect would, in 
substance be to amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it provides for that purpose’.
51 Opinion 1/94 (WTO) [1994] ECR 1-5267; Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention) [1993] ECR 1-1061; Opinion 
1/76 (Rhine Navigation) [1977] ECR 741.
52 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 262.
53 AETR Case, supra  n. 52, para. 4.
54 For example, the German Constitutional Court held at para. 99 o f  the Brunner judgement, supra  n. 23, 
that: ‘Whereas a dynamic extension o f  the existing Treaties has so far been supported on the basis o f  an 
open-handed treatment o f  Article 235 o f  the EEC Treaty as a ‘competence to round-off the Treaty’ as a 
whole, and on the basis o f  considerations relating to the ‘implied powers’ o f  the Communities, and o f  
Treaty interpretation as allowing maximum exploitation o f  Community powers ( ‘effet u tile’), in future it 
will have to be noted as regards interpretation o f  enabling provisions by Community institutions and 
agencies that the Union Treaty as a matter o f  principle distinguishes between the exercise o f  a sovereign 
power conferred for limited purposes and the amending o f  the Treaty, so that its interpretation may not 
have effects that are equivalent to an extension o f  the Treaty. Such an interpretation o f  enabling rules 
would not produce any binding effects for Germany’. See also the subsequent position o f  the Court o f  
Justice as to the use o f  Article 235 EC, expressed in Opinion 2/94 (ECHR), supra  n. 50.
55 Cases 16/83 Prantl [1984] ECR 1299; 222/82 Apple and P ear D evelopm ent Council v. Lewis [1983] 
ECR 4083; 272/83 Commission v. Italy [1985] ECR 1057; 216/84 Commission v. France [1988] ECR 
793.
56 AETR Case, supra  n. 52. Exclusive Community competence thus depends on the extent o f  internal 
harmonization. I f  a field is regulated exhaustively by Community rules, the Community w ill have 
exclusive competence. On the other hand, i f  common rules establish only minimum standards, the
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The doctrines of implied powers and pre-emption aim at maintaining uniformity and 
imply a considerable loss of national autonomy. Such doctrines further differentiate the 
Community method from the international law method, which, besides requiring
57compliance with international law obligations, does not limit the actions of States.
3. The intergovernmental Pillars
3.1 The Maastricht Treaty
3.1.1 The Second Pillar
Cooperation on foreign policy began in 1969. European Political Cooperation (EPC), as 
cooperation on foreign policy was named, was then kept strictly distinct from the 
Community system. As Nuttall explains:
‘EPC was designed to operate in such a way as to guarantee that national sovereignty in the 
conduct o f  foreign policy should not be diminished by contamination with the Community 
system. In the early years, not only was the Commission excluded from many o f  EPC’s 
activities, but Member States were reluctant to make use o f  Community instruments to 
implement the policies o f  EPC. Countries like France, and later Denmark and Greece, anxious to 
keep the intergovernmental nature o f  Political Cooperation unsullied, were reticent, but so also 
were countries like the Netherlands which did not wish the methods o f  EPC to be imported into 
the Community’.58
Since then, the development of cooperation on foreign policy has been driven by two 
factors. The first factor is a search for greater efficiency and effectiveness which has led 
to concentration on improving EPC procedures, with some Member States and the 
Commission advocating an alignment of EPC procedures to those of the Community. 
The second factor is a need for consistency between foreign policy resulting from 
political cooperation and the Community external policies.59 The question of how 
consistency should be achieved (through an intergovernmental or Community 
emphasis) is of constitutional importance and remains unanswered. What has been
Member States w ill retain a degree o f  control and competence will be ‘shared’. See Opinion 2/91 (ILO 
Convention) and Opinion 1/94 (WTO), supra  n. 51. Even when common rules have not been adopted, the 
Community may have exclusive external competence. This w ill be so when the exercise o f  exclusive 
external competence by the Community is ‘inextricably linked’ with the attainment o f  a specific 
Community objective. See supra  n. 51.
57 Denza (2002) p. 17.
58 Nuttall (1992) p. 260. See also Baches Opi and Floyd (2003) p. 303.
59 See for example the 1973 Copenhagen Report, 1981 London Report, the 1983 Solemn Declaration o f  
Stuttgart and Article 30.5 o f  the SEA 1986. See Schmalz (1998) p. 422-424; Nuttall (2000) p. 26-27;
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reached so far is a compromise that relies on cooperation between the two systems, 
which is often successful, but does not rule out the possibility of conflict.60 
Thus, over the years EPC evolved into a progressively more formal and institutionalized 
system and one increasingly closely linked to the Community. The first significant step 
in this direction was the SEA of 1986 whereby EPC was for the first time put in treaty 
form and its provisions featured alongside those for amending the Treaty of Rome.61 
Article 30.5 of the SEA prescribed that ‘the external policies of the European 
Community and the policies agreed in European Political Cooperation must be 
consistent. The Presidency and the Commission, each within its own sphere of 
competence, shall have special responsibility for ensuring that such consistency is 
sought and maintained’.
Notwithstanding some success and the fact that it slowly but significantly transformed 
working practices within national diplomatic services, EPC became increasingly 
criticized for its inability to deal adequately with international crises, its reactive 
character and its confinement to declaratory diplomacy.63
The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were 
the main events that led to greater focus on the issue of ‘political union’. The Dublin 
European Council of 25-26 June 1990 reached agreement on convening an 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union on 14 December 1990, which 
was to parallel the IGC on Monetary Union. The Franco-German initiative for an IGC 
proposed to concentrate on strengthening the democratic legitimation of the Union and 
its institutions, ensuring coherence of Union activities, and defining and implementing a 
common foreign and security policy. What a common foreign and security policy 
meant was however unclear until the Rome European Council of 27 and 28 October 
1990.64
This compromise is the pillar structure. The pillar structure maintains the intergovernmental method for 
foreign and security policy, declares the independence o f  the Community, and at the same time introduces 
a ‘single institutional structure’ and a requirement o f  consistency.
61 Nuttall (2000) p. 19.
62 Forster and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 465; Denza (2002) p. 39; Baches Opi and Floyd (2003) p. 307.
63 Regelsberger and W essels (1996) pp. 32-34. See also Forster and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 466, who 
conclude that there was little evidence that EPC had exerted any direct influence on Arab-Israeli relations 
or on events in Sub-Saharan Africa or in the Persian Arabic Gulf. See also Soetendorp (1999) pp. 93-113; 
Baches Opi and Floyd (2003) pp. 304-306. For an in-depth analysis o f  EPC see Nuttall (1992).
64 Nuttall (2000) p. 126.
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Although there were ambitions for closer integration of EPC within the Community 
structure, during the 1990 IGC the Member States ultimately expressed a preference for 
the draft Treaty prepared by Luxembourg as the basis for negotiations.65 This draft 
Treaty essentially maintained the distinction between the Community and EPC by 
proposing a three-pillar structure for the European Union whereby the Community 
would be complemented by provisions on intergovernmental cooperation on a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and on Justice and Home Affairs. This draft Treaty was 
severely criticized by the Commission for perpetuating the division between the 
Community and EPC.66
The Treaty on European Union agreed at Maastricht in February 1992 confirmed the 
Luxembourg proposal, and introduced a three-pillar structure for the European Union. 
The Common and Final Provisions of the TEU held the three Pillars together. Of 
particular significance were those establishing a ‘single institutional framework’ and 
requiring ‘consistency’ of Union activities.
Title V EU contained the provisions on a CFSP. The scope of the CFSP was generously
/TO
defined as covering ‘all areas of foreign and security policy’. Specific objectives 
included safeguarding the independence of the Union, strengthening the security of the 
Union and that of the Member States, preserving peace and strengthening international 
security, developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.69 These objectives were to be pursued by the 
Union through two forms of activity: (i) systematic co-operation between the Member 
States, and (ii) the gradual implementation of joint action in areas where the Member 
States had important interests in common.70 Systematic co-operation between the 
Member States entailed: (i) an exchange of information and consultation within the 
Council on matters of general interest, (ii) the definition of ‘common positions’, and 
(iii) the co-ordination of the Member States’ action in international organizations and at
65 Notoriously, the more integrationist Dutch Draft Treaty was rejected.
66 Nuttall (2000) p. 164.
67 Article C EU.
68 Article J. 1(1) EU. See Neuwhal (1994) pp. 228-233. Security was also included as an issue for co­
operation (arguably particularly following the events o f  the G ulf War), a remarkable development from 
EPC.
69 Article J .l(2 ) EU.
70 Article J.1(3)E U .
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international conferences. Co-operation was also envisaged between the Member States’ 
embassies and consular posts and the Commission delegations.71 
On the other hand, what was meant by ‘the gradual implementation of joint action’ was 
not spelt out. The inclusion of the concept of ‘joint action’, implying operational 
activity, was however an improvement from EPC which concentrated mainly on 
systematic co-operation.
While in line with the intergovernmental method the Member States continued to play 
the central role under the CFSP, a significant development was that now, as a reflection 
of the principle of the ‘single institutional framework’ introduced by Article C EU, the 
Member States when taking decisions acted as the EC Council. Previously, even 
proposals to merge EPC’s and Council’s meetings, in an attempt to align procedures, 
had been rejected, and the only concession granted was that EPC issues could be
T7discussed during EC Council meetings. Under the CFSP the EC Council became the 
main executive body and was specifically invested with the task of ensuring the ‘unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union’.73
The Council was to define and implement the CFSP on the basis of general political 
guidelines adopted by the European Council. It was to be served by a Political 
Committee consisting of Political Directors. The primary role of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper) -  the body responsible for preparing the work of 
the Council within the Community framework -  was however safeguarded.74 Proposals 
prepared by the Political Committee were transmitted to the Council through Coreper, 
which normally commented only on proposals with First Pillar implications.75 
The Council could adopt two kinds of measures: common positions and joint actions.76 
These were left undefined. It was however prescribed that joint actions were to spell out 
their scope, the Union’s objective, if necessary their duration, and the means, 
procedures and conditions for their implementation.
The general voting rule remained unanimity. Qualified majority voting was envisaged 
only for procedural questions and for matters for which the Council so decided.
71 Articles J.2 and J.6 EU.
72 See the 1981 London Report, the 1983 Solemn Declaration o f  Stuttgart and the 1986 SEA. See Denza
(2002) p. 38.
73 Articles J.8(2) and J.l 1 EU.
74 Article J.8(5) EU.
75 On the problems in relation to the division o f  competence between the Political Committee and 
Coreper, and the fusion o f  the EPC and the Council working groups, see Regelsberger and W essels 
(1996) p. 36; W essel (1999) pp. 79-85.
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The right of initiative was shared between the Member States and the Commission.77 In 
practice, most proposals originated from the Presidency.
The Presidency was invested with the task of representing the Union on CFSP matters 
and implementing the common measures by expressing the Union position in 
international organizations and conferences. The entrustment of these functions to the 
Presidency emphasized the intergovernmental character of the CFSP. At the same time, 
it undermined continuity of approach. This lack of continuity was only partly redressed 
by the fact that the Presidency was to be assisted by the previous and next Presidency 
(the so called ‘troika’ formula), and that the Commission was to be ‘fully associated’.
The Treaty prescribed mandatory effect for common positions and joint actions. This 
was a remarkable development from EPC, whose instruments carried no legal force. 
Under the CFSP, the Member States were to ‘ensure that their national policies conform 
to common positions’.79 They were to uphold common positions in international 
organizations and at international conferences, regardless of whether all Member States 
participated.80 The Member States embassies and consular posts and the Commission’s 
delegations were also required to co-operate in ensuring that common positions and 
measures were complied with and implemented.81 Joint actions were to ‘commit the
87Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’.
Common positions and joint actions were thus intended to bind the Member States 
under international law. The Treaty did not however provide for enforcement 
mechanisms.
The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice was excluded by virtue of Article L 
EU. The Court had jurisdiction only in relation to the division of competence between 
the Community and the CFSP by virtue of Article M EU. The exclusion of the Court 
was due to fears on the part of the Member States that the Court might erode the 
intergovernmental character of the CFSP through introduction of pro-integration legal 
doctrines developed within the Community sphere. A further reason for the exclusion of 
the Court was that the conditions for judicial resolution of disputes did not really exist
76 Articles J.2(2) and J.3 EU.
77 Article J.8(3) EU.
78 Article J.5 EU.
79 Article J.2(2) EU.
80 Article J.2(3) EU.
81 Article J.6 EU.
82 Article J.3(4) EU.
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because of the nature of CFSP measures and the nature of the CFSP itself, which
• 83implied the continuing existence of national foreign policies.
As a reflection of the intergovernmental character of the CFSP, the other EC institutions 
were involved in the CFSP only to a limited extent.
The Commission formally shared a right of initiative with the Member States and was 
to be ‘fully associated’ in the activities of the CFSP.84 The European Parliament was to 
be ‘consulted’ by the Presidency on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP. 
The Presidency was to ensure that the views of the Parliament were taken into 
consideration. The Parliament was to be kept ‘regularly informed’ by the Presidency 
and the Commission on CFSP developments. It could submit questions to the Council 
and make recommendations to it, and was to hold an annual debate on progress in 
implementing the CFSP.85
The operational expenditure of the CFSP was either to be charged to the Member States 
or, following a unanimous decision of the Council, to the Community budget, in which 
case the budgetary procedure of the EC treaty would be applicable. In the latter case, 
therefore, in view of their powers in the Community budgetary procedure, the
OiT
Parliament and the Commission could increase their influence over CFSP measures.
3.1.2 The Third Pillar
The Third Pillar is considered more fully in Chapter 3 on the development of a common 
visa policy under the Maastricht Treaty. This section will cover only some essential 
points.
The Third Pillar marked an important step forward from pre-Maastricht 
intergovernmental cooperation on JHA as it provided for a more structured framework 
for cooperation and was inserted among the activities of the newly created European 
Union.
The institutional and procedural provisions of the Third Pillar reflected its 
intergovernmental character. The Community institutions (other than the Council) had a 
very limited role. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was excluded. Under Third 
Pillar provisions, it was however possible to attribute jurisdiction to the Court with
83 Denza (2002) p. 312.
84 Article J.9 EU. Some form o f  ‘association’ had been provided for since the 1981 London Report.
85 Article J.7 EU. The SEA had already provided for the close association o f  the European Parliament
86 Article J .l 1(2) EU. On the institutional disputes in connection with the CFSP financing, see Schmalz
(1998) p. 429.
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regard to the interpretation and application of conventions adopted under the Third 
Pillar. This flexibility resulted in endless negotiations in the Council over the role of the 
Court in individual conventions. The general voting rule was unanimity, with qualified 
majority envisaged only for procedural and implementing measures. The Commission 
was granted a right of initiative for some of the areas covered which it shared with the 
Member States. It however made very little use of it because no agreement existed 
among the Member States as to the Commission’s proper role under the Third Pillar.
The Third Pillar was characterized by some serious structural deficiencies that arguably 
prevented it from delivering adequate results. It lacked specific objectives. The legal 
effect of some of its instruments (‘joint actions’ and ‘joint positions’) remained unclear 
and the Member States developed the practice of relying on clearly non-binding 
instruments, which were often not implemented at national level. International 
conventions were the only clearly legally binding instruments available under the Third 
Pillar. As a result of slow and uneven national ratification, they took years before 
coming into force and no real monitoring of their implementation took place. Moreover, 
the Third Pillar was characterized by a cumbersome five-layer decision-making 
structure which considerably hindered decision-making. A further problem was that it 
overlapped with Community competence with regard to certain areas, which gave rise 
to bitter disputes between the institutions.
3.2 The Amsterdam Treaty
3.2.1 The Second Pillar
In preparation for the 1996 IGC required under the Maastricht Treaty, the Corfu 
European Council of June 1994 decided to set up a Reflection Group and invited the 
Community institutions to prepare reports on the functioning of the TEU.87 
Both the European Parliament and the Commission advocated the integration of the 
CFSP and the external competences of the Community into a single framework for the 
sake of consistency and in order to strengthen the identity of the Union. According to 
the Commission, the ‘single institutional framework’ had not proven capable of 
ensuring consistency between the Community and the CFSP. Both institutions also 
advocated improving the CFSP through the introduction of qualified majority voting 
and the strengthening of the role of the Community institutions.88
87 For an assessment o f  the functioning o f  the CFSP under Maastricht see Denza (2002) pp. 85-122.
88 European Parliament Resolution on the functioning o f  the TEU with a view  to the 1996 IGC; 
Commission Report for the Reflection Group 1995.
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The Reflection Group identified the need for more effective external action. It suggested 
strengthening the CFSP at the levels of policy formulation, decision-making and 
implementation. Specific proposals included the setting up of a policy planning unit and 
the appointment of a High Representative.89
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on 2 October 1997, introduced various innovations to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Second Pillar and ensure consistency 
between the Community and the CFSP.
The way in which the Union is to pursue the objectives of the CFSP was clarified and 
elaborated, and emphasis was laid on operational action. Accordingly, the Union is to 
pursue the objectives of the CFSP by: (i) defining the principles and general guidelines 
of the CFSP; (ii) deciding on common strategies; (iii) adopting joint actions; (iv) 
adopting common positions; and lastly (v) strengthening systematic co-operation 
between the Member States.90
Common strategies are decided unanimously by the European Council in areas where 
Member States have ‘important interests in common’. They are implemented by the 
Council in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.91 
This new instrument was introduced specifically to further consistency between the 
Community and the CFSP, and thus increase the effectiveness of Union action. In line 
with the over-arching role of the European Council envisaged by Article 4 EU, common 
strategies express the Union’s overall position towards a third country or particular 
theme, bringing together First, Second and Third Pillar issues.
In view of Article 47 EU, it remains doubtful to what extent the Commission and 
Council are legally bound to implement common strategies through First Pillar 
measures. Still, since common strategies are defined by the European Council and may 
create expectations on the part of third countries, the Commission comes under 
considerable political pressure to execute them. A problem which remains is that 
common strategies do not rule out the possibility of institutional conflict as to the choice 
of legal basis for their implementation. In any case, little use has been made of them, 
arguably as qualified majority voting is prescribed for their implementation.94
89 Reflection Group’s Report 1995, SN 520/95 (Reflex 21). For an assessment o f  the working o f  the CFSP 
under Maastricht, see Baches Opi and Floyd (2003) particularly p. 319.
90 Article 12 EU. The issue o f  defence is not considered in this work.
91 Article 13 EU.
92 For a critical appraisal see Hillion (2000b) pp. 1228-1235.
93 Hillion (2000a) pp. 297-300.
94 See for example Cremona (2004) p. 569.
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‘Joint actions’ and ‘common positions’ were clearly differentiated. Joint actions are to 
‘address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be 
required’.95 Common positions are to ‘define the approach of the Union to a particular 
matter of a geographical or thematic nature’.96 A novelty introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in relation to joint actions, with a view to achieving consistency, is that the 
Council can now request the Commission to submit to it any appropriate proposals to 
ensure the implementation of a joint action.97 This provision considerably increases the 
political pressure on the Commission to execute CFSP decisions within the Community 
Pillar.98
The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced a provision whereby the Council can 
conclude international agreements in the field of CFSP (and PJC),99 while it did not 
expressly grant the Union legal personality (proposals to that effect having been 
rejected).100 Such a provision was accompanied by a Declaration which specified that 
the provision and any resulting agreement ‘shall not imply any transfer of competence 
from the Member States to the European Union’.
As regards voting in the Council, the Amsterdam Treaty marked a move away from 
insistence on unanimity by introducing the possibility of ‘constructive abstentions’ and 
qualified majority voting for certain cases.101 Under the provisions on ‘constructive 
abstentions’, abstaining Member States can make a formal declaration qualifying their 
abstention. In such a case, they are not bound by the decision adopted, but are under a
95 Article 14(1) EU.
96 Article 15 EU.
97 Article 14(4) EU.
98 Schmalz (1998) p. 436.
99 Article 24 EU provided that the Council, acting unanimously, could authorize the Presidency, assisted 
by the Commission to open the necessary negotiations for the conclusion o f  an agreement with one or 
more States or international organizations. The Council was to conclude the agreement on a 
recommendation from the Presidency and the Member States were to be bound by the agreement subject 
to their national ratification procedures. The Treaty o f  N ice prescribed action by qualified majority when 
the agreement was envisaged for the implementation o f  a joint action or common position. Further, it 
provided that agreements ‘shall be binding on the institutions o f  the Union’.
00 Article 24 EU gave new impetus to the discussion as to whether the EU possesses legal personality.
See Cremona (1999) pp. 167-168; Neuwahl (2001); Editorial Comments (2001); Denza (2002) pp. 173- 
178; Dashwood (2003b); Eeckhout (2004) pp. 157-160. If  the position is taken that the Union has legal 
personality, the situation is unsatisfactory with regard to possible remedies against the Union since the 
TEU makes no provision on remedies or responsibility, the ECJ has no jurisdiction over the CFSP and the 
Union cannot be taken before the ICJ. See Denza (2003a); Vitsentzatos (2003). On the agreements so far 
concluded see Eeckhout (2004) pp. 159-160.
101 Article 23 EU. Such a move resulted in particular from irritation at Greek obstruction o f  common 
policies on Macedonia and Turkey. See Forster and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 484.
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duty to refrain from taking actions likely to conflict with or impede Union’s action 
based on the decision.102
Qualified majority voting was introduced for the adoption of joint actions, common 
positions and other measures on the basis of common strategies, and for the adoption of 
decisions implementing common strategies. A Member State can oppose the use of 
qualified majority voting for important and stated reasons of national policy. In such a 
case, a vote is not taken and the Council can, acting by qualified majority, refer the 
matter to the European Council.103
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced further important innovations. Firstly, it 
introduced a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) whose tasks include: 
(i) monitoring and analysing relevant international developments; (ii) providing 
assessments of the Union’s foreign policy interests and identifying areas where the 
CFSP could focus in future; (iii) providing timely assessments and early warning of 
events which may have significant repercussions for the CFSP; (iv) producing argued 
policy options papers to be presented under the responsibility of the Presidency as a 
contribution to policy formulation in the Council.104 The Commission is represented in 
the PPEWU (which strengthens its role in the CFSP and thus contributes towards 
consistency).
Secondly, it strengthened the external representation of the Union by introducing a 
‘permanent face’, the High Representative for the CFSP, who, as Secretary General of 
the Council, is to assist the Presidency. His tasks include contributing to the 
formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and, when 
appropriate, conducting political dialogue with third parties.105 The High Representative 
also takes part in the new style troika alongside the Presidency and the Commission.106
102 This provision was strongly criticized on the ground that it has the effect o f  upgrading the position o f  a 
dissenting Member State to a formal act o f  dissociation. This would not only send a clear sign to third 
parties that strong disagreement existed between the Member States, but it would also make it difficult for 
the dissenting Member State to modify its position to conform to that o f  the Union. See Monar (1997a) p. 
419. On the other hand, the possibility o f  constructive abstentions was described as to ‘provide the only 
means o f  effecting a CFSP that retains consistency and coherence with the policies adopted within the EC 
framework’. See Edwards and Philippart (1997) p. 32 quoted in Cremona (1999) p. 169. See also 
Gormley (1999) p. 60, who holds that ‘the constructive abstention technique...effectively recognizes the 
political reality that a Member State might find itself unable to support a decision (because o f  particular 
relations with a third country) yet be unwilling to frustrate Union action’.
103 This provision has been criticized as amounting to a formal codification o f  the Luxembourg 
compromise. See Monar (1997a) p. 420; Dashwood (1999) pp. 215-216.
104 Declaration to the Final Act on the establishment o f  a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit.
105 Article 26 EU.
106 Article 18(3) EU.
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Furthermore, the Council is given express power to appoint, whenever it thinks 
necessary, a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy
107issues.
As regards financing, it is provided that operational expenditure is to be automatically 
charged to the Community, and an Inter-institutional Agreement on financing was 
reached between the institutions.108
The CFSP procedures, following the Treaty of Amsterdam, have been described as 
‘gradually resembling those of the First Pillar’: a single authority is to be responsible for 
planning and development; a hierarchy of instruments is introduced; the possibility of 
qualified majority voting is contemplated; representation is strengthened; and the 
Parliament, as a result of the Inter-institutional Agreement on financing, increased its 
degree of control.109
Furthermore, some provisions were introduced specifically on consistency including 
those on common strategies, on the Commission’s participation in the PPEWU and on 
the possibility for the Council to request the Commission to put forward proposals for 
the implementation of joint actions. Still, a number of missed opportunities have been 
identified.110
107 Article 18(5) EU. For the background to these provisions see Forster and Wallace, W. (2000) pp. 482- 
484.
108 Article 28 EU.
109 See de Zwaan (1998) pp. 188-189; Schmalz (1998).
1,0 Monar (1997a) pp. 432-434.
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3.2.2 The Third Pillar
During the 1996 IGC leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam, JHA emerged as one of the 
areas most in need of reform. Given the underlying differences between the Member 
States, the reforms introduced were marked by extreme complexity and 
differentiation.111 Many areas previously within the scope of the Third Pillar were 
transferred to Community competence.112 The scope of the remaining Third Pillar is 
now restricted to police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters -  which has 
dramatically increased in importance and volume -  and the Third Pillar has been 
completely recast.113
The Third Pillar now covers, as well as co-operation between the authorities of the 
Member States, approximation of Member States’ legislation on criminal matters.114 
New instruments have been introduced.115 There are now four types of measures: (i) 
‘Common positions’, which define the Union approach to a particular matter; (ii) 
‘Framework decisions’, which can be used for the approximation of laws and which are 
binding on the Member States as to their result to be achieved but leave to them the 
choice of form and method; (iii) ‘Decisions’, which can be used for any purpose other 
than approximation of laws; and (iv) ‘Conventions’.
The legal effect of each type of instrument is spelt out. All the instruments except 
common positions are legally binding, while any direct effect of framework decisions 
and decisions is explicitly excluded.
As regards conventions two important innovations were introduced in an attempt to 
reduce uncertainty and delays as to their entry into force. Firstly, the Council can by 
unanimity set a time limit by which the Member States have to begin ratification 
procedures. Although this time limit does not bind national parliaments, it was believed 
that it can at least put pressure on the Member States governments to lay conventions 
before their national parliaments without delay.116 Secondly, unless otherwise provided, 
conventions are to enter into force as soon as they are adopted by at least half of the
1,1 Monar (1998) p. 321.
112 See Chapter 4.
1,3 For a critical analysis o f  justice and home affairs provisions following Amsterdam see Den Boer 
(1999). She concludes, at p. 320, that ‘the new situation under Amsterdam may present us with an even 
more fragmented picture. Not only w ill justice and home affairs issues remain scattered across the EU and 
EC Treaties, and be hurdled by different compartmentalized administrative bodies, the flexibility  
arrangements and opt-in arrangements w ill contribute to a rather confusing and heterogeneous set-up. 
Depending on the issue at stake different voting procedures w ill apply to different Member States; 
conventions may be in force in one Member State and not in others; bilateral and multilateral security 
agreements may give rise to unfavourable coalition building within the Council etc.’.
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Member States. This, it was hoped, can exercise additional pressure on the Member
• 117States to proceed swiftly with ratification.
It is however apparent that since the new instruments were introduced, the Council has 
tended to adopt measures in the form of framework decisions and to avoid recourse to 
international conventions which, because of the failure of national parliaments to 
proceed swiftly with ratification, have proved to be a too inefficient and ineffective law­
making instrument.
Another important innovation is the possibility for the Council to conclude international 
agreements with third countries on matters covered by the Third Pillar.118 International 
agreements envisaged by the new provision of the CFSP can cover matters falling under 
the Third Pillar. The introduction of this provision underlines the necessity of external 
action for the attainment of Third Pillar objectives. Also, the CFSP provisions on 
external representations are now applicable to matters falling within the Third Pillar.119 
Decision-making in the Council is still by unanimity. However, measures implementing 
decisions are now to be automatically taken by a special qualified majority, and 
measures implementing conventions are to be taken by a two-thirds majority.120
114 Article 29 EU.
115 Article 34 EU.
1,6 Denza (2002) p. 25.
117 Monar (1998) p. 327.
118 Article 38 EU. The first agreement signed is with the United States and concerns extradition and 
mutual assistance, see Council doc. 9153/03 (www.statewatch.org). On this see Eeckhout (2004) p. 161.
119 Article 37 EU.
120 Article 34(2)(d) EU.
80
The role of the Community institutions was strengthened. The Commission now shares 
a right of initiative with the Member States in matters of police and judicial co­
operation.121 The greater role for Commission initiatives was expected to result inter 
alia in a more transparent law-making process.
The role of the European Parliament was likewise strengthened. The Council is now 
required to consult the Parliament before adopting framework decisions, decisions and 
conventions.122 Consultation is excluded in the case of common positions, which seem 
to have no legally binding force. The Parliament is granted a period of no less than three 
months for the scrutiny of proposed measures.123
The role of national parliaments was also strengthened, without prejudice to the 
Member States internal rules on parliamentary control over the executive. The Protocol 
on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union, attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, prescribed inter alia that proposals of ‘measures’ to be adopted under the 
Third Pillar are not to be included on the Council agenda for a period of six weeks from 
the date copies of such proposals are made available to the Council and the European 
Parliament. Such a period extends the possibility of effective scrutiny of proposals by 
national parliaments.
The Third Pillar also provides for more extensive jurisdiction for the Court of Justice.124
Three types of proceedings were introduced. Firstly, the Court can give preliminary
rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, on the
interpretation of conventions and on the validity and interpretation of measures 
1implementing them. The Court is not given jurisdiction to interpret Third Pillar 
Treaty Articles -  though it is difficult to see how the Court can avoid evaluating the 
provision attributing jurisdiction to it, or how it could adequately interpret Third Pillar 
measures without being able to interpret their legal bases.126
The jurisdiction of the Court to give preliminary rulings is however not automatic but 
subject to acceptance by the Member States.127 The Member States can opt either for 
allowing any of their national courts to make a reference or for limiting such a 
possibility to their courts of last resort.128 These provisions on optional jurisdiction 
spring from the compromises negotiated in relation to conventions adopted under the
121 Article 34(2) EU.
122 Article 39 EU.
123 The Parliament is not mentioned among the institutions which may bring annulment action under 
Article 35(6) EU. The Court may however recognize the Parliament’s locus standi for the purpose o f  
protecting its prerogatives.
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old Third Pillar.129 The implications of this flexibility are identified in an unequal 
treatment of Union citizens before national courts, a possible lack of uniformity of 
interpretation of Third Pillar measures130 and a threat to the Court position as a uniform 
arbiter.131
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is excluded in relation to ‘the validity and 
proportionality of operations carried out by the police or other law enforcement services 
of a Member State or the exercise of the responsibility incumbent upon the Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security’.132 This limitation underlines the intergovernmental character of the Third
Pillar by drawing a clear distinction between the international instrument and national
1application of the instrument, which is not to be reviewed by the Court. This 
provision, together with the exclusion of any direct effect for framework decisions and 
decisions and the fact that individuals cannot initiate an action for annulment of a Third 
Pillar measure, results in the exclusion of individual remedies.
The second type of proceedings introduced is action for annulment.134 The Court has 
jurisdiction to review the legality of framework decisions and decisions (but not 
conventions) on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural 
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, 
or misuse of powers. Actions can be brought by a Member State or the Commission (the 
Parliament and individuals are excluded) within two months from the publication of the 
measure.
124 Article 35 EU.
125 Article 35(1) EU. Common positions are excluded since they carry no legally binding force but only 
express a political strategy.
126 Curti Gialdino (1998) p. 60.
127 Article 35(2) EU.
128 Article 35(3) EU. By the time the Treaty o f  Amsterdam entered into force, ten Member States had 
declared that they would allow any o f  their courts to make a reference. O f these, seven Member States 
reserved the right to make references compulsory for courts o f  last resort. Spain allowed only courts o f  
last resort to make a reference, while the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and France made no 
provision for reference. See OJ 1999 C 120/24. Whatever their chosen position, under Article 35(4) EU, 
all Member States may present to the Court statements and written observations in preliminary ruling 
cases.
129 See Am ull (1999) p. 116.
130 Still, it is expectable that national courts o f  Member States which do not provide for the possibility o f  
a reference to the Court w ill follow  the Court’s interpretations. See Curti Gialdino (1998) pp. 61-62; 
Am ull (1999) p. 116; Denza (2002) p. 317.
131 See Fennelly (2000) pp. 8-10.
132 Article 35(5) EU.
133 See Denza (2002) p. 317.
134 Article 35(6) EU.
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Lastly, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on disputes between Member States regarding 
the interpretation or the application of Third Pillar acts whenever the Council cannot 
settle a dispute within six months of the matter being raised.135 The Court has also 
jurisdiction to rule on disputes between the Member States and the Commission but 
only as regards the interpretation and application of conventions. The Commission was 
given no right to bring proceedings against Member States for breach of Third Pillar 
commitments.
The introduction of some degree of judicial control over Third Pillar activity 
represented an important step forward. However, the jurisdiction of the Court is subject 
to significant limitations to the effect that individual remedies and supervision of
national implementation are excluded, it is partly optional, and it does not extend to
1 ^measures adopted under the old Third Pillar.
The Third Pillar also improved from the point of view of transparency as a result of a 
greater role for Commission initiatives and encouragement for publication of Member 
States’ initiatives. In a Declaration on Article 34(2) EU attached to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam the Member States agreed that initiatives for measures referred in Article 
34(2) EU and measures adopted by the Council are to be published in the Official 
Journal in accordance with the relevant Rules of Procedure of the Council and the 
Commission.
Furthermore, greater transparency and control of intergovernmental activities under the 
Second and Third Pillar results from the strengthening of the citizens’ right of access to 
documents of the Community institutions as resulting from the case law of the Court of 
First Instance137 and from the introduction of Article 255 EC.138
More transparency and control also resulted from the strengthening of the role of 
national parliaments as envisaged by the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments 
in the European Union.
4. Relationship between the Pillars
135 Article 35(7) EU.
136 For a different opinion see Curti Gialdino (1998) pp. 63-65.
137 See Cases Svenka and Kuijer, supra  n. 16.
138 Article 255 EC prescribed that ‘any citizen o f  the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or 
having its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right o f  access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents’ subject to the principles and limitations expressed in the 
institutions’ Rules o f  Procedures.
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The different nature of the Pillars led writers initially to treat them as ‘legally 
separate’.139 In particular, the TEU was at first not seen as establishing any meaningful 
connection between the Community and intergovernmental cooperation. The 
Community, with its unique character, was seen as remaining autonomous and strictly 
legally separate from intergovernmental cooperation.140 The ‘Union’ on its part was 
considered to be only a ‘term’ to describe the Contracting Parties acting within the 
CFSP and PJC.141
This approach was criticized as unduly focusing on the differences between the Pillars 
(with regard to institutional competences and the legal effect of instruments) and as 
overlooking the TEU’s efforts to unite them in a single system with a view to achieving 
consistency of Union’s action.142 It also overlooked the Union’s capacity to adopt 
binding legal measures and its increased decisional autonomy, as well as its emerging 
international identity.143
Although the three-pillar structure evidently rejects a complete fusion between the 
Community and intergovernmental cooperation in the form of homogeneity of 
procedures and of legal effect of instruments (which would make the current division 
between political and economic aspects of external issues redundant), it is arguable that 
it has established a single system whereby the Pillars only demarcate different capacities 
with partially specific legal instruments and procedures.144
Such conclusion can be based in particular on the fact that the TEU has established a 
‘single institutional framework’ and the requirement of ‘consistency’ of Union 
activity.145
139 See in particular Dehousse (1994); Koenig and Pechstein (1998); Draetta (1999) pp. 53-54.
140 Curtin (1993) pp. 23-26.
141 Or alternative: an ‘entity’, Heukels and de Zwaan (1994) p. 200; a ‘loose association’, Hendry (1993) 
p. 296; an ‘organizational framework’, Everling (1992) p. 1063; an ‘organization without legal status’, 
German Constitutional Court in Brunner, supra  n. 23.
142 See for example von Bogdandy and Nettesheim  (1996) pp. 272-273; Curtin and Dekker (1999) pp. 92- 
95; Shaw (2000) p. 169; W essel (2000b) p. 507; Tizzano (2002) pp. 141-144.
143 Shaw (2000) p. 169; W essel (1997); Cremona (1999) pp. 166-174.
144 Von Bogdandy (1999) p. 887.
145 Article 3 EU. The EU has been defined as a ‘layered international organization’ with one legal system  
that governs in a vertical way the three Pillars as sub-legal systems o f  the Union. Accordingly, the 
Community as a sub-organization o f  the Union has its own existence (and legal personality) and its own 
specific legal regime. See Curtin and Dekker (1999); de Witte (1998). This definition has however been 
attacked on the ground that the ‘single institutional framework’ makes it impossible to speak o f  the 
Community as an independent organization within the Union. Accordingly, the Union and the 
Community have fused in one single organization with one single legal personality. See von Bogdandy
(1999); W essel (2000b) p. 507; Tizzano (2002).
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Claiming that the Union forms a single legal system has important implications for the 
debate on the foundation of Community law and for a definition of the Union. 
Inevitably, any claim that the Community has been absorbed into a wider framework of 
an intergovernmental nature would seem to strengthen the international law foundation 
of Community law. At the same time, however, a single legal system would imply that 
the special features of the Community method, which the system clearly intends to 
preserve,146 can potentially extend over the system as a whole insofar as they are not 
expressly excluded.147
In this light, it is perhaps right to talk of the Union as a ‘constitutional order of 
States’.148 As Verhoeven stated: ‘Calling the European Union a ‘constitutional order’ 
implies that it can no longer be viewed as a loose set of treaty arrangements and 
diplomatic agreements that are the will of the Herren der Vertrage’.149
Although the TEU, by maintaining a dual method for external relations, cannot exclude
the possibility of institutional conflict over competence, it has introduced a number of
provisions specifically to facilitate the achievement of consistency.150 The institutions
themselves have developed practices to manage the ‘dualism’ of the EU external
relations and achieve consistency of Union action.151 Increasingly, issues are tackled by
a combination of instruments under the different Pillars. At the same time, increasingly
Community policies contain elements of political conditionality, and political decisions
1are ‘implemented’ through Community instruments. Overall, the institutions have 
proved capable of working within the TEU structure.153
5. The Constitutional Treaty
The Constitutional Treaty is largely based on the Draft Constitutional Treaty prepared 
by the European Convention. The European Convention was convened by the Laeken
146 Article 2 and 47 EU.
147 Von Bogdandy (1999) p. 909.
148 Dashwood (1998) p. 216.
149 Verhoeven (2002) p. 123.
150 These include those on the role o f  the European Council (Articles 4 and 13 EU), Article 14 EU, and 
those strengthening the Com m ission’s role within the CFSP.
151 See for example the dual-use goods’ regime, ‘m ixed’ agreements, and ‘model common positions’, 
supra  n. 6. See also the Court o f  Justice’s approach to consistency in Centro-Com, supra  n. 14 and in 
Opinion 1/94 (WTO), supra  n. 51.
15 See Cremona (1999) pp. 161 and 171; W essel (1999) pp. 321-322. For an account o f  this development 
see Nuttall (1992) pp. 260-281; Kuijper (1993).
153 von Bogdandy (1999); Curtin and Dekker (1999); W essel (2000a) p. 1168; Denza (2002) p. 308-309.
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European Council of December 2001 as part of the process of ‘debate on the future of 
Europe’ that was originally launched by the Nice European Council of December 2000 
and which was to culminate in an IGC on treaty revision in 2004. The mandate of the 
Convention was to produce a document reflecting consensus among its members on 
how the Union could be reformed to better achieve the objectives set by the Declaration 
on the Future of the European Union, including a more precise delimitation of 
competence between the Union and the Member States, the simplification and 
reorganization of the Treaties, and the improvement of the efficiency, transparency and 
democratic accountability of the decision-making process.
The Draft Constitutional Treaty so produced was declared by the Thessaloniki European 
Council of 20 June 2003 to be a ‘good basis’ for negotiations on treaty revision. The 
final Draft was presented to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 
2003. The IGC was opened on 4 October 2003, but negotiations collapsed in December 
2003 mainly because no agreement could be reached on voting arrangements in the 
Council.154 Agreement was finally reached on 18 June 2004.155
The Constitutional Treaty, in an attempt to ‘simplify and reorganize’ the Treaties, 
abolishes the three-pillar structure and introduces a unified structure for the Union. One 
single entity is created -  the European Union -  which is endowed with legal 
personality.156
From the point of view of procedure and institutional competence, the CFSP continues 
to be governed by its own special provisions -  unanimity is largely retained, the Court 
of Justice jurisdiction continues to be largely excluded,157 the European Parliament’s 
role remains very limited, but important institutional changes are introduced with regard 
to the Commission’s role.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Treaty leaves ambiguity as to whether the 
international law nature of the CFSP is preserved. In particular, certain provisions of the
154 The changes in the distribution o f  votes proposed by the Draft Constitutional Treaty were 
unfavourable to Spain and Poland. A lso problematic were the issues o f  the Comm ission’s composition  
and o f  the extension o f  qualified majority voting to certain areas.
155 See supra  n. 25.
156 Articles 1-1 and 1-6.
157 This has been severely criticized. In particular, it is submitted that accession by the Union to the 
ECHR in a situation where the Court’s jurisdiction over the CFSP is excluded automatically puts the 
Union in breach o f  the Convention as far as the obligation to provide legal remedies is concerned. See 
Denza (2003a).
158 These changes relate to the creation o f  the Minister for Foreign Affairs who w ill also be Commission 
Vice-President (Article 1-27 and III-197).
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Treaty seem to open the possibility of extending to the CFSP some of the features of the 
Community legal method, with important constitutional implications.
Article 1-1 on the establishment of the Union states that the Union ‘shall exercise in the 
Community way’ the competences conferred on it. Article I-5(a) on Union law provides 
that ‘the Constitution, and law adopted by the Union’s Institutions in exercising 
competences conferred on it, shall have primacy over the law of the Member States’.159 
Does Article I-5(a) have the effect of extending the application of the Community legal 
doctrine on primacy to the CFSP? Could CFSP external agreements concluded by the 
Union assume some of the features of Community external agreements?160 What effect 
would they have on the treaty-making capacity of the Member States?
The situation is all the more unsatisfactory since the exclusion of the Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction from CFSP matters would preclude any clarification of these crucial 
questions.161
The Constitutional Treaty also introduces important changes to improve the functioning 
of the CFSP and to ensure consistency of the Union’s external action.
The Union’s external policies are grouped under a single title headed ‘the Union’s 
External Action’.162 In an attempt to ensure consistency, a single set of objectives, 
principles and values is introduced, and the European Council is invested with 
identifying the strategic interests and objectives which should guide Union external
• • 1 A Taction in general, including external aspects of internal policies.
Among the other significant changes, the Constitutional Treaty introduces the new 
figure of ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’. The Minister for Foreign Affairs will also be 
Commission’s Vice President.164 Under the CFSP he has power to make proposals, 
represent the Union and implement the CFSP.165 While it was believed that this
159 Emphases added.
160 See Cremona (2003) p. 1351; Denza (2003b). While Article III-227, governing the conclusion o f  
Union external agreements, prescribes a special procedure for the conclusion o f  agreements covering 
matters within the CFSP, it is silent on their possible different legal effect.
161 See Article III-282 which excludes the Court’s jurisdiction in respect to Articles 1-39 and 40, Chapter 
II o f  Title V (CFSP and CSDP) and Article III-194 on the strategic decisions o f  the European Council. It 
seems however that under Article III-227 the mechanism for a prio ri review o f  the constitutionality o f  
envisaged international agreements extends to all EU agreements. Moreover, the possibility o f  
preliminary rulings on the interpretation o f  CFSP agreements is not clearly excluded. See de Witte (2004)
p. 106.
162 Title V.
163 Articles III-193 and 194.
164 Article 1-27.
165 Article III-197.
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‘double-hatting’ approach would contribute towards consistency,166 it has been
167criticized as raising insuperable problems of conflicting loyalty.
A further change aimed at enhancing consistency is the introduction of a European 
External Action Service which is to assist the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This would 
bring together staff from the Commission, the Council and the Member States, and 
would provide the staff for EU delegations abroad, which would replace the current 
Commission’s delegations.168 It is believed that this change could help achieving 
convergence of views on international events, and could improve the Commission’s 
analysis capacity.169
The Constitutional Treaty also introduces changes in relation to the external 
representation of the Union. The new figures of President of the European Council and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs are responsible for representing the Union, but the division 
of competence between the two remains unclear.170
171The Constitutional Treaty also reforms CFSP instruments. Only one type of 
instrument is now available -  European decisions. However, as Cremona comments, in 
practice several different versions of this act are envisaged to the effect that ‘although 
common strategies, common positions and joint actions are no longer separate legal 
acts, the Union is still empowered to adopt European decisions which essentially reflect
1 77these existing acts’. This situation is unsatisfactory as it results in ambiguity and lack 
of transparency rather than simplification. This is also so since the existing clearly 
differentiated instruments will survive as part of the acquis.
The Constitutional Treaty also introduces major changes in the field of JHA. The Treaty 
introduces a new Chapter headed ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ which brings 
together current First and Third Pillars’ competences. This Chapter -  Chapter IV -  
contains eight articles of general application and divides its subject matter into four 
distinct sections: (i) policy on border checks, asylum and immigration; (ii) judicial 
cooperation in civil matters; (iii) judicial cooperation in criminal matters; and (iv) police 
cooperation.
166 See Final Report o f  Working Group VII, 16 December 2002, CONV 459/02, part A, para. 5.
167 See for example Cremona (2003) p. 1355; Denza (2003a).
168 See Chapter 5.
169 See Final Report o f  Working Group VII, supra  n. 166, part B, para. 64.
170 See Articles 1-21(2) and 111-197(2).
171 Article 111-195(3).
172 Cremona (2003) p. 1357.
The normal Community decision-making procedure (qualified-majority voting and co­
decision) is introduced for most of these areas173 and most of the current limitations as 
to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the Title IV EC and the Third Pillar are 
removed.
Such changes would of course considerably strengthen the judicial control of current 
Third Pillar areas. The abolition of the limitations on the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction 
over Third Pillar activity is particularly important given that activity under the Third 
Pillar touches directly on areas relevant for the individual and given that such a move 
would introduce the possibility for the Commission to resort to infringement 
proceedings against non-compliant Member States.174
Article III-283 continues, however, to exclude the Court’s jurisdiction over the validity 
and proportionality of operations by the police or law enforcement agencies, and the 
exercise of responsibility of Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security. This limitation has been widely 
considered unacceptable from the point of view of judicial protection of individual 
rights.175
The provisions also significantly increase the role of the European Parliament, as a 
result of the introduction of the co-decision procedure. A number of provisions have 
also been introduced conferring a monitoring role to national parliaments, particularly in 
order to compensate the decrease in their role following from the extension of the use of 
the Community method.176 These, however, have been criticized by some national 
parliaments as insufficient.177
The normal Union instruments (laws, framework laws, regulation and decisions) -  
capable of direct effect and supreme -  are introduced for all the areas covered by 
Chapter IV with the aim of increasing efficiency by facilitating implementation.
173 Unanimity is retained in relation to: the establishment o f a European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(Article III-175); extension o f  the scope o f  approximation o f  substantive criminal law (Article III-172); 
police operational cooperation (Article III-176); law enforcement action in the territory o f  another 
Member State (Article III-178). Moreover, a special decision-making procedure is introduced for 
approximating substantive and procedural criminal law (Article III-171-172), see infra.
1 4 See Final Report o f  Working Group X, 2 December 2002, CONV 426/02.
175 See House o f  Lords Select Committee o f  the European Union (2003-04a) paras. 115-123.
176 National Parliaments would ensure that initiative under the Chapter comply with the principle o f  
subsidiarity in accordance with the Protocol on the application o f  the principles o f  subsidiarity and 
proportionality (Article III-160). Further, they would be kept informed as to the activity o f  the proposed 
standing committee in the Council dealing with operational cooperation (Article III-162). They would 
also be kept informed as to the results o f  evaluations o f  implementation o f  Union policies by national 
authorities in accordance with Article III-161. Moreover, the proposed provisions envisage the 
introduction o f  European laws introducing arrangements for the scrutiny by the European Parliament and 
national parliaments o f  the activities o f  Eurojust and Europol (Articles III-174 and 177).
177 House o f  Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2002-03) para. 15-25.
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Although the Constitutional Treaty extends the Community legal method to the Third 
Pillar, some qualifications apply. Firstly, the Constitutional Treaty clarifies that with 
regard to the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ emphasis is placed not only on 
legislative action but also on operational cooperation in relation to which procedures
1 78may apply in a different way. Secondly, with regard to the specific fields of judicial 
and police cooperation on criminal matters, the right of initiative is shared between the 
Commission and the Member States (a quarter of the Member States would be 
necessary to initiate a proposal).179 Moreover, a special decision-making procedure 
applies in relation to harmonization of substantive and procedural criminal law in the 
light of their sensitive nature (see infra), and under a ‘Declaration re Article III-227 
concerning the negotiations and conclusion of international agreements by the Member 
States relating to the area of freedom, security and justice’, the Member States may 
conclude agreements with third countries in the fields of judicial cooperation in civil 
and criminal matters, and police cooperation insofar as such agreement comply with 
Union law.
Among some of the further innovations introduced is the possibility of introducing a 
mechanism for the evaluation by the Member States, in collaboration with the 
Commission, of implementation of Union policies by national authorities.180 A further 
innovation consists in the setting up of a standing committee within the Council 
entrusted with ensuring that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted 
and strengthened, and with facilitating coordination of the action of Member States’ 
competent authorities.181 This committee, which would replace the current Article 36 
Committee, would extend its competence over all areas covered by Chapter IV. 
Democratic control over the committee activity is limited (the Parliament and national 
parliaments are only to be ‘kept informed’), and in general concerns have emerged 
about its scope, powers and accountability.182
Further significant changes have been introduced. With regard to judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, although the principle of mutual recognition of decisions is
178 See Article 1-41 and Final Report o f  Working Group X, supra  n. 174.
179 Article III-165.
180 Article III-161.
181 Article III-162.
182 House o f  Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2002-03) para. 11.
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emphasized (and ‘constitutionalized’),183 the new provisions increase the scope for 
substantive harmonization of criminal law and introduce a new legal basis for the 
approximation of procedural criminal law in order to facilitate the application of mutual 
recognition and judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters having a cross- 
border dimension.
Notoriously, mutual recognition of national laws and judicial decisions in a context 
where convergence of substantive and procedural national laws is lacking has been 
problematic.184
Criminal law remains however an area where the principles of respecting national 
identities and of democratic accountability assume particular relevance. This has been 
reflected in the introduction of a special decision-making procedure for this area. 
Although qualified majority is introduced for the approximation of substantive and 
procedural criminal law, a Member State may refer a proposed measure to the European 
Council if  it believes this measure ‘would affect fundamental aspects of its criminal 
justice system’. Failing agreement at European Council level, enhanced cooperation 
among at least one third of the Member States may be established.185
With regard to further changes, a legal basis is introduced for Eurojust, whose powers 
are strengthened.186 A new legal basis is also introduced for the establishment of the 
new office of European Public Prosecutor, which is to prosecute offences against the 
Union’s financial interests.187
With regard to police cooperation, the proposed provisions give a legal basis to Europol, 
whose mandate is also enlarged,188 and introduce a specific legal basis with regard to 
police operation in another Member State.189
183 Article 1-41.
184 With regard to the application o f  the principle in the context o f  the EU visa policy see Chapter 5. In the 
context o f  the internal market the application o f  the principle has been underpinned by two related 
concepts: some degree o f  convergence in national regulation and the establishment o f  minimum standards 
at EU level. See Peers (2004) p. 18. Divergence between the Member States’ laws capable o f  
undermining mutual recognition can also result from different adherence to (or different interpretation of) 
human rights instruments. See, for example, R v. Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department ex parte  
Adan and Aitsguer [2000] UKHL 67. See also N icol (2004); Alegre and Leaf (2004); Guild (2004).
185 Article III-171-172.
186 Article III-174. More offences may now fall within the scope o f  Eurojust. Moreover, Eurojust is now 
given a power to propose the initiation o f  prosecutions conducted by national authorities. The 
introduction o f  a legal basis for bodies such as Eurojust and Europol makes it easier to develop them.
187 Article III-175. Unanimity is prescribed for the creation o f  this new body. Its powers may be extended 
unanimously by the European Council to include serious crimes having a cross-border dimension.
188 Article III-177. The mandate o f  Europol is extended to ‘serious crime affecting two or more Member 
States’, thus it would no longer cover only enumerated offences.
189 Article III-178. Unanimity is applicable.
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The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have retained their opt-outs.190 An 
innovation is that Denmark has now the option to exchange the provisions governing its 
position with new provisions whereby when it decides to opt-in to measures proposed or 
adopted under Chapter IV it will be bound by them under Union law.
6. Conclusion
The Community, the intergovernmental Pillars and the pillar structure are outcomes of 
an effort to ‘reconcile almost irreconcilable interests’, uniformity versus diversity and 
efficiency versus democratic choice.191
The pillar structure permits recourse to the international law method for CFSP and PJC 
(thus allowing the Member States to retain national autonomy and control in these 
areas), preserves the independence of the Community, and, at the same time, introduces 
a ‘single institutional framework’ and the requirement of ‘consistency’ of Union 
activity.
While the pillar structure does not rule out the possibility of institutional conflict over 
competence (since its architecture refuses to introduce homogeneity or establish a 
hierarchy between the intergovernmental and the Community spheres), the institutions 
have overall proved capable of working within the system.
While there is still scope for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
intergovernmental Pillars and their interaction with the Community, it remains arguable 
what the best course of action to do this is. The extension of the Community method 
over the intergovernmental Pillars is often described as a ‘simplifying measure’ which 
would remedy the pillar structure’s potential to generate institutional conflict over the 
choice of legal base, and which would result in greater efficiency and effectiveness for 
the Union. However, an extension of the Community method over the 
intergovernmental Pillars has implications which do not sit easily with the principles of 
maintaining diversity and of democratic accountability.
An extension of the Community law doctrine of primacy over the Second Pillar would 
create or require a European federation. In this context, the Constitutional Treaty is 
highly unsatisfactory precisely because of its ambiguity on whether the Community law
190 See Protocol on the position o f  the United Kingdom and Ireland on policies in respect o f  border 
controls, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters and on police cooperation;
Protocol on Denmark. On the opt-outs see Chapter 4.
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doctrine of primacy extends over the CFSP, and thus its failure to clarify the 
competence of the Union in this field.
If the aim is to preserve the international law nature of the CFSP, it is unclear how the 
introduction of a unified structure which obfuscates the differences between the Pillars 
can make the whole system more legally certain and comprehensible.
The extension of the Community method over the field of criminal justice also raises a 
number of concerns. It disregards the desirability of maintaining national diversity and 
the importance of democratic choice in such a sensitive field.
It is questionable to what extent the extension of the Community method to the Third 
Pillar can be considered to increase its democratic accountability. National parliaments 
do not seem to think that that is the case. As the House of Commons has recently stated: 
‘The intergovernmental method has been criticized as government-controlled, and it is 
undoubtedly true that the negotiation of a convention or framework decision leaves the 
national parliament with far less scope to review, or reject, the principles of such a 
measure than it has when changes to the criminal law are proposed in a Bill. However, 
the Community method of qualified majority voting with co-decision by the European 
Parliament will not address the concerns over legitimacy, but will aggravate them’.192
191 Verhoeven (2002) p. 71.
192 House o f  Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2002-03) para. 84.
3 FROM EARLY STEPS TO FAILURE OF THE MAASTRICHT
SYSTEM
This Chapter gives an historical overview of the development of the EU visa policy. It 
continues with an analysis of the legal framework introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, 
with an account of the weaknesses of the Third Pillar and the reasons which prompted 
the transfer of visa policy to the First Pillar.
1. The proposed passport union
The establishment of a common policy on short-term visas was first contemplated by 
the Member States during the 1970s as part of a plan to establish a Passport Union.1 
The original EEC Treaty already provided for the free movement of persons in the 
Community. This however was relatively limited in scope, being concerned only with 
movement for economic purposes and applied only in relation to nationals of the 
Member States.2
The European Court of Justice considerably developed the free movement rules by 
establishing an ‘individual right’ of entry into the Member States for EC nationals 
which could only be curtailed on public policy, national security and health grounds. 
This had repercussions on entry formalities and border controls applicable by the 
Member States. The Member States could neither require visas from EC nationals nor 
stamp their passports with the effect of granting ‘leave to enter’ at the moment of entry 
into the national territory.4 Border controls in order to be compatible with the free 
movement provisions were not to be carried out in ‘a systematic, arbitrary or 
unnecessarily restrictive manner’ and had to remain limited to identity checks for all 
Member States’ nationals.5
1 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1979); Evans, A. (1981); Denza 
(1983).
2 Articles 48-66 EC (now 39-55).
3 See for example Case 157/79 Pieck  [1980] 3 CMLR 220. The grounds which can justify exclusion are 
governed by Directive 64/221, OJ Sp. Ed. 1964, 850/64. The Court o f  Justice has interpreted these 
restrictively, see for example Case 67/74 Bonsignore [1975] ECR 297.
4 See Pieck  Case, supra  n. 3, and Directives 68/360, OJ Sp. Ed. 1968 L 257/13, and 73/148, OJ 1973 L 
172/14.
5 Cases 321/87 Commission v. Belgium  [1989] ECR 997; C-68/89 Commission v. the Netherlands [1991] 
ECR 1-2637.
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Third country nationals remained excluded from Community law, with few exceptions 
and notwithstanding some tentative steps on the part of the Commission to act on the 
matter.6
The idea of a Passport Union was launched by Commission President Mansholt in April 
1972 as part of the development of the notion of ‘European citizenship’. The proposal 
constituted one of the first examples of the expansion of the agenda of cooperation to 
include the development of forms of political symbolism.7
The proposal was taken up two years later by Chancellor Schmidt at a Heads of
Government meeting, and at the Paris Summit Conference in December 1974 the
Member States decided to set up a working group to study the possibility of establishing
a Passport Union and, in anticipation of this, the introduction of a passport of uniform
format. The working group was to prepare a report on abolition of passport controls
within the Community and stage-by-stage harmonization of legislation affecting aliens,
• 8including conditions of admission, visa requirements and deportation.
The Member States decided not to allocate any formal role to the Council and the 
Commission. The reason was explained by Evans in the following way:
‘The reason for excluding the Community institutions in this way was probably that 
establishment o f  the passport union involved sensitive issues. In particular, it is the 
distinctiveness o f  his national passport which normally provides evidence o f  an individual’s 
nationality. The Member States may have been concerned to ensure that such distinctiveness was 
not lost as a consequence o f  the introduction o f  a uniform European Passport. For this reason 
they may have preferred to undertake the arrangement for its introduction as far as possible 
among them selves’.9
Thus, the intergovernmental method was considered preferable in the light of the wish 
of the Member States to maintain their sovereign right to grant nationality and to issue 
passports as evidence of it. The rejection of the Community method -  with its 
implications for national autonomy -  illustrates both the role of national symbols as part
6 For the position o f  third country nationals under Community law see Cremona (1995); Peers (1996b). 
On the Court o f  Justice’s attitude see Guild and Peers (2001) particularly p. 271. For the Comm ission’s 
tentative steps to act on the matter o f  admission and treatment o f  third country nationals during the 1970s 
and 1980s see Plender (1988) p. 197; Papademetriou (1996) pp. 18-22.
7 Wallace, H. (2000) p. 56.
8 Bull. EC 12-1974, 7-12, p. 8.
9 Evans, A. (1981) p. 9.
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of the explanation for resistance to Community regimes,10 and, in the light of the nature 
of passports in international law, the determination of the Member States to maintain 
their character of sovereign States.
Notwithstanding the decision to keep the Community institutions out of the project, the 
Commission was required by Coreper to produce a report on the matter, which it 
submitted to the Council in July 1975.11
In its report, the Commission suggested that the European Passport should be issued by 
individual Member States but in a uniform format demonstrating the holder’s 
relationship not only with his State of nationality but also with the Community. The 
Commission emphasized the role of the European Passport in strengthening the 
international identity of the Community and creating among nationals of the Member 
States a feeling of belonging. It recommended that the introduction of the new Passport 
should be accompanied by the abolition of internal frontier controls and the conclusions 
of agreements with third countries on the treatment to be accorded to holders of the 
Passport.
The Commission concluded that there was no provision in the EC Treaty conferring on 
the Community competence to enact the necessary measures for the establishment of the 
Passport Union, but maintained that since the Passport Union amounted to a natural 
extension of the free movement provisions of the EC Treaty, the Community 
institutions should be associated in the negotiations.
However, the project predictably appeared arduous from the start and, as a result of 
increased terrorism in particular, the Member States soon abandoned it, continuing to 
give active consideration only to the establishment of a uniform format for passports.12 
Even with regard to this aspect, it took six years from the time the European Council 
took the decision of principle to introduce a passport of uniform format to final 
agreement on a resolution. This delay resulted mainly from the fact that parallel work 
was being undertaken by ICAO.13
10 See Schnapper (1992) quoted in Wallace, H. (2000) p. 57.
11 COM(75) 322 final.
12 For the difficulties involved see House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
(1979).
13 Denza (1983) p.489.
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A Resolution on the introduction of a passport of uniform design was finally adopted on 
23 June 1981 by the Member States meeting within the Council.14 This type of 
instrument (in contrast to a Council resolution) implied that there was no Community 
competence.15 Under the Resolution, the Member States were to endeavour to issue a 
uniform format passport, as described in the Resolution, by 1 January 1985. The ICAO 
format laminated data page was accepted in replacement of the conventional data page, 
bringing significant protection from forgery.
The Resolution also emphasized the political significance of introducing a passport of 
uniform format and the benefits with regard to facilitation of movement across borders.
The Member States currently cooperate on an intergovernmental basis on the uniform 
format for passports with the aim of strengthening the security of their passports against 
forgery and falsification in order to prevent illegal immigration and terrorism.16 There 
seems to be no legal base in the EC Treaty for the adoption of measures on the matter. 
The Commission’s recent proposal for a Regulation on standards for security features
1 7and biometrics in EU citizens’ passports, solely based on the Community powers on 
external border controls, was considered, in view of the multiple functions of passports, 
to exceed Community powers. As a commentator explained: ‘Given the exclusion of EC 
powers to regulate the free movement aspects of passports [Article 18(3)], and the 
absence of any powers in the EC Treaty for the EC to regulate any aspect of EU 
citizens’ crossing of borders of non-EU countries or the use of passports within a single 
Member State for identity purposes, it may be concluded that no powers conferred upon
the EC by the EC Treaty, taken separately or together confer upon the EC power to
1 8adopt the proposed Regulation’.
2. Pre-Maastricht Cooperation
14 OJ 1981 C 241.
15 While several Member States would have accepted a hybrid instrument (with a EC element based on 
Article 48), France held out most strongly.
16 The latest Resolution was adopted on 8 June 2004 (10030/1/04). It supplements the original Resolution 
as well as subsequently adopted Resolutions (17 October 2000, 14 July 1986 and 10 July 1995).
17 COM (2004) 116 final.
18 ‘EU biometric passport proposal exceeds the EC’s powers’, www.statewatch.org/news.
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The issue of a common visa policy arose again during the middle 1980s as a result of 
the revitalization of the idea of a European Community without internal frontiers, and in 
the context of a changing European environment.19
2.1 The Sinsle Market Project and interpretation o f Article 8a
With the signing of the SEA in 1986 the Member States, determined to restore 
momentum towards European integration, agreed to amend the Treaty of Rome to 
introduce the commitment to create a ‘single market’ in the Community by December
1992 (Article 8a, now 14) and qualified majority voting for the adoption of the
20necessary measures for this purpose (Article 100a, now 95).
Article 8a provided:
‘The Community shall adopt measures with the aim o f  progressively establishing the internal 
m arket...The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement o f  goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions o f  
this Treaty’.21
The nature of the obligation imposed by Article 8a with regard specifically to the 
establishment of the free movement of persons became the object of disagreement
99between the Commission and some Member States. The legal meaning of Article 8a 
was of crucial importance for the division of competence between the Community and 
the Member States, and disagreement on it was ultimately underpinned by 
fundamentally different visions as to the depth European integration should reach.
The Commission interpreted the ‘internal market’ as equivalent to a national market and 
thus Article 8a as requiring the achievement of the goal of complete abolition of border
9 ^controls between the Member States. Such an interpretation could have also supported 
an argument for Community competence with regard to the necessary ‘compensatory’ 
measures for the abolition of internal frontier controls (including common external 
border controls). In its White Paper ‘completing the internal market’, which had led to
19 The Adonnino Committee established by the Fountainbleu European Council o f  June 1984 and 
invested with the task o f  preparing a report on citizens’ Europe, already made clear that the abolition o f  
internal frontier controls was inextricably linked to the adoption o f ‘compensatory’ measures. See Plender 
(1990).
20 Qualified majority voting was excluded with regard to measures on the free movement o f  persons.
21 Emphasis added.
22 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1988-89); Papademetriou (1996) 
pp. 23-24 and 64-65; Geddes (2000) pp. 70-72; Peers (2000) pp. 64-66; Denza (2002) pp. 65-69.
3 Commission Communication on the abolition o f  border controls, SEC(92) 877 final.
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the SEA, the Commission did include proposals on asylum, refugees, visas and the 
status of third country nationals.24
The United Kingdom and Denmark argued that the free movement of persons envisaged 
by Article 8a related exclusively to Member States’ nationals. The United Kingdom 
pointed out that the Article was explicit on the point that free movement was to apply 
‘in accordance with the provisions’ of the EC Treaty. These gave rights to free 
movement exclusively to EC nationals and generally for economic purposes only, and 
provided for the possibility of restrictions based on public policy, national security or 
health grounds.25
This more restrictive interpretation justified the continuation of internal border controls 
aimed at distinguishing between EC nationals, who enjoyed a right of entry, and third 
country nationals, who were subject to immigration control. This position was also
'yfieventually endorsed by the Court of Justice.
A further consequence of the Member States’ interpretation was the refusal to accept 
Community competence over the adoption of the necessary compensatory measures. 
Community competence seemed already excluded by virtue of a Declaration attached to 
the Single European Act on the insistence of the United Kingdom. This provided that:
‘Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right o f  the Member States to take such measures as 
they are considered necessary for the purpose o f  controlling immigration from third countries, 
and to combat terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading...’.28
The lack of a common position with regard to the desirability of internal frontier 
controls abolition did not prevent the Member States from establishing 
intergovernmental cooperation on justice and home affairs. Some Member States, such 
as the United Kingdom, considered such cooperation as valuable per se independently
24 COM(85) 310 final.
25 The United Kingdom was one o f  the strongest opponents to the abolition o f  internal frontier controls on 
persons. It considered such controls, as a result o f  its island-geography, to be an efficient instrument to 
control unwanted immigration, crime and terrorism, and one which contributed to the exclusion o f  
unpopular internal control measures such as compulsory identity cards and identity checks. Such position 
had already been expressed on the occasion o f  the proposed Passport Union. See House o f  Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities (1979) paras. 11 and 15. For the United Kingdom’s position on 
Article 8a see House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1988-89).
26 See Commission v. Belgium  and Commission v. the Netherlands, supra  n. 5. See also Case C -147/91 
Laderer [1993] E C R 1-4097. The Court also denied the direct applicability o f  Article 8a by holding that, 
even after December 1992, the abolition o f  internal frontier controls remained subordinate to the adoption 
o f  the necessary ‘compensatory’ measures. See Case C-378/97 Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR 1-6207.
27 The effect o f  such Declaration is not com pletely clear. See Peers (2000) p. 64.
28 General Declaration on Articles 13-19 o f  the SEA.
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of the objective of internal frontier controls abolition.29 Other Member States saw it as a 
necessary pre-condition to the abolition of internal frontier controls. Moreover, 
cooperation appeared most compelling in the light of changing European circumstances
30particularly increased cross-border crime and migration inflows.
A Declaration attached to the SEA provided that the Member States, with the aim of 
relaxing internal border controls:
‘shall cooperate without prejudice to the powers o f  the Community, in particular as regards the 
entry, movement and residence o f  nationals o f  third countries. They shall also cooperate in the 
combating o f  terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading...’.31
Intergovernmental cooperation on justice and home affairs took place within the pre­
existing structures of the ‘Trevi’ Group, whose mandate was broadened in view of the 
‘1992 project’.32
In parallel, those Member States which shared the goal of abolishing internal frontier 
controls concluded the Schengen Agreement in 1985 followed by the Schengen 
Convention in 1990. Cooperation therefore took a dual track. While at the level of the 
Schengen States the ‘compensatory’ measures were accompanied by the (eventual) 
abolition of internal frontier controls, at the level of the Member States, notwithstanding 
the declared objective of relaxing controls and facilitating free movement, the focus 
remained on restrictive measures.33
As to the choice for the intergovernmental method, the Commission came finally to 
adopt a pragmatic and moderate stance. In 1988 it proposed that:
29 See for example House o f  Lords Select Committee o f  the European Communities (1993-94) para. 57.
30 See den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) pp. 495-497; Turnbull and Sandholtz (2001) particularly p. 215. 
On increased immigration flows see United Nations Department o f  Economic and Social Affairs (1998) 
p. 207 and United Kingdom Government, Home Office (1998) para. 1.10. Germany appeared to have 
specific concerns with regard to crime. Chancellor Kohl called for a ‘European FBI’ in 1988 following  
police reports on the Italian Mafia infiltrating the restaurant trade in Germany. The fall o f  the Berlin Wall 
in 1989 increased concerns on migration inflows.
31 Political Declaration o f  the Member States on the free movement o f  persons.
32 For an account o f  the origins o f  the ‘Trevi’ Group, see Nuttall (1992) pp. 299-302; Pastore (1995) pp. 
15-21; den Boer and W allace, W. (2000) pp. 494-495. Trevi III was established in 1985 to enhance 
cooperation in the area o f  serious international crime. Trevi ‘ 1992’ was established in 1988 and was 
tasked with elaborating the compensatory measures necessary for the abolition o f  internal frontier 
controls.
33 The Commission at a later stage made some proposals on free movement but the Council did not act on 
them, see infra n. 169.
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‘Community legislation in this field be applied only to those cases where the legal security and 
uniformity provided by Community law constitutes the best instrument to achieve the desired 
goal. This would mean therefore that large scope would be left, at this stage, to cooperation 
among the Member States notwithstanding the fact that the Commission should be permitted to 
participate on an informal basis, in this form o f  cooperation with a view  to ensuring compliance 
with the above mentioned objectives’.34
The Commission’s stance was explained by the lack of prospect of action at Community 
level and the Commission’s anxiety to secure its association with the intergovernmental 
work.35
2.2 Intergovernmental cooperation: the Ad hoc Group on Immigration and the 
Coordinators Group
In the context of the extension of intergovernmental cooperation during the 1980s in 
response to the ‘1992 project’, a meeting of justice and home affairs ministers in 
London in October 1986 established the Ad hoc Group on Immigration which was to be
T f\the organizational vehicle for pursuing cooperation on immigration policies.
The Ad hoc Group on Immigration was composed of high level immigration policy 
officials from the Member States and divided into six subgroups (asylum, external 
frontiers, false documents, admission, deportation and information exchange). A 
representative of the Commission was included as an observer. Its mandate covered a 
wide set of issues related to the relaxation of internal border controls on persons and the 
strengthening of internal and external controls for the purpose of counteracting illegal 
immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking and crime.
One of its tasks was to evaluate the feasibility of harmonizing the Member States’ visa
34 COM(88) 640 final, para. 14.
35 Monar (1994) p. 71. See also Peers (2000) p. 65. The lack o f  prospect was already evident when the 
Member States challenged the Com m ission’s Decision o f  18 July 1985 under Article 118 EC ‘setting up a 
prior communication and consultation procedure on migration policies in relation to non-member 
countries’, OJ 1985 L 217/2. See Joined Cases 281 and 283-287/85 Germany and others v. Commission 
[1987] ECR 2303.
36 For an account o f  cooperation pre-Maastricht, see Pastore (1995) pp. 3-21; Papademetriou (1996) pp. 
19-50; Geddes (2000) pp. 67-68; den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) pp. 494-495; Denza (2002) pp. 64-74.
37 Later the working groups on admission and expulsion were merged into one and a working group on 
visas was introduced. In 1992 Cirea (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum) -  now  
redundant -  and Cirefi (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing o f  Frontiers 
and Immigration) were added to the working groups. In 1994 Eurodac (European Automated 
Fingerprinting Recognition System) was added. See Papademetriou (1996) pp. 28 and 79; Peers (2000) p. 
24.
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policies (at the risk of duplicating similar work in EPC)38 and the effect of such action 
on improving external controls. It prepared a common list of fifty countries whose 
nationals were required by all Member States to have visas to enter their territories (the 
‘black’ list). This was adopted by the ministers responsible for immigration at 
Copenhagen in December 1987. It was further expanded following their meeting in 
Munich in June 1988 to include eleven additional countries.39
In 1988 the European Council meeting in Rhodes established the Group of Coordinators 
on Free Movement of Persons.40 Its creation was prompted by a perceived need of 
achieving congruence among the various positions adopted in the different 
intergovernmental groups. The mandates of these various groups (the Ad hoc Group on 
Immigration, the Trevi Group, the Horizontal Group on Data Processing, the Customs 
Mutual Assistance Group and the Judicial Cooperation Group of EPC) overlapped and 
conflicts often resulted. The Group of Coordinators was therefore to oversee their 
agendas and activities.
One of its first tasks was to prepare a report on the measures necessary for creating an 
area without internal frontiers before 1993. This report known as the ‘Palma Document’ 
was adopted by the European Council in Madrid in June 1989 41 
The Palma Document included a common visa policy among the necessary measures 
for creating an area without internal frontiers.
The components of visa policy whose adoption was considered ‘essential’ were: (i) the 
list of countries whose nationals were required by all Member States to have visas to 
cross their external borders (the so called ‘black’ list), which was to be updated every 
six months; (ii) harmonized criteria and conditions for issuing visas and the 
strengthening of diplomatic and consular cooperation; and (iii) a common list of 
‘undesirable’ persons and a convention establishing a procedure for prior notification in 
the event of a visa being issued by a Member State to a person on such a list. 
Components considered ‘desirable’ included: (i) a common visa application form, to be
38 Nuttall (1992) pp. 301-303. Following the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports in December 
1985, the Member States decided to strengthen cooperation in certain areas including visa policy. A 
Working Group on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism was established.
39 At their meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993 the Ministers took note that the ‘black’ list expanded to 
73 countries, while 19 were the countries whose nationals did not require a visa for any Member State and 
92 those whose nationals were subject to visa requirements by some Member States only. See COM(93) 
684, 10.12.1993.
40 Bull. EC 12-1998, para. 1.1.3.
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created by 1989; (ii) a common ‘European visa’, to be introduced by 1992; and (iii) the 
computerization of the exchange of information needed in visa processing, to be 
completed by 1991.
The Palma Document marked the beginning of the drafting of the External Frontiers 
Convention under the authority of the ministers responsible for immigration.42 
The Draft External Frontiers Convention, submitted by the Group of Coordinators to the 
Dublin European Council in June 1990, provided the rules governing the crossing of the 
external frontiers of the Member States including a common visa policy.43 It was 
complemented by a Draft Convention on a European Information System, negotiated 
within the framework of the Horizontal Group on Data Processing.44 
Adoption of these Conventions seemed a pre-requisite for shifting the Member States’ 
focus towards the abolition of internal frontier controls. The United Kingdom however 
never accepted that the underlying purpose of the Draft External Frontiers Convention 
was the removal of internal controls on persons.45 The Draft Convention was never 
signed due to a dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain over the Convention’s 
territorial application to Gibraltar.46
In general progress under the established intergovernmental framework was slow and 
meagre. The intergovernmental structure was described as reactive, chaotic, 
overlapping, inefficient and unaccountable.47 The agenda of the various
41 Published as an appendix to the House o f  Lords Report on Border Control o f  People, House o f  Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities (1988-89). A lso reproduced in Statewatch (1997) pp. 
12- 20 .
42 The provisions o f  the Draft Convention are considered below within the context o f  the revised draft 
proposed by the Commission. See also Pastore (1995) pp. 12-15.
3 The Draft Convention remained secret. It subsequently became public when the Commission proposed 
its adoption under the Maastricht Treaty, see infra.
44 This Draft Convention also remained secret.
45 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) para. 57. The United 
Kingdom pressed for the possibility o f  making a unilateral declaration to be annexed to the Draft 
Convention whereby for a transitional period its ports and airports would be considered to be external 
frontiers with regard to nationals o f  third countries. This dispensation was to be reviewed before January 
1995. Agence Europe, n. 5513, 15.06.1991, p. 10.
46 House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) paras. 3 and 7. More 
progress was achieved in the field o f  asylum with the signing on 15 June 1990 o f  the ‘Dublin Convention’ 
(Convention determining the State Responsible for Examining Application for Asylum lodged in One o f  
the Member States o f  the European Communities, OJ 1997 C 254/1), which came into force only in 1997. 
The Group o f  Coordinators also presented two reports to the Rome European Council o f  December 1990 
respectively on the integration o f  third country nationals in the Member States and on entry and 
movement conditions for third country national, but the European Council took no action. See 
Papademetriou (1996) pp. 44-49.
47 Guild (1998) p. 67; Papademetriou (1996) p. 51; Geddes (2000) p. 80; den Boer and Wallace, W.
(2000) p. 495; Turnbull and Sandholtz (2001) p. 197; Denza (2002) p. 74.
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intergovernmental groups overlapped and their work remained largely uncoordinated. 
Practice and procedures remained informal and decisions took the form of non-binding 
resolutions and recommendations. Progress remained dependent on enacting 
international conventions, which needed to be signed by all Member States and then 
ratified by all at national level before they could enter into force.48 
A different problem was political accountability. The secrecy surrounding 
intergovernmental activity precluded monitoring by national parliaments, putting the 
whole activity beyond any kind of detailed public scrutiny.
It remains true that cooperation did result in the development by 1992 of an extensive 
network which operated under the overall authority of the European Council on several 
political and executive levels and well-established habits of consultation and 
information exchange among national officials.49
Increasingly, the Member States also engaged in discussions on immigration issues with 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.50 Various groups were established (such as 
the Vienna Group, the Berlin Group and the Budapest Group) to discuss issues 
including efforts by Central and Eastern European countries to prevent conditions which 
might result in a uncontrolled influx of migrants to the West, programmes to promote 
development, common measures against illegal immigration, enhanced border controls 
and surveillance, and re-admission.51
2.3 The Schenzen Convention
As mentioned earlier, the inability to reach agreement among all the Member States on 
the removal of internal frontier controls resulted in those Member States which shared 
such an objective establishing cooperation among themselves, which paralleled 
cooperation on justice and home affairs among (all) the Member States.
Thus, in 1985 the Benelux countries, France and Germany concluded the Schengen 
Agreement intended to remove controls at their internal frontiers by January 1990 and
48 Geddes (2000) p. 80; Denza (2002) p. 73. See also Peers (2000) p. 16, who points out that o f  the ten 
conventions agreed before 1993 only the Rome (1980 Convention on the Law applicable to Contractual 
Obligations) and Dublin Convention, supra  n. 46, were ratified prior to 2000, with the Dublin Convention 
taking seven years before ratification by all Member States was completed. Some Conventions were 
applied on an administrative basis.
4 Anderson, M. (1994) p. 12; den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) pp. 495-499.
50 Papademetriou (1996) p. 34.
51 In the following years a number o f  Member States concluded re-admission agreements with these 
countries. Germany took the lead in the conclusion o f  such agreements. See Lavenex (1998) p. 123. A 
Recommendation was also adopted by the Council in 1994 on the model for a normal bilateral agreement 
for readmission between a Member State and a third country, OJ 1996 C 274.
52 O ’Keeffe (1991) p. 186; Turnbull and Sandholtz (2001) p. 201.
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transfer them to their external borders.53 The background to this Agreement was the 
Sarrebruck Accord of 1984 between France and Germany, which was prompted by a 
series of protests by truck drivers about delays and congestion at the German-French 
frontier points resulting from controls.54 Following the Sarrebruck Accord, Germany 
and France invited the Benelux countries, which had had a common travel area since 
1960, to join them thus establishing the Schengen group.
The Schengen Agreement listed the compensatory measures necessary for the removal 
of internal frontier controls which the Parties endeavoured to take, including the 
approximation of their visa policies, the establishment of common external border 
controls, police cooperation, judicial cooperation and the conclusion of extradition 
agreements.
Most of these measures were defined as ‘applicable in the long-term’. The 
approximation of visa policies and the application of procedures for issuing visas in a 
way that took into account ‘the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the 
five States against illegal immigration and activity which could jeopardise security’ 
were defined as measures to be taken in the short-term.
The Agreement was treated by the Contracting Parties as a declaration of intent, and 
Article 32 expressly stated that the Agreement did not necessitate ratification at national 
level.55
It soon became clear that the implementation of the compensatory measures envisaged 
by the Schengen Agreement necessitated a further international instrument. On 19 June 
1990, after four years of secret negotiations, the original Schengen States signed the 
Schengen Implementing Convention.56 The Convention elaborated the objective of the 
Schengen Agreement (extending the deadline for the abolition of internal frontier 
controls to 1993) and provided for the necessary compensatory measures.
The Convention clarified its relationship with Community law by providing that it 
applied only insofar as it was compatible with Community law, and that once the 
Member States concluded conventions ‘with a view to completion of an area without 
internal frontiers’ its relevant provisions were to be amended or replaced accordingly.57
53 Agreement on the gradual abolition o f  controls at the common frontiers, signed in Schengen on 14 July 
1 9 8 5 ,(1 9 9 1 )3 0  ILM 73.
54 See Papademetriou (1996) p. 26.
55 Only the Netherlands felt that national ratification was necessary. See Boccardi (2000) p. 34.
56 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, (1991) 30 ILM 84. For in depth analysis see 
O ’Keeffe (1991); Shutte (1991); Bontempi (1995).
57 For in depth analysis see O ’K eeffe (1991) pp. 209-211. The Preamble to the Convention expressly 
stated that the aim o f  the Contracting Parties was to achieve the objective o f  establishing an internal
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The compensatory measures provided by the Convention focused on the strengthening 
of the external borders and on cooperation between national law enforcement agencies. 
Accordingly, the Convention laid down the conditions that aliens (non-Community and 
later non-EE A nationals) had to fulfil to enter the Schengen territory.58 It provided for 
the harmonization of the Contracting Parties’ visa policies and for the introduction by 
the Contracting Parties of carriers’ sanctions and penalties for assisting illegal entry and 
residence (expressly made subject to the Geneva Convention relating to the status of 
refugees).59 It further laid down rules on the organization of external border controls 
(including an obligation for the Contracting Parties to punish unauthorized entry) and 
on responsibility for assessing asylum applications. The Dublin Convention later 
replaced the latter rules.60
With regard to ‘police and security’, the Convention included measures on: (i) police 
cooperation for the purpose of preventing and detecting criminal offences, cross-border 
observation and hot pursuit;61 (ii) mutual assistance in criminal matters, the application 
of the principle ne bis in idem, extradition and the transfer of the execution of criminal
AO AT • • •judgements; (iii) the prevention and punishment of illegal trafficking in drugs; (iii) 
the acquisition, possession and trading in firearms and ammunition.64 
A central element of the Convention was the Schengen Information System (SIS) -  a 
joint database containing information on persons and objects used for the purpose of 
maintaining public order and security.65
The body responsible for implementing the Convention was the Executive Committee 
composed of one minister for each Contracting State and acting by unanimity.66 A 
Central Group of senior officials was responsible for preparing the Executive 
Committee’s work. The Commission participated as an observer in the meetings of the 
two bodies. The Executive Committee made more than 200 decisions, many of which
market, as provided in the EC Treaty, without prejudice to the measures to be taken to implement the 
provisions o f  the EC Treaty.
8 Articles 5 and 19-20.
59 Articles 9-17 and 26-27.
60 Articles 3-4, 7-8 and 28-38. On the Dublin Convention see supra  n. 46.
61 Articles 39-47.
62 Articles 48-69.
63 Articles 70-76.
64 Articles 77-91.
65 Articles 95-100 made provision for the kind o f  data which could be stored in the SIS. These include 
data relating to persons wanted for arrest for extradition purposes, aliens to be refused entry, witness or 
parties in a judicial proceeding and persons to be kept under discreet surveillance for the purpose o f  
prosecuting criminal offences or preventing threats to public safety. Article 101 identified which national 
authorities were entitled to access the SIS, and Articles 102-118 provided for a privacy protection regime.
66 Articles 131-133.
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67were declared ‘confidential’ and remained unpublished.
Like intergovernmental cooperation among all Member States, because of its secrecy 
the system established by the Convention came increasingly under criticism for lack of 
parliamentary control. Further criticism was based on the lack of a judicial control 
mechanism.68
The Convention was also criticized for some of its substantive provisions including 
those laying down an obligation for the Contracting Parties to introduce carriers’ 
sanctions, on the ground that these affected the ability of asylum-seekers to escape from 
countries where they feared persecution,69 and those on the SIS, particularly with regard 
to the possible grounds for inclusion and the lack of adequate remedies for wrongful 
inclusion.70
Full implementation of the Convention was for many years delayed as a result of 
concerns on terrorism and immigration, French concerns over the liberal Dutch drug
71policy and Dutch concerns over data protection in cross-border information exchange. 
While full implementation was set for March 1995 for Germany, France, the Benelux 
countries, Spain and Portugal, which had meanwhile acceded to the Convention, France 
invoked again the national security clause on grounds of terrorist threats and problems 
relating to the Dutch drug policy.72
Between 1990 and 1996, all Members of the Community, except for the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, ratified or acceded to the Convention. Italy’s full participation 
was delayed until 1997 due to French concerns over Italy’s ability to properly carry out 
frontier controls and practical and legislative problems. Greece was fully admitted to 
the frontier free area only in 2000 because of its difficulties in policing its sea frontiers
67 This was notwithstanding that a Joint Declaration attached to the Convention provided that the 
Contracting Parties were required to inform their national parliaments o f  the implementation o f  the 
Convention.
68 See O ’Keeffe (1991) pp. 188 and 212; Bontempi (1995) pp. 43-45.
69 Carriers’ sanctions were also arguably in breach o f  Annex 9 to the International Convention on Civil 
Aviation. Carriers’ sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom were later found in breach o f  Article 6 and 
Article 1 o f  Protocol 1 ECHR by the Court o f  Appeal in Roth v. Home Secretary [2002] EWCA Civ 158. 
See Chapter 1.
70 See also infra n. 168 with regard to criticism to the same provisions in the Draft External Frontiers 
Convention proposed by the Commission.
71 Den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 498; Papademetriou (1996) p. 27.
72 Turnbull and Sandholtz (2001) p. 202.
73 These amounted to the absence o f  national laws on protection o f  personal data, which were required by 
Articles 117 and 126 o f  the Convention, difficulties in establishing the Italian national section o f  the SIS, 
and difficulties in adapting Italian airport structures. See Lo Iacono (1995) pp. 56-57; Nascimbene (1999) 
p. 422; Rossi (1997) pp. 124-125. Before its entry into Schengen, Italy did not have any comprehensive 
legislation on asylum and immigration. See Nascimbene (1997) pp. 153-154.
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and its border with Albania.74
Accession by Denmark, Finland and Sweden led to negotiation with Iceland and 
Norway in order to maintain the Nordic Union passport free area among these countries.
2.3.1 Rules on visas under the Schengen Convention
As part of the harmonization and strengthening of external border controls, the 
Schengen Convention provided for the establishment of a common visa policy.
The common visa policy rested on three components. The first component was the 
harmonization of the Member States’ visa requirements.
The second component was the introduction of a ‘uniform visa’ (implying mutual 
recognition of visas issued by the Member States for the purpose of external border 
crossing and free circulation) which was underpinned by the establishment of common 
entry conditions for aliens and common rules and procedures to be followed by the 
Member States when issuing visas.
The third component was constituted by the common instructions for the Member 
States’ diplomatic and consular posts in capitals and consular cooperation at local level. 
The common visa policy so formed was characterized by flexibility allowing the 
Member States to retain individual control as to who could obtain a visa to enter their 
territories.
The Schengen common visa policy constituted the model for the current EU visa 
policy.75
(i) Harmonization o f  the Member States' visa requirements
Article 9 of the Schengen Convention prescribed the harmonization of the Contracting 
Parties’ visa policies. Such harmonization was to be total: any third country was either 
to be included in a ‘black’ list, whereby its nationals would require visas to cross the 
external borders of the Contracting Parties, or in a ‘white’ list, whereby its nationals 
would be visa-exempt.76 Once the position in relation to a third country was 
harmonized, the Contracting Parties could amend it only by common consent. However, 
in exceptional cases where overriding reasons of national policy required urgent action, 
they could derogate from the common visa arrangements in relation to a third country,
74 Den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 498.
75 Moreover, the Schengen acquis was, in May 1999, incorporated into the European Union legal order by 
virtue o f  the Protocol ‘integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework o f  the European Union’ 
attached to the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, see Chapter 4.
76 Complete harmonization was a necessary pre-condition to the abolition o f  internal frontier controls.
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after consulting the other Contracting Parties and taking account of their interests and 
the consequences of such decision on them.
Harmonization was a gradual process since the visa policies of the Contracting Parties 
diverged widely. Thus, for a long time a list of countries on which agreement could not 
be reached (the so called ‘grey’ list) continued to exist, and the Contracting Parties 
maintained individual discretion in relation to such countries, with only an obligation to 
notify the other Contracting Parties of their position.
The common visa policy that eventually developed was extremely restrictive. Such 
restrictiveness resulted from the method which was used for developing the ‘black’ list. 
It was evident that the Contracting Parties proceeded by (almost) cumulating their 
individual visa restrictions, which varied widely. In the case where national visa 
restrictions derived from immigration and security risks such a process was justifiable -  
no State could have been expected to relax in relation to those concerns, which 
constituted the very reason for establishing the common visa policy.
Nevertheless, it would have been desirable to agree common criteria for establishing 
what constituted ‘immigration and security risks’. This was so since, given the wide 
divergences among the Contracting Parties (often derived from their different historical 
links, geographical positions and general effect as a ‘magnet’ to immigration flows), 
even cumulation of national visa requirements based on ‘immigration and security risks’ 
resulted in a very restrictive common visa policy with a corresponding negative impact 
on the Contracting Parties’ bilateral relations with third countries and on other interests 
such as tourism.
A negative impact was experienced by Spain and Italy, for example. Spain had 
traditionally granted visa-free access to nationals of Latin American countries as part of 
its policy of forging an ‘Ibero-American Community of Nations’. Such policy was 
reversed when Peru and the Dominican Republic (and eventually Colombia and 
Ecuador) were included in the ‘black’ list as posing problems in relation to drug 
trafficking and illegal immigration.
Italy, before the Legge Martelli (Law n.37/90) was passed in 1990, kept 78 countries 
visa-free as a result of its interest in tourism and its low key Mediterranean policy. 
Shortly afterwards, as part of Italy’s entry into Schengen, visa requirements were 
introduced for a number of these countries. In 1995, after some resistance, Italy also 
introduced visa requirements for nationals of Serbia and Montenegro, which had been
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kept visa-free notwithstanding their inclusion in the ‘black’ list and considerable protest 
from Germany.77
It remains doubtful to what extent the Contracting Parties had at their disposal 
instruments permitting a uniform evaluation of the conditions justifying the imposition 
of visa requirements.78
The negative impact of the common visa policy should have been an even more 
powerful argument against cumulating national visa restrictions based purely on
70reciprocity or political disapproval.
While it is understandable that a State may be reluctant to grant privileged treatment to 
the nationals of another State in the absence of reciprocity, insistence on reciprocity in a 
context where the Contracting Parties’ relations with third countries varied widely 
resulted in an extremely restrictive visa policy, which was disadvantageous particularly 
to Parties with wide external links.
In this context, it would at least have been desirable to reduce the variation in 
reciprocity between the Contracting Parties in their relations with third countries. It 
appears however that this was not done and many reasons can be adduced. Firstly, 
external relations may be difficult to change for a number of reasons. Secondly, EPC -  
the framework within which the Contracting Parties hammered out political 
convergence -  was then embryonic. Thirdly, there might have been a deliberate political 
decision to give priority to restrictive positions in the circumstances.
(ii) The ‘uniform’ visa
The Schengen Convention also provided for the introduction of a uniform visa. A 
uniform visa was a visa for stays not exceeding three months or for transit valid for the 
entire territory of the Parties.80 Uniform visas were to be issued only if an alien fulfilled 
the entry conditions established by the Convention and according to certain criteria and 
procedures provided by the Convention or by decisions of the Executive Committee.
77 See Cornelius (1994) p. 350; Nascimbene (1988) p. 221; Santel (1995) p. 76; Foot (1995) p. 140; 
Papademetriou (1996) pp. 93-96; Sciortino (1999) p. 243.
78 This question is considered more fully in Chapter 4.
79 See Home Office evidence to the House o f  Lords, House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities (1993-94) para. 71, and p. 81 o f  evidence.
80 Article 10. Under Article 19(1) a uniform visa entitled its holder to circulate freely in the Schengen  
territory for the period o f  the visa’s validity providing he continued to fulfil the conditions o f  entry.
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The common entry conditions
The entry conditions established by Article 5 of the Convention provided that in order 
to be granted entry into the Schengen territory an alien had: (i) to present a valid travel 
document; (ii) to present documents justifying the purpose and conditions of his visit 
and proving he had means of support; (iii) not to be reported on the SIS as a person to 
be denied entry; (iv) not to be considered a threat to the public policy, national security 
or the international relations of any of the Contracting Parties.
A Contracting Party could still issue a visa to an alien not fulfilling all these conditions 
on humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international 
obligations. In such a case the validity of the visa was restricted to the national territory
0 1
of the issuing Party (a limited territorial validity visa).
It is thus evident that the visa arrangements established by the Convention allowed the 
Contracting Parties to individually decide who could obtain a visa to enter their 
territories. A uniform visa (i.e. entitling the holder to enter any of the Contracting 
Parties) could be issued only if  the conditions laid down in the Convention were met. 
These amounted to a cumulation of nationally determined requirements. Under the same 
rationale, the Convention allowed the Contracting Parties to grant access into their 
national territories to aliens who did not fulfil the common entry conditions through the 
issue of limited territorial validity visas (i.e. national visas).82
The possibility of unilateral action was in some cases justified on constitutional 
grounds, as in the case of recognition of passports. It was also justified by the 
Contracting Parties’ duty to honour their international law obligations regarding validity 
of travel documents or access into the national territory. Lastly, it made it possible for 
the Contracting Parties to give expression to their individual national interest.
As Hailbronner remarked with regard to virtually the same provisions contained in the 
Draft External Frontiers Convention:
‘During the negotiations on the Draft External Frontiers Convention, it became obvious that the 
conditions for issue o f  a uniform visa as well as for a mutual recognition o f  national visas touch 
upon very sensitive issues o f  national security. In spite o f  certain common conditions and criteria 
Member States consider it essential to refuse entry to third country nationals deemed a security
Aliens in possession o f  a residence permit issued by a Contracting Party were entitled to cross the 
external borders and circulate freely for three months (Articles 21 and 25).
81 Article 16.
82 Under Article 18 the Contracting Parties also retained discretion to issue visas for stays exceeding three 
months in accordance with their national laws. These, since not granted according to common criteria, did
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risk or unwanted for political purposes. On the other hand, Member States may want to deviate
from politically motivated decisions to refuse entry for humanitarian or other political
83grounds’.
Even considering the granting of limited territorial validity visas as an exceptional 
course of action, it is difficult to reconcile their existence with the idea of an area 
without internal frontiers.84 There was an evident tension between the project of 
abolishing internal frontiers and the retention of sovereign status by the Contracting 
Parties. Sovereign status implied that the Contracting Parties continued to be 
individually bound by international law obligations governing directly or indirectly 
entry into their territories. In this context, frontiers continued to exist for delimiting the 
application of international law in a given case, and this was reflected in practice in 
recourse to limited territorial validity visas. Even more obviously, sovereign status 
implied that the Contracting Parties retained the right to exclude an individual from 
their national territory on national security grounds or because of political 
considerations.
Mutual recognition and the possibility of departing from its application also 
characterized the SIS. The SIS contained the common ‘black’ list of ‘undesirable’ 
persons to be denied entry by the Contracting Parties.
Article 96 of the Schengen Convention provided for some of the criteria on which 
national decisions to include an alien in the SIS were to be based. It stipulated:
‘2. Decisions may be based on a threat to public policy or public security or to national 
security which the presence o f  an alien in national territory may pose.
This situation may arise in particu lar  in the case of:
(a) an alien who has been convicted o f  an offence carrying a penalty involving deprivation 
o f  liberty o f  at least one year;
(b) an alien in respect to whom there are serious grounds for believing that he has 
committed serious criminal offences, including those referred to in Article 71 [illicit 
trafficking in drugs], or in respect o f  whom there is clear evidence o f  an intention to 
commit such offences in the territory o f  a Contracting Party.
not carry the right o f  free circulation but permitted the holder, provided certain conditions were satisfied, 
to transit visa-free through the Schengen States in order to reach the State which issued the visa.
83 Hailbronner (1994) p. 991.
84 It also remains unclear how the territorial limitation o f  limited territorial validity visas could be 
enforced in the absence o f  frontier controls.
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3. Decisions may also be based on the fact that the alien has been subject to measures 
involving deportation, refusal o f  entry or removal which have not been rescinded or 
suspended, including or accompanied by a prohibition on entry or, where applicable, a 
prohibition on residence, based on a failure to comply with national regulations on the entry 
or residence o f  aliens’.85
The SIS provided therefore only for limited guidance as to the grounds on which 
national decisions to include an alien in the SIS were to be based. Concepts such as 
‘national security’ or ‘public order’ were left undefined,86 and when a possible 
definition was provided it was limited. Thus, while conviction for an offence carrying a 
penalty of at least one-year imprisonment was identified as a possible ground for 
inclusion in the SIS, there was no harmonization as to which offences carried such 
penalty. The SIS was based on mutual recognition of the Member States’ public policy 
and national security concerns and their legislation with regard to denial of entry. Such 
mutual recognition was again subject to the possibility of derogations based on 
humanitarian grounds, on grounds of national interest or on international obligations, 
which resulted in the issue of limited territorial validity visas.87
Mutual recognition had particularly harsh consequences on individuals since a third 
country national whose name had been entered in the SIS by a Contracting Party was to 
be excluded from all the other Contracting Parties irrespective of whether his conduct 
would have constituted a ground for exclusion there.
A ‘pure’ mutual recognition approach was however refuted by the national courts of
O Q
some Contracting Parties. The French Conseil d’Etat ruled that it could review the
legality of an entry in the SIS made by the authorities of another Contracting Party by
80virtue of Article 111 of the Schengen Convention. In Forabosco, the Conseil d’Etat
85 Emphases added.
86 For this reason, the Netherlands Parliament required the adoption o f  protocols to be annexed to the 
Convention which were to define such terms on the basis o f  their interpretation under Community law. 
See Bontempi (1995) p. 45.
87 See Article 5(2).
88 See Guild (2001) p. 27.
89 Forabosco, Case 190384, and Hamassaoui, Case 198344, 9 June 1999 (www.legifrance.gouv.fr). In 
both cases the Conseil d ’Etat held that the applicants were entitled to sufficient information regarding 
their entry in the SIS to enable the national judge to review the lawfulness o f  the entry. The Conseil 
d’Etat based these decisions on Article 111(1) o f  the Schengen Convention which provided that ‘any 
person may, in the territory o f  each Contracting Party, bring before the courts or the authority competent 
under national law an action to correct, delete or obtain information or to obtain compensation in 
connection with an alert involving them ’. For in-depth analysis see Gortazar (2001) p. 138. A  similar 
approach was applied by the Tribunale amministrativo regionale del Lazio, sentenza n. 13164/2001 
Ghadban (www.giustizia-amministrativa.it). The Tribunale amministrativo held that the consular 
authority had a duty to inform the visa applicant o f  the national or other Member States’ dispositions from
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ruled that German authorities had made an error by including Forabosco in the SIS on 
the basis of the sole fact that she was refused asylum in Germany. Such a ground was 
held not to be among the grounds laid down in Article 96 of the Schengen Convention.
In this context, it appeared clear that the exclusion of a central judicial authority 
entrusted with interpreting the Convention could resulted in lack of uniformity of 
national entry conditions, which could undermine the application of mutual recognition 
and thus the functioning of the whole system.90
The common conditions and procedures for issuing visas
The Convention also established certain criteria and procedures for issuing uniform 
visas. It provided that the diplomatic and consular authorities of the Contracting Party 
of main destination or, where this could not be determined, first entry were to be 
responsible for issuing the uniform visa.91
92It also made provision for the affixing of uniform visas on travel documents. 
According to these, only limited territorial validity visas could be affixed on travel 
documents valid for only one or more Contracting Parties (with the territorial validity of 
the visa excluding the Contracting Parties for which the travel document was not 
valid).93
When a travel document was not recognized as valid by one or more of the Contracting 
States (since it had been issued by an unrecognized State or government) the visa was to 
be affixed on a separate sheet. The Executive Committee could however agree on 
affixing visas to travel documents issued by countries or international bodies not 
recognized by all the Contracting Parties (such as North Korea, the Former Republic of 
Macedonia, Somalia and Taiwan) provided that the documents guaranteed retumability. 
In practice, often, the Contracting Party that did not recognize the travel document
which his assessment as a ‘security threat’ derived and o f  the specific list where his name was traced, 
particularly in view  o f  the consequences faced by an individual in case o f  erroneous inclusion in the SIS. 
See Staples (2003) pp. 246 and 248.
91 Article 12. The Executive Committee also adopted decisions on the criteria for determining the state o f  
main destination and on the rights and obligations between representing and represented States in the 
context o f  visa issue. See Decisions o f  the Executive Committee o f  14 December 1993 extending the 
uniform visa (SCH/Com -ex(93) 21) and o f  27 June 1996 on the principles for issuing Schengen visas in 
accordance with Article 30(1 )(a) o f  the Schengen Convention (SCH/Com-ex(96) 13 rev 1), OJ 2000 L 
239/18 and 180.
92 Articles 13-14.
93 Travel documents issued under the 1954 U N  Convention on the Status o f  Stateless Persons, for 
example, are not valid for Austria and Portugal which are not parties to the UN Convention. These 
countries, nevertheless, consented to the other Schengen States affixing uniform visas to the Convention 
Travel Document. See D ecision o f  the Executive Committee o f  16 December 1998 concerning the 
compilation o f  a manual o f  documents to which a visa may be affixed (SCH/Com-ex (98)56), OJ 2000 L 
239/207.
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affixed the visa on a separate sheet but consented to the other Contracting Parties 
affixing uniform visas on the document. This was for example the practice of Portugal 
with regard to passports issued by Taiwan.94 The Executive Committee was to agree 
unanimously the list of passports and travel documents to which a visa could be affixed 
and the list of countries that were not recognized. Such lists were without prejudice to 
the Member States’ recognition of countries and entities.95
The Convention left other criteria and procedures to be determined by the Executive 
Committee at a later stage. The Executive Committee was to specify cases where the 
issue of a uniform visa was subject to prior consultation of the central authorities of the 
issuing Contracting Party or any other Contracting Party. Further rules to be agreed 
within the Executive Committee included rules on the examination of visa application, 
on the issue of visas at borders, and on the visa-issuing authorities.96
(iii) The Common Consular Instructions and local consular cooperation 
The success of the Schengen common visa policy ultimately depended on its uniform 
implementation by the Contracting Parties’ consular authorities. Lack of uniform 
implementation would have led to visa shopping, thus undermining the very rationale of 
the common visa policy.
The first instrument to ensure uniformity was the Common Consular Instructions 
(CCI).97 The CCI contained the Convention articles and the Executive Committee’s 
decisions on the common conditions and procedures for issuing visas.
Through the CCI, national consular authorities were to implement the principle of 
mutual recognition of the Contracting Parties’ conditions for issuing visas and of their 
concerns with regard to national security, public order and international relations.
Thus, the CCI naturally contained the ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists, the airport transit ‘black’ 
list, the list of national documents entitling entry without a visa (such as residence 
permits and cards issued by foreign ministries to members of international organizations
94 See the Manual o f  documents to which a visa may be affixed, supra  n. 93.
95 See Article 17. See also the Manual o f  documents to which a visa may be affixed, supra  n. 93, and 
Annex 11 (criteria for travel documents to which a visa may be affixed) o f  the CCI, infra n. 97.
96 Article 17.
97 The CCI, as contained in Decision o f  the Executive Committee o f  28 April 1999 ‘withdrawal o f  old 
versions o f  the Common Manual and the Common Consular Instructions and Adoption o f  new versions’ 
(SCH/Com-ex (99) 13), were published in the Official Journal after the Schengen acquis was 
incorporated into the European Union legal order in May 1999 by virtue o f  the Protocol ‘integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the framework o f  the European Union’ attached to the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, see OJ 
2000 L 239/317. For the latest consolidated version o f  the CCI, see OJ 2002 C 313/1.
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and foreign diplomats), and the Manual of documents to which a visa could be 
affixed.98
Further, they laid down an obligation for the consular authorities to consult the SIS 
before a uniform visa was issued. They also provided a list of nationalities for which the 
central authorities of one or more Contracting Parties were to be consulted before a 
uniform visa was issued. This list, contained in Annex 5, was classified as ‘confidential’ 
and not published.99
The CCI also contained some rules aimed at improving security generally. Thus, they 
laid down some criteria in relation to the examination of visa applications including a 
requirement for consular authorities to be particularly vigilant in relation to ‘risk’ 
categories (unemployed persons or persons with no regular income) and with regard to 
verification of documents.100 They provided that in the case where a visa application 
was lodged with the consular post in a State which was not the applicant’s State of 
residence and a risk of illegal immigration was observed, the uniform visa could be 
issued only after consultation with the consular mission in the applicant’s State of 
residence or with the central authorities.101
The CCI also laid down requirements with regard to the administrative management and 
organization of the visa sections in diplomatic or consular posts, particularly security 
measures on blank visa storage and measures to ensure that the staff responsible for 
issuing visas was not exposed to local pressure.102
The second instrument to ensure uniform implementation of the common visa policy
101 •was consular cooperation at local level. Local consular cooperation involved an
exchange of information considered important for a uniform interpretation of the CCI,
for ensuring that the interests of all the Contracting States were known and taken into
account, and for preventing visa shopping in general (in particular through the exchange
of information on the use of false documents, illegal immigration routes, clearly ill-
98 Annexes 1, 3 and 4, and supra  n. 93.
99 For example, following events in East Timor, Portugal requested that Indonesian nationals be issued 
only with limited territorial validity visas (excluding the visa validity for Portugal) or, in the case the 
applicant for a visa intended to enter or transit Portugal, its central authority were to be consulted before a 
visa could be issued. See D ecision o f  the Executive Committee o f  5 May 1995 on common visa policy  
(SCH/Com-ex (95)), OJ 2000 L 239.
100 Parts III and V.
101 See Part II and Annex 5.
102 Part VII.
103 See Part VIII.
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founded applications and the good faith of applicants).
The practical measures to prevent visa shopping also included the regular exchange of 
information on visas issued and refused through which consular authorities were 
expected to detect trends and shifts in applications from one Contracting Party to 
another and make the necessary recommendation to their central authorities.104 Further, 
they included the practice of stamping the passports of visa applicants when visa 
applications were lodged in order to prevent multiple or successive applications.105 
Moreover, document advisers were from time to time sent to selected consular posts in 
order to assist them with the detection of false documents.106
Arrangements for monitoring the implementation of the CCI constituted a further and
1 07essential instrument to ensure uniformity.
Such monitoring was the responsibility of a Standing Committee. This was composed of 
one representative for each Contracting Party as well as the necessary seconded experts 
(the Commission was also included as an observer).
With regard to the implementation of the CCI, the Standing Committee was in 
particular to evaluate the application of the provisions for prior consultation, 
consultation of the SIS and storage of visa blank stickers. In relation to applicant 
countries, it was also to assess whether the conditions governing the issue of visas 
corresponded to those of the CCI, while, with regard to countries already applying the 
Convention, it was to make an assessment on the issue of limited territorial validity 
visas (quantity, target groups, and grounds for issue).
3. The Maastricht Treaty: Article 100c and the Third Pillar
3.1 The negotiations
With the adoption of the Draft External Frontiers Convention blocked over the issue of 
Gibraltar, by the end of 1990 progress on the adoption of the compensatory measures on
104 See D ecision o f  the Executive Committee o f  21 April 1998 on the exchange o f  statistics on issued 
visas (SCH/Com-ex(98) 12), OJ 2000 L 239/173.
105 See Decision o f  the Executive Committee o f  23 June 1998 on the stamping o f  passports o f  visa 
applicants (SCH/Com -ex(98) 21), OJ 2000 L 239/200.
1 Decision o f  the Executive Committee o f  16 December 1998 on coordinated deployment o f  document 
advisers (SCH/Com -ex(98) 59 rev), OJ 2000 L 239/308.
107 See Decision o f  the Executive Committee o f  16 September 1998 setting up a Standing Committee on 
the evaluation and implementation o f  Schengen (SCH/Com-ex(98) 26 def), OJ 2000 L 239/138. On 
monitoring implementation see D ecision o f  the Executive Committee o f  21 April 1998 on the activities o f  
the Task Force (SCH/Com-ex (98)1 rev 2), OJ 2000 L 239/191.
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external border controls appeared meagre. The intergovernmental structure came
108 • . . .  increasingly under criticism because of its inefficiency. Cooperation on immigration
and policing, however, attracted initially little attention at the IGC on Political Union
launched at the December 1990 Rome Summit. It was Chancellor Kohl who -  already
determined solidly to anchor a reunified Germany into a reinforced European Union -
pushed the issue high on the IGC’s agenda as he saw in European cooperation a solution
to an increasingly hot issue in domestic politics.109 The debate centred on the issue of
whether intergovernmental cooperation should be abandoned in favour of Community
competence.
Denmark and the United Kingdom were against any transfer of competence to the 
Community, with the United Kingdom also opposing the elimination of internal border 
controls. Moreover, the United Kingdom and France were concerned about the effects 
of Community policies on their bilateral obligations and their ability to act unilaterally. 
On the other hand, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries wished to transfer 
competence to the Community.110
The Luxembourg Presidency, which took over responsibility for managing the IGC in 
January 1991, made four suggestions on the matter: (i) maintaining the existing 
cooperation arrangements (which suited Denmark), (ii) inserting a new reference in the 
Treaty to cooperation with details left to the Council (which suited the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Greece), (iii) introducing in the Treaty more elaborate provisions for 
cooperation specifying the decision making procedures for each policy area before final 
integration of immigration policy into the Community legal order (which suited 
Germany, France and Portugal), (iv) full communitarization (preferred by the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Spain).111
In April 1991, Luxembourg presented a ‘non-paper’ on draft amendments to the Treaty 
proposing a three-pillar structure according to which the Community (the First Pillar) 
would be complemented by intergovernmental cooperation on foreign and security 
policy (the Second Pillar) and justice and home affairs (the Third Pillar). This suited the 
United Kingdom but was seen as too ‘minimalist’ by Germany, France, Spain, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Italy. Germany, in particular, called at the Luxembourg Summit in 
June 1991, for the adoption of a common immigration policy at Community level. 
When the Netherlands assumed the presidency in July 1991 it proposed
108 See supra.
109 Papademetriou (1996) pp. 51-52; Turnbull and Sandholtz (2001) p. 215.
110 Papademetriou (1996) pp. 51-52.
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communitarization of justice and home affairs. It was however supported only by
Belgium and the Commission. The Member States expressed a clear preference for the
112three-pillar model which became the basis of negotiations at the Maastncht Summit.
The Treaty on European Union agreed at Maastricht in February 1992 confirmed the 
Luxembourg proposal, and introduced a three-pillar structure for the European Union.113 
While the preference for the intergovernmental method for cooperation on justice and 
home affairs thus prevailed, as a result of a political compromise between those 
Member States which wanted to communitarize immigration, asylum and external 
border controls and those Member States which objected to communitarization, the 
TEU transferred some aspects of visa policy to Community competence.114 
Article 100c EC, inserted among the internal market provisions of the EC Treaty, 
conferred competence on the Community for the establishment of the ‘black’ list of 
countries whose nationals were to have visas to cross the external borders of the 
Member States, and a uniform format for visas. The selection of these aspects for 
communitarization, and the inclusion of Article 100c among the internal market 
provisions, emphasized their characterization as the most indispensable compensatory 
measures. At the same time, the split minimized curtailment of national autonomy for 
visa policy. The establishment at Community level of only a ‘black’ list, as opposed to 
full harmonization of the visa requirements imposed by the Member States, implied less 
intrusion on the sovereign right to control entry of aliens and on the Member States’ 
ability to use visa requirements as a national foreign policy instrument. The exclusion 
from Community competence of the ‘conditions and procedures’ for issuing visas and 
of ‘rules on a uniform visa’ (i.e. mutual recognition of national visas issued according to 
the common conditions) can also be explained by their touching more deeply on the 
issue of state sovereignty. The conditions and procedures for issuing visas have 
ramifications into areas which remain within national competence (such as recognition
1,1 See Geddes (2000) p. 89.
112 See Pryce (1994) p. 36; Papademetriou (1996) pp. 52-53; Geddes (2000) pp. 90-91; Denza (2002) pp. 
74-75.
113 The Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993 after ratification by Denmark and France following  
national referenda and, lastly, by Germany following the judgement o f  the German Constitutional Court 
on the compatibility o f  the TEU with the German Constitution {Brunner v. European Union Treaty 
[1994] 1 CMLR 57). As to the implications o f  the pillar structure see Chapter 2.
114 As Anderson, den Boer and Miller explained: ‘At the two extremes o f  this compromise were the UK, 
whose island-state is not much threatened, and Germany, which is open and exposed at the crossroads o f  
a continent. In the IGC, the UK was in the forefront o f  wanting to continue with primarily 
intergovernmental methods. Only visa policy, at the insistence o f  the Germans, was successfully tacked 
on to the EC Pillar. Anderson, M., den Boer and Miller (1994) p. 115.
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of passports). Mutual recognition of national visas was perhaps the most sensitive issue 
involving a considerable curtailment of state sovereignty in relation to access into the 
state territory.
However, the division of competence between the Third Pillar and Article 100c was 
difficult to defend and became the object of disagreement and disputes between the 
institutions which greatly impeded progress.
3.2 The Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs
The Third Pillar provisions were contained in Title VI TEU, Articles K-K.9.115 
The objective of cooperation was established in Article K.l. This provided that: ‘For the 
purpose of achieving the objectives of the Union, in particular the free movement of 
persons...Member States shall regard the following areas as matters of common 
interest’. These area were: (i) asylum policy, (ii) rules governing the crossing by 
persons of the external borders of the Member States, (iii) immigration policy, (iv) drug 
addiction, (v) fraud, (vi) judicial cooperation in civil matters, (vii) judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, (viii) custom cooperation, and (ix) police cooperation for the 
purpose of combating terrorism, drug-trafficking and other serious forms of crime. The 
objective of cooperation appeared vague as the Member States were required only to 
treat such areas as ‘matters of common interest’.
Cooperation so defined was limited by three principles. Firstly, it was to be ‘without 
prejudice to the powers of the European Community’. Secondly, it was to comply with 
the ECHR and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Thirdly, it was 
‘not to affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States 
with regard to maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.116
Reflecting Article C EU, prescribing a ‘single institutional framework’ for the Union, 
the Council, which had previously been excluded from intergovernmental cooperation, 
acquired the central role under the Third Pillar. The Council could adopt ‘joint 
positions’ and ‘joint actions’, and could draw up conventions to be recommended to the 
Member States for adoption in accordance with their constitutional requirements.117 It 
was to act by unanimity -  except for matters of procedure and for implementing 
measures if it so decided -  on an initiative of a Member State or, with regard to the first
115 For an in-depth analysis see Hendry (1993).
116 Article K.1-K.2.
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• 118six matters of common interest, the Commission.
The Commission was to ‘be fully associated’ with the work of the Third Pillar.119 
Moreover, as just mentioned, it shared a right of initiative with the Member States with 
regard to the first six matters of common interest. In practice, the Commission seldom 
used its right of initiative, at least until 1997.120 This mainly reflected the Commission’s 
desire to avoid any counter-productive disagreement among the Member States as to its 
proper role under the Third Pillar. Moreover, justice and home affairs ministers 
generally appeared reluctant to allow the Commission to establish a role in their field. 
The Commission’s actual influence depended thus on its tactical ability and the 
provision of expertise.121
As with the Second Pillar, the initiation of policy rested primarily on the Presidency 
assisted by the Council Secretariat. This meant a lack of continuity, because of the 
Presidency’s half-yearly rotation and the link of initiatives with specific national 
interests, which was only to a limited extent redressed by multi-annual programmes 
agreed by the Council.122
Article K.6 provided that the European Parliament was to be regularly informed by the 
Presidency and the Commission on discussions, that it was to be ‘consulted’ by the 
Presidency on the principal aspects of activities and its views were to be taken duly into 
account, and that it could submit questions to the Council and make recommendations 
to it. This provision, like the provision governing the role of the Commission, was 
ambiguous and open to different interpretations.123 In practice, before 1997 few 
proposals were passed to the European Parliament for consultation.124 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice was almost completely excluded by virtue of 
Article L EU.125 Exclusion of the Court aimed at preserving the intergovernmental 
character of the Pillar. The Member States feared that the Court would introduce legal 
principles and doctrines developed in the Community context with the ultimate effect of
117 Article K.3. The Member States were also required to ‘inform and consult one another in the Council 
with a view to coordinating their action’.
118 Articles K .4(3) and K.3(2).
119 Articles K .4(2) and K.3(2).
120 See Curtin and Dekker (1999) pp. 117-119; Peers (2000) pp. 20-21.
121 Monar (1997b) p. 329; den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 509; Peers (2000) pp. 20-21.
122 See Monar (1997b) p. 330; den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 504. A  Resolution identified the 
priorities for the 1996-1998 period, OJ 1996 C 319/1.
123 O’Keeffe (1995) p. 903. The extent and effectiveness o f  consultation varied depending on the 
Presidency in office. See evidence to the House o f  Lords by Am6dee Turner MEP (qq. 227-234), House 
o f Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94).
124 Peers (2000) p. 21.
125 On the Court’s jurisdiction under Article M see infra.
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1 9Acurtailing their autonomy.
Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court was regrettable given the substantive scope of 
the Third Pillar. Although individuals were not in principle to be affected by Third 
Pillar measures but only by national implementing measures against which national 
judicial protection was available,127 exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
meant that there was no overriding judicial authority to ensure consistency of
interpretation and enforcement, and provide for minimum standards of human rights
128compliance among all Member States.
Article K.3(2)(c) however established that conventions could attribute jurisdiction to the 
Court of Justice with regard to their interpretation and application ‘in accordance with 
such arrangements as they may lay down’. The issue of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
individual conventions negotiated under the Third Pillar gave rise to bitter disputes 
between the Member States and deadlocks.129
Article K.4 established a Coordinating Committee of senior officials -  the K.4 
Committee -  which was entrusted with coordinating and preparing the work of the 
Council, and delivering opinions at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. 
The K.4 Committee was in fact the old pre-Maastricht Group of Coordinators. The role 
of Coreper was safeguarded through a reference to Article 151 EC in Article K.4. 
Again, the relationship between the two bodies was however not fully clarified and 
friction arose.130 Generally, the practice became that the K.4 Committee transmitted 
proposals to the Council through Coreper which normally commented only on proposals 
with First Pillar implications or raising important political issues.131
With regard to Third Pillar instruments, the legal effect of joint positions and joint 
actions remained unclear. Third Pillar provisions expressly obliged the Member States 
to defend joint positions in international organizations and at international conferences. 
But, unlike Second Pillar provisions, they did not expressly require that the Member 
States’ national policies conformed to joint positions, or that joint actions were to
126 See O ’Keeffe, infra n. 187.
127 Cf. Meyring (1997) p. 241.
128 Justice (1996a) p. 16; Neuwahl (1995); Rossi (1997) p. 106.
129 For a full account see Peers (2000) pp. 25-26; Denza (2002) p. 313-316; Rossi (1997) p. 114. The 
compromise dispute settlement provisions o f  the European Police Office (Europol), the Customs 
Information System  (CIS) and the Protection o f  the Communities’ Financial Interests Conventions (PIF) 
Conventions (respectively Articles 40, 27 and 8), all adopted by the Council under the Third Pillar in July 
1995, became the model for the Amsterdam Treaty provisions, OJ 1995 C 316/1, 33 and 48.
130 Monar (1997b) p. 329; den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 507.
131 Peers (2000) p. 18; Denza (2002) p. 81.
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commit the Member States in their positions. In the light of this difference, many 
commentators concluded that Third Pillar joint positions and joint actions -  which were 
not free-standing international instruments among States but made by the Council under 
Treaty powers -  were not capable of being legally binding so as to require national law 
to conform to them.132 The issue constituted a further example of the ambiguity of the 
Third Pillar. The Member States developed the practice of relying on clearly non­
binding instruments such as resolutions, recommendations, conclusions and decisions. 
Conventions thus appeared the only clearly legally binding instrument capable of 
requiring changes to national laws.
The Third Pillar also provided for the possibility of closer co-operation between the
• 1Member States, which was taking place under the Schengen Convention.
3.2.1 Relationship between the Third Pillar and the Community
The Third Pillar was connected to the Community in various ways. The Common and
Final Provisions of the TEU linked together all three Pillars. Article C EU established a
‘single institutional framework’ for the Union which was to ensure the consistency of its
activities. This had some far-reaching implications. It meant, for example, that certain
Community measures governing the institutions were applicable in an across-the-pillars
fashion.134
Article D EU entrusted the European Council with defining the general political 
guidelines of the Union. This was clearly reflected in Second Pillar provisions, which 
prescribed that the Council responded to the political guidelines of the European 
Council, but it was not expressly reflected in the Third Pillar provisions, although action 
by the European Council did cover the Third Pillar in accordance with Article D.135 
Article M EU safeguarded Community competence by providing that nothing in the 
TEU was to affect the Community Treaty. The same stipulation was provided for in 
Article K.l which stated that cooperation under the Third Pillar was to be ‘without 
prejudice to the powers of the European Community’. Since Article L, which excluded
132 MUller-Graff (1994) p. 509; Denza (2002) p. 78. For a different opinion see Meyring (1997) pp. 232- 
233.
133 Article K.7.
134 See, for example, Case T-174/95 Svenka Journalistforbundent v. Council [1998] ECR 2289, where the 
Court o f  First Instance held that D ecision 93/731 -  the Community instrument governing access to 
documents -  which was adopted under Article 151 EC (now 207) covered Council decisions on access to 
Third Pillar documents since Article 151 EC expressly applied to the Third pillar by virtue o f  Article 
K.8(2) and Decision 93/731 contained no exclusion,.
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the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction with regard to the TEU provisions, excluded Article 
M from its scope, the Court had jurisdiction to monitor that Third Pillar activity did not 
encroach on Community powers.
Such jurisdiction was affirmed by the Court in the Airport Transit Visas Case, where 
the Commission challenged the validity of the Joint Action on Airport Transit Visas 
adopted by the Council under Article K.3 on the ground that the measure fell within the 
scope of Article 100c EC.136 The United Kingdom intervening argued that the Court did 
not have jurisdiction to review the validity of the Joint Action since Third Pillar 
measures were outside the scope of Article 173 EC. The Court dismissed the argument 
holding that Article L and M EU entrusted the Court with ensuring that Third Pillar 
activity did not encroach on Community powers.
A further bridge between the First and Third Pillars was provided by Article K.9. 
Article K.9 -  the so called passerelle provision -  provided for the possibility of 
transferring any of the first six matters of common interest listed in Article K. 1 to the 
European Community (Article 100c). Such transfer -  as it constituted in practice an 
amendment of the Treaties -  required unanimity in the Council and ratification by all 
Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. It could 
be proposed either by a Member State or the Commission.
A Declaration on Asylum attached to the Maastricht Treaty provided that the Council 
was to consider by the end of 1993 whether to apply the passerelle provision to asylum 
policy. In November 1993 the Commission expressed the opinion that further 
experience with the Third Pillar was desirable before the use of Article K.9, which the 
Council endorsed.137 In November 1995 the Commission advocated the transfer to 
Community competence of all matters dealt with in the Third Pillar with the exception 
of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters. However, it declared that the 
issue was better left to the 1996 IGC, particularly given the cumbersome procedure
n o
envisaged by Article K.9. Monar suggested that the Commission might have wanted 
to avoid polarization of the Member States on the question of communitarization at least 
before the start of the IGC.139
A further connection between the Community and the Third Pillar was provided by
135 O ’Keeffe (1995) pp. 896-897.
136 Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council [1998] 1-2763.
137 SEC(93) 1687.
138 COM(95) 566.
139 Monar (1997b) p. 331.
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virtue of the arrangements for financing.140
3.2.2 Criticism o f the Third Pillar
Soon after its entry into force and already in the context of the TEU’s review as 
provided for in Article N EU,141 the Third Pillar was strongly criticized on the ground of 
serious structural deficiencies.142
The Third Pillar’s greatest defect was that it did not provide for adequate legal 
instruments.143 As mentioned earlier, the Member States remained divided on the legal 
effect of joint positions and joint actions -  with no possibility for a clarification from 
the Court of Justice -  and came to rely on clearly non-binding instruments.144 Reliance 
on non-binding measures and lack of a mechanism for monitoring implementation 
meant that Third Pillar measures were often not transposed (or at least not fully and 
timely) into national policies or national administrative agencies’ practices.145 
Conventions, the only clearly legally binding instrument, generally took a very long 
time before entering into force as a result of slow and uneven ratification by national 
parliaments, and no real monitoring of their implementation took place.
A further problem of the Third Pillar was its cumbersome five-layer decision-making 
structure.146 Below the Council were Coreper and the K.4 Committee. Three Steering 
Groups reported to the K.4 Committee on respectively: immigration and asylum; police 
and custom cooperation; and judicial cooperation.147 Various working groups reported 
to each Steering Group. Moreover, other groups existed independently, such as Cirea,
140 Article K.8.
141 In this context, the Council in its Report on the Functioning o f  the Treaty on European Union (SN  
1821/95, 10.03.1995), emphasized that the little time the Third Pillar had been in force for precluded a 
true assessment o f  its provisions.
142 See Comm ission’s Report on the Operation o f  the Treaty on European Union, SEC(95) final, 10 May 
1995, paras. 47-52. See also Hailbronner (2000) p. 49.
143 O’Keeffe (1995) p. 898. See also Commission Communication on immigration and asylum policies, 
23.02.1994, COM(94) 23 fmal, paras. 15-18; Reflection Group’s Report, 5 December 1995, SN 520/95 
(Reflex 21), para. 48.
144 Walker (1998) pp. 235-236.
145 See the Austrian Strategy Paper on immigration and asylum, Council doc. 9809/98, 29.09.1998. See 
also Den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) pp. 511-512. An exception was the Joint Action on an evaluation 
mechanism, OJ 1997 L 344/7, under which a group o f  experts would visit the Member States regularly to 
see whether they had implemented Third Pillar crime and policing measures effectively. Under the 
Schengen Convention implementation was assured through a system o f  inspections by multinational 
teams.
146 See for example the United Kingdom Government (1996) para. 53.
147 These replaced the old working groups in pre-Maastricht. They were terminated by the United 
Kingdom Presidency in early 1998.
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Cirefi and Horizontal Group on Data Processing.148 This heavy structure tended to slow 
down the decision-making process and increase the workload of coordination.149 
A further weakness of the Third Pillar was that it overlapped with Community 
competence with regard to visa policy, drug addiction, international fraud and treatment 
of migrants.150 This caused institutional friction and slowed down the decision-making 
process. The boundary between the Community and Third Pillar competence was firstly 
questioned in Portugal v. Council where Portugal challenged the validity of a 
Development Cooperation Agreement concluded under the First Pillar on the ground 
that the Agreement included provisions on fighting drug abuse which should have been 
based on Article K EU.151 Later, in the Airport Transit Visas Case the Court was again 
called to delimit the division of competence, this time with regard to visa policy (see 
infra)}52
Apart from its inefficiency, the Third Pillar was also worrying on the ground of lack of
1transparency and political accountability. Secrecy surrounded Third Pillar activity, 
which made it difficult for national parliaments to influence policy.154 
Some national parliaments developed procedures for scrutiny of Third Pillar activity. 
The United Kingdom government, for example, following a Report by the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities in 1993,155 undertook to provide 
Third Pillar documents to Parliament at an appropriate stage of policy development. The 
government however refused at that time to grant a parliamentary scrutiny reserve under 
which it would withhold agreement in the Council until Parliament had scrutinized the 
relevant documents. Stricter procedures were applied by the Parliaments of the 
Netherlands -  which has a monist approach to international law -  and Finland.156 
Access to Third Pillar documents by the public also improved as a result of the Court of
• 1 ^*7First Instance’s judgement in Svenka Journalistforbundet v. Council.
148 See Peers (2000) p. 24.
149 Monar (1997b) p. 329. ‘Horizontal’ or ‘high level’ groups, such as the High Level Group on Asylum  
and Migration were developed to link together the negotiations within the different working groups and 
prepared multi-annual programmes. See den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 506.
150 This was clearly pointed out by the Commission with regard to visas. See Commission’s Report, supra 
n. 142, para. 52.
151 Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council [1996] E C R 1-6177. The Court o f  Justice, pointing to the general 
nature o f  the provisions in questions, found that they fell within the concept o f  development policy.
152 Supra n. 136.
153 See Comm ission’s Report, supra  n. 142, para. 18.
154 See for example Justice (1996b).
155 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1992-93).
156 See Curtin and Dekker (1999) pp. 120-121; Denza (2002) pp. 328-329.
157 Supra n. 134.
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3.2.3 Results 
According to Denza:
‘It was clear by the end o f  the process o f  ratification o f  the Maastricht Treaty, that the Third 
Pillar broadly reflected the extent o f  public and parliamentary readiness at that stage to integrate 
asylum, immigration, police and judicial cooperation into the E U ’.158
The field of justice and home affairs was a particularly sensitive one. Cooperation was 
inextricably linked to the issue of sovereignty, touching on responsibility for 
maintaining internal security and on the issue of jurisdiction.
As Monar states:
‘ ...traditionally the enormous concentration o f  political, administrative and financial powers o f  
the m odem  state has found one o f  its main reasons o f  legitimacy in the guarantee o f  the internal 
security o f  its citizens. As a result justice and home affairs are intimately linked to the traditional 
concept o f  national sovereignty: even the slightest renunciation o f  national control over state 
instruments in this area seems to question the nation-state in one o f  its most essential 
functions’.159
Moreover, cooperation was made difficult by the existence of profound differences 
between the Member States’ substantive and procedural laws and law enforcement 
practices and by their propensity to assume the superiority of their individual national 
systems, which hindered the application of the principle of mutual recognition.160 
These factors and attitudes were ultimately at the basis of the Third Pillar’s legal and 
constitutional ambiguities.
What the Third Pillar did at least provide for was a framework for a process of 
reciprocal learning which was essential to establish the foundations for common 
policies and to build sufficient mutual trust to support their implementation.161 Activity 
under the Third Pillar did result in the transformation of working practices of interior
158 Denza (2002) p. 84.
159 Monar (1997b) p. 326.
160 Thus, for example application o f  the Dublin Convention had in some cases been excluded on the 
ground that the national asylum laws o f  the Member State responsible for processing the application did 
not afford the same level o f  protection as those o f  the Member State where the applicant was seeking 
refuge. See R v. Secretary o f  S tate fo r  the Home D epartm ent ex parte  Adan and Aitsguer [2000] UKHL 
67. See Boccardi (2002) p. 177; N icol (2004) p. 173.
161 Den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 501.
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162ministries and police forces and the development of extensive networks.
In practice, activity under the Third Pillar also brought about a great deal of policy 
convergence in the field of asylum and immigration, with national policy makers 
adopting unilaterally many of the restrictive measures they had been reluctant to adopt 
collectively.163
Moreover, although progress under the Third Pillar appeared generally limited,164 by the 
time of the 1996 IGC a network of instruments and institutions was starting to take 
shape.165
3.3 Article 100c EC
As mentioned earlier, as a result of a political compromise between those Member 
States that wanted to communitarize immigration, asylum and external border controls 
and those that were against communitarization, the Treaty of Maastricht transferred 
some aspects of visa policy to Community competence. Article 100c EC provided that 
‘the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, shall determine the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member 
States’. Qualified majority voting applied after 1 January 1996.
Further, it provided that the Council, before 1 January 1996, was to adopt, acting by 
qualified majority voting on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, measures relating to a uniform format for visas.
Article 100c also made provision for the introduction of visa requirements ‘in the event
162 See, for example, House o f  Lords Select Committee o f  the European Communities (1997-1998a).
163 See Papademetriou (1996) pp. 106; Rasmussen (1997) p. 159. In this respect see, for example: 
Resolution o f  20 June 1994 adopted by the Council on limitations on admission o f  third country nationals 
to the Member States for employment (OJ 1996 C 274/3); Resolution o f  30 November 1994 relating to 
limitations on the admission o f  third country nationals to the Member States for the purpose o f  pursuing 
activities as self-em ployed (OJ 1996 C 274/7). With regard to asylum, two Resolutions were adopted by 
the EU immigration ministers in London from 30 November to 1 December 1992. One related to 
‘manifestly unfounded applications for asylum ’, the other regarded ‘a harmonized approach to questions 
concerning host third countries’, published in Guild and Niessen (1996) pp. 141 and 161 respectively.
The Council also adopted measures in an attempt to establish a common approach to the 1951 Convention 
on Refugees: Resolution o f  June 1995 on minimum guarantees for asylum procedures, OJ 1996 C 274, 
and Joint Position o f  March 1995 on the harmonized application o f  the definition o f  the term ‘refugee’ in 
Article l o f  the 1951 Geneva Convention, OJ 1996 L 63/2.
164 See for example Monar (1997b) pp. 331-334; Hailbronner (2000) p. 48; Denza (2002) pp. 193-234.
For an account on progress toward a EU immigration policy see Peers (1998).
165 Den Boer and Wallace, W. (2000) p. 512. In particular, Europol, supra  n. 129, was taking shape 
(although the Convention had not yet been ratified). The CIS, supra  n. 129, was being computerized and 
two other databases for Europol and Eurodac were under development (the formal adoption o f  the 
Eurodac Convention establishing a system  for the identification o f  applications for asylum under Article 
15 o f  the Dublin Convention was set aside to take place under the Amsterdam Treaty, Council Document 
111 18/4/96 p. 10).
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of an emergency situation in a third country posing a threat of a sudden inflows of 
nationals from that country into the Community’, thus explicitly confirming the use of 
visas to block asylum inflows.
Such visa requirements were to be introduced by the Council acting by a qualified 
majority voting on a recommendation from the Commission for a period not exceeding 
six months (consultation of the European Parliament was excluded presumably on the 
ground of a need to act quickly).
The Article, departing from the standard Community legislative procedure, provided 
that the Commission was to examine any request made by a Member State that it submit 
a proposal to the Council. It also contained a material exception stating that nothing in it 
‘could prejudice the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member States 
with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security’.
It clarified its relation with intergovernmental cooperation by stipulating that the 
provisions of conventions in force between the Member States governing areas covered 
by the Article were to remain in force until their content was replaced by measures 
adopted pursuant to the Article.
4. Progress on visa policy under the Maastricht Treaty
4.1 The Visa R e fla tio n  and the Draft External Frontiers Convention
4.1.1 The Commission’s proposals
Soon after the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, the Commission in a 
Communication proposed two related measures for adoption by the Council which, 
together with a regulation on a uniform format for visas to be proposed by the 
Commission at a later stage, were to provide the rules governing the crossing of the 
external frontiers of the Member States including a common visa policy.166 
One proposal, based on Article K.3 EU, was a Council decision to establish a 
Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States. This Draft 
Convention corresponded in substance to the Draft External Frontiers Convention that
166 COM(93) 684, 10.12.1993, OJ 1994 C 11. For an in-depth analysis see House o f  Lords on the 
European Communities (1993-94).
167 On the Comm ission’s choice for a Council decision ‘establishing’ a convention see O ’Keeffe (1994) p. 
141. The Commission held that under the TEU the Member States could no longer conclude conventions 
between one another in the areas listed in Article K. 1 in the traditional manner prescribed by public 
international law. O ’Keeffe remarked that the very purpose o f  introducing the Third Pillar was to allow  
the Member States to act under international law rather than Community law.
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had been negotiated by the Member States within the framework of the Ad hoc Group 
on Immigration but had never been signed because of the dispute between the United 
Kingdom and Spain over its application to Gibraltar.
The Commission amended the original Draft Convention in response to changes 
brought about by the TEU, in particular the transfer of competence to the Community 
for certain aspects of visa policy and the possibility of granting jurisdiction to the Court 
of Justice over the interpretation and application of Third Pillar conventions.
The provisions of the Draft Convention were largely based on the relevant provisions of 
the Schengen Convention.168 Unlike the Schengen Convention, however, the Draft 
Convention did not provide for the abolition of internal border controls. The 
Commission, in accordance with its interpretation of Article 7a (previously 8a), 
maintained that measures on the removal of internal frontier controls were to be adopted 
under Community law. At a later stage, it did propose such measures under Community 
powers but the Council did not act on them.169 The United Kingdom, for its part, never 
accepted that the underlying objective of the Draft Convention and the Visa Regulation
1 -7A
was the removal of internal border controls.
With regard to visa policy, the Draft Convention provided for the progressive 
harmonization of the Member States visa policies, without prejudice to decisions 
adopted under Article 100c EC.171
It introduced the concept of a uniform visa. This was defined as an ‘entry, transit or re­
entry visa of the uniform format provided for in Article 100c(3).. .issued under the rules
168 They included provisions on: organization and standards o f  border controls (Articles 2-6); entry 
conditions for short stays (Article 7); equivalence between a residence permit and a visa for the purpose 
o f  external border crossing (Article 8); a joint list o f  persons to be refused entry (Articles 10-13); and the 
introduction o f  carriers’ sanctions and o f  penalties for unlawful crossing (Articles 14-15). The provisions 
on the joint list -  by virtue o f  which a Member State could exclude a third country nationals from the 
territory o f  the whole Community sim ply on the basis that there were serious grounds for believing that 
he was planning to commit a serious crime or that he represented a threat to public policy or national 
security -  were strongly criticized particularly on the ground o f  lack o f  adequate remedies for persons 
wrongly included in the joint list. A lso strongly criticized was the obligation to introduce carriers’ 
sanctions on the ground that these had the effect o f  hindering the ability o f  asylum-seekers to escape from 
countries where they feared persecution. See ILPA and Refugee Council, House o f  Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) paras. 29 and 44.
169 The Commission proposed three directives after the Schengen Convention became operative in March 
1995. Two, based on Article 100 EC, provided for respectively the abolition o f  border controls and free 
circulation o f  all third country nationals. The third, based on Articles 49, 54(2) and 63(2) EC, provided 
for amendments to the EC free movement provisions. COM(95) 347, 348, and 346, OJ 1995 C 289/16, C 
306/5 and C 307/18.
170 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) para. 57.
171 Article 17.
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specified in...this Convention’.172 These rules established the entry conditions to be 
satisfied by aliens and the conditions and procedures to be followed by the Member 
States when issuing visas.173 The Draft Convention provided that ‘a Member State shall 
not require a visa issued by its own authorities of a person applying to stay for a short 
time within its territory who holds a uniform visa’.174
The second Commission’s proposal was a regulation based on Article 100c determining 
the third countries whose nationals were to be in possession of a visa when crossing the 
external frontiers of the Member States.
The proposed Draft Regulation contained a list of 126 countries whose nationals had to 
be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders (the ‘black’ list) and an 
obligation for the Council to include by 30 June 1996 any other third country either on 
the ‘black’ list or on a list of countries whose nationals were to be visa exempt (the 
‘white’ list).
The Commission justified the postponement to 30 June 1996 on the grounds of the 
sensitivity of the matter and of the divergent policies of the Member States. Until 30 
June 1996, the Member States were to retain discretion over visa requirements for 
nationals of countries not included on the ‘black’ list, on the understanding that 
divergences between the Member States ‘may not give rise to controls contrary to 
Article 7a’. '75
The declared ‘cornerstone’ of the Commission proposed Draft Regulation was the 
establishment of the principle of mutual recognition of visas for the purpose of external 
border crossing. According to Article 2 of the Draft Regulation ‘a Member State shall 
not be entitled to require a visa of a person who seeks to cross its external frontiers and 
who holds a visa issued by another Member State, where that visa is valid throughout 
the Community’. A visa valid throughout the Community would be the uniform visa 
granted according to the rules in the Draft Convention.
4.1.2 Disagreement over the division o f competence
The Commission’s understanding of the division of competence for visa policy between 
the First and Third Pillars, as illustrated by the Commission’s proposals, was ultimately
172 Article l( l) (f ) .
173 Articles 19-22, 24-25. These provisions were the same as those o f  the Schengen Convention.
174 Article 18.
175 Article 1 and Preamble.
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• 176underpinned by the Commission’s interpretation of Article 7a.
The Commission interpreted Article 100c as ultimately functional to the removal of 
internal frontier controls. It thus interpreted the Article as requiring complete 
harmonization of the Member States’ visa requirements, and accordingly it included in 
the Draft Regulation not only a ‘black’ list but also an obligation for the Council to 
include any third country either in the ‘black’ or in a ‘white’ list by June 1996.
However, the objective of removing internal frontier controls remained a disputed one, 
and accordingly some Member States never accepted that the underlying purpose of the
177Visa Regulation was to serve it.
A further controversial point was the Commission’s splitting of the principle of mutual 
recognition of visas between the Draft Convention and the Draft Regulation. While the 
Draft Convention laid down the principle for the purpose of free circulation in the 
Community, the Draft Regulation was to give effect to it specifically where it related to 
the crossing of the external borders of the Member States.
The Parliament adopted an even wider interpretation of Article 100c than the 
Commission, holding that the Draft Regulation was also to cover the common 
conditions and procedures for issuing visas and the principle of equivalence between a
1 78residence permit and a visa, which had been included in the Draft Convention.
The Council rejected the interpretations of the Commission and the Parliament. It 
amended the Commission’s Draft Regulation deleting the obligation to completely 
harmonize the visa requirements of the Member States by June 1996 and the principle 
of mutual recognition of visas. The Preamble to the Council Regulation stated that ‘the 
Member States will constantly endeavour to harmonize their visa policies with regard to 
third countries not on the common list’,179 and that the principle of mutual recognition 
and the conditions and criteria for issuing visas were matters to be determined within 
the ‘appropriate framework’, namely the Third Pillar.180
4.1.3 The ‘black'list
176 See Hailbronner (1994) pp. 981-985 and 987; O ’Keeffe (1994) pp. 146-147.
177 See supra  n. 170.
178 See Peers (1996) p. 153, who argued that at first sight only the Parliament’s and the Council’s 
maximalist interpretations appeared coherent.
179 9th Recital Regulation 574/1999, OJ 1999 L 72/2, replacing Regulation 2317/95, OJ 1995 L 234/1. The 
Council did not expressly reject the view  that Article 100c required complete harmonization o f  the 
Member States’ visa requirements eventually. Article 2(4) o f  the Regulation established a duty for the 
Member States to notify their position in relation to the countries not on the ‘black’ list, and Article 3 
provided for the Commission to draw up a progress report on harmonization two years after the 
Regulation’s adoption.
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A further problem surrounding the adoption of the Commission’s proposals was the 
‘black’ list of the Draft Regulation. The Commission proposed a ‘black’ list which was 
substantially the same as the Schengen ‘black’ list without any prior negotiations with 
those Member States that were not taking part in the Schengen Convention (the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and at that stage Denmark).181 The ‘black’ list so proposed thus 
included a number of Commonwealth countries for which it was the United Kingdom’s 
policy to grant visa-free access.
The United Kingdom strongly opposed the adoption of the list claiming that the 
inclusion of these countries in the ‘black’ list was not justified either on security or on 
immigration risk grounds. In particular, it argued that any immigration flow from these 
countries would be directed primarily to its territory rather than that of the other 
Member States.182
The final list thus excluded twenty-eight countries, almost all Commonwealth countries 
-  though nationals of these countries remained subject to visa requirements within the
1 S'!Schengen framework.
As mentioned earlier in the context of the Schengen Convention, the ‘black’ list was 
generally criticized as too restrictive. Such restrictiveness resulted from the fact that the 
‘black’ list amounted (almost) to a cumulation of the Member States’ national visa 
requirements. These varied widely for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Member States 
used different criteria for deciding whether to impose visa requirements, with certain 
Member States emphasizing immigration and security risks and others reciprocity and 
political disapproval. Secondly, even taking the same criteria as a starting point, 
divergences remained wide. As the Home Office explained, there were genuine 
differences in the level of immigration and security threat that particular countries 
presented to different Member States, flowing from historical links or geographical 
proximity. In this context, it was doubted whether more common reporting under the 
CFSP arrangements could have been very significant in achieving a shared positions 
since the existing disparities were not seen as coming primarily from differences in
• • • • 1 fiiperception of the political situation in third countries. Thirdly, there were no adequate 
instruments to ensure a uniform evaluation of the criteria or their implementation.
180 2nd and 4th Recitals Regulation 574/1999.
181 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) para. 70.
182 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) paras. 70-73 and 106- 
108.
183 Article 6 Regulation 574/1999 expressly provided that the Regulation was without prejudice to any 
further harmonization between individual Member States going beyond the common list.
184 See supra  n. 79.
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The resulting restrictiveness of the common visa policy meant a disruptive impact on 
the Member States’ bilateral relations. The United Kingdom was the only Member State 
that was not prepared to withdraw the preferential treatment accorded to its ex-colonies 
in the form of visa-free access, and such policy currently remains at the basis of the
• 185United Kingdom’s opt-out from the Community common visa policy.
The final list also included three additional countries -  Peru, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -  following developments 
at Schengen level.186
4.1.4 Results
The unresolved dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain over the territorial 
application of the Draft External Frontiers Convention continued to block its signing. 
The Draft External Frontiers Convention was also unacceptable to the United Kingdom 
on the ground that it attributed jurisdiction to the Court of Justice, as was permissible 
under Article K.3(2)(c) EU.187
The Visa Regulation adopted by the Council in 1995 departed radically from the
Commission’s proposal. Apart from introducing the changes in relation to the division
of competence between the Third Pillar and Article 100c and in relation to the ‘black’
list, the Council also limited the scope of the Visa Regulation so that it covered only
visas issued for stays of three-months and for transit, thus excluding airport transit 
188visas.
Since the Council failed to reconsult the Parliament despite the major changes 
introduced into the Commission’s proposal, the Parliament brought proceedings against 
the Council under Article 173 EC (now 230) for failure to reconsult. The Court of 
Justice annulled the Regulation on this procedural ground while preserving its effects
185 Interview with United Kingdom diplomat, 30 July 2003.
186 Peers (1996) p. 152.
187 See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1993-94) para. 48. The reasons 
were explained by O ’Keeffe in these terms: ‘It is assumed that the Court will bring to the task o f  
interpretation and dispute settlement o f  conventions concluded under this provision at least some o f  the 
feature which have characterized its case law when acting within the context o f  the Community Treaties. 
Thus, it may be expected that the Court could emphasize the Rule o f  Law, the pre-eminence o f  the 
general principles o f  law such as equality and non-discrimination, legal certainty, legitimate expectations, 
ne bis in idem, the right to a fair hearing, proportionality and the respect o f  the principles contained in 
human rights instruments to which the Community and/or its Member States are parties, including the 
European Convention on Human Rights’. O ’Keeffe (1994) pp. 144-145.
188 Moreover, the Visa Regulation (and the Draft Convention) did not preclude the possibility o f  granting 
a longer period o f  stay (national visas). The practice o f  the United Kingdom, for example, was to grant 
visas for stays o f  six months.
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until a replacement was adopted.189 The Council adopted the replacement two years 
later after duly consulting the Parliament and ignoring its proposed amendments.190 
Thus, even in the context of Article 100c progress was agonizingly slow.191 While the 
Commission presented its proposal in December 1993, the Council adopted the Visa 
Regulation only in September 1995 after lengthy negotiations over the visa list. After 
the Parliament’s successful challenge in 1997, it took two further years for the Council 
to adopt the replacing Regulation which contained only two minor amendments to the 
visa list.
4.2 The Joint Action on Airport Transit Visas
After excluding airport transit visas from the scope of the Visa Regulation, the Council 
adopted a Joint Action on Airport Transit Visas under Article K.3 EU.192 
This contained a list o f ten countries whose nationals required visas for the purpose of 
airport transit in all Member States.193 The objective of harmonization was security and 
control of illegal immigration.
The Joint Action stipulated that for countries not on the list the Member States retained 
discretion as to whether or not to require airport transit visas.
It did not provide for the conditions governing issue of airport transit visas but 
envisaged the possibility of future adoption of criteria by the Council.
4.2.1 Dispute over competence: the Airport Transit Visas Case
The adoption of the Joint Action on Airport Transit Visas was also surrounded by
disagreement over the division of competence between the First and Third Pillars.
Soon after the adoption of the Joint Action, the Commission brought an annulment 
action under Article 173 EC arguing that measures on airport transit visas fell within the 
scope of Article 100c EC, thus linking harmonization in this field to the establishment 
of the internal market. The Council maintained that the measure was outside the scope 
of Article 100c since in the case of airport transit no ‘crossing of the external borders’ of 
the Member States was involved (third country nationals would not legally enter the 
territory of the Member States). The Court of Justice, after establishing its jurisdiction
189 Case C-392/95 Parliam ent v. Council [1997] E C R 1-3213.
190 Regulation 574/1999, supra  n. 179.
191 Den Boer and W allace, W. (2000) p. 509.
192 Joint Action 96/197 JHA, OJ 1996 L 63/8.
193 These countries were Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka 
and Zaire. At Schengen level, the list further included Pakistan and Bangladesh.
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to police the boundary between the Community and the intergovernmental Pillars on the 
basis of Articles L and M EU, held that Article 100c, in the light of Article 3(d) of the 
EC Treaty, was concerned with measures on entry and movement of persons in the 
internal market. Since in the case of airport transit no legal crossing of the external 
border occurred, the measure was outside the scope of Article 100c.194 
As Peers pointed out the resulting situation was that airport transit visas fell within the 
scope of Article 100c(3) -  since the Regulation on a uniform format for visas explicitly 
applied to them -  but not of Article 100c(l).195
4.3 The Regulation on a uniform format for visas
More successful was the adoption of the Regulation laying down a uniform format for 
visas.196 A uniform format for visas was indispensable to ensure a high and uniform 
level of protection for visas against falsification and forgery. The Regulation provided 
that short-term (three months’ validity) and transit visas (including airport transit visas) 
issued by the Member States were to be produced in the form of a uniform format 
(provided in the Regulation), and were to comply with a number of specifications (to be 
adopted by the Commission assisted by a Committee of representatives of the Member 
States).197
The Regulation authorized the Member States to use the uniform format also for visas 
falling outside its scope (i.e. national visas), provided differences were incorporated in • 
order to distinguish them from those within the scope of the Regulation.198
Furthermore, a Draft Joint Action on a uniform format for forms for affixing visas 
issued to persons holding travel documents not recognized by the Member State issuing 
the visa was almost agreed in 1998 under the Third Pillar. The European Parliament, 
expressing its opinion on the proposal in accordance with Third Pillar consultation 
arrangements, maintained that the measure should have been based on Article 100c(3) 
rather than Article K.3.199
194 Airport Transit Visas Case, supra  n. 136.
195 Peers (1996) p. 154.
196 Regulation 1683/95, OJ 1995 L 164/1.
197 Articles 1 and 5.
198 Article 7.
199 OJ 1998 C 379/384. The European Parliament also proposed to amend the measure to include an 
obligation for the Member States to exchange information on counterfeited or falsified visa formats and a
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4.4 Other measures
A Council Recommendation relating to local consular cooperation was adopted under 
the Third Pillar.200 The Recommendation, recognizing that the issue of visas, pending 
the preparation of joint instructions, was governed by national legislation, endorsed the 
need for each Member State to take account, when issuing its own visas, of the interests 
of the other Member States with regard to national security, public order and illegal 
immigration. For this reason, it envisaged the need for the Member States’ consular 
services to maintain local consular cooperation involving the exchange of information 
on criteria for issuing visas and on national security, public order and illegal 
immigration risks.
The Recommendation also envisaged the drawing up of joint reports on local visa issue. 
Further, local consular services were expected to adopt joint measures to detect 
simultaneous visa applications or any earlier visa refusal by a Member State, and to 
exchange information for the purpose of determining the good faith and reputation of 
visa applicants.
The Council further adopted a Recommendation on provisions for the detection of false 
or falsified documents in the visa departments of representations abroad and in the
901offices of domestic authorities dealing with the issue or extension of visas. The 
Recommendation called for uniform levels of expertise and equipment, and, for this 
purpose, for the Member States to consider whether to make their equipment available 
when necessary to other Member States or the common use of equipment.
Other measures adopted by the Council included ‘Conclusions on the organization and 
development of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing
909of Frontiers and Immigration (Cirefi)’.
This was in response to the K.4 Committee recommendation that Cirefi, originally 
established in 1992 to assist in the implementation of the External Frontiers Convention 
(which was eventually never signed), should be progressively strengthened to assist the 
Member States in preventing unauthorized immigration and illegal residence,
clause stating that ‘counterfeiting or falsifying such format shall be punishable according to national 
laws’.
200 4 March 1996, OJ 1996 C 80/1.
201 29 April 1999, OJ 1999 C 140/1. See also Joint Action 98/700, adopted under Article K.3, setting up a 
European Image Archiving System  (FADO) for the purpose o f  exchanging among the Member States by 
computer means information concerning genuine and false documents, OJ 1998 L 333.
202 30 November 1994, OJ 1996 C 274/50.
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combating trafficking, detecting forged documents and improving expulsion 
procedures.
The Council also adopted a Joint Action allowing visa-free travel of third country 
national school children.203 The legal basis of this measure was again disputable. Since 
the measure concerned the abolition of internal border controls, it could have been 
argued that Article 100 EC constituted the appropriate legal basis. The Commission 
took umbrage when the Council adopted the Joint Action, but it declined to sue the 
Council.204
5. Conclusion
The sensitive nature of visas meant that initially cooperation on visa policy was strictly 
maintained within the intergovernmental sphere. The lack of political consensus among 
the Member States on the abolition of internal frontier controls in the Community 
resulted in such cooperation taking a dual track (the ‘Trevi’ Group and the Schengen 
Convention).
The TEU, in striking a compromise between the Member States which wanted to 
introduce Community powers for the adoption of the ‘compensatory’ measures and 
those which opposed communitarization, introduced significant changes. It introduced a 
more formal framework for intergovernmental cooperation on justice and home affairs -  
the Third Pillar -  which was connected to the Community through the device of the 
pillar structure, and Community powers for some aspects of visa policy (the ‘black’ list 
and the uniform format for visas). The split of visa policy between the First and Third 
Pillars made it possible to communitarize the most indispensable compensatory 
measures for the removal of internal frontier controls. At the same time, it minimized 
curtailment of national autonomy for visa policy by implying minimum intrusion in the 
sovereign right to control entry into the State and in the ability of the Member States to 
use visas as a national foreign policy instrument.
The split, however, turned out to be unworkable. Institutional conflict arose over 
demarcation of competence, underpinned by disagreement over the interpretation of 
Article 7a. This greatly impeded progress.
The Third Pillar itself did not deliver the expected results because of its structural
203 Joint Action 94/795 JHA, OJ 1994 L 327.
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deficiencies, particularly the inadequacy of its instruments and the lack of a monitoring 
mechanism. Some of these structural deficiencies were the result of the Third Pillar’s 
legal and constitutional ambiguity and flexibility, underpinned by caution on the part of 
the Member States in proceeding with cooperation in the sensitive field of JHA and the 
lack of political consensus on a number of issues, such as the ultimate objective 
cooperation was to serve and the role of the Community institutions, particularly the 
Court of Justice, in the Third Pillar’s framework.
With regard to visas and external border controls, the Third Pillar produced no 
significant results, with the adoption of the Draft External Frontier Convention blocked 
over the issue of Gibraltar.
While there was agreement among the Member States on the inadequacy and deficiency 
of the Third Pillar and on the need for reform, there was no consensus as to how to 
proceed. A majority of the Member States favoured communitarization of visas, asylum 
and immigration. Others, maintaining that the Third Pillar’s deficiency was not directly 
attributable to its intergovernmental nature, proposed to improve the intergovernmental 
framework.
204 See Peers (2000) p. 31.
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4 AMSTERDAM AND BEYOND
The first part of this Chapter analyses the changes in the legal framework on visas 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, subsequent developments and proposed 
changes in the Draft Constitutional Treaty. The second part considers progress since 
Amsterdam on measures for a common visa policy.
1. Title IV EC of the Amsterdam Treaty
1.1 The negotiations
As a commentator explained with regard to the situation ahead of the 1996 IGC:
‘The British view immediately after the signing o f  the TEU, with its provisions for a review in 
1996, was that they had five years in which to prove to the Germans that real progress could be 
made in these sectors on an intergovernmental basis. Because o f  the delay in ratification o f the 
Treaty they only had two.
Making Maastricht work in these pillars was never going to be easy, and as the 1996 IGC 
approached it was clear that the Germans were dissatisfied with progress, and would be pressing 
for the absorption o f  the intergovernmental pillars into the EC pillar. The British position ahead 
o f  1996 was that the protection o f  the three-pillar structure remained a fundamental objective, in 
line with the general British commitment to building a Europe o f  cooperating nation-states rather 
than transferring power to a supranational super-state’.1
Already in 1994, the German Presidency made clear its wish that Third Pillar issues 
should be gradually transferred to Community competence. The ‘Lamers Report’ 
published by Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union in anticipation of the 1996 IGC 
proposed, as a solution to the ongoing dispute as to the pace and depth of European 
integration, a two-speed Europe, provoking negative reactions from both the United 
Kingdom and France.2
1 George (1997) p. 109.
2 Papademetriou (1996) p. 91.
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The reports by the Community institutions on the functioning of the TEU -  prepared 
under the mandate of the Corfu European Council of June 1994 in view of the IGC -
• * 3converged to a remarkable extent on emphasising Third Pillar deficiencies.
The major shortcomings of the Third Pillar were identified in the inadequacy of its 
instruments, the absence of any mechanism to monitor implementation, the 
cumbersome decision-making structure and the overlap with Community competence.4 
In this light, both the Commission and the European Parliament advocated the transfer 
of justice and home affairs to the Community Pillar, except with regard to judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, and the incorporation of the 
Schengen system into the European Union legal system.5
The Reflection Group, convened by the Spanish Presidency to assist in the preparation 
of the IGC agenda, was divided on how to achieve greater efficiency in the field of 
justice and home affairs. The majority of its members favoured communitarization of 
external border controls, visa, immigration and asylum policies. Other members, on the 
other hand, expressed their belief that the lack of progress was not necessarily 
attributable to the intergovernmental nature of cooperation and that structural 
improvements in this sphere could solve many of the problems.6 
The IGC reflected the same division. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Austria wanted to communitarize external border 
controls, visa, asylum and immigration policies, with Germany and Austria also 
wanting to bring into Community competence matters on crime, terrorism and drug 
trafficking and France strongly opposing such a move. The United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Denmark, and initially Sweden, on the other hand, opposed any communitarization, 
preferring to strengthen the existing intergovernmental structure. Italy, Spain, Austria 
and the Benelux countries also wanted to integrate the Schengen system into the 
European Union.7
In addition to such fragmentation, as Monar explained:
3 Monar (1997b) p. 321.
4 See, for example, Com m ission’s Report on the Operation o f  the Treaty on European Union, SEC(95) 
final, 10 May 1995, paras. 47-52. See also Reflection Group’s Report, 5 December 1995, SN 520/95  
(Reflex 21), para. 48. Among the other deficiencies identified were the lack o f  clear objectives and the 
requirement o f  unanimity. See also Chapter 3.
5 See Commission Opinion ‘Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement’ requested by the 
Italian Presidency with regard to its proposal to the Council for amendment o f  the Treaties (Council doc. 
CONF 3860/1/96, 17 June 1996) identifying asylum and immigration as suitable areas for incorporation 
into the Community Pillar; Parliament Resolution A 4-0102/95 on the functioning o f  the TEU with a view  
to the 1996 IGC -  Implementation and development o f  the Union, Bourlanges-Martin Report, para. 4.
6 Reflection’s Group Report, supra  n. 4, paras. 45-55.
7 See Monar (1997b) pp. 321-322; den Boer and Wallace (2000) p. 513.
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‘There was a whole range o f  staunchly defended national positions which needed to be 
accommodated. Among these were the British and (volens nolens) Irish non-participation in the 
Schengen System, the special position o f  Denmark as a Schengen member opposing further 
communitarization, French concerns about jurisdiction o f  the Court o f  Justice on national 
measures relating to internal security, the Dutch interest in limiting applications to the Court in 
asylum matters, German concerns about the asymmetrical effects o f  international migratory 
pressure on Germany and Belgium ’s reluctance to accept the safe country o f  origin principle in 
respect o f  asylum applications emanating from other European Union countries’.8
The Treaty of Amsterdam, agreed in June 1997,9 accommodated all these different 
national positions, bringing about fragmentation and increased confusion.10 
The Treaty gave a new content to Article 14 EC (ex 7a) by providing, in Article 62(2) 
EC, that Article 14 requires ‘the absence of any controls on persons, be they citizens o f  
the Union or nationals o f  third countries, when crossing internal borders’.11 
It reformulated the allocation of competence by communitarizing visa, asylum and 
immigration policies, which are now governed by new Title IV EC (Articles 61-69). It 
also provided for the integration of the Schengen acquis into the European Union legal 
order. The Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European 
Union provided that the Council was to determine the legal basis for each of the 
provisions which constituted the Schengen acquis. In default of agreement, provisions 
were to be regarded as acts based on the Third Pillar.12
The Treaty also accommodated, through the introduction of ‘variable geometry’ 
arrangements, the positions of the United Kingdom, which opposed removal of internal 
frontier controls, Ireland, which wanted to retain its ‘common travel area’ with the 
United Kingdom, and Denmark, which under the 1992 Edinburgh Declaration was 
precluded from accepting Community competence on visas, asylum and immigration.
8 Monar (1997b) p. 322.
9 The Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force in May 1999.
10 It was the change o f  government in the United Kingdom following the May 1997 elections which made 
possible an agreement based on a series o f  opt-out clauses. See Nugent (1999) p. 78; Boccardi (2002) p. 
131.
11 Emphasis added.
12 Article 2 o f  the Protocol, OJ 1997 C 340/93. When the Treaty o f  Amsterdam entered into force in May 
1999, the Council adopted two decisions whereby it defined the Schengen acquis and allocated it to a 
legal basis under the EC or EU Treaties, see Council Decisions 1999/435/EC and 1999/436/EC o f  20 
May 1999, OJ 1999 L 176/1 and 17. On incorporation see House o f  Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities (1997-98b); Wagner (1998). On issues related to the communitarization o f  the 
Schengen acquis such as the determination o f  the character o f  the instruments attributed and judicial 
review o f  the attribution or o f  the compatibility o f  the Schengen acquis with the Community Treaty, see 
Hailbronner (2000) pp. 73-74.
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Furthermore, new Title IV EC is characterized by sui generis provisions in the 
Community context. The law-making procedure is complex and departs from the 
Community standard procedure, the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is limited, and 
national autonomy in a number of areas is safeguarded.
The remaining Third Pillar, now covering only police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters -  which greatly increased in importance and volume -  was itself 
considerably reformed.13
New Title IV EC and the new Third Pillar are linked by the same objective: the 
establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. This objective was added to 
the existing Union objectives in Article 2 EU.
The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced provisions for ‘closer cooperation’, 
permitting Member States wishing to establish closer cooperation between themselves 
to use the institutions, procedures and mechanisms of the Treaties. Title VII EU lays 
down the general principles and conditions for closer cooperation, while Article 11 EC 
and Article 40 EU add specific additional criteria for closer cooperation within the 
Community’s and the Third Pillar’s spheres respectively.14
1.2 Provisions o f  Title IV 15
1.2.1 Opt-outs
A Protocol on Article 14 attached to the Treaty stipulates that the United Kingdom and 
Ireland can maintain frontier controls on persons seeking access to their territories from 
other Member States, and that the other Member States are reciprocally entitled, in 
derogation from Article 14 EC, to exercise controls on persons seeking to enter their 
territory from the United Kingdom and Ireland.16
A separate Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland provides that 
these countries are not automatically bound by Title IV EC.17 They have however the 
option of participating in the negotiation and adoption of any measure proposed under 
the Title within three months from the proposal having been presented to the Council,18
13 See Chapter 3.
14 See Gaja (1998).
15 See Hailbronner (1998); Monar (1998); O ’Keeffe (1998).
16 Protocol on the application o f  certain aspects o f  Article 14 o f  the Treaty establishing the European 
Community to the United Kingdom and Ireland, OJ 1997 C 340/97.
17 OJ 1997 C 340/99.
18 Article 3. This also ensures that the opt-in procedure cannot be used by the United Kingdom and 
Ireland to block the decision making process by providing that i f  after a reasonable period o f  time a 
measure cannot be adopted with the United Kingdom  and Ireland taking part, the Council can adopt it 
without their participation, in accordance with the normally applicable procedure.
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and of opting-in with regard to measures already adopted, subject to a Commission 
decision in accordance with Article 11(3) EC.19 Ireland however reserved the possibility 
of withdrawing from the opt-out Protocol altogether so as to be fully covered by Title 
IV.20
The Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European 
Union also makes special provision for the United Kingdom and Ireland, which were 
not parties to the Schengen Convention.21 The United Kingdom and Ireland are not 
bound by the Schengen acquis, but can at any time request to take part in some or all of 
its provisions. Adherence is not automatic upon request but is subject to a positive
99decision of the Council taken by unanimity of the Schengen members. The United 
Kingdom applied in 1999 to participate in the Schengen provisions on police and 
judicial cooperation, drugs and the SIS consistently with its policy of supporting 
cooperation on internal security measures. Ireland has adopted a similar approach.23 The 
United Kingdom also participates in practical cooperation on external border controls, 
which has led to increased criticism, given the rationale behind such cooperation, of the 
United Kingdom’s continuing determination to retain internal frontier controls.24 
However, United Kingdom and Irish participation in security measures contributes 
towards easing border controls between these two countries and the rest of the 
Community.
Denmark also obtained through a further Protocol an opt-out from Title IV except with 
regard to measures ‘determining the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States’ and 
measures relating to a uniform format for visas, for both of which Denmark had already 
accepted Community competence with the introduction of Article 100c EC by the 
Maastricht Treaty.25
19 Article 4.
20 Article 8.
21 Supra  n. 12.
22 Article 4. On the other hand, the opt-in o f  the United Kingdom and Ireland to measures ‘building upon 
the Schengen acquis’ that find their legal basis in Title IV is governed by Articles 3 and 4 o f  the Protocol 
on the position o f  the United Kingdom and Ireland. This is confirmed by the position taken by the 
Council as regards the United K ingdom ’s and Ireland’s possible opt-in to Regulation 539/2001 on the 
visa lists, which was considered a measure ‘building upon the Schengen acquis
23 See respectively Council Decisions o f  29 M ay 2000 and 28 February 2002, OJ L 2000 L 131/43 and OJ 
L 2002 64/20.
24 See House o f  Lords Select Committee o f  the European Union (2002-03b) para. 50.
25 Article 4 o f  the Protocol on the position o f  Denmark, OJ 1997 C 340/101. Institutional conflict emerged 
with regard to the application o f  this exception to the Danish opt-out (see infra). N o such provision is 
contained in the Protocol on the position o f  the United Kingdom and Ireland.
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Under the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European 
Union, Denmark continues to be bound by the Schengen acquis under international law 
vis-a-vis the Member States which were signatories to the Schengen Convention. 
Accordingly, those parts of the Schengen acquis integrated into Title IV EC are binding 
on Denmark under international law.26 As regards Council decisions ‘building upon the 
Schengen acquis’ that find their legal basis in Title IV EC, Denmark can within six 
months from their adoption decide whether to be bound by them under international 
law.27
The constitutionality of the arrangements for Denmark has, however, been questioned. 
As Dekker and Wessel state, ‘it is highly questionable whether the Treaties allow for a 
possibility of Union member states to engage in separate legal relationships on areas
yo
covered by the Union and thus to act as regular states, instead of member States’.
Indeed, as a result of incorporating the lack of political consensus on removal of internal 
frontier controls and on Community competence for the necessary ‘compensatory’ 
measures (which previously found expression in the pillar structure and the Schengen 
Convention) into the Community Pillar, the Amsterdam Treaty has eroded the 
Community method with regard to the principle that the Member States cannot assume 
permanent derogations from Community regimes (uniformity of application of the law) 
and the principle that they cannot resort to international law to govern their relations 
within areas which fall within Community competence.
Moreover, the ‘variable geometry’ arrangements result in extreme complexity, not least 
because it becomes very difficult to map out the applicable law due to the possible 
existence of different overlapping regimes of a different nature. The situation is 
rendered worse by the fact that old Third Pillar measures also continue to apply in 
relation to the Member States which do not participate in Title IV measures replacing 
them, and that Title IV overlaps with other Community powers on the treatment of 
third country nationals, for which no derogations are in place.
26 Article 3 o f  the Protocol, supra  n. 12.
27 Article 5 o f  the Protocol on the position o f  Denmark, supra  n. 25.
28 Dekker and W essel (2001) p. 409. Denmark is at present seeking an international agreement with the 
Community in order to adhere to the Brussels I Regulation on civil cooperation in its amended form. See 
Kuijper (2004) p. 621.
29 According to Hailbronner measures adopted under the old Third Pillar ‘remain unchanged in their legal 
nature and binding force until their content is replaced by the new measures adopted on the basis o f  the 
new Title in the EC Treaty’. Moreover, once new measures are adopted, old Third Pillar instruments 
‘have to remain in force and unchanged in their legal nature in relation to countries that do not participate 
in the adoption o f  new instruments’. See Hailbronner (2000) p. 1059.
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As to the practical working of the opt-out arrangements, it seems that they are greatly 
contributing to watering down Commission proposals. As a commentator explained, by 
extending the offer to opt in as a bargaining chip, the outsider Member States ‘obtain 
certain concessions, resulting in considerable dilution of the original Commission 
proposals’.30
1.2.2 Legislative procedure
With regard to the legislative procedure, Title IV prescribed that for the first five years 
after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (i.e. up to 1 May 2004) the 
Council was to act by unanimity, the Commission had no monopoly on the right of 
initiative but shared it with the Member States, and the Parliament was only to be 
consulted. This ‘weak’ procedure reflected the wish of the Member States to retain 
extensive control of the newly communitarized fields.
After the five-year transitional period (i.e. since 1 May 2004), the Commission has the 
sole right of initiative, but is under a duty to examine any request made by a Member 
State that it submit a proposal to the Council. The Council is to decide by unanimity 
whether to apply to all or parts of the areas covered by Title IV the co-decision 
procedure prescribed in Article 251 EC.31
Given that the adoption of most measures under Title IV is subject to a mandatory five- 
year time limit, most measures should have been adopted under the ‘weak’ legislative 
procedure described above.
In derogation from its normal legislative procedure, Title IV provides a less restrictive 
legislative procedure for the adoption of measures on short-term visas. This reflects the 
fact that some measures on visas had already been agreed under the First Pillar and to a 
greater extent under the Schengen Convention. It probably also reflects a desire to 
facilitate the adoption of the most indispensable compensatory measures for the 
realization of the free movement of persons.
30 Kuijper (2004) p. 621.
31 Articles 67(1) and (2) EC. Automatic passage to qualified majority voting was blocked by Germany 
because o f  the strong opposition o f  the Lander. See Geddes (2001) p. 117.
32 The five-year time limit does not apply to the adoption o f  burden-sharing measures (Article 63(2)(b) 
EC), conditions o f  entry and residence and rules on the issue o f  long-term visas and residence permits 
(Article 63(3)(a) EC), and measures on the rights and conditions under which third country nationals 
legally resident in a Member State may reside in another Member State (Article 63(4) EC). The five-year 
time limit, i f  not respected, can arguably give rise to actions for failure to act.
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With regard to the adoption of the ‘white’ and ‘black’ lists and of a uniform format for 
visas the Council (from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam) is to act by 
qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament.33
This procedure is the same as that applicable under old Article 100c EC after 1 January 
1996, with the exception that under Article 100c the Commission had to examine 
requests by Member States for a proposal to the Council.
Since the adoption of the ‘white’ and ‘black’ lists and the uniform format for visas is 
subject to the mandatory five year time limit, the Council came under an obligation to 
abolish the ‘grey’ list by 1 May 2004. The Vienna Action Plan envisaged a further 
restriction of this time limit.34 A Regulation was duly adopted by the Council on 15 
March 2001.35 The Regulation eliminated the ‘grey’ list by including Colombia -  the 
only country on which the Schengen States had not reached agreement by the time the 
Schengen acquis was incorporated into the European Union -  on the ‘black’ list.
In relation to the adoption of measures laying down the ‘conditions and procedures’ for 
issuing visas and ‘rules on a uniform visa’, the normal legislative procedure of Title IV 
applied for the first five years after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty.36 After 
the five-year transitional period, however, in derogation from the normal procedure 
applicable under Title IV, these areas came to be automatically covered by the 
procedure prescribed in Article 251 EC (i.e. qualified majority voting and co- 
decision). The Commission has the sole right of initiative, but is under a duty to 
consider any request by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the Council.
The adoption of measures on mutual recognition of visas for the purpose of free 
circulation, on the other hand, is to take place indefinitely under the normal legislative 
procedure of Title IV.38
The fact that different law-making procedures are prescribed for different visa measures 
makes it important to establish a clear distinction between the different legal bases. This 
can however prove difficult in certain cases. It appears, for example, that the Council
33 Article 67(3) EC.
34 The Action Plan listed the Regulation on the ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists among the measures to be taken 
in two years from the entry into force o f  the Treaty o f  Amsterdam, see infra.
35 Regulation 539/2001, OJ 2001 L 81/1.
36 Article 67(1) EC.
37 Article 67(4) EC.
38 Article 62(3) EC.
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and the Commission held different opinions as to whether visa exemption for third 
country nationals in possession of residence permits issued by the Member States was to 
be based on Article 62(2)(b)(i), governing the adoption of the visa lists, or Article 
62(2)(b)(iv), governing the adoption of rules on a uniform visa. Similarly, their opinions 
diverged as to the borderline between Article 62(2)(b)(iii), on a uniform format for 
visas, and Article 62(2)(b)(ii), on the procedures and conditions for issuing visas.39 
Some overlap also exists between Title IV EC and other legal bases in the EC Treaty 
governing access of certain categories of third country nationals in the Member States.40
1.2.3 Jurisdiction o f  the ECJ
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice with regard to Title IV and measures adopted 
under it is limited 41 Only national courts of last resort can request preliminary rulings 
on the interpretation of Title IV and on the interpretation and validity of measures 
adopted under it.42
Although the attribution of at least some automatic jurisdiction to the Court of Justice 
with regard to justice and home affairs was a welcomed major reform, the limitation of 
the preliminary ruling procedure within the framework of the EC Treaty constitutes a 
further example of erosion of the Community method.
The possible effects of such limitation are a lack of uniformity in the application of the 
law (given that major questions of interpretation might reach courts of last resort only 
with considerable delays or not al all), and a less effective protection of individual 
rights. The restriction of the ability of individuals to question the validity of Community 
law through the preliminary ruling procedure (in view of the fact that individuals cannot 
resort to annulment actions under Article 230 EC with regard to Community general 
legislation) goes against the principle of effective remedies. Moreover, under the 
Court’s jurisprudence, national courts cannot declare Community law invalid,43 and can 
set aside national measures implementing Community law on the ground of the 
Community measure’s possible invalidity only after requesting a preliminary ruling.44
39 See infra.
40 See Comm ission Staff Working Paper on visa policy consequent upon the Treaty o f  Amsterdam and 
the integration o f  the Schengen acquis in the EU, 26 July 1999, SEC(99) 1213.
41 For an account see Curti Gialdino (1998) pp. 52-60; Amull (1999) pp.l 15-117; Eeckhout (2000).
42 Article 68(1) EC.
43 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4109.
44 Joined Cases C-143/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik [1991] ECR 1-415. For these comments see Eeckhout 
(2000) p. 157-159. See also A mull (1999) pp. 116-117.
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Article 68(2) EC provides for the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to 
Community measures taken pursuant to Article 62(1) EC (lifting of internal border 
controls) relating to the ‘maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security’. This provision is echoed by Article 2 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen 
acquis into the framework of the European Union, which states that with regard to the 
Schengen acquis the Court ‘shall have no jurisdiction on measures or decisions relating 
to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’.45 It still 
remains for the Court to define what measures are excluded from its jurisdiction by 
virtue of Article 68(2) EC (although the Member States can be expected to claim that 
the Court should not argue with their characterization of a measure).
As a counterweight for the limitation of the preliminary ruling procedure, and with a 
view to avoiding the protraction of proceedings by preliminary rulings, a new judicial 
procedure was introduced. Accordingly, the Council, the Commission or a Member 
State (but not the European Parliament) can request the Court to give a ruling on a 
question of interpretation of Title IV or acts based on it. However, such rulings are not 
to apply to judgments of courts or tribunals of the Member States which had become res 
judicata*6
1.2.4 Provisions safeguarding national competence
Title IV EC also contains a number of provisions aimed at safeguarding national 
competence. Article 63 EC provides that measures adopted by the Council pursuant to 
Article 63(3) and (4) EC47 ‘shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
introducing in the areas concerned national provisions which are compatible with this 
Treaty and with international agreements’. Such provision seeks to limit the application
45 Article 68(2) EC. For an interpretation o f  the scope o f  this provision see Eeckhout (2000) pp. 163-165.
46 Article 68(3) EC. Curti Gialdino described this judicial procedure as a mixture of: (i) the Article 300(6) 
procedure with regard to international agreements, under which only the Council, the Commission and 
the Member States may request an interpretative ruling, (ii) the ‘reference in the interest o f  the law ’ 
procedure used in the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement o f  judicial decisions in 
civil and commercial matters, and in the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, which prescribes the non applicability o f  rulings to judgments o f  national courts or tribunals 
which have becom e res judicata-, and (iii) the preliminary reference procedure laid down in Article 234 
EC as far as the effect o f  the judicial decision is concerned. See Curti Gialdino (1998) pp. 57-58.
47 Measures on immigration policy within the areas o f  (i) conditions o f  entry and residence, and 
procedures for the issue by Member States o f  long term visas and residence permits, and (ii) illegal 
immigration and residence; and (iii) measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals o f  
third countries who are legally resident in a Member State may reside in other Member States.
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of the Community doctrine under which the Community would normally acquire
48exclusive competence once it adopted rules.
Parallel to this provision, the Member States adopted a Declaration on Article 63(3)(a) 
EC (ex 73k(3)(a))49 which stated that Member States could negotiate and conclude 
agreements with third countries in the areas covered by Article 63(3)(a) EC ‘as long as 
such agreements respect Community law’. The effect of such Declaration was again to 
preserve the Member States’ treaty-making powers irrespective of the adoption of 
comprehensive Community legislation, thus avoiding the effects of the AETR doctrine. 
Similar provisions are found in the Protocol on the external relations of the Member 
States with regard to the crossing of external borders. The Protocol states that Article 
62(2)(a) EC ‘shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member States to 
negotiate or conclude agreements with third countries as long as they respect 
Community law and other relevant international agreements’. The Protocol thus 
precludes the Community from acquiring exclusive external competence.
Further, a political Declaration on Article 62(2)(b) EC (ex 73j(2)(b)) was introduced. 
According to this, the Council could take into account the ‘foreign policy considerations 
of the Union and the Member States’ when adopting rules on short-term visas. The 
Declaration thus confirmed that the Member States’ foreign policy considerations 
constitute a legitimate concern in the decision-making process at Community level. It 
also created a bridge between the Community visa policy and the CFSP, but underlined 
that the CFSP parallels and does not subsume the foreign policies of the Member States.
Title IV also contains a national public order clause. Article 64(1) EC provides that 
Title IV ‘shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the Member 
States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal 
security’.50 It remains for the Court of Justice to interpret Article 64(1) EC.51
48 See Hailbronner (2000) p. 67; Denza (2002) p. 17.
49 On the conditions o f  entry and residence, and procedures for the issue o f  long-term visas and residence 
permits.
0 The same provision was contained in Article 100c(5) EC and Article K.2(2) EU o f  the Maastricht 
Treaty, and is now contained in Article 33 EU. For an interpretation o f  the scope o f  this provision see 
Hailbronner (1998) pp. 1052-1053. He argues that the provision should be concerned with the exercise o f  
police power. On the other hand, he argues, it may be interpreted as a limit for Community action 
implying that it is not the task o f  the Community to issue regulations restricting the exercise o f  police 
power relating to the maintenance o f  law and order.
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1.2.5 Emergency situations
Article 64(2) EC provides for emergency situations. In case one or more Member States 
is confronted with an emergency situation characterized by a sudden inflow of nationals 
of a third country, the Council can, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission (and with no consultation of the European Parliament), adopt provisional 
measures of a duration not exceeding six months for the benefit of the Member State(s) 
concerned.
This provision resembles old Article 100c(2) EC, but the provisional measures are now 
not limited to the imposition of visa requirements but apply across the whole area of 
Title IV. Article 64(2) EC is however more restrictive in its application than old Article 
100c(2) EC since under the latter a ‘threat’ of a sudden inflow was sufficient to justify 
the adoption of provisional measures. Further, Article 64(2) EC, as opposed to old 
Article 100c(2) EC, is concerned with emergency situations affecting one or more 
Member States, as opposed to the Community, and with the adoption of measures for 
their individual benefit.
2. The Vienna Action Plan and the Tampere European Council
2.1 The Vienna Action Plan
In December 1998 the European Council meeting in Vienna approved the Council and 
Commission’s Action Plan on ‘how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice’.53 The Action Plan laid down 
the priorities for the establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice.
The Action Plan identified two principles as its starting points. Firstly, the success of 
the Action Plan depended on ‘ensuring that the spirit of inter-institutional co-operation 
inherent in the Amsterdam Treaty is translated into reality’. Secondly, the concepts of 
freedom, security and justice were inseparable: ‘one cannot be achieved in full without 
the other two’.54
From this premise, the Action Plan defined the aims of the area of freedom, security and 
justice by considering each of the three concepts in turn. With regard to ‘an area of
51 And thus to establish a limit to the scope o f  application o f  infringement actions. See Curti Gialdino 
(1998) pp. 58-59.
52 See Peers (2000) p. 80.
53 Action Plan o f  the Council and the Com m ission on how best to implement the provisions o f  the Treaty 
o f  Amsterdam establishing an area o f  freedom, security and justice, 4 December 1998, 13844/98, OJ 1999 
C 19/1.
54 Paras. 4-5.
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freedom’, the Action Plan provided that ‘the Treaty of Amsterdam ...opens the way to 
giving “freedom” a meaning beyond free movement of people across internal borders’. 
The concept thus included ‘freedom to live in a law-abiding environment in the 
knowledge that public authorities are using everything in their individual and collective 
power to combat and contain those who seek to deny or abuse that freedom’. The 
Action Plan further provided that ‘freedom must also be complemented by the full range 
of fundamental human rights’, and identified respect for privacy and the protection of 
personal data as fundamental freedoms deserving special attention.55 
Referring in particular to immigration and asylum policies, the Action Plan stated that 
‘different considerations must apply to immigration policy on the one hand and asylum 
policy on the other’ and that ‘particular priority needs to be attached to combating 
illegal immigration on the one hand, while on the other hand ensuring the integration 
and rights of those third country nationals legally present in the Union as well as the 
necessary protection for those in need of it even if they do not meet fully the criteria of 
the Geneva Convention’.56
With regard to ‘an area of security’, the Action Plan, after clarifying that the new 
provisions do not ‘affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent upon the 
Member States to maintain law and order and safeguard internal security’, stated that 
the Treaty of Amsterdam ‘provides an institutional framework to develop common 
action...not only to offer enhanced security to the citizens but also to defend the 
Union’s interests’.
The objective was ‘to prevent and combat crime at the appropriate level, organized or 
otherwise, in particular terrorism, trafficking in persons and offences against children, 
illicit drug trafficking and illicit arms trafficking, corruption and fraud’.57
With regard to ‘an area of justice’, the Action Plan, after emphasizing the importance of 
‘respecting the reality that, for reasons deeply imbedded in history and tradition, the 
Member States’ judicial systems differ substantially’, identified a clear need to improve
CO #
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This was seen to require some approximation 
of legislation. The Action Plan emphasized that ‘criminal behaviour should be 
approached in an equally efficient way throughout the Union: terrorism, corruption,
55 Paras. 6-7.
56 Para. 8.
57 Paras. 10-11.
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traffic in human beings, organized crime, should be the subject of minimum common 
rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts, and should be pursued with 
the same vigour wherever they take place’. At the same time, the Action Plan 
emphasized the necessity that ‘procedural rules should respond to broadly the same 
guarantees’ and concluded that in principle this was already achieved through the 
application of the ECHR.59 This conclusion has been widely challenged.60
After defining the aims of the area of freedom, security and justice, the Action Plan 
made general considerations and recommendations. It stressed the significance of 
communitarization of immigration and asylum policies, which made it possible to 
overcome the deficiencies shown by intergovernmental co-operation such as the non­
binding character of the instruments adopted and the absence of adequate monitoring 
arrangements.61 In this context, it stressed the need to replace certain ‘soft-law’ 
measures of the former Third Pillar with more effective instruments.
The Action Plan also stressed the significance of the enhanced Union’s external role 
resulting from communitarization of visa, asylum and immigration policies and from 
the new possibility for the Council to conclude international agreements under the Third 
Pillar. It also emphasized the necessity to co-ordinate the work undertaken under the 
Community and the Union structures on the establishment of the area of freedom, 
security and justice, and proposed to reform for this purpose the working structures of 
the Council. Moreover, it stressed the importance of the Action Plan within the context 
of the pre-accession strategy since the Action Plan set out for the benefit of the 
applicant countries a clear and comprehensive statement of the Union’s priorities in the 
area.
In addition, the Action Plan spelt out the principles under which the Council and the 
Commission determined the priorities for the establishment of the area of freedom, 
security and justice. These included, apart from the guidance already given by the
58 Para. 15.
59 Paras. 18-19.
60 See for example Guild (2004) particularly pp. 225-226 and 233. The author points out to the partial 
incorporation o f  due process rights contained in the ECHR and to the inconsistent ratification by the 
Member States o f  Protocol 7. See also Alegre and Leaf (2004) pp. 207-208.
61 The lack o f  implementation o f  non-binding instrument was emphasized by the Austrian Strategy Paper 
on immigration and asylum, Council doc. 9809/98, 29.09.1998.
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Treaty of Amsterdam, subsidiarity, solidarity, operational efficiency and the principle
f\ 9that ‘responsibility for safeguarding of internal security rests with Member States’. 
Priorities were divided into measures to be taken within two years and measures to be 
taken within five years.
With regard to visa policy, measures to be taken within two years included the 
establishment of: (i) procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States 
(resources, guarantees of repatriation and accident or health cover); (ii) a list of 
countries whose nationals were subject to airport transit visas; (iii) rules on a uniform 
visa; and (iv) a Regulation establishing the ‘white’ and ‘black’ lists.
Measures to be taken within five years included: (i) extension of the Schengen 
representation mechanisms with regard to visas and initiation of a discussion ‘on the 
possibility of establishing an arrangement between the Member States, which will 
improve the possibility of preventing visa applicants from abusing the foreign 
representations of one or more Member States in order to gain access to another 
Member State, which at the time of application was the actual intended country of 
destination’63; and (ii) attention to new technical developments in order to ensure -  as 
appropriate -  an even better security of the uniform format for visas.
Other priority measures identified by the Action Plan which were to complement 
measures on visas in the fight against illegal immigration included: (i) further 
harmonization of the Member States’ laws on carriers’ liability; (ii) a coherent EU 
policy on readmission and return; (iii) improvement of the possibilities for removal of 
persons through co-ordinated implementation of re-admission clauses and the 
development of European Official (Embassy) Reports on the situation in countries of 
origin; (iv) information campaigns in countries of origin and transit; and (v) assessment 
of countries of origin in order to formulate a country specific integrated approach.64 In 
relation to the implementation of the latter measure, the Vienna European Council 
approved the creation of the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration 
(HLWG), which was vested with the task of drawing up action plans for certain 
countries of origin of asylum seekers and migrants with the aim of addressing, in a 
comprehensive, integrated cross-pillar approach, the root causes of migration and flight 
from those countries.65
62 Para. 24.
63 Para. 38.
64 Para. 36.
65 See Chapter 5.
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Further relevant priority measures included: strengthening the fight against illegal 
immigration networks within the context of Europol co-operation, and establishing 
minimum rules relating to the constituent elements and to penalties with regard to 
offences such as trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation of children, and drug 
trafficking.
2.2 The Tampere European Council
Apart from approving the Council’s and Commission’s Action Plan, the Vienna 
European Council also agreed on the need to call a special meeting of the European 
Council in October 1999 to continue discussions on the creation of the area of freedom, 
security and justice.
According to Denza: ‘the objective was that following the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam a high profile should be given to this area of increasing importance, that 
its relevance to the citizens of Europe should be demonstrated, and that strategy in novel 
areas should be established for some years ahead’.66 More cynically, a Finnish diplomat 
described the special European Council as intended ‘to make sure that our heads of 
governments at last understand what they signed up to at Amsterdam’.67 
The Tampere European Council of October 1999 -  the first European Council 
exclusively devoted to justice and home affairs -  established the political guidelines and 
the concrete objectives for the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice.
The European Council set out the political guidelines for each of the policies required 
for the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice. With regard to ‘a common 
EU asylum and migration policy’, the European Council stated that ‘the aim is an open 
and secure European Union, fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and other relevant human rights instruments, and able to respond to 
humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity’.69
66 Denza (2002) p. 240. See also House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1998- 
99), pp. 12-16.
67 Quoted in den Boer and W allace, W. (2000) p. 517. In this context, the Protocol integrating the 
Schengen acquis into the European Union appeared particularly problematic since at the time o f  signature 
the Schengen acquis had not been clearly defined. See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities (1997-98b).
68 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, 200/1/99.
69 Para. 4.
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With regard to ‘a genuine European area of justice’, the European Council emphasized 
inter alia that better compatibility and more convergence between the legal systems of 
Member States must be achieved.70
With regard to ‘a Union-wide fight against crime’, the European Council stated that ‘a 
common effort is needed to prevent and fight crime and criminal organizations 
throughout the Union’ in the form of joint mobilization of police and judicial resources. 
Finally, with regard to ‘stronger external action’, the European Council underlined the 
necessity for the Union to ‘develop a capacity to act and be regarded as a significant 
partner on the international scene’.71
Generally, the European Council expressed its determination to maintain the objective 
of the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice at the top of the political 
agenda, and to keep in constant review progress made towards implementing the 
necessary measures and meeting the deadlines of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
After setting out the political guidelines, the European Council formulated concrete 
objectives for each of the policies required by the creation of the area of freedom, 
security and justice. These objectives straddled all three Pillars.
With regard to ‘a common EU asylum and migration policy’, and particularly within the 
context of ‘management of migration flows’, the European Council recommended the 
further development of ‘a common active policy on visas and false documents, 
including closer co-operation between EU consulates in third countries and, where
77necessary, the establishment of common EU visa issuing offices’.
The Tampere European Council also called for ‘the development, in close co-operation 
with countries of origin and transit, o f information campaigns on the actual possibilities
7 ^for legal immigration’.
It urged the adoption of legislation by the Council foreseeing severe sanctions against 
trafficking in human beings and economic exploitation of migrants,74 and invited the 
Member States, together with Europol, to direct their efforts to detecting and 
dismantling the criminal networks involved.
70 Para. 5.
71 Para. 8.
72 Para. 22.
73 Para. 22.
74 See Council Framework D ecision o f  19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings, OJ 2002  
L 203/1.
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It also called for closer co-operation and mutual technical assistance between the 
Member States’ border control services, and for the rapid inclusion of the applicant 
States in such co-operation.
Further, the European Council called for ‘assistance to countries of origin and transit to 
be developed in order to promote voluntary return as well as to help the authorities of 
those countries to strengthen their ability to combat effectively trafficking in human 
beings and to cope with their readmission obligations towards the Union and the 
Member States’.
Pointing out that the Amsterdam Treaty conferred powers on the Community in the 
field of readmission, the European Council further invited the Council to ‘conclude 
readmission agreements or to include standard clauses in other agreements between the 
European Community and relevant third countries’.75
The European Council stressed the need for partnerships with countries of origin and 
transit aimed at addressing the root causes of migration. For this purpose it invited the 
Union and the Member States to ensure a greater coherence of the Union’s internal and 
external policies. It also extended the mandate of the HLWG.76
In the context of EU ‘stronger external action’, the European Council underlined that 
‘all competences and instruments at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in 
external relations must be used in an integrated and consistent way to build the area of 
freedom, security and justice. Justice and Home Affairs concerns must be integrated in 
the definition and implementation of other Union policies and activities’. The European 
Council also underlined that ‘full use must be made of the new possibilities offered by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam for external action and in particular of Common Strategies as 
well as Community agreements and agreements based on Article 38 EU’.77
3. The Treaty of Nice
The Treaty of Nice78 -  whose purpose was to introduce certain institutional and 
procedural reforms in the Treaty o f Amsterdam in view of enlargement79 -  did not
75 Paras. 26-27.
76 The Tampere European Council approved the HLW G’s Action Plans for Afghanistan and the region, 
Iraq, Morocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka. See Chapter 5.
77 Paras. 59-60.
78 OJ 2001 C 80. The Treaty was signed on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 2003 
following Irish ratification.
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introduce any significant amendment to Title IV EC. No changes were introduced in 
relation to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. The co-decision procedure was 
extended only in relation to the adoption of two kinds of measures: measures on judicial 
co-operation (except for aspects relating to family law), and certain measures on 
asylum.80
As regards other provisions of the Treaties relevant to visas, the Treaty of Nice
o 1
amended Article 18 EC on Union citizenship. Qualified majority voting was 
introduced for the adoption by the Council of measures on the right of citizens of the 
Union to move and reside freely in the Member States. However, the Article was 
amended to exclude from its scope ‘provisions on passports, identity cards, residence 
permits or any other such document’.
The Treaty o f Nice also amended Article 230 EC to the effect that now the Parliament 
may bring annulment actions on the same terms of the Commission, the Council and the 
Member States, and not only for the purpose of protecting its prerogatives.
4. Changes under the Constitutional Treaty
The Constitutional Treaty, if  ratified, would introduce major changes in the field of 
justice and home affairs. The Constitutional Treaty introduces into Part III (The 
Policies and Functioning of the Union), under Title III (Internal Policies and Actions), a 
new Chapter headed ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ bringing together current 
First and Third Pillars’ competences. This Chapter -  Chapter IV -  contains eight 
articles of general applications (Articles III-158-165), and then divides its subject matter 
into four distinct parts: (i) policy on border checks, asylum and immigration; (ii) 
judicial cooperation in civil matters; (iii) judicial cooperation in criminal matters; and 
(iv) police cooperation.
79 The Treaty o f  Amsterdam had failed to address the issues o f  the Commission composition and the 
voting rules in the Council after enlargement. Consequently, a Protocol ‘on the institutions with the 
prospect o f  enlargement o f  the European U nion’ annexed to the Treaty envisaged a comprehensive 
review o f  the provisions on the com position and function o f  the EU institutions ‘at least one year before 
the membership exceeds twenty’. See Nugent (1999) p. 82.
80 However the co-decision procedure was to be applicable only after the Council adopted legislation  
defining the com m on rules and basic principles governing the issue.
81 Article 18 EC can arguably cover measures governing the access into the Member States’ territories o f  
third country nationals who are family members o f  EU nationals.
82 See Chapter IV o f  Title III o f  Part III, provisional consolidated version o f  the draft Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, 25 June 2004, CIG 86/04. On the changes see also Chapter 2.
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The normal Community decision-making procedure (qualified-majority voting and co­
decision) is introduced for most of these areas,83 and the current limitations as to the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the Title IV EC and the Third Pillar are 
removed. Also, standard Union instruments (laws, framework laws, regulation and 
decisions) apply to all the areas covered by Chapter IV.
With regard to border checks, asylum and immigration, Chapter IV requires the 
establishment of ‘common policies’ and, for this purpose, reformulates some of the 
current legal bases.
A common policy on visas forms an integral part of the Union policy on border checks. 
The aim of the latter policy remains unclear. According to Article III-166, the policy 
should not only ensure the absence of internal frontier controls on persons and common 
controls at the external borders, but it should also lead to the ‘gradual introduction of an 
integrated management system for external borders’. The Constitutional Treaty is 
however silent on the form this system should take. It is however apparent that a Union 
policy on border checks is becoming an objective itself, independent of frontier-free 
movement, and that more integration is envisaged.
With regard to visa policy, a single legal basis is introduced, thus ending the current
QA
splitting of the policy into four specific parts with different procedures.
A further innovation introduced by the Constitutional Treaty with regard to border 
checks, asylum and immigration policies consists in the introduction of the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing o f responsibility. In particular, the Constitutional Treaty 
envisages the introduction in Union acts of measures giving effect to this principle. 
The introduction of the principle appears particularly appropriate given the inequality in 
responsibility for policing the Union external borders among the Member States, 
particularly after enlargement.
Among some of the further innovations introduced (whose application extends over all 
the areas covered by Chapter IV) is the possibility of introducing a mechanism for the 
evaluation by the Member States, in collaboration with the Commission, of 
implementation of Union policies by national authorities. This evaluation mechanism,
83 For some o f  the areas currently covered by the Third Pillar unanimity is retained or a special decision­
making procedure is applicable. See Chapter 2.
84 Article III-l 66(2)(a).
85 Article III-169.
86 Article III-161.
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which has its roots in Schengen arrangements, is contemplated, at least partially, as a
87response to concerns over implementation standards of future new Member States.
A further innovation consists in the setting up of a standing committee within the 
Council entrusted with ensuring that operational cooperation on internal security is 
promoted and strengthened.88
• • 89The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark have retained their opt-out positions. 
Denmark, however, can substitute the provisions governing its position with new 
provisions whereby when it decides to opt-in to measures proposed or adopted under 
Chapter IV, it will be bound by them under Union law, rather than international law.90 
It also appears that the Constitutional Treaty continues to safeguard national 
competence to conclude agreements with third countries on the crossing of the external 
borders.91
§. Measures on visas under the Amsterdam Treaty
5.1 Visa lists
Article 62 EC prescribes the adoption of ‘the list of third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement’ (the ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists), within five 
years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
In the light o f the Community objective of internal frontier abolition, which Title IV is 
meant to serve, such ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists are to be exhaustive (i.e. include all third 
countries); no Member State could be expected to abolish controls at the frontiers with 
other Member States when such a course of action could cause a security deficit 
resulting from other Member States applying a more relaxed visa policy.
87 See Monar (2003) p. 134. With regard to current Third Pillar areas, the possibility o f  infringement 
actions under Articles III-265 and 266 is also introduced.
88 Article III-162. See Chapter 2.
89 See Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework o f  the European Union, Protocol on 
the application o f  certain aspects o f  Article III-14 o f  the Constitution to the United Kingdom and Ireland, 
and Protocol on the position o f  the United Kingdom and Ireland on policies in respect o f  border controls, 
asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters and on police cooperation. See also United 
Kingdom Government (2003) para. 84. With regard to Denmark, see Protocol on Denmark.
90 Article 9 Protocol on Denmark.
91 Protocol on the external relations o f  the Member States with regard to the crossing o f  the external 
borders.
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The visas referred to in Article 62 EC are visas ‘for intended stays of no more than three 
months’ which related to ‘the crossing of the external borders of the Member States’. 
Article 62 EC, in view of the Airport Transit Visas Case,92 excludes airport transit visas.
5.1.1 Regulation 539/2001 (as amended)93
The Council adopted the Regulation ‘listing the third countries whose nationals must be 
in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are 
exempt from that requirement’ on 15 March 2001.94 The Regulation included every 
non-member country on either the ‘black’ or the ‘white’ list. Since its adoption, it has 
been amended twice.95
Harmonization of the visa requirements imposed by the Member States is a remarkable 
achievement,96 although the resulting visa regime can be criticized as excessively 
restrictive. An important consequence of harmonization is that the Community, under 
the AETR doctrine, has acquired exclusive competence to conclude visa exemption 
agreements with third countries. Apart from constituting an instrument of 
harmonization, which is a pre-condition for the abolition of internal frontier controls, 
Community exclusive external competence for visas further strengthens the external 
identity of the Community.
However the Community visa regime remains fragmented due to the opt-outs of 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland.
With regard to Denmark, the Commission in its original proposal maintained that on the 
basis of the exception to the Danish opt-out from Title IV EC, contained in the Protocol 
on the position of Denmark, Denmark was to participate in the Regulation.
Such position was based on the Commission’s interpretation of old Article 100c EC - 
whose exact wording constitutes the subject matter of the exception. The Commission 
argued that old Article 100c in view of Article 7a (now 14) required the adoption of 
both a ‘black’ and ‘white’ list (i.e. total harmonization) and that accordingly Article
92 Case C -170/96 Commission  v. Council [1998] ECR 1-2763.
93 For the consolidated text see CONSLEG, 2001R 0539, 1 May 2004.
94 Regulation 539/2001, supra  n. 35. For the Com m ission’s amended proposal see COM (2000) 27final,
OJ 2000 C 177E/66. For the Com m ission’s original proposal see Document 500PC0027  
(europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/dat/2000/en_500PC0027.htm).
95 Regulation 2414/2001, 7 Decem ber 2001, OJ 2001 L 327/1, by which Romania was effectively  
included in the ‘w hite’ list, and Regulation 453/2003, 6 March 2003, OJ 2003 L 69/10, by which Ecuador 
was moved from the ‘w hite’ to the ‘black’ list.
96 It took the Council almost eight years to achieve full harmonization under a Community instrument, 
with the first Comm ission proposal dating back to December 1993.
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62(2)(b) ‘makes no innovation over Article 100c but merely confirms and clarifies the 
objectives to which it gives form’.97
The Council, however, treated the Regulation as a measure ‘building upon the Schengen
QO
acquis'. Accordingly, under the Protocol on the position of Denmark, Denmark was 
not bound by the Regulation under Community law, but could, within six months, 
decide whether to be bound by it under international law.99 The direct applicability of 
the Regulation in Denmark and the possibility of infringement actions before the Court 
of Justice are thus excluded.
The United Kingdom and Ireland decided not to take part in the Regulation. The main 
reason for the United Kingdom’s non-participation was that adherence to the Regulation 
would have meant the introduction of visa requirements for nationals of 31 countries 
(26 of which are Commonwealth countries), as well as the removal of visa requirements 
for nationals of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Croatia, Ecuador and Macao. This reason 
continues to be at the basis of the United Kingdom’s non-participation.100 
A further reason for non-participation appeared to be concerns on the part of the United 
Kingdom that participation in the arrangement could undermine in the long-term the 
legal security of its controls at the frontiers with other Member States.101 
United Kingdom and Irish non-participation in the visa arrangements may hinder free 
movement between these countries and the rest of the Community. Differences between 
the visa requirements applied by the United Kingdom and Ireland and those applied by 
the Member States may result in the strengthening of border controls between the two 
groups. The aim is to maintain differences to a minimum. Thus, the United Kingdom -  
which is present at every level of the Council when visa matters are considered -  
intervened strongly against proposals to amend the Visa Regulation to lift visa 
requirements for nationals of Bulgaria and Romania, notwithstanding its non-
107participation in the Community regime. United Kingdom and Irish participation into 
security measures (such as the SIS, the uniform format for visas and local consular 
cooperation) may also contribute to ease controls between these two countries and the 
rest of the Community. As convergence between the policy of the United Kingdom and
97 Explanatory Memorandum o f  the Com m ission to its first proposal, supra  n. 94. The Com m ission’s 
interpretation o f  Article 100c was not explicitly  accepted by the Council during Maastricht. See Chapter 
3.
98 2nd Recital.
99 See supra  n. 25.
100 Interview with United Kingdom diplomat, 30 July 2003.
101 House o f  Commons Select Committee on European Scrutiny (2000a).
102 Interview with Comm ission official DG JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
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Ireland and that of the Community increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for the 
United Kingdom to justify its opt-out from frontier-free movement.
Non-participation has also implied that the principle of equivalence between residence 
permits issued by the Member States and visas (i.e. exemption from visa requirements 
for holders of residence permits) does not apply between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, on the one hand, and the rest of the Member States, on the other. This causes 
practical problems for third country nationals resident either in the United Kingdom and 
Ireland or in the rest of the Community who wish to travel to the Community or the 
United Kingdom and Ireland respectively.
The Regulation sets out in a Recital the criteria on which decisions on whether to 
include a third country in the ‘white’ or ‘black’ lists are based. These are said to relate 
to ‘illegal immigration, public policy and security and to the Union’s external relations 
with third countries, consideration also being given to the implications of regional 
coherence and reciprocity’.103
The Commission in the Explanatory Memorandum to its original proposal considered 
each of these criteria in turn.104
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, the assessment of the risk of illegal 
immigration includes both an internal and an external assessment. The internal 
assessment is based on information and statistics on illegal residence (resulting, for 
example, from apprehensions of illegal immigrants within the national territory, or 
applications for regularization within the context of national regularization 
programmes), refusals of admission, expulsions and clandestine immigration and labour 
networks.
The criteria for collecting and analysing such information, however, continue to vary 
among the Member States with a European dimension lacking.105 In this light, a number 
of proposals have been made to advance the collection, exchange and analysis of 
information on the basis of common definitions and methods. The Council decided in 
May 2001 to introduce a public annual report on asylum and migration which includes a
103 5th Recital.
104 For an in-depth consideration o f  the criteria see Guild (2001) pp. 33-37. See also Melis (2001) p. 138.
105 This is clearly stated in: Commission Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration, 
COM (2001) 672 final, 15.11.2001, para. 4.2.2; Commission Communication on the development o f  a 
common policy on illegal immigration, COM (2003)323 final, 3.03.2003, para. 2.5; Comprehensive Plan 
to combat illegal immigration and trafficking o f  human beings, Council doc. 6621/1/02 JAI, 28.02.2002, 
para. 44; Commission Green Paper on a common return policy, COM(2002) 0175/final, para. 3.4.1. See 
also Guild (2001) p. 35.
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section analysing data on illegal immigration.106 Furthermore, proposals have been 
made to strengthen the role of Cirefi -  whose actual efficiency had come into doubt -
• 107particularly with regard to networking among Member States in the field of analysis.
A European Migration Observatory is also under development to monitor and carry out
1 ORcomparative analysis of both legal and irregular migratory flows.
The external assessment of the risk of illegal immigration concerns the reliability of 
travel documents issued by third countries and the existence and impact of readmission 
agreements.109
Following the introduction of Community competence with regard to repatriation of 
illegal residents,110 the Community has successfully concluded negotiations on 
readmission agreements with Sri Lanka, Hong Kong and Macao, while negotiations are 
in progress with Morocco, Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine, Albania, Algeria, China and 
Turkey.111 In return for the conclusion of readmission agreements, Hong Kong and 
Macao were offered the lifting of visa requirements. However, as the Commission 
pointed out when discussing Union leverage in persuading third countries to conclude 
readmission agreements in its Green Paper on a Community Return Policy, offering 
‘visa facilitation or the lifting of visa requirements can be a realistic option in 
exceptional cases only (e.g. Hong Kong, Macao); in most cases it is not’.112 It is clear
106 Council doc. 7973/01 ASIM  10. The Comm ission has presented an Action Plan for the collection and 
analysis o f  Community statistics, SEC (2001) 602, 9.04.2001.
107 Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration, supra n. 105, para 45; Commission 
Communication on the development o f  a com m on policy on illegal immigration, supra  n. 105, para. 2.5. 
Cirefi collates statistical information on: illegal immigration and unlawful residence, facilitation o f  illegal 
immigration, use o f  false or falsified documents and expulsion matters. Cirefi and Cirea were assessed as 
inefficient in the Austrian Strategy Paper on migration and asylum policy, supra  n. 61. In July 2002, the 
Council abolished Cirea on grounds o f  inefficiency. It was replaced by Eurasil (European Network for 
Asylum  Practitioner). See Monar (2003) p. 120.
108 See Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration, supra  n. 105, para. 46; Commission Green 
Paper on a com m on return policy, supra  n. 105, para. 3.4.1. The establishment o f  such European 
Migration Observatory was called for by the Laeken European Council o f  14 and 15 December 2001, see 
Presidency Conclusions, SN 300/1/01 Rev 1, para. 40.
109 On the issue o f  readmission agreements as a central element o f  the E U ’s strategy to combat illegal 
immigration see Chapter 5. Conclusion o f  readmission agreements together with financial assistance to 
countries o f  origin and transit and retorsion against countries which are unwilling to cooperate constitute 
an example o f  the U nion’s practice o f  using its external econom ic and political leverage to achieve its 
internal objectives. On this issue generally see Cremona (1998).
110 See Article 63(3)(b) EC and confirmation by the Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions 
para. 27.
11 See Comm ission Communication on the development o f  a common policy on illegal immigration, 
supra  n. 105, para. 3. See also Draft Council Conclusions: Criteria for the identification o f  third countries 
with which new re-admission agreements need to be negotiated, Council doc. 7990/02, 15.04.2002, para. 
3.
112 Para. 4 .1.1, supra  n. 105. See also the EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region (OJ 2000 L 
183/5) which lists among the proposed E U ’s ‘actions and specific initiatives’ that ‘the EU will study the 
simplification and acceleration o f  visa issue procedure’. See also the ADS (Approved Destination Status)
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that the conclusion of readmission agreements is not in itself a sufficient factor to 
include a third country in the ‘white’ list. All other criteria outlined in the Regulation 
must also be taken into account.
In relation to the assessment of ‘public policy’ and ‘domestic security’ risks, again, the 
existence of common definitions and uniform evaluation mechanisms seems a crucial 
precondition. However, a ‘common European approach’ in this field seems restricted to 
the objective of combating criminal networks concerned with the smuggling of migrants 
and trafficking in human beings, and terrorism. Indeed, the Explanatory Memorandum 
only referred, in relation to the assessment of the ‘public policy’ and ‘domestic security’ 
criteria, to the importance of conclusions reached in the police cooperation context. 
Such conclusions, arrived at with the support of Europol, concern mainly the 
prevention, investigation and analysis of crimes relating to smuggling of migrants and
1 1 0
trafficking in human beings, and terrorism.
The criterion of the ‘European Union’s external relations, consideration also being 
given to the implications o f ... reciprocity’ is perhaps the most controversial, being one 
which greatly contributed to the common visa policy’s restrictiveness.114 
As the Explanatory Memorandum explained, what this criterion actually means is that 
the common visa regime may well ‘reflect the specific position of a Member State in 
relation to a third country, to which the other Member States adhere in a spirit of 
solidarity’. This position is in line with the Declaration on Article 62(2)(b) EC (ex 
73j(2)(b)) attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam which stated that the Council could take 
into account the ‘foreign policy considerations of the Union and the Member States' 
when adopting rules on short-term visas.115
The background to this state o f affairs is that the European Union does not have a 
‘single’ foreign policy. In line with the fact that the Member States continue to be 
sovereign States, the CFSP parallels and does not subsume the foreign policies of the 
Member States. The limited nature of the CFSP and the fact that, for a number of 
reasons, the Member States’ national foreign policies vary considerably implies only
Agreement between the Community and China containing provisions on visa facilitation and on 
readmission. See Kuijper (2004) p. 619.
113 See Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration, supra  n. 105, paras. 82-85. On Europol role 
see also Council Recommendation o f  30 Novem ber 2000, OJ 2000 C 357/7.
114 See the United K ingdom ’s position as to the ‘black’ list proposed by the Commission under old Article 
100c EC, in Chapter 3.
115 Emphasis added.
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relatively limited convergence on foreign policy. The differences in the national visa 
policies of the Member States prior to harmonization provide an example of such 
limited convergence.
The controversial point is that, as pointed out by the United Kingdom in relation to the 
adoption of the ‘black’ list under old Article 100c, even in relation to divergences 
stemming purely from different political relations with third countries (rather than from 
public policy or security concerns) the method employed for harmonization 
concentrated on giving priority to restrictive positions rather than visa-free treatment. 
This approach resulted in an extremely restrictive common policy and disadvantaged 
those Member States with strong external links.
It is possible to explain the priority given to restrictive positions in terms of the 
retention of sovereign status by the Member States and the consequent application of 
the principle of reciprocity in their relations with third countries. On the one hand, it is 
understandable that a Member State may be unwilling to grant visa-free access into its 
territory to nationals of a third country in the absence of reciprocity. On the other hand, 
this means that if uniformity is to be achieved among the Member States, all of them 
would have to impose visa requirements on the nationals of the country in question with 
implications on their bilateral relations with this country and on the treatment their 
nationals are going to receive. The only way to avoid an excessively restrictive outcome 
out of harmonization was to hammer out the variation in reciprocity in the relations 
between Member States and third countries.
The central role of reciprocity is confirmed by the arrangements introduced by the 
Regulation to ensure reciprocity between individual Member States and third countries. 
The mechanism established by the Regulation ensures reciprocity and at the same time 
uniformity of the visa requirements applied by the Member States and, necessarily, 
solidarity between them. Thus, under the Regulation, if a country on the ‘white’ list 
imposes visa requirements on nationals of a Member State, all Member States must 
introduce visa requirements for nationals of such third country no later than 30 days 
after the Member State on whose nationals visa requirements were imposed notifies the 
Council and the Commission.116
116 Standard bilateral visa exemption agreements generally contain suspension clauses to the effect that 
either party may temporarily suspend the agreement in whole or in part with an obligation to notify the
other party without delay.
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The imposition of visa requirements by the Member States is to be treated as a 
provisional measure. If the third country in question repeals the visa requirements, such 
provisional measure will cease to operate. If it does not, the Commission is to examine 
any request by the Council or by a Member State that it submit a proposal to the 
Council for including the third country concerned on the ‘black’ list.117 
This reciprocity mechanism will become superfluous once, as a result of the AETR 
doctrine, Community visa exemption agreements replace the Member States’ individual 
bilateral visa exemption agreements with third countries.118 What remains to be seen is 
the extent to which a unified position on the part of the Member States, resulting from 
Community visa exemption agreements, will strengthen their individual positions vis-a- 
vis third countries.119
In the meantime the Commission is to undertake an in-depth review of the meaning and 
scope of reciprocity in view o f the fact that it appears that nationals of certain Member 
States are subject to visa requirements by certain third countries included in the ‘white’ 
list or are exempt for a period shorter than the period for which the Member States
1 90exempt nationals of those countries.
The criterion of ‘regional coherence’ was not articulated in the Explanatory 
Memorandum. It clearly applied in relation to the Commission’s proposal to include 
Bulgaria and Romania in the ‘white’ list.
In the context of the Central and Eastern European countries, the application of a 
‘regional coherence’ criterion for the determination of visa requirements softens some 
of the problems ensuing from ‘differentiation’ among these countries resulting from the
191Union’s ‘membership conditionality’ approach. In particular, the application by the 
new Member States of the Schengen acquis on border controls and visas will result in 
the strengthening of the borders between the new Member States and non-Member
1.7 Article 1(4).
1.8 The Com m ission is currently preparing negotiating briefs to conclude agreements between the 
Community and third countries. See Biannual update o f  the scoreboard to review progress on the creation 
o f  an area o f  freedom, security and justice in the European Union, 30.11.2000 (COM (2000) 728 final), p. 
32. See also Kuijper (2000) p. 365.
119 Thus, to what extent a third country w ill be ready to impose visa requirements to nationals o f  a 
Member State when such a course o f  action w ill result in all Member States imposing visa requirements 
on its nationals.
120 Article 2 Regulation 453/2003, supra  n. 95.
121 On the issue o f  differentiation see Smith, K. (2003).
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States which could exacerbate existing tensions among them, particularly with regard to 
the issue of the treatment of ethnic minorities.122
In this context, the inclusion of Romania in the ‘white’ list would have resolved a 
specific problem faced by Hungary, now a Member State. The imposition by Hungary 
of visa requirements on Romania would have given rise to difficulties because of the 
large number of Hungarians living in Romania and possible retorsion on the part of 
Romania. The imposition of visa requirements in this case was described as a 
‘politically and socially intractable problem’ that might even give rise to 
destabilization.123
In this context, there even appeared to be discrepancy between the various accession 
requirements (the application of the Schengen acquis on border controls and protection 
of ethnic minority rights) since candidate countries had been encouraged by the Union 
to conclude agreements among themselves for the protection of ethnic minority rights 
which inter alia included provisions on the facilitation of cross-border movement.124
The ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists introduced by the Regulation are the same as those which 
were agreed at Schengen level with very few changes. Colombia, the only country on 
which the Schengen States had not reached agreement by the time the Schengen acquis 
was incorporated into the European Union legal order, was included in the ‘black’ list 
following pressure from the Benelux countries, France, Portugal and Greece. The 
‘black’ list includes approximately 135 countries.
While the Commission proposed the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in the ‘white’ 
list -  as a result of progress these countries had achieved on border controls, security of 
travel documents, conclusion o f new readmission agreements and review of existing 
ones and because of the state of relations between these countries and the Union -  
agreement could not initially be reached in the Council. This was notwithstanding that 
‘the Kosovo crisis in the first half of 1999 and the ensuing instability throughout the
122 Smith, K. (2003) p. 124; Phuong (2003) pp. 647-648 and 658-659.
123 See House o f  Lords Select Comm ittee on European Union (1999-2000) paras. 44-47. Hungary 
suggested special visa arrangements for ethnic Hungarians living abroad, but these proposals were later 
abandoned, see Phuong (2003) p. 647. Various proposals have now been put forward for facilitating 
m ovement o f  persons between the new Member States and their Eastern neighbours. See, for example, 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment o f  a regime o f  local border traffic at the 
temporary external borders between Member States, COM (2003)0505 (02).
124 H illion (2004) pp. 728-730. See also Borissova (2003) p. 119, who argues that the application o f  the 
acquis on visas seem ed contrary to the concept o f  relations de bon voisinage, a component o f  the first 
political Copenhagen criterion. It also appeared inconsistent with plans to establish a free trade area in 
South Eastern Europe, in the context o f  the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.
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Balkans led to a consensus within the EU that Bulgaria and Romania should not be 
further isolated’.125
The resulting compromise was that the Regulation originally included both countries on 
the ‘white’ list but in relation to Romanian nationals it provided that visa exemption 
was to come into force at a later date to be decided by the Council following reports by 
the Commission setting out undertakings Romania was prepared to give in relation to 
illegal immigration and residence, including arrangements for repatriation. Thus, 
nationals of Romania were provisionally to be subject to visa requirements under the 
Regulation.126
The Commission’s report on Romania presented in June 2001 stated that ‘Romania has 
made undeniable progress in legislative and organizational matters as regards illegal 
immigration and repatriation from the Member States of persons illegally resident there
1 97who have travelled from Romania, visa policy and border controls’. The Regulation 
was accordingly amended on 7 December 2001 to effectively include Romania on the 
‘white’ list.128 However, it appears that some of the undertakings Romania has given in 
return for visa-free access for its nationals to the Union may put it in breach of 
international human rights instruments, including the undertaking to punish its own 
nationals found residing and working illegally in Member States by preventing their 
future departure from their homeland for a specified length of time (arguably contrary to 
Article 2 Protocol 4 ECHR on the right to leave one’s country).129
A further amendment of the lists took place on 6 March 2003, by virtue of Amending 
Regulation 453/2003.130 This was in response to calls from the Seville European 
Council of 21 and 22 June 2002 urging the Council and the Commission, within their 
respective areas of responsibility, to attach top priority to reviewing the ‘black’ and 
‘white’ lists by the end of 2002 in the context of the Union’s fight against illegal
131immigration.
By virtue of the amendment, Ecuador was moved from the ‘white’ to the ‘black’ list. No 
amendment to the list had been previously undertaken (except with regard to the 
position of Romanian nationals). In particular, no amendments followed the terrorist
125 Smith, K. (2003) p. 128.
126 Ex Article 8.
127 COM (2001) 361 final, 29.06.2001. The report also sets out Romania’s commitments in these areas.
128 Regulation 2414/2001, supra  n. 95.
129 COM (2001) 61 final, 2 .02.2001, Vol. 1, pp. 4 and 7, and Vol. 2, pp. 12-13. See also ILPA (2002).
130 Supra n. 95.
131 Presidency Conclusions, 200/02, para. 30.
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attacks of 11 September 2001 -  a fact that can be taken to testify to the common visa 
policy’s extreme restrictiveness.
The background to the Commission’s proposal for the Amending Regulation illustrates
that the common visa policy is still underpinned by national evaluation of the conditions
for imposing visa requirements and highlights the inadequacy of the existing
instruments aimed at achieving an assessment according to common definitions and 
1methods. Such a state o f affairs -  which may partly be reconnected to the 
intergovernmental roots of the common visa policy and partly to the division of 
competence between the Community and the Member States -  has important 
implications for the role of the Commission and for the content and character of the 
policy.
The way the Commission proceeded to gather the information necessary for reviewing 
the visa lists was to send a questionnaire to the Member States (including the United 
Kingdom and Ireland for information only) asking for a fresh evaluation of third 
countries in the light of the criteria for the determination of the visa lists. Evaluation of 
the replies led to the proposal to include Ecuador in the ‘black’ list. Only four Member 
States requested such an inclusion on the ground that recent regularization programmes 
had shown that a large number o f Ecuadorian nationals were illegally present on their 
territories and because of political and public order considerations.
The Commission therefore relied on information directly provided by the Member 
States. Information collated by bodies such as Cirefi and Europol appeared insufficient 
since it mainly concerns countries that are already on the ‘black’ list. Information 
resulting from local consular cooperation is useful, but collection and presentation of 
such information depends on the Presidency in office.134
The Amending Regulation also introduced a provision establishing a uniform date from 
which the Member States had to bring the visa requirement for nationals of Ecuador 
into effect.135 This appeared necessary in the light of past experience: Spain 
implemented the visa requirements for nationals of Colombia six months after 
Regulation 539/2001 had entered into force. In this context, the Commission 
underlined that a correct and timely implementation of the amendment to the ‘black’ list
132 Interview with Com m ission official DG JHA/A1, 10 December 2002. For the Commission proposal 
see COM (2002) 679 final.
133 Some Member States did not reply to the questionnaire or replied after the deadline.
134 Interview with Com m ission official, DG  JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
135 Article 3(2) Regulation 453/2003, supra  n. 95.
136 Interview with Comm ission official, DG JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
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by all Member States was essential for the common visa policy’s success as an 
instrument to combat illegal immigration.137
The ‘black’ list of the Regulation also includes the Palestinian Authority under the 
category of ‘entities and territorial authorities that are not recognized as States by at 
least one Member State’ (together with Taiwan, which was already so listed in old 
Regulation 574/1999).138
Hong Kong and Macao are listed under the same category on the ‘white’ list, following 
assessment of the criteria referred to above.
Notwithstanding the specific reference to this particular category, inclusion in the 
‘black’ or ‘white’ lists under the heading ‘States’ does not of course imply or preclude 
recognition by the Member States and the Community since decisions on recognition of 
States and governments continue to be national decisions, though they are often taken
1 TOcollectively within the CFSP framework. Article 6 of the Regulation clarifies this 
point by explicitly stating that the Regulation does not affect the competence of the 
Member States as regards recognition of States and passports, travel or identity 
documents.
Like the previous Visa Regulation, the Regulation makes also provision for succession 
of States. Nationals of third countries formerly part of countries on the ‘black’ or 
‘white’ lists are respectively to be subject to or exempt from visa requirements unless 
and until the Council decides otherwise.140
In contrast with the Commission’s original proposal, the Regulation does not provide 
for the equivalence between residence permits issued by the Member States and visas 
for the purpose of crossing the external borders. The practical effect of such a provision 
would be to exempt nationals of countries included on the ‘black’ list from visa 
requirements when they possess a residence permit issued by a Member State. 
Accordingly, the provision also implies mutual recognition of residence permits issued 
by the Member States for the purpose of external border crossing. On this ground, the
137 Comm ission Communication on the development o f  a common policy on illegal immigration, supra  n. 
105, para. 2.1.
138 East Timor, which acquired full statehood on 20 May 2002, was moved from the section ‘territorial 
entities’ to the section ‘States’ o f  the ‘black’ list by Regulation 453/2003, supra  n. 95.
139 Warbrick (2003) p. 258.
140 Article 1(3).
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Council believed that the provision fell within the scope of Article 62(2)(b)(iv) on rules 
on a uniform visa, which prescribes a stricter legislative procedure.141
Under the Regulation, the Member States maintain discretion in relation to several 
categories of persons. According to the Commission, in spite of the objective of 
attaining a high degree of harmonization in visa matters, it has to be accepted that 
national considerations specific to a Member State will continue to apply in certain 
areas. Each Member State should retain a certain margin of flexibility so that it can 
decide on the visa to apply to third-country nationals in these categories.
As regards stateless persons and recognized refugees,142 the Commission proposed that 
visa requirements could be determined according to a residence criterion. Thus, under 
the Commission’s original proposal, stateless persons and recognized refugees were to 
be subject to or exempt from visa requirements depending on whether the country 
where they resided and which issued them with travel documents was included on the 
‘black’ or the ‘white’ list respectively. This was said by the Commission to ‘constitute 
further progress towards harmonization’ of the Member States’ visa policies.
This residence criterion proposed by the Commission was rejected by the Council. The 
Member States were concerned on security grounds about exempting from visa 
requirements refugees resident in countries included on the ‘white’ list.143 
Accordingly, under the Regulation recognized refugees and stateless persons are to be 
subject to visa requirements if  the country where they reside and which issued them 
with travel documents is included on the ‘black’ list, while the Member States maintain 
discretion with regard to recognized refugees and stateless persons residing in a country 
included on the ‘white’ list. This arrangement is without prejudice to obligations under
141 The issue constitutes an exam ple o f  possible legal basis confusion. The provision is currently applied 
by virtue o f  communitarized Schengen rules. Annex 4 to the CCI contains the list o f  documents issued by 
the Schengen States that entitle the holder to enter without a visa. The equivalence o f  residence permits 
and visas for the purpose o f  external border crossing has made it necessary, in order to avoid the 
Schengen visa regime being undermined, to introduce anti-counterfeit and anti-forgery residence permits, 
see Regulation 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third country nationals, 
OJ 2002 L 157/1. The Council also adopted a Joint Action under the old Third Pillar on 16 December 
1996, OJ 1997 L7/1.
142 Persons within the meaning o f  the N ew  York Convention o f  28 September 1954 relating to the status 
o f  stateless persons (360 U NTS 117) and the Geneva Convention o f  28 July 1951 relating to the status o f  
refugees (189 U N TS 137) respectively. Neither Convention lays down any rule specifically on visa 
requirements. They only provide that: ‘(1) The Contracting States undertake to issue transit visas to 
stateless persons who have obtained visas for a territory o f  final destination. (2) The issue o f  such visas 
may be refused on grounds which would justify refusal o f  a visa to any alien’ (para. 9 Schedule). 
Moreover, they prescribe an obligation to recognize as valid the Conventions’ travel documents (para. 7 
Schedule).
143 Interview with Comm ission official DG JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
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the 1959 European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees,144 which 
stipulates that refugees resident in the territories of the signatory governments are 
exempt from visa requirements providing they hold a valid travel document and their 
visits are of not more than three months duration.145
The imposition of visa requirements on certain other categories of persons remains 
similarly within the discretion of the Member States. Under the Regulation the Member 
States can provide for exceptions from the visa requirements or exceptions from the 
exemption from the visa requirements with regard to the following categories: (a) 
holders of diplomatic passports, official-duty passports and other official passports; (b) 
civilian air and sea crew; (c) the flight crew and attendants on emergency or rescue 
flights and other helpers in the event of disaster or accident; (d) the civilian crew of 
ships navigating in international waters; and (e) holders of laissez-passer issued by 
some intergovernmental international organizations to their officials.146 
Rules on visa requirements for such special categories are the subject of bilateral 
agreements, such as diplomatic visa exemption agreements, or are contained in 
multilateral or bilateral agreements of a wider scope.147
However, national policy is not completely unrestricted, but the Member States have 
entered a number of undertakings in order to ensure security. With regard to visa 
requirements for holders of diplomatic, official and service passports, for example, 
provisions included in the CCI stipulate that ‘the Schengen States undertake not to 
conclude at a future date, without prior agreement with the other Member States, 
agreements in the area of removing visa requirements for holders of diplomatic, official 
and service passports with States whose nationals are subject to prior consultation for a
1 AS •visa to be issued by another Schengen State’. In this respect the Commission’s 
position is that following the attribution of the CCI to Articles 62 and 63 EC such an 
undertaking has acquired the force of Community law.149 The Commission’s position 
has made Italy desist from concluding a visa exemption agreement with Russia.
144 Article 3. A ll Member States are parties to the Agreement except for Austria and Greece.
145 See Article 1 o f  the Agreement, 376 UNTS 85.
146 Article 4.
147 For a detailed account o f  the international agreements see Chapter 1.
148 Annex 2, point 1.8.2, CCI, OJ 2002 C 313/1.
149 Interview with Com m ission official DG  JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
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Further, building on the old Third Pillar Joint Action concerning travel facilities for 
school pupils from third countries resident in the Member States,150 the Regulation 
stipulates that the Member States retain discretion to exempt from visa requirements a 
school pupil national of a country on the ‘black’ list but residing in a country on the 
‘white’ list travelling in the context of a school excursion. They also retain discretion to 
impose visa requirements on nationals of countries included on the ‘white’ list if they 
carry out a paid activity during their stay.151
The Member States are under an obligation to communicate the measures governing
visa matters within their discretion to the Commission and the other Member States.
1Such measures are to be published by the Commission in the Official Journal. Unlike 
the Commission’s amended proposal the Regulation does not state that the issue of 
exceptions from the visa exemption is in due course to be covered by Community visa 
exemption agreements with third countries.
5.1.2 Airport transit visas
Notwithstanding the fact that the Vienna Action Plan identified ‘the drawing up of a list 
of countries whose nationals are subject to an airport transit visa requirement (abolition 
of the current grey list)’ as a priority measure to be taken within three years from the 
entry into force of the Treaty o f Amsterdam,153 and that the Commission in its biannual 
scoreboard envisaged the adoption of a regulation by April 2001, a Community measure 
establishing the list of countries whose nationals are subject to airport transit visas has 
not yet been adopted or proposed.
The Member States, including the United Kingdom and Ireland, remain bound by the 
Joint Action on Airport Transit Visas adopted under the former Third Pillar.154 The 
Member States (excluding the United Kingdom and Ireland) are also bound by the 
airport transit visa ‘black’ list agreed at Schengen level, which is contained in the 
C c i 155 Thjs has not been changed in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 .
150 Joint A ction 94/795, 30.11.1994, OJ 1994 L 327.
151 Article 4.
152 Article 5.
153 Para. 36, supra  n. 53.
154 Supra  n. 29. On the Joint Action, see Chpater 3.
155 The CCI were attributed to Articles 62 and 63 EC, see supra  n. 12. Regulation 789/2001 ‘reserving to 
the Council implementing powers with regard to certain detailed provisions and practical procedures for 
examining visa applications’, adopted under Articles 62(2) and (3), lays down the procedure to amend the 
airport transit visa ‘black’ list contained in the CCI. This stipulates a shared right o f  initiative for the 
Comm ission and the Member States and unanimity in the Council (no consultation o f  the Parliament is
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Moreover, there is uncertainty as to which Article of Title IV may constitute the 
appropriate legal basis for measures on airport transit visas. Following the Airport 
Transit Visas Case,156 Article 62 EC -  which envisages the least restrictive law making 
procedure in the entire Title IV -  cannot constitute a legal basis for airport transit visa 
measures since it concerns measures on the ‘crossing of the external borders’ and visas 
for intended ‘stays’ of no more than three months.
5.2 Conditions and procedures for issuing visas
Article 62(2)(b)(ii) EC prescribes the adoption by the Council, within five years of the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, of ‘the procedures and conditions for 
issuing visas’.
A Community measure has not yet been adopted, and communitarized Schengen 
provisions apply. These provisions lay down the common conditions aliens must fulfil
1 S7to be granted entry in the Schengen territory for stays not exceeding three months, 
and the rules and procedures to be followed by the Member States when issuing 
visas.158 They are implemented through the CCI.159
As explained in Chapter 3, the Schengen visa arrangements are characterized by 
flexibility allowing the Member States ultimately to maintain individual control as to 
who can obtain a visa to enter their territories. This flexibility is achieved through the 
principle of mutual recognition of national entry requirements and the possibility of 
departing from its application. Its justification resides in the nature of visas (an 
expression of the sovereign right to control entry) and in their ramifications into areas 
which remain within national competence (such as recognition of States).160
prescribed). The Regulation further states that at the end o f  the five-year transitional period, the Council 
may decide to confer implementing powers on the Commission. In light o f  the practice o f  the Member 
States, it seem s that they continue to retain competence as to airport transit visa requirements for nationals 
o f  countries not included in the com m on list.
156 Supra n. 92.
157 Articles 15-16 o f  the Schengen Convention established the common entry conditions for aliens (see 
Chapter 3). They were allocated to Article 62(2)(b), but in relation to Article 14 on affixing visas to travel 
documents it was ‘recognized that the current rules on the recognition o f  travel documents are 
unaffected’. The Convention Articles on the SIS (see Chapter 3) were allocated by default to the Third 
Pillar. See supra  n. 12.
158 Articles 12-14 o f  the Convention established these rules and procedures (see Chapter 3). They were 
allocated to Article 62(2)(b). Moreover, there are a number o f  decisions o f  the Executive Committee, 
adopted under Article 17 o f  the Convention with a view  to implementing the Schengen Convention’s 
provisions on visas, which were allocated to legal bases in Title IV. See supra  n. 12.
159 On the CCI, see Chapter 3. They were allocated to Articles 62 and 63 EC. See supra  n. 12.
160 See Chapter 5.
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This flexible approach also characterizes new Community instruments adopted under 
Article 62(2)(b) EC.
The Regulation governing the issue of visas to participants to the Olympic and 
Paralympic Games in Athens in 2004,161 for example, provides that the Member State 
responsible for issuing visas to members of the Olympic family (generally Greece under 
communitarized Schengen rules) can issue limited territorial validity visas when these 
persons do not meet the conditions governing the issue of uniform visas.
Similarly, the Regulation ‘on the issue of visas at the border, including the issue of such 
visas to seamen in transit’163 stipulates that seamen who, because of their nationality, 
fall into the category o f aliens who cannot be granted a visa without prior consultation 
of one or more Member States’ central authorities in accordance with Annex 5B of the 
CCI, can without such consultation taking place, be issued at the border with a limited 
territorial validity visa.164
The independence of the Member States in formulating entry conditions is also 
acknowledged by Regulation 789/2001 ‘reserving to the Council the implementing 
powers with regard to certain detailed provisions and practical procedures for 
examining visa applications’.165
The Regulation provides that the Manual of travel documents to which a visa may be 
affixed, the Manual concerning the issuance of Schengen visas in third States where all 
the Schengen States are not represented, and those parts of the CCI which consist of 
‘lists of factual information which must be provided by each Member State’166 are to be 
amended or updated unilaterally by the Member States, rather than by an act of the 
Council. The Regulation only provides for a procedure whereby the amendments are to 
be communicated to the other Members of the Council and to the Commission.167
161 Regulation 1295/2003, OJ 2003 L 183/1.
162 Rules established by the IOC require the national government o f  the city hosting the Olympic Games 
to give an assurance that competitors w ill not be refused visas. See Chapter 1.
163 Regulation 415/2002, OJ 2003 L 64/1.
164 As to international instruments governing the international movement o f  seamen see Chapter 1.
165 OJ 2001 L 116/2.
166 These include the airport transit visa ‘grey’ list; diplomatic visa exemption for countries not subject to 
prior consultation and diplomatic visa exception to the visa exemption; the list o f  visa applications 
requiring prior consultation; the list o f  documents entitling entry without a visa; and the amounts required 
for crossing borders.
167 Article 2.
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Thus, although the Manual of travel documents to which a visa may be affixed was 
attributed to Article 62(2)(b)(ii) EC,168 since the Manual collects the Member States’ 
different positions as to recognition of passports and travel documents, each Member 
State may amend unilaterally the part of the Manual recording its position, with only an 
obligation to communicate the amendments to the other Member States and the 
Commission.
This state of affairs illustrates the uncertainty surrounding the significance of attribution 
of certain Schengen provisions to an EC legal basis. It is unclear why the Manual was 
attributed to Article 62 in the light of the fact that the Member States retain competence 
as to recognition o f passports, and that, accordingly, they continue to amend it 
unilaterally.
The Regulation also prescribes that, for the first five years after the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, certain other parts of the CCI are to be amended by a special 
procedure (requiring unanimity in the Council and a shared right of initiative between 
the Commission and the Member States) rather than the procedure prescribed by Title 
IV.169 This is justified on the ground that ‘the Member States have an enhanced role in 
respect of the development of visa policy, reflecting the sensitivity of this area, in 
particular involving political relations with third countries’.170
After this transitional period, the Council is to review the conditions under which such 
implementing powers would be conferred on the Commission.
The Commission has applied pursuant to Article 230 EC for the annulment of the 
Regulation on the ground that under the Regulation the Council reserved to itself 
implementing powers improperly and without giving adequate reasons, in breach of 
Article 202 EC and the Second Comitology Decision.171
Tension between the Commission and the Member States also developed over the issue 
of competence to conclude agreements with third countries on visa facilitation. The 
attitude of some Member States has been that the flexibility of Schengen rules (i.e. the 
fact that the Member States retain competence as to who can obtain a visa to enter their
168 D ecision o f  the Executive Committee o f  16 December 1998 concerning the compilation o f  a manual o f  
documents to which a visa m ay be affixed (SCH/Com -ex (98)56).
169 Article 1. These include the airport transit visa ‘black’ list; provisions on the diplomatic mission or 
consular post responsible for issuing visas; provisions on prior consultation; and diplomatic visa 
exemption for nationals o f  countries subject to prior consultation.
170 8th Recital.
171 Case C-257/01 Commission  v. Council, pending.
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territories) implies that they also have external competence with regard to the 
conclusion of agreements on visa facilitation. On this understanding, Germany 
concluded an ADS (Approved Destination Status) Agreement with China containing 
provisions on the issue of collective visas to groups of Chinese tourists and a provision 
on readmission of such persons. The Commission threatened to bring infringement 
proceedings against Germany on the ground that the agreement infringed Community 
competence and resulted in discrimination in favour of German travel services 
operators. The result was that the Community itself finally signed an ADS agreement 
with China.172
5.3 The uniform format for visas
Article 62(2)(b)(iii) EC prescribes the adoption of measures on a uniform format for 
visas.
The exact scope o f Article 62(2)(b)(iii) EC was at least initially uncertainty. The 
borderline between this Article and Article 62(2)(b)(ii) on conditions and procedures for 
issuing visas -  which prescribes a stricter law-making procedure -  seemed not totally 
clear-cut.173 Moreover, it was at first uncertain whether Article 62(2)(b)(iii) could cover 
measures ‘on a uniform format for forms for affixing visas issued to persons holding 
travel documents not recognized by the Member State issuing the visa’ since old Article 
100c was never used as a legal basis for such measures and a draft joint action on the 
matter within the framework of the Third Pillar came close to agreement in 1998.174 
The issue was later settled in light of the adoption under Article 62(2)(b)(iii) of a 
regulation on the matter.175
Adopted measures also confirmed that Article 62(2)(b)(iii) covered ‘rules and methods 
for filling in the uniform format’, but did not cover ‘rules on conditions of storage of 
blank visas’.176
The uniform format for visas -  originally adopted under old Article 100c -  is an 
important component of the common visa policy. It introduces a very high level of
172 SeeK uijper (2004) p. 619.
173 See Com m ission staff working paper, supra  n. 40, para. 6.
174 At that time, the European Parliament expressed its opinion that the measure should have been based 
on Article 100c(3) EC rather than Article K.3 EU. See Chapter 3.
175 Regulation 333/2002, OJ 2002 L 53/4.
176 See Article 2 Regulation 333/2002, supra  n. 175, and Article 1 Regulation 334/2002 amending 
Regulation 1638/95 laying down a uniform format for visas, OJ 2002 L 53/7. The Commission proposals,
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security for visas against falsification and forgery, thus contributing to ensuring the 
effectiveness of the common visa policy. In light of the nature of visas, it is also a 
symbol of political unity -  although the common visa policy remains characterized by 
arrangements which ensure that the Member States can continue to use visas to express 
their individual positions.177
The uniform format for visas has been one of the aspects of the common visa policy 
whose development has been most influenced by the events of 11 September 2001. 
Following these events, both the European Council and the Council emphasized the 
urgency for the European Union to take immediate action, including action to ensure the
1 78security of passports and visas, and the fight against false and forged documents. 
Accordingly, in February 2002 the Council adopted a Regulation amending Regulation 
1683/95 on the uniform format for visas and a Regulation laying down a uniform format 
for forms for affixing visas (in both of which the United Kingdom is participating) .179 
Amended Regulation 1683/95 prescribes the future integration of a photograph in the 
visa sticker (by 2007). It also introduces powers to change the colour of the visa sticker 
and to lay down technical standards to be used for the filling in of the uniform visa. 
According to the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum, the possibility of changing 
the colour of the visa format assists the prevention of forgeries, while the integration of
a photograph allows establishment of a more reliable link between the holder and the
1 80visa so that the visa can be protected against fraudulent use.
Further proposals were put forward in the Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal
1 ft 1immigration and trafficking in human beings. The Plan proposed the inclusion of 
biometric data in the visa and the establishment of a Visa Identification System.182 
Following the Plan, the Commission proposed further amendments to the Regulation on 
the uniform format for visas, on which political agreement has now been reached.183
on the other hand, covered also the conditions o f  storage o f  blank visas and forms, COM (2001) 157 final, 
23.03.2001.
177 See Chapter 5.
178 JHA Council, 20 September 2001; European Council, 21 September 2001 and 19 October 2001.
179 Regulation 334/2002, supra  n. 176, and Regulation 333/2002, supra  n. 175.
180 Com m ission’s Explanatory Memorandum to the amended proposal, document 501PC0577, 
http://europa.eu.int.
181 Supra n. 105.
182 See infra. The establishment o f  the Visa Identification System was urged by several European 
Councils, including the Laeken, Seville and Thessaloniki European Councils.
183 CO M (2003) 558 final, 24.09.2003.
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Under these amendments, the visa would also include biometric data (facial image and 
fingerprints), and the introduction of the photograph would be brought forward to 2005. 
The proposals have been widely criticized as a step on the road to widespread use of 
biometric indicators across the EU, and on the basis of concerns over data protection. 
The Commission itself underlined that the supervisory authorities established by the 
Member States under Directive 95/46/EC on data protection are under funded and that 
consideration should be given to the establishment of a supervisory authority at 
Community level. Questions have also been raised as to the operation of the scheme 
with regard to photographs of heavily veiled Muslim women.184
The changes that have been taking place with regard to the uniform format for visas, 
following the events of 11 September 2001, are striking. The visa is changing into an 
identity document and a register of third country nationals who are granted or refused 
visas (the Visa Identification System) is under construction.185 This development 
remains highly controversial from the point of view of data protection.
Parallel to these developments are changes in relation to other identity documents. 
Uniform formats have been introduced for residence permits, 186 Facilitated Transit 
Documents (FTD) and Facilitated Rail Transit Documents (FRTD) ,187 while in relation 
to passports of Union citizens measures have been adopted on an intergovernmental 
basis.188
Following the Thessaloniki European Council recommendations to establish a ‘coherent 
approach in the EU on biometric data’, the Commission proposed to introduce biometric 
identifiers also in residence permits.189
Moreover, following calls from the European Council of 12 December 2003 urging the 
Commission ‘to submit in due time a proposal for the introduction of biometric 
identifiers in passports’, also in light of recent US legislation requiring biometric 
identifiers in passports of citizens o f countries granted a visa waiver, the Commission
184 Letter from the Chairman to Caroline Flint MP, House o f  Lords European Union Committee (2003- 
04b) pp. 314-315.
185 On the issues surrounding such developments see Guild (2003) p. 344.
186 Supra n. 141. Communitarized Schengen rules provide for visa-free access to the Schengen States for 
third country nationals who hold a residence permit issued by a Schengen State.
187 Regulations 693/2003 and 694/2003, OJ 2003 L 99/8 and 15. These documents are meant specifically 
to facilitate transit between Kaliningrad and Russia.
188 See Resolution o f  the representatives o f  the government o f  the Member States meeting within the
Council o f  8 June 2004 (10038/1/04), supplementing the resolutions o f  23 June 1981, 30 June 1982, 14 
July 1986, 10 July 1995 and 17 October 2004.
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proposed a Regulation on standards for security features and biometrics in EU citizens’ 
passports, which could be followed by proposals on the establishment of a ‘EU passport 
register’.190 However, it seems that in the light of the multiple functions of passports, 
the Community powers on external border controls, on which the Commission’s 
proposal is based, are insufficient for adopting the measure.191 Article 18 EC cannot 
constitute a legal base either since, following the Treaty of Nice amendments, it 
excludes ‘passports and other identity documents’ from its scope.
It is also Union practice to encourage and support other countries in strengthening their 
efforts to render their travel documents more secure. In particular, abolition by the 
Community of visa requirements for nationals of third countries is declared conditional 
inter alia on the introduction by the countries in question of measures against passport 
fraud.192
5.4 Rules on a uniform visa
Article 62(2)(b)(iv) EC prescribes the adoption by the Council of ‘rules on a uniform 
visa’.193 A uniform visa is a visa issued by the Member States according to the common 
procedures and conditions for issuing visas which is valid for the entire territories of the 
Member States (it implies mutual recognition of visas issued by the Member States in 
accordance with the common conditions for the purpose of both external frontier 
crossing and free circulation in the Community).
Article 62(2)(b)(iv) EC covers only mutual recognition of visas for the purpose of ‘the 
crossing of the external borders of the Member States’. Mutual recognition of visas for 
the purpose of free circulation is covered by Article 62(3) EC, which envisages a 
different law-making procedure.194
At present, mutual recognition is applied by virtue of communitarized Schengen rules. 
Article 10 of the Schengen Convention, attributed to Article 62(2)(b), prescribes mutual 
recognition of visas for the purpose of external border crossing, while Article 19 of the
m  Supra n. 183.
190 C O M (2004)116 final.
191 ‘EU biometric passport proposal exceeds the EC’s powers’, www.statewatch.org/news.
192 See supra  the criteria for the definition o f  the ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists.
193 Again, the exact scope o f  the Article was disputable. Confusion arose for example on whether rules 
prescribing visa exem ption for third country nationals in possession o f  residence permits issued by the 
Member States were to be based on Article 62(2)(b)(i) EC on the visa list or Article 62(2)(b)(iv) EC on 
the uniform visa. See supra.
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Convention, attributed to Article 62(3) EC, prescribes mutual recognition of visas for 
the purpose of free circulation.
With regard to free circulation, the Commission proposed a directive ‘relating to the 
conditions in which third-country nationals shall have the freedom to travel in the 
territory o f the Member States for periods not exceeding three months, introducing a 
specific travel authorization and determining the conditions of entry and movement for 
periods not exceeding six months’.195
The proposed directive covers free circulation for third country nationals who possess 
short-stay visas, are exempt from visa requirements, or possess a residence permit or a 
long stay visa. 196 It does not extend to third country nationals who have a right to enter 
or stay in a Member State under Community law, such as family members of EU 
nationals and beneficiaries under Community agreements with third countries. It does 
not substantively harmonize the conditions for free circulation but provides for mutual 
recognition of national conditions.
An important innovation in the proposal is the introduction of a travel authorization 
which would allow third country nationals to move freely for six months instead of 
three (provided they do not spend more than three months in the same Member 
State) .197 Accordingly, the proposed directive (together with the fact that the 
Community is to replace the Member States in visa exemption agreements under the 
AETR doctrine) would put an end to the practice under the Schengen Convention which 
allows the Contracting States to extend the stay of an alien exempted from visa 
requirements beyond three months on the basis of bilateral visa exemption 
agreements.198 Such a practice was described by the Commission as incompatible with
194 Article 62(1) EC could have also been identified as a possible legal basis. However, the allocation o f  
Article 19 o f  the Schengen Convention -  establishing the principle o f  mutual recognition o f  visas for the 
purpose o f  free circulation -  to Article 62(3) EC dissipates any doubt.
*95 OJ 2001 C 270E/244.
196 Accordingly, the proposed directive would repeal Regulation 1091/2001, OJ 2001 L 150/4, which 
envisages the equivalence between a short-stay and a long-stay visa for the purpose o f  free circulation.
197 Since the authorization was to cover stays o f  six months, Article 62(3) EC could not be used as a legal 
basis. Article 63(3) EC was used instead.
198 As the Com m ission explained, for third country nationals exempt from visa requirements Article 20(2) 
o f  the Schengen Convention envisaged each Member State’s right to extend beyond three months an 
alien’s stay pursuant to a bilateral agreement. Thus, nationals o f  third countries could cumulate successive 
rights o f  short stay that they enjoyed by virtue o f  bilateral agreements between their country and the 
Schengen States.
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the spirit of an area without ‘frontiers’199 and with the limit on short stays under the visa 
exemption scheme set by Article 62(3) EC.
The proposed directive would also have the effect of extending the possibility of 
moving freely for six months to all third country nationals (whether subject to or 
exempt from visa requirements).200
6. Measures under development
Future developments o f the common visa policy are illustrated in the Comprehensive
9ntPlan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings, developed on the
'JO'}
basis of the Commission communication on illegal immigration, which was adopted 
by the Council on 28 February 2002.
The Plan -  which post-dated the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack -  underlined the 
significance of visa policy as an instrument to prevent illegal immigration and terrorism, 
and proposed its development in three ways. Firstly, the Plan proposed the adoption of 
‘measures aimed at improving the security of the visa and of the residence permit based 
on new technologies’. Accordingly, it recommended that consideration should be given 
to including the biometric data of the applicant in visas and, where appropriate, in 
residence permits. Moreover, it recommended that third countries should be encouraged 
‘and even supported in strengthening their efforts in order to render their travel 
documents more secure’.
Secondly, the Plan proposed the development of a Visa Identification System (VIS), 
called for by the Laeken European Council and the JHA Council of 20 September 
2001.203 The VIS will be a database storing information on visa holders, including their 
photo and biometric data (which are required for issuing the visa), and the image of 
their travel documents. It will therefore permit the verification of the identity of 
travellers on the basis of such stored information. In particular, it will enable the 
identification of those travellers found without travel documents and will, by virtue of
199 Such interpretation o f  the concept o f  ‘frontiers’ highlights the tension between the objective o f  
achieving an area without internal frontiers and the retention o f  sovereign status by the Member States. 
Retention o f  sovereign status implies ‘frontiers’ since they delimit responsibility for the application o f  
international law.
200 Contrast with the initiative o f  the Portuguese Republic ‘with a view to adopting the Council 
Regulation on the period during which third-country nationals exempt from visa requirements are free to 
travel within the territory o f  the Member States’, OJ 2000 C 164/6.
201 Supra n. 105.
202 Supra n. 105.
203 See Council D ecision  o f  8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Identification System, OJ 2004 L 213/5.
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the stored image of their travel documents, facilitate the issue of new travel documents 
for the purpose of repatriation. It will also permit the detection of any travel document 
manipulation. Controversially, the Plan also proposed the inclusion of information on 
visa requests and refusals in the VIS.204
The Plan furthermore underlined the need to assess whether such a system could be 
integrated in the SIS. If this were the case the information on issued visas could be used 
also for the purpose of issuing alert tags (for arrest and removal) for persons who did 
not leave the Union on time.
Thirdly, in line with calls from the Tampere and Laeken European Councils, the Plan 
recommended the progressive adoption of measures for the establishment of joint visa 
offices. For this purpose, it proposed the setting up of joint offices or infrastructures in 
Pristina as a pilot project, and a feasibility study on the legal and technical issues 
involved. The Plan pointed out that such a system would facilitate ‘more uniform 
application of the common rules’ on issuing visas and thus reduce the risk of visa 
shopping. Furthermore, a burden-sharing approach would reduce the costs of issuing 
visas and provide the financial means necessary to improve the technical equipment 
used for the purpose of issuing visas (detection of counterfeit or forged documents, 
secured storage conditions for blank visas, etc.). Moreover, the sharing of staff would 
mean the sharing of experience and know-how in the field of risk assessment of illegal 
immigration or potential overstayers. The pilot project in Pristina was however 
unsuccessful, and no progress has been made in this field.
The Plan must also be seen in the light of co-operation with the United States following 
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Such co-operation might cover: (i) encouraging 
the introduction by third countries of machine-readable documents, (ii) exploring 
further use of biometrics, (iii) information exchange on stolen passports/visas or breach 
of passport/visa security, (vi) co-ordination of false document training, and (v) 
identification of a list of data to be exchanged between border management services.
7. Conclusion
204 On this see ILPA (2002). The Plan is silent on the issue raised by previous proposals o f  including in 
the database ‘certain visa categories to be refused at the request o f  UN, NATO, WEU, CFSP, etc’. See 
Statewatch (2002) p. 14.
205 See Statewatch, supra  n. 204, p. 14.
206 Comm ission Communication on the development o f  a common policy on illegal immigration, supra  n. 
105, para. 2.1.
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The Amsterdam Treaty has introduced major changes: an amendment of Article 14, 
communitarization of visas, asylum and immigration, and incorporation of the 
Schengen acquis into the Union legal order. These changes have been accompanied by 
the introduction of ‘variable geometry’ arrangements to accommodate the position of 
the Member States which oppose removal of internal frontier controls and 
communitarization of the ‘compensatory’ measures. The Amsterdam Treaty has thus 
accommodated the lack of political consensus on these issues (which previously found 
expression in the Schengen Convention and in the pillar structure) into the Community 
Pillar through erosion of the Community method with regard to the principle that the 
Member States cannot assume permanent derogations from Community regimes, and 
the principle that they may not resort to international law to regulate their relations 
within areas falling within Community competence.
The introduction of these ‘variable geometry’ arrangements has resulted in an extremely 
complex and fragmented regime.
The accommodation of national interests and concerns is also at the heart of the sui 
generis and complex character of Title IV, and of the fragmentation of the legal base for 
visas into four distinct parts, which has resulted in institutional tension over the scope of 
the different legal bases.
Institutional tension over the division of competence for visas between the Community 
and the Member States also inevitably continues in the light of the nature of visas and 
their ramifications into areas for which the Member States retain competence (see, for 
example, tension in relation to Regulation 789/2001, and the allocation of competence 
for visa facilitation agreements with third countries). In this context, also, the legal 
implications for national autonomy of the attribution of certain Schengen provisions on 
visas to a Community legal basis remain uncertain (see, for example, the Manual of 
documents to which a visa may be affixed).
Considerable progress has been made over the adoption of measures on visas since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. Exhaustive ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists have been 
established, the uniform format for visas has been developed to include biometric 
identifiers and the Visa Identification System is being constructed. Communitarization 
has remedied some of the problems of the intergovernmental method, particularly those 
related to ensuring compliance.
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The Union’s visa policy continues, however, to be surrounded by controversy, 
particularly because of its emphasis on restriction. Concerns have also emerged in 
relation to the use of biometric identifiers, data protection and the adequacy of 
individual remedies.
Furthermore, the nature of visas continues to dictate flexibility for the common visa 
policy in the form of an extensive retention of national autonomy as to who can obtain a 
visa to enter the national territory, which may prevent the common visa policy from 
achieving all its objectives. Also, the Member States continue to be responsible for the 
implementation of visa policy at consular level, and the achievement of greater 
uniformity in this field has been problematic in the light of its constitutional 
implications.
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5 VISA POLICY IN THE THREE-PILLAR STRUCTURE
1. Managing the three pillar structure: the EU as a unity
This study, while focusing on visa policy, has investigated the legal nature of the 
European Union in an attempt to shed light on the constitutional form European 
integration is taking and the role of the nation state in such a process.
The European Community has been surrounded by much debate as to its nature. 
Difficulties in defining the Community derived from its ‘combining the hitherto 
incompatible’. The Community arguably possesses both federal and intergovernmental 
characteristics, which has made it difficult for both federalist and state-centric theories 
of integration to render a convincing account of its nature. Such difficulties have in turn 
led to new descriptions which combine the federalist and the intergovemmentalist 
approaches. Going even further than that, the Community has been described as ‘the 
first truly post-modern international political form’,1 or ‘Europe’ has been described as 
‘overlapping layers of European economic and political “spaces” tied together by the
'y
Community’s “spider like strategy to organize the architecture of a Greater Europe’” .
It is often argued that the Community (or the ‘supranational’ character of European 
integration) was weakened by the creation of the European Union with the Maastricht 
Treaty.3 With the creation o f the Union, the Community was absorbed into a wider 
framework of co-operation of an intergovernmental nature. Such a development can be 
interpreted as a denial of the central position of the Community (or the Community’s 
method) in the process of European integration and as the negation of any movement 
towards a federal political system which would mean the end of the separate existence 
of the Member States as sovereign States. Thus, while the TEU advanced the scope of 
integration by including new areas of policy into the common framework, ‘the level of 
integration was not fundamentally altered to take the system closer to a supranational 
political community’.4
1 Ruggie (1993) pp. 140 and 172.
2 Former Comm ission President Jacques Delors in ‘Inner Space’, The Economist, 18 May 1991.
Quotation from Ruggie (1993), p. 140. See also Harding (2000).
3 Such development is seen by many authors as the culmination o f  a continuing process o f  movement 
from the Community method to the intergovernmental one. See for example, Ballarino (1997), pp. 45 and 
52. According to whom, such a tendency can be seen as triggered by the ‘democratic deficit’. See also 
W eiler’s ‘exit and vo ice’ approach to the analysis o f  the relationship between normative and decisional 
supranationalism. W eiler (1999) p. 36-38.
4 Chryssochoou (2001) p. 57, who treats such development as a denial o f  neofunctionalism’s assumption 
that the scope and level o f  integration are mutual reinforcements.
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Equally important is to establish the nature of the relationship between the Union and 
the Community: are they autonomous from each other or do they form a single legal 
system? If a ‘fusion’ between the Community and the Union is accepted what are the 
consequences for the Community (and the intergovernmental) method? It may be 
argued that the Community method has been weakened. The role entrusted by the TEU 
to the European Council, for example, has practical implications for the institutional 
balance under the Community Treaty.5 It causes an alteration of the Commission’s role 
as the sole initiator of the legislative process in the Community sphere and it further 
weakens the role and legitimacy of the European Parliament.6
Moreover, what are the consequences of a fusion for the hierarchy of Union norms (or 
the relationship between the Pillars)? While the primacy of the Community is envisaged 
by many Articles of the TEU ,7 some authors have doubted whether taking this principle 
as the basis of the hierarchy of Union norms is consistent with the treatment of the 
Union as a single legal system.
As Wessel states:
‘ ...despite the plain language o f  Article 47 TEU, it cannot be maintained that Community law is 
not at all affected by CFSP, or -  more generally -  by Union law apart from the explicit 
modifications in the three Treaties. Im plied  modifications o f  Community law do not seem to be 
subject to Article 47, since this would deprive a number o f  provisions in the remaining Titles o f  
the T E U ...o f  their effect. The requirement o f  consistency ... is the best example in this respect. 
But one could also mention the single institutional framework..., the common objectives..., or 
the respect for human rights...The preservation o f  the acquis communautaire may be a key 
principle in the Treaty on European Union, but a functioning o f  the Community in complete 
isolation from the other areas o f  the Union is obviously not intended’.8
5 Curtin (1993) p.42; D e Burca (1999) pp. 66-69. Many authors argue that European Council guidelines 
are not legally binding on the EC institutions because o f  Article 47 EU. See for example, Curtin (1993) p. 
27; Everling (2002) p. 150. But see also Timmermans (1996) p. 68, who argues that the European Council 
is ‘the only institution which has an overall competence covering all Union activities irrespective o f the 
pillar in which they are situated.. .But this competence is o f  a restricted nature. It does not imply a 
competence to enact legally binding decisions, it remains limited to providing “the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development” and defining “the general political guidelines thereof” .
6 Draetta (1999), p. 58. It is apparent that the Community method is also being weakened through treaty 
revision. See for example: declarations and protocols on certain provisions o f  Title IV EC excluding the 
application o f  Community pre-emption doctrines in certain areas; the legislative and judicial provisions o f  
Title IV EC; ‘variable geometry’ arrangements; the Protocol on the Role o f  National Parliaments.
7 Articles 1 ,3 ,4 7  TEU.
8 W essel (2000a) p. 1148. True points out that: ‘The fundamental equal ranking follows from the 
coherence requirement: the coherence requirement does not require ... a change in the law under one 
pillar to conform to that o f  another, but a contemporaneous coordination o f  the pillars’. True, Verleihung 
von Rechtspersonlichkeit and die Europaische Union und Verschmelzung zu einer einzigen Organisation 
-  deklaratorisch oder konstitutiv?, Universitat des Saarlandes: Vortrage, Reden und Berichte aus dem
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On the other hand, a fusion has implications for the intergovernmental method as well.9 
It is possible, for example, for the Court of Justice to declare a legal act adopted under 
any of the intergovernmental Pillars void under Article 230 EC .10 Also, certain 
obligations binding on the institutions are binding in an across-the-pillars fashion.11 
Most importantly, as von Bogdandy states:
‘ ...a s  a presumption, the legal principles developed in the context o f  the EC Treaty can be 
extended to the EU Treaty as long as they are not expressly excluded. The principle o f  direct 
effect, for exam ple, is excluded, but the principle o f  supremacy o f  European Law is not’.12
Thus, while the extension of the doctrine of ‘direct effect’ on Third Pillar framework 
decisions is precluded because of Article 34 EU, the applicability of the doctrine of 
‘supremacy’ is possible when the EU is treated as a unity.13 The extension of the 
doctrine of supremacy on Third Pillar framework decisions would result in an erosion of 
the international law nature o f the Third Pillar and an alignment of the Third Pillar 
method to the Community method.14 The legal effect of framework decisions remains 
uncertain due to a lack of jurisprudence by the Court of Justice.15
Europa-Institut, N o 357 (Saarlandes, 1997), p. 61. Quotation and translation from W essel (2000a) p.
1131.
9 It is also through treaty revision that the intergovernmental method is made increasingly ‘resemble’ the 
Community method. This results from the strengthening o f  the position o f  the EC institutions and from an 
improvement o f  the organization o f  the intergovernmental Pillars. See de Witte (1998) pp. 55-56; de 
Zwann (1998) p. 188-189.
10 Case C-170/96 Commission v. Council (A irport Transit Visas) [1998] E C R 1-2763.
11 Cases T-174/95 Svenka Joum alistforbundent v. Council [1998] ECR 2289; T-188/98 Kuijer v. Council 
[2000] ECR 11-1959. See also Article 46(d) EU which includes infringement o f  the fundamental rights 
mentioned in Article 6(2) EU as a ground on which the Court o f  Justice may review acts o f  the 
institutions irrespective o f  the Pillar under which such acts are undertaken. However, the Article states 
that the Court may review such acts only ‘insofar as the Court has jurisdiction’ under the EC or EU 
Treaty.
12 Von Bogdandy (1999) p. 909. See also Everling (2002) p. 157.
13 Cf. Hailbronner (2000) p. 48. Hailbronner remarks that Third Pillar instruments adopted within the 
Maastricht framework were sources not o f  Community but o f  international law and, accordingly had 
neither direct effect in the domestic sphere nor took precedence over national law. As to the implications 
o f  extending the Court o f  Justice’s jurisdiction over the Third Pillar, see O ’Keeffe (1994) pp. 144-145.
14 The doctrine o f  supremacy o f  Community law, as developed by the European Court o f  Justice in Case 
6/64 Costa  v. Enel [1964] ECR 585, is one o f  the most important features which distinguish Community 
law from international law. Although international law regards itself as hierarchically superior to national 
law and compliance with national law cannot justify a failure to comply with international law, 
international law remains result orientated. A conflict between obligations emanating from international 
law and national law does not result in the invalidity o f  one o f  the obligations but in responsibility for 
breach o f  the relevant obligation. On the other hand, Community law, under the doctrine o f  supremacy, 
‘takes precedence over national law’ to the effect that national courts should not apply national laws 
which conflict with Community law, and the national legislator is under a duty not to adopt laws which 
are inconsistent with Community obligations. See Bethlehem (1998); de Witte (1999). The doctrines o f  
supremacy and direct effect o f  Community law have been accommodated in national legal systems by
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It may therefore be argued that a fusion may accelerate an already existing process of 
convergence of methods.16
The unity of the European Union has long been denied on the basis of its heterogeneity
17with regard to procedure and effect of legislative acts under the different Pillars.
• 18However, an alternative criterion to determine unity could be consistency. In the 
context of the EU, consistency is ensured in particular by the existence of common 
objectives and principles and by the ‘single institutional framework’ -  which ‘shall 
ensure the consistency and continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain the 
objectives’ of the Union, with the Council and the Commission specifically invested 
with a duty to ensure consistency of the EU external activities.19
But, does the Union’s heterogeneity prevent the proper working of the single 
institutional framework and the achievement of consistency in practice?
Many authors have remarked that under the Maastricht Treaty the goal of consistency
was overall not met.20
Schmalz, for example, states that:
‘The divergent interpretations o f  the concept o f  coherence [the communitarian and the 
intergovernmental interpretations] led the institutional connections between the Union’s pillars 
often being blocked by inter-institutional clashes or being abused as one-way streets for the 
procedural contamination o f  one pillar by the other. The effect was fragmentation rather than 
coherence and fear o f  contamination rather than interaction between the pillars, causing
way o f  national constitutional provisions or acts which provide for the transfer or delegation o f  
sovereignty to the Community. In the United Kingdom the European Communities Act 1972, which 
serves such purpose, does not apply to the intergovernmental Pillars.
15 Uncertainty remains also with regard to any possible direct effect o f  measures implementing 
framework decisions and ‘indirect effect’ o f  framework decisions. See Peers (2000) p. 49; Craig and de 
Burca (2003) p. 179.
16 As to convergence o f  methods see Denza (2002) p. 5-32.
17 See Koenig and Pechstein (1998). See also Everling (2002) p. 156, who argues that the formal 
separation o f  the EC and EU and their different degree o f  integration and supranationality preclude the 
existence o f  a com pleted legal unity and make possible to talk only o f  a political unity. This would 
however not preclude a far-reaching uniform application o f  the Treaties (such as the extension o f  the 
doctrine o f  supremacy over Third Pillar framework decisions).
18 The systematic link between norms: the validity and meaning o f  a norm are determined according to 
the totality o f  all norms presumed to belong to the legal system. See von Bogdandy and Nettesheim
(1996) p. 281. See also Verhoeven (2002) pp. 124-132. A legal system is thus defined as a set o f  legal 
propositions which are consistent with each other. Further characteristics, which are desirable, but not 
essential, are a reasonable comprehensiveness and the possession o f  institutions o f  a judicial, executive 
and legislative nature. See Hartley (1999) p. 126.
19 Article 4 EU. For the concepts o f  consistency and coherence in the EU, see Tietje (1997).
20 See however the analysis by Cremona (1998).
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European foreign policy to be preoccupied with quarrels over procedures rather than producing 
real substance’.21
Indeed, the heterogeneity of the Pillars, the unclear division of competence between 
them and the lack of clarity as to their relationship (which is ultimately connected to the 
existence of different visions on the direction European integration should take) have 
been an obstacle to the proper functioning of the three-pillar structure. The strategy 
adopted to make the heterogeneous Union function as a single system has been three 
fold:
(i) the creation of what Schmalz has called ‘functional and institutional bridges’ (i.e. 
coherence of procedures and institutional competences under the intergovernmental and 
Community Pillars).22 Such an aspect of the strategy may be seen as an attempt to make 
the intergovernmental and the Community methods converge without merging into one 
another. It has amounted to an improvement of the organization of the 
intergovernmental Pillars, which has led many authors to talk, rather misleadingly, of a 
‘resemblance’ of the intergovernmental Pillars to the Community, and to a 
strengthening of the role of the EC institutions, the Commission in particular, under the 
intergovernmental Pillars.24 Inevitably, some ‘bridges’ have established a hierarchy by 
strengthening the position of the Council and the European Council.
(ii) A clearer division of competence between the Pillars. While overlaps between the 
Pillars are to a certain extent inevitable,26 there are examples of ‘managed’ overlaps and 
the institutions have proved ready to review the allocation of legislative powers between 
the Pillars.27 It remains important to avoid what can be called ‘unreasonable’ overlaps or
21 Schmalz (1998) p. 427.
22 Schamlz (1998) pp. 428-439. See also Smith, M. (2001) p. 184-192 for ‘informal and formal 
mechanism s’ o f  institutional reform.
23 See supra  n. 9.
24 This has led many authors to describe the intergovernmental Pillars as not ‘purely’ intergovernmental 
but as a ‘third w ay’ between intergovemmentalism and communitarization. See, for example, Anderson, 
den Boer and Miller (1994) p. 116; O ’Keeffe (1995) p. 901; Regelsberger and W essels (1996); Rossi
(1997) p. 103.
25 See for example Articles 13 and 14 EU. Such strengthening is often justified on the ground that it is 
balanced by the strengthening o f  the Com m ission’s role under the intergovernmental Pillars.
26 In this context, see von Bogdandy (2002) p. 236, who describes the European Union as ‘a cooperative 
system o f  separation o f  powers’ which ‘implies that there are narrow limits to disentangling the powers o f  
the various (com petence) levels in order to establish clearer lines o f  responsibilities’.
27 See for example Article 301 EC on trade sanctions, and the transfer o f  competence to the Community 
for dual use goods -  a subject previously divided between the EC (implementation) and the CFSP 
(content). See Koutrakos (2001) pp. 104-106; Denza (2002) pp. 103 and 303-304. For further examples o f  
‘m anaged’ overlaps, see ‘model common positions’ (Council doc. 5194/95, 6.03.1995) meant to solve the 
conflict between the Commission and the Council as to the extent CFSP common positions could touch 
on Community issues. See Timmermans (1996); Rummel and Wiedeman (1998); Smith, M. (2001) p.
185. See also EU ‘m ixed’ agreements with third countries, which because o f  their wide scope have been
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unclear fragmentation of policies between the Pillars, as was the case for visa policy 
under the Maastricht Treaty.
(iii) Reliance on the guiding and coordinating role of the European Council, which 
coordinates the different Pillars by identifying the Union’s objectives and creates 
impetus for decision-making.28
With regard to the changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam to facilitate the 
proper functioning of the three-pillar structure and the achievement of consistency, 
Schmalz argues:
‘True, the Amsterdam Treaty does not provide for ‘golden bridges’ to manage the dual structure 
o f  European external activities between the individual pillars. However, there are a number o f  
bridges which allow  for an adequate dualism management, provided it is the political w ill o f  all 
Member States and institutions involved to use these bridges effectively .... The key to an 
effective and coherent external policy o f  the EU is a change in perspective from the restricted 
focus on the defence o f  com petencies to the perception o f  contributing to a genuine European 
external p olicy’.29
As to the actual institutional practice following the Treaty of Amsterdam, Denza 
concludes:
‘Examination o f  recent practice by the institutions, suggests that where the need for cross-pillar 
action follow s from a strategic overview o f  a subject or a geographical area or from a defensible 
division o f  powers set out in the TEU, the institutions are able to adopt consistent and coherent 
legislative instruments. . ..  [Ojn the evidence o f  recent instruments, the institutions are becoming 
familiar with cross-pillar techniques and are now able to use their various powers in a consistent 
and convincing manner.’30
If a (perhaps not completed) legal fusion between the Union and the Community is 
accepted, what are the consequences for a definition of the Community and the Union?
described as ‘institutionalized frameworks to help achieve coherence among the EU's policies toward 
important areas o f  interest’. See Hillion (2000b) pp. 1216-1223; Smith, M. (2001) p. 185.
28 The European Council, established in 1974, was the first institutional link between the EC and EPC, 
see Baches Opi and Floyd (2003) p. 303. It remains true that the involvement o f  the European Council 
does not rule out the possibility o f  institutional conflict as to the choice o f  legal base for implementation 
o f  European Council guidelines or common strategies. But it at least establishes the direction policy  
should take and creates momentum.
29 Schmalz (1998) p. 439-440.
30 Denza (2002) p. 308-309. For a similar assessment see von Bogdandy (1999); Curtin and Dekker 
(1999); W essel (2000a) particularly p. 1168.
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There is a growing consensus that the European Union is more international than statal 
in nature. The creation of the European Union was seen by many authors as supporting 
the conclusion that in explaining European integration ‘intergovemmentalism -  or 
modified schemes of cooperative interstate behaviour in the form of “confederance”, 
“cooperative confederalism” or “confederal consociation” -  has survived the tides of 
supranationalism and regional centralization’.31 The continuing existence of a system of 
States is confirmed, although a less rigid understanding of state sovereignty is put 
forward (such as ‘ultimate responsibility’ or ‘powers reserved to the State’).32 
Thus, Wallace describes the Union as ‘a constitutional system which has some state 
attributes, but which most -  or all -  of its constituent governments do not wish to 
develop into a state, even while expecting it to deliver outcomes which are hard to 
envisage outside the framework of an entity which we would recognise as a (federal) 
state’. Such a definition also informs other descriptions of the Union such as 
‘Staatenverbund’,34 ‘federation of nation states’,35 ‘constitutional order of States’36 or 
‘commonwealth’. The term ‘constitutional’ is used ‘to denote that the European Union 
seeks to restrain the propensity o f nation states to parochialism and self-interest’. The 
Union cannot ‘be viewed as a loose set of treaty arrangements and diplomatic 
agreements that are the will of the Herren der Vertrage’.38
Thus, as de Witte argues, ‘the view of the EU as a single organization ... requires a 
rethinking of age-old doctrines about the nature of European Community law \ At the 
same time, one of the fundamental principles of the TEU is the preservation of the 
acquis communautaire. Such requirement has implications for a definition o f the Union. 
Although given its intergovernmental components the ‘European Union...is less 
different from other international organizations than the pre-Maastricht EEC used to
31 Chryssochoou (2001) p. 26.
32 Chryssochoou (2001) p. 140.
33 W allace, W. (1994) p. 274. See also Hill (1993) p. 315 who describes the EU as suffering from a 
‘capability-expectations gap’.
34 The German Constitutional Court in Brunner v. European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57.
35 Cohen-Tanugi (1995) p. 174, quoted in de Witte (1998) p. 65.
36 Dashwood (1998) p. 216.
37 MacCormick (1997) p. 9. According to MacCormick, the status o f  each Member State ‘towards other 
states external to the European Community and Union has not changed in the way o f  any diminution o f  
their independence and “sovereignty” in an external sense. This is a fact which does not conflict with the 
equal truth that in the internal perspective o f  the Community and the relations o f  member states each has 
ceded fundamental powers pertaining to sovereignty with the effect that none remains in the full classical 
sense a sovereign state’. MacCormick (1997) p. 8.
38 Verhoeven (2002) p. 123.
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be’, it is not ‘an ordinary international organization because the acquis
• • 39communautaire.. .colours the whole organization’.
The changes which the Constitutional Treaty will introduce, if ratified, may challenge 
this vision. In an attempt to simplify and reorganize the Treaties, the Constitutional 
Treaty abandons the three-pillar structure in favour of a unitary structure. The 
Community method is extended to the Third Pillar. The CFSP continues to be governed 
by its own special provisions with regard to decision-making procedure and institutional 
competence, but the Constitutional Treaty tends to conceal, if not undermine, the 
specificity of the CFSP with regard to the legal method employed.40 
As de Witte anticipated:
‘The merger [o f  the Pillars] could then be used as the opportunity for a critical reconsideration o f  
the need to preserve the present legal differences between the pillars... [I]t w ill have to be seen 
how much o f  the distinctiveness o f  the second and third pillar must be preserved’.41
Finally, some theories on European integration have gone beyond the dichotomy 
intergovemmentalism-supranationalism. Such theories, labelled ‘multi-level 
governance’, see integration as a polity-creating process where authority and policy­
making are shared across multi-levels of government (national, supranational and 
subnational) which are interconnected rather than nested.42 The result is a system of 
‘overlapping authority and multiple loyalties’ often described as ‘new medievalism’.43 
Such theories challenge the concept of state sovereignty and claim a discontinuity in the 
modem system of States.44
What is the importance of the EU visa policy in a study of the European Union?
The EU visa policy lends itself to testing the unity of the European Union (i.e. the 
interaction between the intergovernmental and the Community spheres). Although the 
Treaty of Amsterdam transferred visa policy as a whole to the First Pillar, ending the
39 D e Witte (1998) p. 65.
40 See Chapter 2.
41 D e Witte (2002) p. 1267.
42 Hooghe and Marks (2001).
43 Bull (2002) p. 245-246. As he explains: ‘I f modem states were to come to share their authority over 
their citizens, and their ability to command loyalties, on the one hand with regional and world authorities, 
and on the other hand with sub-state or sub-national authorities, to such an extent that the concept o f  
sovereignty ceased to be applicable, then a neo-medieval form o f  universal political order might be said to 
have em erged’. See also Ruggie (1993) p. 173; Harding (2000) p. 145; Chryssochoou(2001) p. 111.
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division of competence between the First and Third Pillars that existed under the 
Maastricht Treaty, visa policy remains a subject which straddles all the Pillars of the 
Union. Visas have ramifications into areas for which the Member States remain 
competent and which are often the object of cooperation under the intergovernmental 
Pillars. The clearest example is provided by the use of visas in recognition of States and 
governments.
The roots of visas in state sovereignty result in a specific character for the common visa 
policy under the First Pillar. The common visa policy is characterized by flexibility 
which allows acknowledgement of the continuing independence of the Member States 
for certain aspects of visas.
Furthermore, some essential aspects of visa policy, such as local consular cooperation, 
continue to be tackled under the Second Pillar.
The issue which arises is to what extent the policy is viable: is it possible effectively to 
cooperate on visa policy while maintaining the division of competence between the 
Community and the Member States as enshrined in the pillar structure? Is the common 
policy capable of achieving its objectives? What are the implications of the Pillars’ 
overlapping for democratic and judicial control of the policy?
The issue of consistency o f Union activity also emerges in relation to the project of 
creating an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ of which the common visa policy is a 
component.
The project requires the coordination of measures falling under the First and Third 
Pillars, the integration of justice and home affairs concerns into the EU external activity 
and the coordination of different treaty objectives. Thus, the project forces us to 
consider whether the Union is acting as a ‘unity’ (i.e. is capable of using all the different 
instruments at its disposal to achieve its objectives and maximise its impact), and the 
legal and institutional implications of consistency in terms of convergence of methods.
2. Consistency of Union activity under the Maastricht Treaty
2.1 Disputes over competence
44 Ruggie (1993) pp. 143-144.
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While there are a number of examples of successful management of overlaps between 
the Pillars,45 the division of competence for visa policy between the First and Third 
Pillars under the Maastricht Treaty proved unsustainable.46 The split of visa policy was 
the result o f a political compromise, rather than principle, and as such was all the more 
capable of reflecting the underlying disagreement between the Commission and the 
Member States as to the interpretation of Article 7a (now 14), and the corresponding 
scope of Article 100c EC.
According to Denza:
‘...[T ]h e cross-pillar allocation o f  competence over visa policy set out in the Maastricht Treaty 
could only have worked satisfactorily i f  the line between intergovernmental and Community 
action had been clearly drawn and logically defensible, and this was not the case. Whereas in the 
cases o f  sanctions and control o f  dual-use good s..., cross-pillar action could be justified by the 
dichotomy between the foreign policy objectives and the commercial instruments for their 
implementation, this was not the case with visa policy. Visa policy called for integrated decision­
making and legislation, and the artificial division set out in the Maastricht Treaty was not 
defensible’.47
Disagreement between the institutions as to the borderline between the First and Third 
Pillars arose in relation to four sets of measures: (i) the Draft External Frontiers 
Convention and the Visa Regulation; (ii) the Airport Transit Visas Joint Action; (iii) the 
Draft Joint Action on a uniform format for forms for affixing visas issued to persons 
holding travel documents not recognized; and (iv) the Joint Action allowing visa free 
travel of third country nationals school children. The choice of the legal basis for the 
Airport Transit Visa Joint Action, in particular, became the object of a dispute before 
the Court of Justice 48
2.2 Cross-pillar measures
The Maastricht Treaty, however, also offered a few examples of across-the-pillars 
action by the institutions. The Commission’s linked proposals for a Visa Regulation and 
for the adoption of the Draft External Frontiers Convention constituted such an 
example. The Commission approached visa policy substantively, integrating the 
different powers at its disposal. The failure in this case was attributable to the confusing
45 See supra  n. 27.
46 For a full account see Chapter 3.
47 Denza (2002) p. 305.
48 Supra n. 10.
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division of competence, but most of all to the deadlock between the United Kingdom 
and Spain over Gibraltar. It remains true, however, that such across-the-pillars action by 
the Commission remained an isolated case since the Commission, in general, refrained 
from using its right of initiative under the Third Pillar.49 The Draft External Frontiers 
Convention represented a ‘safe’ proposal given that it had already been negotiated by 
the Member States within the framework of the Ad hoc Group on Immigration, and a 
measure on which the success of Community action on visas was strictly dependent.
49 For the reasons, see Chapter 3.
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The Council also adopted an across-the-pillars approach where the circumstances so 
required. In 1996, for example, the European Union adopted a defensive strategy in 
response to the adoption by the US Congress of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts.50 
Such a strategy involved all the three Pillars of the Union.51 It included an EC 
Regulation laying down the various EC countermeasures and a complementary Joint 
Action based on both Articles J.3 and K.3 EU which provided that the Member States 
were to take national measures insofar as European interests were not protected under 
the Regulation. The Joint Action thus formed the basis for national measures 
introducing visa requirements and providing for visa denial to potential litigants against 
European interests.53 The EU defensive strategy is remarkable from the point of view of 
the unity of the EU not only because it constitutes an example of successful integration 
of the three Pillars leading to a watertight system for the protection of European 
interests,54 but also because the Joint Action constitutes the first example of an EU 
instrument finding its legal base in both the Second and Third Pillars.55
A further example of across-the-pillars activity in the context of visa policy resulted 
from reliance on local consular cooperation established under the Second Pillar.56 The 
Council adopted a Recommendation relating to local consular cooperation regarding 
visas under Article K .l(3) EU and also a Recommendation, under Article K.l EU, on 
the provision for the detection of false or falsified documents in the visa departments of
50 Respectively the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act and the Iran-Libyan Sanctions Act. 
These in an attempt to isolate the countries concerned aimed at penalizing those trading with or investing 
in such countries. The Helms-Burton Act, for example, provided that Cuban Americans whose business 
had been taken over during the 1959 revolution could sue foreign companies which bought or leased the 
assets from the Castro government, and also that the US government could deny visas to any foreigner 
with a stake in such properties. B y their extraterritorial application the Acts violated international law 
rules on jurisdiction. For in depth analysis see Cremona (1998) pp. 90-94; Roy (2000); Denza (2002) pp. 
106-109.
51 For the background which led to rely on a combination o f  action under the different Pillars rather than 
on a Community instrument exclusively, see Cremona (1998) pp. 90-91.
52 Regulation 2271/96, OJ 1996 L 309/1 and Joint Action 96/668 CFSP, OJ 1996 L 309/7. See also the 
Common Position on Cuba o f  2 Decem ber 1996 adopted under Article J.2.
53 See Roy (2000) p. 138.
54 See Denza (2002) p. 108, who states that ‘the measures gave the EU an extremely powerful negotiating 
weapon in seeking to persuade the US to abandon its confrontational course o f  action and to bring its 
legislation within internationally accepted lim its’.
55 For more recent exam ples o f  double legal base measures see Common Positions 2001/930 and 
931/CFSP, OJ 2001 L 344/90 and 93. These were adopted on the joint basis o f  Articles 15 and 34 EU  
since they addressed both foreign policy and policing and criminal law matters. The first Common 
Position transposed Security Council Resolution 1373/2001 o f  28 September 2001 on the suppression o f  
terrorism. The second Common Position laid down specific measures to combat terrorism. They were part 
o f  a pack o f  measures including also a Community Regulation and a Decision. See Peers (2003) pp. 237- 
239.
56 Article J.6 EU (now 20 EU).
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representations abroad and in the offices of domestic authorities dealing with the issue 
or extension of visas.57
A further example where cooperation between the Member States’ embassies under the 
Second Pillar was used for Third Pillar purposes is provided by the use of joint reports 
on third countries prepared by the Member States’ embassies by Third Pillar bodies 
such as Cirefi and the former Cirea.58 As two commentators pointed out, these bodies 
‘prepare critical reports on the situation in each country outside the EU based on reports 
from embassies on the refugee situation. Such reports then form an essential part in the 
evolution of policies at national and EU level’.59
Thus, institutional practice under the Maastricht Treaty already gave expression at least 
to a limited extent to the unity of the Union. Firstly, it was possible to detect symmetry 
between the practices of the institutions when they performed EU tasks and when they 
performed EC tasks and a maximization of their powers under the TEU.60 This was the 
case in particular for the Council and for the Court of Justice in the light of the Airport 
Transit Visas Case.61 The same cannot be said of the Commission, whose reliance on its 
right of initiative under the Third Pillar to propose the adoption of the Draft External 
Frontier Convention remained an isolated episode.
Secondly, the institutions tended to approach issues substantively rather than in a pillar- 
specific fashion. The Commission proposed the Visa Regulation and the Draft External 
Frontiers Convention jointly, while the Council’s defensive strategy in response to the 
adoption of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts in the US involved the integration of 
measures from different Pillars, as well as a Joint Action whose legal base lay in both 
the Second and Third Pillars.
57 Recommendations o f  4 March 1996 and o f  29 April 1999, OJ 1996 C 80/1 and 1999 C 140/1. See 
Chapter 3. Within the framework o f  the Schengen Convention, Schengen States used cooperation among 
their em bassies also to address difficulties in obtaining documents by foreign consulates in the Schengen 
capitals for expulsion o f  illegal foreign nationals from the Schengen territory. In the case a Schengen 
State experienced difficulties in obtaining a laissez-passer for repatriation, it could instruct its ambassador 
in the country concerned to draw up the measures to be taken locally together with Schengen colleagues. 
D ecision o f  the Executive Committee o f  21 April 1998 on the activities o f  the Task Force (SCH/Com-ex 
(98) 1 rev 2), OJ 2000 L 239/19.
58 Under the Maastricht Treaty the Council adopted ‘Guidelines on joint reports on third countries’ and 
‘Procedure for drawing up reports in connection with joint assessment o f  the situation in third countries’, 
20.06.1994, OJ 1996 C 274/52.
59 Curtin and Dekker (1999) p. 115.
60 Curtin and Dekker (1999) p. 104.
61 Supra  n. 10.
62 See Peers (2000) pp. 20-21.
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Thirdly, activity under the different Pillars was functionally integrated. Thus, diplomatic 
cooperation established under the Second Pillar was used for the benefit of Third Pillar 
activity.
3. Consistency of Union activity under the Amsterdam Treaty
3.1 Nature o f  the common visa policy: mutual recognition o f  the conditions o f entry and 
cooperation under the intergovernmental Pillars 
While the Treaty of Amsterdam transferred visa policy as a whole to the First Pillar, 
visa policy, because of its ramifications, continues to be a subject which straddles all the 
Pillars of the Union. The nature of the common visa policy reflects such a state of 
affairs.
In accordance with the nature of the EU, the Member States retain competence in a 
number of fields which are relevant with regard to the conditions aliens must satisfy to 
enter their territories (or to obtain visas for this purpose). Firstly, the Member States 
retain competence with regard to the conclusion of international agreements that either 
as a principal objective or indirectly make provision for access into the state territory of 
specific categories of persons, including the establishment and validity of special travel 
documents.63
Secondly, as sovereign States the Member States retain ultimate competence with 
regard to recognition o f passports and travel documents (i.e. recognition of States and 
governments).
Thirdly, the Member States remain responsible with regard to their criminal law 
systems (including what criminal offences may justify exclusion from the national 
territory).
Fourthly, the Member States remain responsible with regard to the maintenance of their 
‘national security’ and ‘public order’, and with regard to the conduct of their foreign 
policies (and thus with regard to exclusion of aliens on such grounds).
This situation is reflected in the common entry conditions for aliens.64 The method 
which has been employed for the formulation of common entry conditions is mutual 
recognition of the Member States’ national entry conditions and the possibility of 
departing from such mutual recognition through the issue of limited territorial validity 
visas, or, in the case of recognition of passports, through special arrangements for 
affixing visas. This method permits the acknowledgement of the Member States’
63 For these instruments see Chapter 1.
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retention o f competence in the fields upon which entry conditions touch. It also implies 
that ultimately the Member States retain the sovereign right to control access into their 
territories.
The Member States’ determination to maintain competence in these fields has however 
not prevented them from cooperating under international law towards substantively 
harmonizing their positions. Such cooperation has taken place within the 
intergovernmental Pillars.
3.1.1 Recognition o f  States and governments
Recognition o f States is an aspect of foreign policy on which the Member States now 
systematically cooperate within the CFSP. Cooperation aims at recognizing States 
collectively, and a CFSP decision is followed by acts of express or implied recognition 
by individual Member States.
Within the framework o f cooperation, recognition is used by the Member States to 
further the Union’s objectives including the preservation of peace and international 
security, the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.65 Through an EPC statement, for 
example, the Member States and the Community implicitly recognized North Korea in 
1992, making recognition conditional on the acceptance by North Korea of 
commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.66
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
Member States produced in December 1991 the EC Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.67 The Guidelines stated that 
recognition by the Community and the Member States could follow for these States if 
they were prepared to accept the conditions set out in the Declaration, which included: 
(i) respect for the UN Charter, the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris, 
especially with regard to the development and consolidation of the rule of law and 
democracy and respect for human rights, (ii) respect for ethnic minorities, (iii) respect 
for the inviolability of all frontiers, and (iv) acceptance of all relevant commitments 
with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
The CFSP is sometimes an imperfect framework for cases of recognition. There are still 
some differences among the Member States as to recognition of States and governments
64 See Chapters 3 and 4.
65 See Frowein (2002) pp. 171-174.
66 Denza (1994) pp. 579-581.
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which are not resolved within the CFSP.68 Even when cooperating under the CFSP it 
may be difficult to achieve results in certain cases. Greece, for example, long blocked 
joint recognition of Macedonia although Macedonia had satisfied the EC Guidelines.69 
The non-adherence to the EC Guidelines in the case of Macedonia showed the limited 
nature o f the CFSP: the EC Guidelines were non-binding and one Member State alone 
blocked the formation of a common position.
As Nuttall commented:
‘The deliberations o f  the Council become those o f  a diplomatic conference mediating among the 
domestic interests o f  the participants, rather than a body working out and implementing a 
com m on foreign and security policy reflecting the joint interests o f  the Community’.70
It remains true that non-recognition of Macedonia was a matter of vital national interest 
to Greece, and that the emergence of issues especially sensitive to one Member State, 
although possible, has been relatively rare. Greek obstruction of the common position 
on recognition o f Macedonia has however contributed to the move away from insistence 
on unanimity under the CFSP and the introduction by the Amsterdam Treaty of the
71possibility o f ‘constructive abstentions’.
Any divergence in the Member States’ recognition decisions will be reflected in the EU 
visa policy through special arrangements for affixing uniform visas.72 The Member 
States’ positions vary in relation to, inter alia, passports issued by North Korea, the 
Former Republic of Macedonia and Taiwan. Greece does not recognize passports issued 
by North Korea and by Macedonia. All Member States, except Portugal, treat ordinary 
passports issued by Taiwan as documents entitling the holder to cross the external 
borders and which may be endorsed with a visa. Diplomatic passports issued by Taiwan 
are recognized only by Austria, Germany and Italy.73
67 (1991) 62 B Y IL 559.
68 This may be taken as a by-product o f  the nature o f  the CFSP.
69 Germany, on its part, anticipated slightly recognition o f  Slovenia and Croatia. Under the German 
declaration, however, recognition was to become effective as from 15 January 1992 -  the date agreed by 
the Member States for joint recognition. Warbrick (1997) pp. 25-32; Smith, M. (1998) p. 71.
70 Nuttall (1994) p. 25.
71 Forster and Wallace, W (2000) p. 484.
72 See Chapter 3.
73 See the Schengen Manual o f  documents to which a visa may be affixed (SCH/Com-ex (98)56), 
originally published in OJ 2000 L 239/207. See Chapter 4.
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In the case of recognition of passports, the overlap between the First and Second Pillars 
with regard to visa policy is clear. The overlap dictates the method of harmonization 
used at Community level: the EU visa policy does not entail loss of autonomy with 
regard to recognition of passports, but it is capable of reflecting convergence reached 
under the CFSP or its absence.
3.1.2 Harmonization o f  criminal laws under the Third Pillar
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the SIS -  the common ‘black’ list of ‘undesirable’ persons -  
relies on cross-recognition of the Member States’ laws governing exclusion of aliens 
from the national territory.
Cross-recognition in this context has been particularly criticized for its harsh 
consequences on individuals: a person whose name has been inserted in the SIS by a 
Member State will be excluded from all other Member States irrespective of whether his 
conduct would have constituted a ground for exclusion there. A notorious illustration of 
the application of these rules was provided by the case of the Greenpeace activist who 
was denied entry into the Netherlands following a report in the SIS entered by France 
despite the fact that the Netherlands would otherwise not have blocked entry in the 
circumstances.74
Cross-recognition is again underpinned by the Member States’ autonomy with regard to 
their laws governing exclusion of aliens from the national territory. It remains to be seen 
to what extent the Third Pillar will provide for substantive harmonization of the 
Member States laws in this area.
The Third Pillar, whose objective is to ‘provide citizens with a high level of safety 
within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing common action among the 
Member States’,75 provides for common action on judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters which includes the progressive adoption of ‘measures establishing minimum 
rules relating to the constituent elements of criminal acts and to penalties’. The scope of 
harmonization is currently limited to the fields of organized crime, terrorism and illicit 
drug trafficking.76
So far the Member States have approximated their legal provisions with regard to 
facilitation of unauthorized entry and with regard to trafficking in human beings. As to 
facilitation of unauthorized entry, the Council, using both the First and Third Pillars,
74 Staples (2003) p. 229.
75 Article 29 EU.
76 Article 31 EU.
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adopted a Community Directive based on Article 63(3)(b) EC defining the infringement 
in question and, on a French initiative, a Third Pillar Framework Decision providing for 
minimum rules for penalties.77
With regard to trafficking in human beings, the Council, on a Commission proposal, 
adopted a Third Pillar Framework Decision which defines the punishable acts and 
establishes minimum rules for penalties.78
Furthermore, political agreement has finally been reached on a framework decision 
laying down minimum provisions on the constituent elements of criminal acts and 
penalties in the field of drug trafficking.79 Agreement on this had proved problematic 
since the Netherlands refused to accept the principle of prison sentences for the 
possession of small amounts of soft drugs.80
Such EU measures approximating criminal laws have indeed influenced national 
immigration legislation. Amendments to Italian immigration legislation of 11 July 2002 
(Bossi-Fini) added as entry requirements for aliens (alongside the already existing 
requirement that an alien should not constitute a threat to the public order and security 
of any Schengen State) the requirement that an alien must not have been convicted of 
offences relating to the facilitation of unauthorized entry into Italy or from Italy into 
other States, or of offences relating to trafficking in persons for the purpose of
O 1
prostitution or in children for the purpose of illicit activities.
Approximation of substantive criminal law under the Third Pillar remains however 
limited in scope for the purpose of the functioning of the SIS.
The Constitutional Treaty amplifies the scope of harmonization. It envisages 
harmonization of criminal offences and sanctions for a number of specific crimes. This 
list of crimes may be extended by the Council by unanimity to cover other crimes 
considered to fall in the category of ‘particularly serious crime with cross-border 
dimensions resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need 
to combat them on a common basis’. The Constitutional Treaty also contemplates
77 See respectively Directive 2002/90, OJ 2002 L 328/17, and Framework Decision o f  28 November 
2002, OJ 2002 L 328/1. The Framework Decision provides that the Member States shall take the 
measures necessary to ensure that the infringements in question ‘are punishable by effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, which may entail extradition’. It also provides for 
circumstances where the Member States shall ensure that the infringements in question ‘are punishable by 
custodial sentences with a maximum sentence o f  not less than eight years’.
78 Framework D ecision o f  19 July 2002, OJ 2002 L 203/1. On this see Obokota (2003).
79 The Commission proposal dates back to M ay 2001, COM(2001)259, OJ 2001 C 270E.
80 See Monar (2003) p. 127.
81 Legislative Decree 286/1998 as amended.
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harmonization ‘if the approximation of criminal legislation proves essential to ensure 
the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 
harmonization measures’.82
3.1.3 Harmonization offoreign policy positions and implementation o f visa bans 
The Member States have been cooperating since EPC collectively to use visa 
requirements against certain nationalities to indicate political disapproval of their 
governments’ policy, and collectively to use visa bans against specific persons deemed 
politically responsible for a particular state of affairs.
The examples of collective action are numerous. On 22 April 1980, as a response to the 
Iranian hostage affair, the Member States agreed within the framework of EPC to 
reintroduce visa requirements for Iranian nationals.83 On 14 April 1986 they agreed to 
introduce restrictions on the issue of visas to Libyans following a collective decision 
that Libya was responsible for fostering terrorism. In 1996 the adoption in the US of 
the Helms-Burton and D ’Amato Acts prompted agreement among the Member States 
on measures to introduce visa requirements for US nationals as part of countervailing 
measures.
Visa bans have also been used in many occasions. In October 1986, for example, the 
Member States, except Greece, agreed to introduce restrictions on high-level visits by
o r
Syrians after the Hindawi bomb plot. In March 1998 the Member States agreed within 
the CFSP to refuse visas to representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
responsible for repressive action in Kosovo.86 They have also agreed visa bans for 
members of the military regimes in Sierra Leone, Angola, Nigeria, Afghanistan, 
Myanmar, Liberia, Belarus, Zimbabwe and the Transnistrian region of the Moldovan 
Republic, and for persons responsible for violent acts in Monstar and Macedonia.87
82 Article III-172. A  special decision-making procedure is applicable whereby one third o f  the Member 
States may establish ‘enhanced cooperation’ in relation to a measure if  agreement among all the Member 
States cannot be reached. See Chapter 2.
83 See Hill (1988) p. 181.
84 The restrictions were introduced in relation to the Berlin disco bomb affair. See Hill (1988) p. 176; 
Nuttall (1992) p. 305.
85 See Hill (1988) p. 179; Nuttall (1992) p. 307.
86 Common Position o f  19 March 1998, OJ 1998 L 95/1, et subs.
87 Common Position (Sierra Leone) o f  29 June 1998, OJ 1998 L 187/1; Common Position (Angola) o f  3 
July 1998, OJ 1998 L 190/1; Common Positions (Nigeria) o f  20 November 1995 and 28 November 1997, 
OJ 1995 L 298/1 and OJ 1997 L 338/7; Common Position (Afghanistan) o f  26 February 2001, OJ 2001 L 
57/1; Common Positions (Myanmar) o f  28 October 1996 and 6 February 1998, OJ 1996 L 287/1 and OJ 
1998 L 32; Common Position (Liberia) o f  7 May 2001, OJ 2001 L 126/1; Common Position (Belarus) o f  
11 July 1998, OJ 1998 L 195; Common Position (Zimbabwe) o f  18 February 2002, OJ 2002 L 50/1; 
Common Position (Transnistrian region o f  the Moldovan Republic) o f  28 February 2003, OJ 2003 L
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Many o f these visa bans -  but not all of them -  are based on Security Council 
Resolutions.88 Moreover, in CFSP decisions they usually complement sanctions of an 
economic nature (as was the case with regard to Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe, for 
example).89
Notwithstanding the introduction of Title IV EC, decisions by the Member States on the 
introduction o f visa bans continue to be taken under the CFSP.90 This state of affairs has 
been described as offering ‘an example of a possible legal basis confusion’.91 Visa bans 
indeed offer a further example of possible tension between the Community and the 
CFSP. While the foreign policy objective of visa bans justifies the adoption of a CFSP 
instrument, their migration aspect would seem to justify the adoption of a Community 
instrument based on Title IV.92
However, while in relation to economic sanctions the dichotomy ‘foreign policy 
objective-economic nature’ is acknowledged by Article 301 EC, which envisages the 
adoption of a Community instrument implementing a CFSP decision, this is not the case 
for visa bans, and CFSP decisions imposing visa bans are implemented through national 
measures.93
This state of affairs is ultimately connected to the nature of the Community visa policy 
regime. The visa policy regime leaves almost intact the Member States’ autonomy to 
grant or deny visas to individuals for their national territories and does not provide for
53/60; Common Position (Monstar) o f  17 March 1997, OJ 1997 L 81/1; Common Position (Macedonia) 
o f  16 July 2001, OJ 2001 L 194/55.
88 This is the case for the Common Positions on Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, see supra 
n. 87. See also Chapter 1.
89 The Common Position on Yugoslavia, supra n. 86, also confirmed the embargo on arms export and 
provided for a moratorium on government-financed export credit support for trade and investment. 
Previous sanctions against Yugoslavia also included the suspension o f  the Community Cooperation 
Agreement, quantitative limits on the importation o f  textile products, suspension o f  the Generalized 
System  o f  Preferences, and suspension o f  the PHARE programme. See Kuijper (1993) p. 414. The 
Common Position against Zimbabwe, supra  n. 87, also included an arms embargo and the freezing o f  
funds and financial assets o f  identified persons. See also Regulation 926/98/EC on reduction o f  certain 
econom ic relations with Yugoslavia (OJ 1998 L 130/1) and Regulation 310/2002 concerning certain 
restrictive measures in respect o f  Zimbabwe (OJ 2002 L 50/4).
90 A  CFSP decision introducing visa bans for certain nationals from the former Federal Republic o f  
Yugoslavia was challenged on the ground that it should have been based on Title IV EC instead, but the 
cases were eventually withdrawn. See W essel (2000a) p. 1151.
91 W essel (2000a) p. 1152.
92 It appears that Article 62 is not considered appropriate for specific, individual bans, often o f  a short­
term character.
93 See also Italy’s proposal to implement Security Council Resolution 1390/2002 requiring the imposition 
o f  entry and transit bans on persons included in the list established by the Sanctions Committee on 
Afghanistan, through the SIS. Council doc. 7994/03, 31.03.2003.
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‘positive’ rules which may be affected in case of unilateral national action.94 While 
recourse to a Community instrument for implementing a visa ban agreed within the 
CFSP would have its advantages in terms of the uniform implementation of the ban, it 
would undermine Member States’ competence and their sovereign right to control 
access into their territories.
This situation may be contrasted with that arising in relation to the visa requirements 
imposed by the Member States on third country nationals in accordance with the Visa 
Regulation establishing the ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists. This aspect of the common visa 
policy falls into the exclusive competence of the Community and has been totally 
harmonized following the adoption of exhaustive ‘black’ and ‘white’ lists. Any 
alteration of the rules may thus take place only through a Community instrument. In this 
context, the issue that emerges regarding the interaction between the Pillars is the 
recurrent issue of the extent to which CFSP decisions (or even European Council acts) 
may cover matters relating to visa requirements without infringing Community 
competence.95 The recent Union action in relation to Kaliningrad shows that in practice 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to compartmentalize action by the Union and that 
there is increasingly fluidity between what can be called the ‘political sphere’ of the 
Union and the Community.96
With regard to substantive convergence of the Member States’ foreign policy positions, 
notwithstanding some progress under the CFSP, this is inevitably incomplete, and the 
EU visa policy provides for a number of instruments to accommodate divergence. 
Under communitarized Schengen arrangements, a Member State may require 
consultation of its central authorities before uniform visas are issued by any Member 
State to certain nationalities. Following such consultation, the Member State may 
oppose the granting of a uniform visa, in which case only a limited territorial validity
94 In this context, see also Draft Council Conclusions on flexibility in issuing visas to participants in 
Euro-Med meetings, 13.02.2003, doc. 6254/03. Under the Draft Conclusions, in order to facilitate the 
issue o f  visas to participants in the Euro-Med meetings, the Presidency ‘should... inform, on the one hand, 
other Member States o f  the schedule meetings and, on the other hand, the appropriate local authorities 
about the way in which the relevant rules should be applied in order to facilitate the process’.
95 See Timmermans (1996). In this context, see Conclusions o f  the Seville and Brussels European 
Councils (respectively, paras. 55 and 17) and the ‘Common Line’ for Russia adopted by the Council on 
13 May 2002.
96 A  deal between the EU and Russia was struck at the EU-Russia Summit in November 2002. This 
consisted in a system o f  multiple-entry transit papers for Russian citizens travelling to and from 
Kaliningrad and a EU-Russia joint anti-terrorist strategy. Following this, the Council adopted Regulation 
693/2003 on facilitated transit documents, OJ 2003 L 99/8.
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visa can be issued. This procedure was used by Portugal to prevent the issue of uniform
97visas to Indonesia nationals following events in East Timor.
On the other hand, the positions of the Member States seem to converge remarkably on 
visa denial to Taiwanese high-ranking officials, as a result of Chinese pressure. It has 
been submitted that ‘the foreign ministries of the EU’s Member States have an 
unofficial and secret agreement of travel restrictions for ROC/Taiwanese Politicians: the 
five most important political leaders, including the president, vice president, premier, 
foreign minister, and defence minister, are not to receive a visa even for private
> 98reasons .
An important innovation introduced by the Constitutional Treaty is that the addressees 
of CFSP decisions on visa bans may now challenge the legality of the decisions before 
the Court of Justice." This is a modest answer to concerns about the exclusion of 
individual remedies for CFSP action (resulting from the exclusion of the Court of 
Justice jurisdiction), particularly in the light of possible Union accession to the ECHR.
3.1.4 The Member States’ international obligations to grant access into their 
territories
While the Member States may depart from mutual recognition of national entry 
conditions and grant a limited territorial validity visa on grounds of ‘national interest’, a 
structural limit to the application of mutual recognition results from the Member States’ 
duty to honour their international obligations governing access into their territories.100 
The principle that the Member States should honour their pre-existing international 
obligations is recognized in the EC Treaty itself. Article 307 EC provides that ‘the 
rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into force of 
this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third 
countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty’. Moreover, 
it is generally not possible for a Member State to justify a breach of its international 
obligations on the basis of a security risk to (or an internationally wrongful act against) 
another Member State, except in the presence of a United Nation Security Council
97 See D ecision  o f  the Executive Committee o f  5 May 1995 on common visa policy (SCH/Com-ex (95)
PV 1 Rev), OJ 2000 L 239/175.
98 See Lan (2004) pp. 125-126 and 131.
99 Article III-282.
100 See for example The Times, ‘M ugabe’s Rome visit beats EU travel ban’, 8 June 2002. Italy was bound 
under U N  rules to admit Mr. Mugabe to attend a FAO meeting in Rome as head o f  a FAO Member State. 
International obligations (particularly with regards to human rights) also limit mutual recognition o f
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resolution or where the wrongful act amounts to a violation of an obligation owed erga 
101omnes.
Thus, for example, when the Member States, following the Falklands invasion, imposed 
sanctions on Argentina by means of various EEC regulations (but without Security 
Council cover), Argentina complained that the Member States were in breach of their 
GATT obligations and that Article XXI of the GATT -  which stipulates that a Party can 
take ‘any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests’ -  could not legitimize their actions since they were not involved in the conflict 
and their security was not at issue.102
Thus, European Union instruments prescribing the imposition of visa bans by the 
Member States often contain exceptions to their application. The Common Position on 
Nigeria provided that the Member States could grant exemptions from the visa bans to 
Nigerian nationals: (i) participating in an international conference on their territory, (ii) 
pursuant to the provisions of a headquarters agreement, and (iii) in order to follow up 
undertakings already entered into particularly in respect of sporting events (i.e. the 1998 
Football World Cup and the World Basketball Championship).103 
Similarly, the Common Position concerning restrictive measures against the leadership 
of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova provided that the Member 
States’ obligation to impose the travel ban was to be ‘without prejudice to cases where a 
Member State is bound by an obligation of international law, namely: (i) as a host 
country of an international intergovernmental organization; (ii) as a host country of an 
international conference convened by, or under the auspices of, the United Nations; or
(iii) under a multilateral agreement concerning privileges and immunities’.104 
The same approach was adopted in the Community Regulation governing the granting 
of visas to participants in the Athens 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games, and the 
Regulation governing the issue of visas at the borders, particularly to seamen in transit. 
Both Regulations, in light of the IOC rules and international rules governing the
judicial decisions in criminal matters and have in some occasions limited the application o f  the Dublin 
Convention. See Alegre and L eaf (2004); N icol (2004).
101 A  breach o f  treaty obligations resulting from the imposition o f  visa bans decided by the Security 
Council w ill not be problematic since Article 103 o f  the UN Charter provides that where there is a 
conflict between obligations under the Charter and obligations under any other international agreement, 
the former prevail.
102 See Chinkin (1997) pp. 193 and 187-198.
103 Common Position o f  28 November 1997, supra  n. 87.
104 Article 1(3) Common Position o f  28 February 2003, supra n. 87.
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movement of seamen, provide for the possibility of granting limited territorial validity 
visas when the common conditions of entry are not satisfied.105
The use of limited territorial validity visas in this context illustrates the tension between 
the project of creating an area without internal ‘frontiers’ and the retention of sovereign 
status by the Member States. As long as the Member States remain individually bound 
by international obligations concerning entry into their territories, frontiers between 
them will continue to exist to demarcate the application of international law in a given 
case. This situation could change only if Community agreements were substituted for 
the Member States’ individual agreements.106 This of course would imply an enormous 
transfer of competence to the Community and, given the number and far-reaching scope 
of these agreements, call into question the separate existence of the Member States. 
These factors are also at the basis of the exceptions laid down in the Visa Regulation as 
to its application. The application of the Visa Regulation is excluded for a number of 
special categories of persons. Visa requirements for these categories are determined by 
bilateral agreements (such as diplomatic visa exemption agreements or headquarters 
agreements between the Member States and international organizations) or by 
multilateral or bilateral agreements o f a wider scope (such as the 1944 Chicago 
Convention on International Civil Aviation).107 Apart from the difficulties which it 
would entail, harmonization at Community level of the visa requirements applied by the 
Member States with regard to these categories would raise the issue of Community 
external competence under the AETR doctrine. Still, it is difficult to envisage a 
Community agreement covering one aspect (e.g. diplomatic visa requirements) of a 
wider issue which by its nature falls squarely into Member States’ competence (e.g. 
diplomatic representation by third countries in the Member States). Moreover, rules on 
visas are often contained in international agreements of a wider scope which the 
Community may have no competence to conclude.
3.1.5 The role o f the Community institutions
105 See Chapter 4.
106 The substitution o f  the Member States’ individual visa exemption agreements with the countries in the 
‘w hite’ list with Community visa exemption agreements, for example, puts an end to the situation 
whereby third country nationals could extend their stay within the common area beyond three months by 
cumulating successive rights o f  short stay that they enjoyed by virtue o f  bilateral agreements between 
their country and the Member States -  a practice which was described by the Commission as 
incompatible with the spirit o f  an area without internal ‘frontiers’. See Chapter 4.
107 See Chapter 1.
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Notwithstanding the introduction of a Community legal basis for the adoption of ‘the 
procedures and conditions for issuing visas’, formulation of entry conditions continues 
to be national. Consistency derives from the Community principle of mutual recognition 
of nationally determined entry conditions, but States may depart from its application. 
Even where substantive convergence is achieved among the Member States (for 
example in relation to recognition of passports or visa bans for individuals), this is not 
translated into a Community instrument in order not to undermine Member States’ 
competence in these fields and their sovereign right to exclude aliens. Substantive 
convergence is often recorded in an instrument adopted under the intergovernmental 
Pillars which for its nature poses no threat to national autonomy.
Although a First Pillar policy, visa policy thus envisages a very limited role for the 
Community institutions in the formulation of the conditions and procedures for issuing 
visas.108 This is further reflected in Regulation 789/2001 ‘reserving to the Council 
implementing powers with regard to certain detailed provisions and practical procedures 
for examining visa applications’. This allows the Council to amend certain parts of the 
CCI unanimously on a proposal from a Member State or the Commission, while those 
parts of the CCI consisting of ‘lists of factual information which must be provided by 
each Member State’ can be amended unilaterally by the Member States.109 
The flexibility o f the common visa policy (i.e. the fact that the Member States retain 
competence as to who can obtain a visa to enter their territories) has also been used by 
some Member States as an argument to resist Community competence with regard to 
agreements with third countries on visa facilitation, which the Commission has 
attacked.110
The extensive retention of national autonomy also implies a limited role for the 
Commission in monitoring implementation of the policy. It appears that the Member 
States are bound only by obligations of a procedural nature laid down in some 
provisions of the Schengen acquis, such as obligation to consult or obtain the agreement 
of the other Member States before undertaking a certain course of action. Following the 
attribution of these provisions to a Community legal basis, the Commission maintains 
that such obligations have acquired the force of Community law, and that accordingly 
the Commission may bring infringement actions against non-compliant Member States.
108 See Cholewinski (2003) p. 112.
109 See Chapter 4. The Commission has now challenged the validity o f  the Regulation in Case C-257/01 
Commission  v. Council, pending.
110 See Chapter 4.
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The Commission’s attitude has made Italy desist from concluding a diplomatic visa 
exemption agreement with Russia.111
The flexibility of the common visa policy is also at the basis of the exclusion of a rights- 
based approach for the common visa policy, with implications for the Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction.
As Hailbronner explains:
‘Taking into account the weak position o f  third country nationals under the law as it stands 
[generally no one has an individual right to be issued with a visa] there is no more than a marginal 
role for the European Court o f  Justice with respect to visa and entry issues. Taking into account that 
the Schengen Protocol has established an irrebutable presumption that the Schengen acquis 
attributed by the Council is in toto  in conformity with primary Community law and that, moreover, 
the visa-related parts o f  this acquis do not affect Schengen States’ competence to refuse issuance o f  
visas in accordance with the relevant national law it is hard to imagine that any questions might 
arise which require referral for preliminary ruling to the European Court o f  Justice’.112
While the introduction of a rights-based approach would not in principle be inconsistent 
with retention of national autonomy for the formulation of entry conditions, it would 
entail some limitations on the Member States’ sovereign right to control entry.
In the context of other EC policies, the Court has proved to be a vehicle for the control 
and harmonization of concepts such as ‘national security’ and ‘public order’ on which 
the Member States rely as justification for derogating from Community regimes.113 The 
Court has engaged in assessing the exercise of powers retained by the Member States to 
ensure its compatibility with Community rules.114 This has included a review of a 
Member State’s practice of recognizing documents issued by an unrecognized State,115 
and a review of a Member State’s actions aimed at implementing their international 
obligations under the UN Charter.116
111 See Chapter 4.
112 Hailbronner (2000) p. 158. For a different opinion see Cholewinski (2003) pp. 129-130.
113 See Staples (2003) pp. 236-244 with regard to the EC free movement o f  persons regime.
114 For example, the Court affirmed its jurisdiction to assess whether restrictions on export o f  dual-use 
goods were in conformity with Article 30 EC and the Community Common Commercial Policy. See 
Cases C -367/89 Aime Richardt [1991] E C R 1-4621; C-70/94 Werner v. Germany [1995] E C R 1-3189; C- 
83/94 Leifer  [1995] ECR 1-3231.
115 The Court assessed whether the United Kingdom’s practice o f  recognizing documents issued by the 
‘Turkish Republic o f  Northern Cyprus’ for the purpose o f  the Community Association Agreement with 
Cyprus was in conformity with that Agreement. See Case C-432/92 Anastasiou  [1994] ECR 1-3087.
116 The Court considered whether national sanctions based on ‘public policy’ aimed at strengthening 
implementation o f  a U N  Security Council resolution were in conformity with the Common Commercial
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In the context of the common visa policy, the Court will be largely precluded from 
controlling the exercise of powers retained by the Member States. The possible
• 117consequences o f this are lack of uniformity of national entry conditions and remedies. 
This has not only harsh consequences for individuals,118 but may also undermine the 
system as a whole since, in a situation where a minimum level of uniformity of entry 
conditions is not guaranteed, the application of mutual recognition may prove difficult 
or may even be challenged by national courts.119
In such a situation, the smooth functioning of the common visa policy (i.e. the 
unhindered application of the principle of mutual recognition) relies heavily on 
convergence achieved within the intergovernmental Pillars on foreign policy issues 
relevant for entry conditions or on what individual behaviour may constitute a ground 
for exclusion. Convergence within the Second Pillar will also determine to what extent 
the common visa policy can be considered a foreign policy instrument of the Union.
In the context of the common visa policy, the role of the Court of Justice seems 
restricted to cases where Community law grants rights of entry to third country 
nationals. This is primarily the case for family members of Community nationals, but
• 1 90may also be the case for beneficiaries of Community external agreements and posted 
workers of Community enterprises.121
Policy. See Case C -124/95 Centro Com  [1997] ECR 1-81. For an in-depth analysis o f  the Court’s role see 
Koutrakos (2001) particularly pp. 113-163.
117 See Staples (2003).
118 However, i f  a rights-based approach is to serve any purpose to a third country national who has been 
denied a short-term visa, the review system  would have to work swiftly.
119 The case o f  the Greenpeace activist mentioned earlier offers an example o f  a case where mutual 
recognition proved difficult (and embarrassing) for a Member State. For an example o f  a national court 
rejecting the application o f  mutual recognition, see the Conseil d’Etat in Forabosco, Case 190384, 9 June 
1999, considered in Chapter 3.
120 Community Association Agreements may grant rights o f  entry to the nationals o f  the Contracting 
Parties for the purpose o f  establishment or the provision o f  services. The Association Agreements with 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics provide (or provided) only for 
a right o f  establishment. They are accordingly irrelevant for short-term visas. Moreover, the Court o f  
Justice held that the right o f  entry established by such Agreements was not undermined by national 
system s o f  prior controls (long-term visa requirements). See Cases C-235/99 Kondova  [2001] ECR I- 
6427; C -63/99 G loszczuk  [2001] ECR 1-6369; C-257/99 Malik [2001] ECR 1-6567. For an in-depth 
analysis see W eiss (2001) pp. 255-260. On the other hand, in some Community agreements which 
envisage the realization between the Parties o f  the freedom to provide services, it is possible to find a 
reference to the speedy issue o f  visas for service providers. This is the case for the EC-Russia Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement which provide in Article 37 for the temporary movement o f  persons for the 
purpose o f  negotiating or concluding agreements to sell cross-border services (the relevant national rules 
on entry and stay are applicable, but it is provided that their application should not nullify or impair 
benefits accruing to any Party under a specific provision o f  the Agreement). A Joint Declaration on 
Article 37 requires the Parties to ‘ensure that the issuing o f  visas and residence perm its...are 
conducted... with a view  to facilitating the prompt entry, stay and movement o f  businessmen in Russia 
and the Member States’.
121 The Court held that Articles 49 and 50 EC gave the right to enterprises established in a Member State 
to provide services in another Member State by way o f  posting their third country national workers there.
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Thus, in M RAX  v. Belgium}22 the Court of Justice interpreted Directive 68/360123 - 
requiring the Member States to accord to family members of Community workers who 
are third country nationals ‘every facility for obtaining any necessary visas’ -  to the 
effect that ‘a visa must be issued without delay and, as far as possible, at the place of 
entry into national territory’.124 The Court held that under Community legislation ‘a 
Member State may not send back at the border a third country national who is married 
to a national of a Member State and attempts to enter its territory without being in 
possession of a valid identity card or passport or, if necessary, a visa, where he is able to 
prove his identity and conjugal ties and there is no evidence to establish that he
I ^ c
represented a risk to the requirements of public policy, or public health’.
The Commission, on its part, considered (and eventually desisted from) bringing a case 
against Spain arguing that Directive 64/221126 - imposing a duty on the Member States 
to inform third country nationals who are family members of Community nationals of 
the grounds of public policy, public security or public health upon which decisions to 
exclude them from their national territories are based (unless this is contrary to the 
interests of the security of the State involved) -  created a duty for the Member States
when refusing a visa on the ground of a report in the SIS to give information on the
1 01grounds on which the report decision was based.
3.2 Local consular cooperation
Local consular cooperation is an aspect of visa policy that falls under the Second Pillar 
of the Union.
Cooperation between the Member States’ consular and diplomatic posts is a long- 
established practice.128 Reflecting and building on this, Article 20 EU provides:
The im position o f  residence permits by the receiving State would amount to a breach o f  Articles 49 and 
50. See Case C-43/93 Vander E lst [1994] ECR 1-3803. The Commission in its proposal for a directive on 
the posting o f  workers who are third country nationals for the provision o f  cross-border services, 
proposed the abolition o f  visa requirements for such workers, OJ 1999 C 67/12. The amended proposal is 
at present before the European Parliament.
122 Case C -459/99, [2002] ECR 1-6591.
123 ‘On the abolition o f  restrictions on movement and residence within the Community for workers o f  
Member States and their fam ilies’, OJ Sp. Ed. 1968 L 257/13.
124 Para. 60.
125 Para. 62.
126 ‘On measures concerning the movement and residence o f  foreign nationals which are justified on 
grounds o f  public policy, public security and public health’, OJ Sp. Ed. 1964 850/64.
127 Interview with Commission official, DG JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
128 M acleod, Hendry and Hyett (1996) p. 420. For an account o f  cooperation within EPC, see Bot (1984); 
Brinkhorst (1984). For a recent assessment see Anderson, S. (2001).
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‘The diplomatic and consular missions o f  the Member States and the Commission Delegations in 
third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international 
organizations, shall cooperate in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted 
by the Council are com plied with and implemented.
They shall step up cooperation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and 
contributing to the implementation o f  the provisions referred to in Article 20 o f  the Treaty 
establishing the European Community’.129
It is also established practice for the Member States to share premises and functions of 
their diplomatic and consular posts in an attempt to save costs and improve the 
efficiency of representations in third countries. This is the case for the shared United 
Kingdom/France/Germany embassies in Alma Ata and Minsk and the joint Nordic 
embassies in Windhoek and Dar-es-Salaam.
Also, the Member States often entrust the protection of their interests in a country where 
they are not represented to another Member State that has a diplomatic presence there in 
accordance with Article 46 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 
For example, Belgium (for economic issues) and the Netherlands (for political issues) 
represent Luxembourg in South Korea. Sharing of resources has also taken place 
between the Member States’ diplomatic missions and the Commission’s delegations, as
1 TOis the case for the ‘House of Europe’ at Abuja.
In the context of visa policy, cooperation between the Member States’ diplomatic and 
consular posts in third countries is essential for the uniform implementation of the
common visa policy, which is a precondition for its success, and for the collection of
10 1
information indispensable for policy formulation.
Uniform implementation of the EU visa policy by the Member States’ consular posts is 
ensured through the CCI and local consular cooperation.132
129 Article 20 EC provides that ‘every citizens o f  the Union shall, in the territory o f  a third country in 
which the Member State o f  which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic or consular authorities o f  any Member State,...’.
13 See Duke (2002) pp. 856-857; Anderson, S. (2001) p. 468; Denza (1998) pp. 49 and 400-402 who 
points out that as yet there is no disposition on the part o f Member States to accredit a single individual as 
head o f  m ission in a third country, as it is allowed by Article 6 o f  the Vienna Convention, since there are 
still sensitivities about free access to archives and sharing confidential information. There are also 
national bars to closer integration. France, for example, has a constitutional prohibition on being 
represented abroad by a non-French national.
131 Joint reports on third countries prepared by the Member States’ embassies form raw material for third 
country reports and action plans by bodies such as Cirefi, the HLWG and former Cirea. These have an 
impact on the evolution o f  both national and EU policies. See Curtin and Dekker (1999) p. 115.
132 See Chapter 3.
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With regard to local consular cooperation, the CCI provide that ‘missions...shall 
organize meetings on a regular basis depending on the circumstances and as often as 
they deem suitable’. Exchange of information during such meetings aims to ensure a 
uniform implementation of the EU visa policy (indispensable for avoiding visa 
shopping and enhancing security) and the identification of local conditions which may 
require the adoption of further measures at national or EU level.
While the missions and consular posts of the Member States enjoy a certain discretion 
with regard to the organization of local cooperation meetings -  with ultimate 
responsibility falling on the central authorities of the Member States -  and the circle of 
people participating in such meetings may vary considerably from one place to another, 
the Council has made some recommendations on the matter.
The Council recommended that all EU and Schengen members and the Commission 
should be invited to meetings and that attendance by the heads of visa sections or their 
deputies should be ‘imperative and mandatory’. Candidate countries which have started 
accession negotiations should also be invited on a regular basis by the heads of 
missions, while representatives of third countries should be invited at intervals on the 
basis of local practice or where there are special reasons. Third countries such as the
US, Canada and Australia, which often have special migration experts, can be invited
1 *11for the purpose o f acquiring information.
Furthermore, the Council, following the events of 11 September 2001, recommended 
that local consular cooperation should be intensified, since exchange of information is 
‘an invaluable means of seeking at an early stage to identify persons related to terrorist 
threats, terrorists and terrorist groups and to fight illegal immigration and trafficking in 
human beings’. In particular, the Council urged ‘the diplomatic missions of the Member 
States in third countries where networks involved in or associated with terrorism are 
assumed to exist to exchange information obtained in connection with visa applications 
regularly and at least once a month’.134
But how successful has local consular cooperation been? Does the fact that 
responsibility for local consular cooperation, in terms of monitoring and collecting 
information, falls with the Member States have a negative impact on the formulation 
and implementation of the common visa policy?
133 Local consular cooperation, doc. 7819/1/01, approved by the Council on 28-29 M ay 2001.
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The extent to which local consular cooperation is successful remains controversial. It
seems that the success of local consular cooperation varies according to the places
involved. Some concrete results include the fruitful exchange of information on forged
documents in Congo, and the joint elaboration of a uniform information leaflet and of a
• 1 ^  •translation o f the visa application in Russia, China and Algeria. According to a 
commentator: ‘in the local consular cooperation meetings on visas, the embassies 
actually do make European Immigration policy...With regard to Schengen although the 
meetings are informal, they may decide policy by deciding to whom to give visas -  or 
not’.136
The Report on local consular cooperation prepared by the French Presidency in 
December 2000 mentioned among the achievements of local consular cooperation ‘the 
harmonization of lists of justifications and, in general, of conditions for examining 
applications and the regular exchange of statistics’, as well as numerous specific 
initiatives against documentary fraud.137
However, lack of uniformity was also identified, particularly in the form of: (i) no 
harmonized approach to applications lodged through travel agencies, which in the case 
of Kiev resulted from different instructions from national central authorities, and (ii) 
divergences concerning the recognition of travel documents and applications from 
aliens in transit. Such lack of uniformity caused visa shopping. Other problems 
revealing malfunctioning included: (i) a misunderstanding of the stamp ‘visa application 
lodged on.. .a t... ’ (which is affixed on the passports of visa applicants for the purpose of 
preventing multiple applications), which was wrongly treated by certain posts as 
indicating the rejection o f the visa application; and (ii) the high number of limited 
territorial validity visas issued.
The French Presidency also expressed its disapproval on practices of establishing a
1
local common roster of persons deemed undesirable (a kind o f ‘local SIS’).
110The Council has begun to address these problems. Inter alia it adopted a decision on 
a uniform visa application form and on rules on the processing of visa applications 
lodged through travel agencies.140
134 Council Conclusions on intensified consular cooperation, 20.11.2002, Council doc. 14525/02.
135 Interview with Commission official, DG JHA/A1, 10 December 2002.
136 Anderson, S. (2001) p. 472.
137 Council doc. 14496/00.
138 Such a practice raises the issue o f  lack o f  democratic and judicial control o f  local consular cooperation.
139 See supra  nn. 133-134.
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The Commission in its Communication on a common policy on illegal immigration 
commented that:
‘It does not make any sense to introduce new rules or to harmonize rules at EU level, i f  present 
regulations are not enforced with sufficient resources and, most importantly, the necessary will. 
Common efforts are condemned to fail, if  Member States’ services and practices do not follow  
the rules adopted in com m on i.e. relating to visa issuance and external border controls’.141
The Commission suggested that monitoring the enforcement of existing common rules, 
by, for example, undertaking regular joint screenings of consular posts, should be 
strengthened.142
Some limited progress in this direction has been made. While responsibility for 
supervising local consular cooperation continues to fall on the Presidency (which under 
the CFSP has general responsibility to represent the Union), the Greek Presidency in its 
Report on local consular cooperation recommended a procedure that the Presidency 
should follow to monitor local consular cooperation and also collect relevant 
information.143
The Presidency, it is suggested, should send a questionnaire to the members of local 
consular cooperation in regions in which migration flows originate, and compile a 
report setting out conclusions and tables of statistics on visas granted and applications 
rejected. Such a report should then be passed to the Working Party on Visas which on 
its basis would decide on possible additional activities. The Presidency would also be 
responsible for transmitting to posts involved in local consular cooperation the records 
of meetings of the Working Party on visas, drawn up by the Council Secretariat, in 
order to achieve a continuous flow of information to its members regarding the latest 
initiatives and developments in visas.
The solution now seriously contemplated in order to achieve a uniform implementation 
of the common visa policy is the establishment of common visa offices. The French
140 Council D ecision  o f  25 April 2002 on the amendment o f  Part III and Annex 16 to the CCI, OJ 2002 L 
123/50; Council D ecision  o f  12 July 2002 on the adaptation o f  Parts III and VIII o f  the CCI, OJ 2002 L 
187/44.
141 COM (2001) 672 final, 15.11.2001, para. 3.5.
142 A s to the monitoring arrangements under the Schengen Convention, see Chapter 3. See also Article 
III-161 o f  the Constitutional Treaty, considered in Chapter 4.
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Presidency in its Report saw this as ‘the only way of achieving full harmonization of 
procedures’.
The establishment of common visa offices has been called for by the Tampere and 
Laeken European Councils.144
The Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration, considering the establishment 
of common visa offices, stated:
‘One o f  the expected advantages o f  joint visa posts would be to reduce the cost o f  issuing visas. 
Such a burden-sharing approach could provide the financial means needed by the Member States 
in order to improve the technical equipment used for the purpose o f  issuing visas (detection o f  
counterfeit or forged documents, access to online databases o f  sample travel documents, secured 
storage conditions for blank visas stickers, etc.). In addition, staff sharing would also mean 
sharing o f  experience and know-how in the field o f  risk assessment o f  illegal immigration or 
potential overstayers. In a medium or longer-term perspective, one more substantial positive 
outcome o f  joint visa posts would consist o f  more uniform implementation o f  the common rules 
and the reduction o f  visa shopping’.145
What form common visa offices should take (mere sharing of premises, extension of the 
system of representation or, controversially, issue of visas on behalf of the Community) 
is still unclear.
Although visa policy falls now within the First Pillar, it is likely that the Member States 
will resist, on constitutional grounds, the introduction of a Community measure 
governing the establishment of common visa offices (setting out powers and 
responsibility of officials and legal remedies).146 Instead, it is likely that the matter will 
be tackled intergovemmentally within the Second Pillar. Even within the 
intergovernmental framework, the issue as to the form of the common visa offices (the 
creation of a specific body of officials or a looser form of cooperation) will be a delicate 
one because of its legal and constitutional implications.
In this context, the Constitutional Treaty introduces some relevant changes. The 
Constitutional Treaty introduces ‘Union delegations’.147 These will represent the Union
143 2.06.2003, doc. 9991/03.
144 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, para. 22; Presidency 
Conclusions, Laeken European Council, 14 and 15 December 2001, para. 42.
145 28.02.2002, Council doc. 6621/1/02, para. 32.
146 See Staples (2003) p. 249.
147 The name ‘Union delegations’ was finally favoured to the other controversial proposal to call such 
delegations ‘EU em bassies’. See Final Report o f  Working Group VII on External Action, 16 December 
2002, CONV 459/02, part A, para. 7.
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in third countries and international organizations and will replace the current 
Commission’s delegations. They are to operate under the authority of the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and in close cooperation with the Member States’ diplomatic 
services.148 The staff of these Union delegations is to be provided from the ‘European 
External Action Service’. This (to be established by a European decision of the Council 
taken on a proposal from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and after consulting the 
European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission) will be composed 
of officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and 
of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services, and will 
assist the Minister for Foreign Affairs.149
The creation of Union delegations will probably improve the Commission’s access to 
information and its analysis capacity as a result of secondment of members of national 
diplomatic services.
It appears that the Union delegations ‘will not at first be issuing visas and passports to 
EU citizens, although some countries want to include such consular services at a later 
date’.150
4. The ‘area of freedom, security and justice’: consistency and maximization of 
Union activity
The Union project to establish an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ offers a further 
opportunity to look at the coordination and interaction of the Pillars.
As the Tampere European Council emphasized, the project requires the coordination of 
measures falling under different Pillars because of their complementarity, the 
integration of justice and home affairs concerns into the Union external policies in order 
to maximize Union leverage vis-a-vis third countries, and the coordination of different 
treaty objectives in the light of their overlap (development policy has, for example, an 
impact on migration pressure).
This section looks at how Union powers are integrated with regard to the objective of 
‘combating illegal immigration’ specifically. The analysis is restricted for reasons of
148 Article III-230.
149 Article III-197. From the Declaration re Article III-197, it appears that preparatory work on the 
External Action Service is to start from the date o f  signing o f  the Constitutional Treaty, rather than after 
national ratification.
150 The Times, ‘EU to set up its own embassies around the world’, 12 June 2004.
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space and relevance (combating illegal immigration is one of the main objectives of the 
common visa policy).
4.1 The European Council: formulating Union overall policy
Within the Union, the European Council takes a central political leadership role, 
guiding the work of the meetings of the Council and the Commission, setting the 
medium term objectives of the Union and taking the so called ‘history-making 
decisions’.151
Article 4 EU provides:
‘The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development 
and shall define the general political guidelines thereof.
Reflecting Article 4 EU, Article 13 EU, included in the CFSP provisions, provides:
‘ 1. The European Council shall define the principles o f  and general guidelines for the common 
foreign and security p o licy ...
2. The European Council shall decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in 
areas where the Member States have important interests in com m on....
3. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common 
foreign and security p olicy  on the basis o f  the general guidelines defined by the European 
Council.
4. The Council shall recommend common strategies to the European Council and shall 
implement
them, in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions.
The Council shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness o f  action by the Union’.
Article 4 EU implies that action by the European Council may touch upon any of the 
three Pillars, and both European Council conclusions and common strategies in relation 
to third countries do include issues falling under all three Pillars. It is the broadly 
political nature of European Council decisions that allows an overarching combination 
of different Pillars’ issues.152
151 Hix (1999) p. 29; Peterson and Bomberg (1999) p. 28; Wallace, H. (2000) p. 20.
152 Although decisions by the European Council are capable o f  imposing obligations on the Member 
States and the institutions, they are something less than legal instruments in the full sense. See 
Timmermans (1996) p. 68; Denza (2002) p. 136. See also Article 1-20 o f  the Constitutional Treaty which 
states that the European Council ‘does not exercise legislative functions’.
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The European Council thus plays a prominent role in establishing consistency of Union 
activity.
4.1.1 Conclusions o f  the European Council
The European Council formulates the overall Union policy in relation to the 
establishment of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, thus coordinating measures 
falling under different Pillars.
The central role of the European Council appears evident from the work programme 
established by the Tampere European Council -  the first European Council which dealt 
exclusively with justice and home affairs issues.153
Subsequent European Councils have reviewed progress on implementation of the 
Tampere Work Programme and have provided further impetus.
The Laeken European Council of December 2001 held that: ‘The European Council 
reaffirms its commitment to the policy guidelines and objectives defined at Tampere 
and notes that while some progress has been made, there is a need for new impetus and 
guidelines to make good delays in some areas’.154
With regard to ‘a true common asylum and immigration policy’, the Laeken European 
Council (after affirming the importance of achieving a balance between protection of 
refugees, in accordance with the principles of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the 
legitimate aspiration to a better life and the reception capacities of the Union) called for, 
inter alia: (i) the integration of the policy on migratory flows into the European Union’s 
foreign policy, and in particular the conclusion of re-admission agreements, (ii) an 
action plan on illegal immigration on the basis of the Commission communication, and
(iii) the development of a European system for exchange of information on asylum, 
migration and countries of origin.155 The Laeken European Council also called for better 
management of the Union’s external borders, which would help in the fight against 
terrorism, illegal immigration networks and trafficking in human beings, and for the 
Commission and the Council to work out the necessary arrangements for cooperation 
between external border control services and examine the conditions in which a 
common service could be created.156 It also asked the Commission and the Council to
153 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European Council, 15 and 16 October 1999, 200/1/99. For an 
analysis, see Chapter 4.
154 Presidency Conclusions, Laeken European Council, 14 and 15 December 2001, 300/1/01, para. 37.
155 Para. 40.
156 A  feasibility study on the creation o f  a European Border Police was undertaken by Italy, see Feasibility 
study for the setting up o f  a ‘European Border Police’, Final Report, May 2002.
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take steps to set up the common VIS and to examine the possibility of setting up 
common consular offices.157
The politicization of illegal immigration issues in the French presidential election
campaign in April and May 2002 -  resulting in the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen
gaining second place in the first round of elections -  contributed to keeping illegal
immigration high on the Union’s agenda. EU countries saw the production of action at
EU level as one way to avoid far-right political groups exploiting illegal immigration 
1 ^ 8issues. Illegal immigration thus became the central issue of the Seville European 
Council of June 2002.159
The Seville European Council expressed its determination ‘to speed up the 
implementation of all aspects of the programme adopted in Tampere for the creation of 
an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union’, and welcomed the 
adoption of the Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration and the Plan for the 
management of external borders.160 With regard to the Comprehensive Plan on illegal 
immigration, the Seville European Council called on the Council and the Commission 
to attach top priority to the following measures contained in the Plan: (i) review of the 
list of third countries whose nationals required visas (the ‘black’ list), (ii) introduction 
as soon as possible of the common VIS, (iii) speeding up the conclusion of readmission 
agreements, and adoption of a repatriation programme on the basis of the Commission’s 
Green Paper, (iv) formal adoption by the Council of the Framework Decisions on 
combating trafficking in human beings and on the strengthening of the penal framework 
to prevent the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence and of the 
Directive defining facilitation of irregular entry, transit and residence.161 
Within the context of the Plan for the management of the external borders, the Seville 
European Council urged the introduction of the Common Unit for External Border 
Practitioners to coordinate the measures contemplated in the plan.162 It requested the
157 Para. 42.
158 Monar (2003) p. 122.
159 In this context, see also the letter written by Prime Minister Blair to former Prime Minister Aznar on 
16 May 2002 expressing his hope that the Seville European Council would deliver a ‘strong push’ on the 
Tampere agenda, particularly with regard to the strengthening o f  the EU external borders, a tougher 
approach towards countries o f  origin on returns and the creation o f  an equitable asylum system. See 
Monar (2003) p. 122.
160 Presidency Conclusions, Seville European Council, 21 and 22 June 2002, 200/02, paras. 26 and 27.
161 Para. 30.
162 Such a body was established within the Council in the framework o f  SCIFA + (Strategic Committee 
for Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum meeting with the heads o f Member States’ border guards) by the 
Danish Presidency. The Commission has now proposed the establishment at Community level o f  a
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Council, the Commission and the Member States to implement a number of measures
163including the creation of a network of Member States’ immigration liaison officers.
The Seville European Council also addressed the issue of integrating immigration 
policy into the Union’s relations with third countries. This issue had been surrounded by 
disagreement. The United Kingdom and Germany wanted a tough approach involving 
negative measures and retorsion against non-cooperating countries. France, on the other 
hand, preferred the ‘carrots’ approach involving aid to countries willing to cooperate. 
While the French approach had so far prevailed, the Seville European Council endorsed 
the use of negative measures under the EC and CFSP.164
Thus, apart from urging that ‘any future cooperation, association or equivalent 
agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any 
country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on 
compulsory readmission’, the Seville European Council stated that:
‘The European Council considers it necessary to carry out a systematic assessment o f  relations 
with third countries which do not cooperate in combating illegal immigration. That assessment 
will be taken into account in relations between the European Union and its Member States and 
the countries concerned, in all relevant areas. Inadequate cooperation by a country could hamper 
the establishment o f  closer relations between that country and the Union.
After full use has been made o f  existing Community mechanisms without success, the Council 
may unanimously find that a third country has shown an unjustified lack o f  cooperation in joint 
management o f  migration flows. In that event the Council may, in accordance with the rules laid 
down in the treaties, adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and other European Union policies, while honouring the Union’s contractual commitments and 
not jeopardising developm ent cooperation objectives’.165
The Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 also laid great emphasis on the 
integration of migration issues in the Union’s relations with third countries.
It underlined ‘the importance of developing an evaluation mechanism to monitor 
relations with third countries which do not cooperate with the EU in combating illegal 
immigration’. It identified the following criteria for such evaluation: (i) participation in
European A gency for the management o f  operational cooperation at the external borders, which should 
take over the more operational tasks o f  the Common Unit, see COM (2003)687 final/2. The Seville 
European Council was silent on the issue o f  creating a European Border Guard, perhaps reflecting the 
lack o f  consensus among the Member States on the need, shape, task and organization o f  such a body.
163 Para. 32.
164 Monar (2003) p. 122.
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international human rights instruments (which contributes in defining the third country 
in question as ‘safe’ in the context of processing asylum applications in the Union), (ii) 
cooperation in readmission/retum, (iii) efforts in border controls and interception of 
illegal immigrants, (iv) combating trafficking in human beings, including taking 
legislative and other measures, (v) cooperation on visa policy and possible adaptation of 
their visa systems, (vi) creation of asylum systems, and (v) efforts in redocumentation 
of their nationals. It further stated that the Council should evaluate such factors using 
information from International Labour Organization networks and through intensified 
and more efficient consular cooperation between the Member States in third countries, 
and that the Commission should report annually on the results.166 
Furthermore, the Thessaloniki European Council welcomed the progress made in 
entrusting the Common Unit o f External Border Practitioners with the operational 
implementation and coordination of the measures contained in the plan for the 
management of the external borders. It also called for solving the remaining problems 
with regard to the establishment of the VIS. In this context, it underlined the need for a 
coherent approach in the EU on biometric data, which would result in harmonized 
solutions for documents for third country nationals, EU citizens’ passports and 
information systems, and invited the Commission to prepare the appropriate 
proposals.168
A further example of the European Council political leadership role and its cross-pillar 
approach is provided by the Extraordinary European Council which met in Brussels in 
response to the attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001. Apart from 
expressing the Union’s support and calling for a global coalition against terrorism, the 
European Council set up a plan of action which included immediate action to ensure the 
security of passports and visas and strengthen the fight against false or forged 
documents.169
4.1.2 Common strategies
165 Paras. 35-36.
166 Presidency Conclusions, Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, paras. 19-21.
167 See supra  n. 162.
168 Para. 11.
169 European Council Conclusions, 21 September and 19 October 2001. As to the European Union 
responses to terrorism see Peers (2003).
225
Common strategies with regard to third countries constitute a further example of the 
European Council’s prominent role in establishing consistency. Little use has been 
made of common strategies so far, allegedly because they may be implemented by 
instruments adopted under qualified majority voting.170
Generally, common strategies set out the Union’s strategic goals with regard to its 
relationship with a third country (such as the establishment or maintenance of peace, 
stability and security, and the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and a market 
economy). Such strategic goals are followed by more precise objectives and by specific 
initiatives which may touch on issues falling under any of the three Pillars.
The strengthening of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs is a recurrent 
objective of common strategies. With regard to Russia, for example, the EU identified 
as an ‘area of action’, the ‘fight against organized crime, money laundering and illicit 
traffic in human beings and drugs’.171 This fight is to be conducted, inter alia: (i) by 
improving cooperation on readmission, including the conclusion of a readmission 
agreement; (ii) by intensifying dialogue with Russia on the adjustment of Russia’s visa 
policy to that of the European Union and on the introduction of travel documents which 
are sufficiently fake-proof; and (iii) by working together with Russia with a view to the 
introduction of carriers’ sanctions by Russia. In this context, a ‘specific initiative’ was
177the setting up of a plan focused on common action.
With regard to Ukraine, cooperation on justice and home affairs was also identified as a 
‘principal objective’.173 According to the Common Strategy, ‘the EU will seek to 
intensify dialogue with Ukraine on the adjustment of Ukraine’s visa policy with that of 
the EU through the introduction of visa requirements consistent with EC provisions and 
the introduction of travel documents which are sufficiently non-forgeable’. Among the 
‘specific initiatives’ were: improving cooperation regarding readmission, including the 
conclusion of a readmission agreement, supporting the full application of the Geneva 
Convention, and assessing the scale of illegal immigration via Ukraine.
The EU Common Strategy on the Mediterranean of 20 June 2000, which contemplates 
similar ‘specific initiatives’ in the field of justice and home affairs,174 also includes the
170 See for example Cremona (2004) p. 569.
171 Common Strategy o f  the European Union on Russia, 4 June 1999, OJ 1999 L 157/1.
172 OJ 2000 C 106/5.
173 Common Strategy o f  the European Union on Ukraine, 23 December 1999, OJ 1999 L 331.
174 Such as developing ‘effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration, inter alia 
through the establishment o f  readmission agreements’, OJ 2000 L 183/5.
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undertaking by the Union that it ‘will study the simplification and acceleration of visa 
issue procedures’.
4.1.3 Implications o f  the role and approach o f the European Council
The active involvement of the European Council is typical of the intergovernmental
1 7Spolicy-mode of the EU. It results from the need to provide impetus for a relatively 
new area of Union activity -  the formal approval of the European Council in these areas 
confirms the highest level of political commitment176 -  and from the sensitivity of the 
subject-matter, which also dictates its being tackled at the highest political level.
The cross-pillar approach of the European Council has an impact on the Commission’s 
role as sole initiator of legislation under the Community Pillar. The Commission comes 
under enormous political pressure to execute European Council directions. This is 
because the European Council is the body where ultimate legitimacy resides, which 
implies also that common strategies generate expectations on the part of third countries. 
The impact of the European Council’s role on the Commission is, however, to some 
extent redressed by the Commission increasingly strong involvement in the 
intergovernmental Pillars, and by the fact that the Commission also considerably 
contributes to overall policy formulation (see infra).
Tension may arise insofar as the Commission may resist intrusion in certain Community 
policies. With regard to development policy, for example, the Commission has 
consistently maintained that developmental considerations only should be at the basis of 
the Community development policy.177
A further issue arising from the European Council’s approach relates to the integration 
of justice and home affairs issues in Community external policies. This is indeed taking 
place. Clauses on cooperation on justice and home affairs, such as clauses on ‘joint 
management of migration flows and compulsory readmission’, are being integrated into
• 17R •Community agreements with third countries. It is still uncertain how these clauses 
will evolve in terms of their legal effect (whether their breach can constitute a ground 
for suspension of the agreement), particularly in the light of the new approach
175 W allace, H. (2000) p. 34.
176 Hix (1999) p. 29.
177 Nuttall (1992) p. 267.
178 See, for example, the Association Agreement with Tunisia, OJ 1998 L 97/1 (Article 61 on money 
laundering; Article 62 on combating drug use and trafficking; Article 69(3)(c) on establishing a dialogue 
on illegal immigration and the conditions governing the return o f  individuals) and the Association  
Agreement with Morocco, OJ 2000 L70/2.
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introduced by the Seville European Council envisaging the application of negative
* 179measures in the case of lack o f cooperation.
Integration has also taken the form of assistance to third countries to help them cope 
with certain justice and home affairs issues.
Although integration of justice and home affairs issues into Community external 
policies is taking place, there is also a tendency to tackle certain justice and home affairs 
issues separately in Third Pillar instruments rather than including them in ‘mixed’ 
agreements with third countries. This tendency has been said to have an impact on 
consistency and the institutional balance.180 Some justice and home affairs issues, 
however, may require to be addressed in a separate instrument because of their 
complexity.
As long as justice and home affairs concerns (competence for which is fragmented 
between the Community and the Member States) are included into Community external 
instruments and agreements, institutional conflict may arise, for example, as regards 
which procedures (those of the First or Second/Third Pillar) should govern their 
suspension.181 In this context, the European Council has not excluded resort to a CFSP 
decision providing for retorsion when a third country is assessed as ‘unwilling to 
cooperate’ on combating illegal immigration, ‘after full use has been made of existing 
Community mechanisms without success’ and ‘while honouring the Union’s contractual 
commitments and not jeopardizing development cooperation objectives’.
A final issue relating to the European Council’s role in establishing consistency is that 
such a role does not rule out the possibility of institutional conflict as to the choice of
1 89legal basis for the adoption of the relevant measures. Common strategies, for 
example, provide that they are to be ‘implemented by the EU institutions and bodies 
each acting within the powers attributed to them by the Treaties, and in accordance with 
the applicable procedures under those Treaties’. No serious institutional conflict has
179 In this context see the evolution o f  human rights clauses in Community agreements. See Kuijper 
(1993) pp. 420-421; Cremona (1996).
180 Hillion (2000b) pp. 1228-1235.
181 The overlap between the CFSP and the Community with regard to human rights concerns, for 
example, gave rise to the question whether suspension o f  an agreement due to a violation o f  human rights 
should be decided on according to the procedures o f  the Community or those o f  the CFSP. Divergent 
views on such a point blocked for a long time the conclusion o f  the MEDA programme between the 
Union and the Mediterranean countries. See Schmalz (1998) p. 428.
182 See H illion (2000a) pp. 297 and 300.
183 Para. 24 Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, supra.
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arisen so far. Some tension over allocation of competence arose, however, with regard 
to an agreement with China covering visa facilitation and readmission.184
4.2 The Council and the Commission
The Council and the Commission have also tackled issues in an across-the-pillar 
fashion, following closely the direction and priorities identified by the European 
Council.
4.2.1 The Vienna Action Plan
Even before the Tampere European Council, the Commission and the Council adopted 
an integrated approach to the creation of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ in 
their Action Plan on ‘how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
on an area of freedom, security and Justice’, approved by the Vienna European Council 
in 1998.185
4.2.2 Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human 
beings (the Santiago Plan)
In the establishment of a Union policy against illegal immigration, the Presidency, the 
Council and the Commission have actively followed the directions set by the European 
Council. The Council has adopted various action plans on the basis of Commission 
communications (which specific initiatives in the form of legislation, projects, studies, 
more specific action plans and guidelines have followed) whose implementation has 
been monitored by the Presidency and the Commission through its Scoreboard.
The Commission produced a Communication on a common policy on illegal 
immigration in November 2001 which closely followed the objectives established by 
the Tampere European Council for the ‘management of migration flows’.186 The Laeken 
European Council of December 2001 called for the development of an action plan on 
the basis of such Communication. The Spanish Presidency produced the 
‘Comprehensive Plan to combat illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings in 
the European Union’ (the Santiago Plan) which was adopted by the Council (with no 
parliamentary scrutiny) on 28 February 2002.187
Kuijper (2004) p. 619.
185 4.12.1998, 13844/98, OJ 1999 C 19/1. This is considered in Chapter 4.
186 Supra n. 141.
187 Supra n. 145.
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The Santiago Plan includes proposals on: (i) visa policy, (ii) information exchange and 
analysis on migration flows, (iii) pre-frontier measures such as coordination of the 
Member States’ liaison officers in countries of transit and origin, financial and technical 
support to third countries to combat illegal immigration, and the introduction of 
awareness-raising campaigns, (iv) border management, including the development of a 
coherent strategy to integrate the different functions of border control and a feasibility 
study on a European Border Guard (v) readmission and return policy, (vi) the role of 
Europol in the detection and dismantling of criminal networks, (vi) the introduction of 
penalties, and the swift ratification and coordinated implementation of the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its two accompanying Protocols 
on smuggling and trafficking signed in Palermo on 15 December 2000.
With regard to visa policy, the Santiago Plan recommended the annual review of the 
visa lists, the inclusion of photo and biometric data of visa holders in their visas, the 
establishment of joint visa offices with a pilot project in Pristina, and the establishment 
of the VIS. Progress has been achieved on all these aspects of visa policy, except for the 
establishment of joint visa offices,188 and on all other policies dealt with in the Plan 
which complement visa policy.
Disagreement and uncertainty continues however to surround the development of some
1 RQof the most controversial proposals.
Other developments have given rise to concern with regard to democratic and legal 
accountability.190
4.2.3 Integration o f  justice and home affairs concerns in the EU external policies 
The Tampere and successive European Councils emphasized the importance of 
integrating justice and home affairs concerns into Union external policies. With regard 
to the fight against illegal immigration specifically, such integration has taken the form 
of financial and technical support to countries of origin and transit, the insertion of JHA 
clauses in Community agreements and the conclusion of Community readmission
188 See Chapter 4.
189 The idea o f  a European Border Police, which was originally supported by som e Member States 
particularly in the aftermath o f  the terrorist attacks o f  11 September 2001 and in the light o f  fears that the 
acceding countries were not capable o f  fulfilling Schengen standards and would be disproportionally 
burdened, has been abandoned in favour o f  a later possible decision to establish a European Corps o f  
Border Guards which would complement but not replace national border police forces. See Council Plan 
on the management o f  the external borders o f  the Member States, 14.04.2002, Council doc. 10019/02. See 
also House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Union (2002-03b).
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agreements, and assessment of cooperation by third countries in the fight against illegal 
immigration.
(i) Financial and technical support to countries o f  origin and transit
The Santiago Plan envisages financial and technical support to countries of origin and 
transit in particular to help them strengthen their capacity to combat trafficking in 
human beings and to cope with their readmission obligations. The Plan envisages the 
financing of projects in the area of: support for asylum seekers infrastructure, 
establishment of reception centres, awareness-raising campaigns, improvement of 
documentary security, fight against corruption, deployment of liaison officers, support 
for returns of irregular immigrants and improvement of border control management and 
equipment. Community financial assistance instruments such as PHARE, MEDA, 
CARDS and TACIS were accordingly adapted to include justice and home affairs 
programmes and the Commission has provided for a new budgetary instrument for 
cooperation with third countries of origin and transit.191
(ii) Readmission agreements and JHA clauses in Community agreements
The Santiago Plan, recognizing the importance of a readmission and return policy in the 
fight against illegal immigration, required the Commission to present a Green Paper on 
a Community return policy and analyse the advisability of establishing a financial 
instrument for implementing it. The Santiago Plan emphasized the role of the proposed 
VIS in facilitating the identification of illegal residents and the issue of travel
1 Q}
documents for return purposes. It urged the identification of the third countries 
generating illegal immigration with a view to concluding readmission agreements, and 
the use by the EU of its political weight against third countries which showed reluctance 
to fulfil their readmission obligations. It also underlined the desirability of agreeing with 
third countries rules on transit of returnees.
The Commission presented its Green Paper on 10 April 2002.193 The Commission 
emphasized the desirability of concluding readmission agreements with countries which 
are reluctant to readmit returnees and require extensive administrative procedures to
190 This is the case for operational cooperation between the Member States’ heads o f  border guards in the 
Council, see supra  n. 162. See House o f  Lords Select Committee on the European Union (2002-03b) 
para. 58-63.
91 See Scoreboard (First half o f  2003). Country or Regional Strategy papers prepared by the Commission 
provide a list o f  financial programmes on a country-by-country basis.
192 See Chapter 4.
193 COM (2002) 175 final.
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determine nationality and identity. In order to enhance such countries’ willingness to 
cooperate, the Commission underlined that the EU should consider forms of support, 
which could also ensure that return is sustainable. Moreover, underlining the difficulties 
in negotiating readmission agreements resulting from the fact that they are for the 
exclusive benefit of the Community, and the fact that the Commission has very little to 
offer in exchange for their conclusion in the area of freedom, security and justice (visa 
facilitation or the lifting of visa requirements being a realistic option in exceptional 
cases only, such as Hong Kong and Macao), the Commission invited the Council to 
examine the possibility of developing complementarity between readmission and return 
policy and other Community policies (trade, technical/financial assistance, 
development, legal immigration, etc.).
The Council has adopted Conclusions on criteria for identification of third countries 
with which new readmission agreements need to be negotiated.194 The criteria were 
identified as: (i) migration pressure (with data to be submitted by Cirefi) and degree of 
difficulty in obtaining travel documents for repatriation (with data submitted by the 
Member States in accordance with the relevant Council Conclusions);195 (ii) 
geographical proximity to the EU; and (iii) regional coherence.
The Council authorized the Commission to negotiate Community readmission 
agreements with Morocco, Sri Lanka, Russia, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Macao, Ukraine, 
Albania, Algeria, China and Turkey.196
The Council has also proposed to ensure that the full migration agenda is taken forward 
in the dialogue within the context of current and future Association, Cooperation or 
equivalent agreements including the root causes of migration, the Community legal 
migration policy, the joint management of migration flows, including visa policy, 
border control, asylum, readmission and controlling illegal immigration, and the 
integration of legal migrants living and working in the EU.197
194 15.04.2002, Council doc. 7990/02.
195 Council Conclusions on obtaining travel documents for the repatriation o f  people who do not fulfil or 
no longer fulfil entry and residence conditions, 6071/02 REV 1.
196 Comm ission Communication on the development o f  a common policy on illegal immigration 
COM (2003) 323 final, para. 3.
197 Comm ission Communication on the development o f  a common policy on illegal immigration, supra n. 
196, para. 3.
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(iii) Assessment o f cooperation by third countries
The Seville and the Thessaloniki European Councils underlined the importance of 
assessing cooperation by third countries in the fight against illegal immigration and of 
applying retorsion against third countries assessed as ‘unwilling to cooperate’.
Already before the Seville European Council, the strategy adopted by the Council ‘to 
prevent and combat illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings by sea’ 
provided for a system of retorsion in the case of lack of cooperation by third 
countries.198 According to the Council Conclusions, third countries of boarding, 
departure or transit of vessels should adopt a number of measures to fight illegal 
immigration including: (i) international instruments such as the UN Conventions against 
Transnational Organized Crime of December 2000 with its accompanying Protocols, 
and the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adherence to which 
contributes towards defining the third country in question as a ‘safe third country’ in the 
context of processing asylum applications in the Union); (ii) criminal penalties for 
smuggling, trafficking and travel document fraud; (iii) awareness-raising campaigns;
(iv) police controls at sea borders and inside the national territory; (v) strengthening of 
controls at their land borders including the adaptation of their visa systems; (vi) 
cooperation with the border services of the Member States; (vii) a willingness to accept 
readmission obligations.
Relations with third countries which did not cooperate were to be systematically 
assessed on the basis of a report by the HLWG, and such assessment was to be taken 
into account in relations between the Union and its Member States and the countries 
concerned in all relevant areas. Moreover, the Union was to apply an ‘early political 
response’. On the other hand, third countries willing to cooperate were to receive 
support. Furthermore, independently of assistance under Community policy, such 
countries could require resources and technical support from the Union and the Member 
States, in their respective fields of competence, for the application of the measures they 
were required to take.
The form that integration of justice and home affairs concerns in the EU external 
relations is taking has been strongly criticized.199 Statements such as ‘the EU will use its
198 Council Conclusions on measures to be applied to prevent and combat illegal immigration and 
trafficking o f  human beings by sea, 13.06.2002, 9958/02.
199 See, for example, Boccardi (2003) p. 206; European Parliament Resolution o f  30 March on asylum- 
seekers and migrants -  action plans for countries o f  origin and transit, OJ 2000 C 378/75.
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political weight against third countries which are assessed as reluctant to cooperate’ 
have been described as very heavy-handed and only construable as a threat.200 
Moreover, third countries are increasingly required to align their external border 
policies to that of the Union and to introduce a number of measures and legislation to 
prevent immigrants travelling to the Member States. The strengthening of borders with 
neighbouring countries may however cause a number of problems and damage political 
relations. The Union’s policy seems in this context to contradict the Union’s objective 
to encourage integration between third countries as a recipe for peace and prosperity. 
Moreover, the introduction of restrictive measures may even put third countries in 
breach of international human rights instruments.201
4.2.4 Coordination o f treaty objectives
The Tampere European Council envisaged a comprehensive approach to migration i.e. 
an approach that also aimed at addressing the root causes of migration by tackling 
political, human rights and development issues in third countries of origin. 
Notwithstanding such an objective, it has been submitted that the link between the
707Member States’ foreign policies and migration pressure has been largely overlooked.
(i) The High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum
To help implement such an approach, the Council established the HLWG, whose
70T •mandate was continued by the Tampere European Council. The HLWG’s action 
plans for third countries of origin are prepared by one or more Member States acting as 
coordinators. These action plans not only adopt a cross-pillar approach by proposing 
measures for cooperation in the four integrated categories of foreign policy, 
development, economic assistance, and migration and asylum, but also coordinate 
measures by the Union, the Community, the Member States and international 
organizations.
The Action Plan for Morocco, for example, proposed, inter alia'.
200 ILPA (2002).
201 A questionable commitment from the standpoint o f  human rights is represented by Romania’s and 
Bulgaria’s undertaking to punish their own nationals found residing and working illegally in Member 
States by preventing their future departure from their homelands for a specified length o f  time (which is 
contrary to the right to leave one’s own country). This undertaking was given in return for visa-free 
access to the Union for their nationals. See also the implications attached to the adoption o f  the visa 
‘black’ list by some o f  the Central and Eastern European Countries. On these issues see Chapter 4.
202 Boccardi (2003) p. 211.
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(i) the establishment of permanent dialogue on migration in the framework of the 
EU-Morocco Association Agreement;
(ii) strategies to combat illegal trafficking including the early detection of false 
documents, with seminars on the topic organized by France, Belgium and Spain 
and financed by Odysseus;204
(iii) fight against criminal trafficking networks by enforcing measures to improve 
police cooperation on the identification and detection of networks, with 
provision of technical assistance and equipment by the Union;
(iv) conclusion of an EC readmission agreement;
(v) the adoption of visa requirements by Morocco for third country nationals from 
the West Africa region (including Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Democratic 
Republic of Congo) and the training of consular officials from the Maghreb to 
be organized by the International Organization on Migration and financed by 
Odysseus;
(vi) a report by Cirea/Cirefi on the numbers, nationalities, destinations and ‘modus 
operandi’ of third country nationals transiting through Morocco to Europe and 
evaluation of measures introduced by Morocco, under the responsibility of the 
Presidency;
(vii) various initiatives aimed at economic development, training and retraining and 
promotion of local development to be included by the Commission in its country
90Sstrategy papers and financed under MEDA.
The Action Plans prepared by the HLWG were severely criticized by the European 
Parliament in March 2000 for insufficient attention to human rights concerns, undue 
focus on prevention measures, inadequate consultation with politicians and 
representatives of the civil society in the ‘target’ countries, and an inappropriate
'ycifxbudgetary allocation.
203 The Tampere European Council approved the Action Plans for Afghanistan and the region, Iraq, 
M orocco, Somalia and Sri Lanka. An Action Plan for Albania and the Region was produced on 20 March 
2000 .
204 The Odysseus Programme (o f  training, exchanges and cooperation in the fields o f  asylum, 
immigration and crossing o f  the external borders) established by Joint Action 98/244/JHA o f  19 March 
1998 has been substituted by ARGO (action programme for administrative cooperation in the fields o f  
external borders, visas, asylum and immigration) adopted by the Council on a proposal from the 
Comm ission by D ecision 2002/463/EC, 13.06.2002, OJ 2002 L 161/11.
205 ‘Implementation o f  the Action Plan for M orocco’, 30.05.2002, 8939/00.
206 See supra  n. 199. See also ILPA Submissions on the European Com m ission’s Communication on a 
Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, www.ilpa.org.uk/submissions/Illegalresponse.htm.
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(ii) Commission Communication ‘integrating migration issues in the European 
Union’s relations with third countries'
The integration of the treaty objectives of creating an ‘area of freedom, security and 
justice’ and of pursuing a policy in the field of development cooperation is a sensitive 
issue which may give rise to institutional tension particularly since the Commission, the 
executor of the EC development policy, has consistently maintained that development 
considerations only should be at the basis of the EC development policy.
In its Communication on ‘integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations 
with third countries’ the Commission considered the relationship between the 
Community development policy and migration. The Commission underlined that 
development policy contributes to the effectiveness of the EU migration policy since it 
addresses the ‘push’ factors of migration and tries to prevent and reduced forced 
migration. On this basis, the Commission held that the current priorities of the EC 
development policy, which focus on poverty reduction, should be maintained. However, 
the Commission held that ‘to ensure coherence between the Community development 
and migration policy it is necessary to assess systematically the relationship between 
migration issues and the priority sectors and cross-cutting concerns -  gender, 
environment and human rights -  of the EU development policy, and to identify actions 
where appropriate’.
The Commission identified four areas that could be considered for further action. The 
first area is ‘trade and development’. The Commission recommended to ‘continue to 
promote the improvement of effective market access’ for products coming from 
developing countries and the integration of developing countries into the world trading 
system. It also underlined the importance of the Community promoting south-south 
trade, the promotion of foreign direct investment and of core labour standards. 
Moreover, the Commission recommended that the Community stimulated international 
discussions on the free movement of people.
The second area identified is ‘conflict prevention, regional integration and cooperation’. 
According to the Commission regional integration is the best recipe against war and 
thus represents a structural contribution to avoid refugee-producing conflicts. The 
Community should support conflict prevention activities such as shared management of 
natural resources and border region cooperation programmes.
207 3.12.2002, COM (2002) 703 final.
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The third area for further action is ‘institutional capacity building and good 
governance’. The Commission included among the relevant actions institutional and 
constitutional reform, reform of the electoral system, measures to strengthen and 
guarantee human and minority rights, anti-corruption measures and reform of police, 
judiciary and civil service.
The fourth area is ‘food security and sustainable rural development’. The Commission 
underlined that food security and access to food and drinking water will limit ‘survival’ 
migration by poor people. Moreover, sufficient jobs and satisfactory income to rural 
people will reduce the number of people moving from the rural areas to the cities, which 
is considered by the Commission as the first step towards international migration.
5. Conclusion
An analysis of the common visa policy shows that the Union is increasingly assuming 
the nature o f a ‘cooperative system of separation of powers’ which ‘implies that there
^AO
are narrow limits to disentangling the powers of the various (competence) levels’.
The roots of visas in state sovereignty -  resulting from the fact that visas are the 
expression of the sovereign right to control entry and from their ramifications -  has 
implied a sui generis character for the common visa policy within the Community 
context. The common visa policy has not so far involved the loss of ultimate national 
competence as to who can obtain a visa to enter the national territory.
This flexibility has had consequences for the role of the Community institutions in the 
formulation, implementation and monitoring of the policy. In particular, it has resulted 
in the exclusion of a monitoring mechanism at Community level capable of ensuring a 
minimum level of consistency of the Member States’ positions with regard to the 
granting of individual visas. In the absence of this, the smooth functioning of the policy 
depends heavily on convergence achieved within the intergovernmental Pillars. This 
will also determine the extent to which the common visa policy can be considered a 
foreign policy instrument of the Union as a whole.
The Member States also continue to be responsible for implementation of visa policy at 
consular level. Local consular cooperation established under the Second Pillar is the 
instrument through which the Member States seek to achieve a uniform implementation 
of the policy, through coordination and sharing of resources, expertise and information.
208 Supra n. 26
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There have been demands for greater integration in this field, but so far little progress 
has been made. The Constitutional Treaty would introduce some important changes in 
this context.
Visa policy thus continues to depend greatly on activity under the intergovernmental 
Pillars for its smooth functioning. The intergovernmental Pillars have increasingly been 
strengthened, but they still leave scope for divergences between the Member States with 
the ultimate aim of not undermining their sovereign status. The common visa policy 
thus remains fragmented, and may fail to achieve all its objectives.
With regard to the creation of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’, the Union has 
clearly shown to be capable of acting as a ‘unity’, and the European Council has had a 
major role in directing Union action within this field. While the institutions have been 
acting as interlocking components, development policy appears to be the area where 
institutional conflict over competence could emerge.
A different issue which arises is the increasingly strong emphasis which JHA concerns 
are assuming within the Union’s external policy, at the expense of other equally 
important objectives.
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Annex
‘Black’ and ‘white’ lists annexed to Regulation 539/2001 (as amended)
‘ Black9 list
1. STATES
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burma/Myanmar
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
China
Colombia
Congo
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cuba
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Djijbouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic 
East Timor 
Ecuador 
Egypt
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia- 
Montenegro)
Fiji
Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
251
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Madagascar
Malawi
Maldives
Mali
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
North Korea
Northern Marianas
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Papua New Guinea 
Peru
Philippines
Qatar
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Surinam
Swaziland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
The Comoros
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
252
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Western Samoa
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
2. ENTITIES AND TERRITORIAL 
AUTHORITIES THAT ARE NOT 
RECOGNISED AS STATES BY AT 
LEAST ONE MEMBER STATE 
Palestinian Authority 
Taiwan
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‘White* list Monaco
1. STATES New Zealand
Andorra Nicaragua
Argentina Panama
Australia Paraguay
Bolivia Romania
Brazil Salvador
Brunei San Marino
Bulgaria Singapore
Canada South Korea
Chile United States of America
Costa Rica Uruguay
Croatia Venezuela
Guatemala
Holy See 2. SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
Honduras REGIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S
Israel REPUBLIC
Japan OF CHINA
Malaysia Hong Kong SAR
Mexico Macao SAR
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